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In trodiictiosi^
The im te ro a t  which l i e n  behind tliiB the Bin i s  an i n t e r e s t  
i n  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  b a s i s  of th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s .  A 
c o n f r o n ta t io n  between th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  and th e  c u r r e n t  ph ilo sophy  
o f  e t h i c s  i s  always n e c e ssa ry  i f  th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  i s  a t  every  
tim e  to  have a  c l e a r  uEf I o r s ta n d in g  of i t s e l f ,  and to  uphold  i t s  
c la im  to  be a  s e p a ra te  ami s e r io u s  d i s c i p l i n e .  But i t  i s  our 
c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  t h i s  c o n f r o n ta t io n  i a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  im p o r ta n t  to d a y .
The reaso n  f o r  t h i s  i a ,  a s  we see  i t ,  t h a t  th e  maim«Btrearn of 
p h ilo so p h y  of e t h i c s  to d a y ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  th e  Anglo™%xon w orld , 
a d v o c a te s  a g en e ra l  th e o ry  o f  e t h i c s  which appears  to  p u t  the  
wliole im d e rtak in g  of th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  i n  je o p a rd y .
We a r e  h e re  re ferrin^y  to  the  s e p a r a t io n  of f a c t  and v a lu e  w hich, 
i f  i t  has to  be a c c e p te d ,  w i l l  le a v e  na w ith  no b a s i s  f o r  a s s e r t i n g  
any th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c .
I t  m ust be p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  th e  r e c o g n i t io n  and th e  subsequen t 
r e f u t a t i o n  of th e  s o - c a l l e d  " n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a l l a c y "  i n  e t h i c s  was a  
v a lu a b le  c o n t r ib u t io n  to  e t h i c a l  th o o ïy .  %  " n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a l l a c y "  
we r e f e r  to  th e  a t te m p ts  made to  d e f in e  v a lu e  words i n  term s of 
n o u -o v a lu a t iv e  ones , o r  to  d e r iv e  va lue  judgements from n o n -e v a lu a t iv e  
s ta te m e n ts •
I I
But when t h i s  r e f u t a t i o n  o f  th e  " n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a l l a c y "  
hccomes i d e n t i c a l  w i th  a  s e p a r a t io n  o f  f a c t  and v a lu e ,  and when 
t h i s  s e p a r a t io n  becomes a b s o lu te ,  th e  th e o ry  tu rn s  o u t to  be 
d i s a s t r o u s  f o r  th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c a «
The f i e l d  i n  which th e  s e p a r a t io n  of f a c t  and v a lu e  i s  moot 
s t r i c t l y  m a in ta in ed  today@ i s  t h a t  of th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  U n g u i s t i c  
a n a l y s i s .  I t  i s  an  ex a n d n a tio n  of t h a t  p a r t  of th e  e t h i c a l  
th e o ry  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  ph ilo so p h y  which forms th e  main o b je c t  of 
t h i s  th e s i s *
We re o o g n ise  t h a t  l i n g i ï i s t i c  p h ilo so p h y  i s  n o t  one s in g l e  
s c h o o l .  But wo th in k  t h a t  i t  i s  a f t e r  a l l  a d i s t i n g u i s h a b le  
movement i n  contem porary  pliiloBophy, w ith  a marked s i m i l a r i t y  
betiveen i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . T h is  h o ld s  t r u e  ale© w i th  re g a rd  to  
our main problem* That t h i s  i s  so i s  n o t sim ply ta k e n  f o r  granted- 
Wo have t r i e d  to  s u b s t a n t i a t e  i t  i n  th e  co u rse  of th e  in q u i r y .
I t  i s  n o t  p o s s ib le , ,  however, to  d e a l  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  w ith  th e  
whole of l i n g u i s t i c  p h ilo so p h y  i n  g e n e ra l ,  o r  to  g ive  a l l  i t s  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  equal trea tm ex it.
We have c o n c e n tra te d  our a t t e n t i o n  on E.M* ï îa ro ’ s w r i t i n g s .  
Because i n  th e  r e s p e c t s  which r e l a t e  to- our problem h ie  p h ilo so p h y  
i s  a  r e l e v a n t  and a  f a i r  example of th e  l i n g u i s t i c  a n a l y t i c a l  
apjïroach to  e t h i c a l  th e o ry .  I t  m ust be cm phasised t h a t  we have
n i
not boon using B.M« Hare as a whipping-horeeo We have not been 
in te re s te d  in  him fo r  h is  own sake, but as one who has posed our 
problem most c le a r ly ,  and also  the argument of l in g ii is t ic  
|.îMlosopliy w ith regard to  the  separa tion  of f a c t  and value*
A fter c lo sing  a sym pathetic examination o f the w ritin g s  of 
JUMe Hare we have made a oomparieon w ith other philosophers of 
h is  sch o o l, dravdng lin e s  a lso  to the "predecessor" of l in g u is t ic  
p hilosoph y, namely lo g ic a l  positiv ism * I t  i s  our conten tion  
th a t  there  i s  a basic  u n ity  in  the whole of th is  movement, in  the 
re sp e c ts  which we have shown* This i s  the reason why the  term 
" a n a ly tica l philosophy" i s  d e lib e ra te ly  used in  the sub-^headingf 
to  poae the problem as one th a t  r e la te s  to  both l in g u is t ic  
philosophy and to e a r l ie r  and re la ted  sc h o o ls .
We are  only too aware o f  the Inadequacy In many re sp ec ts  of 
r e la t in g  l in g u is t ic  philosophy to lo g ic a l  positiv ism  under a common 
name. Hut we are  only  tr e a t in g  "a n a ly tic a l philosophy" as a u n ity  
in  so fa r  as our own in v e s tig a tio n  has shown th a t there  i a  such a 
u n ity , d esp ite  the  d lv s r s i ty  in  the  various accounts of the meaning 
of moral language.
I t  i s ,  however, p a r tly  the r e la t io n  to lo g ica l p o sitiv ism  which 
has suggested the l in e s  along which our furth er d iscu ss io n  of the 
problem have to  be pursued.
IV
What ig  needed i s  r e a l l y  to  r a i s e  tlie fundam ental q u e s t io n  
ab o u t th e  p re s i ip p o s i t io n s  of th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  method o f  th e  
sc h o o l o f  p h ilo so p h y  we a r e  d e a l in g  w i th , This becomes e v id e n t  
from a c lo s e r  s tudy  of th e  argument of  lUM, Hare*
T h is ,  Imwever, opens up th e  px^oblcBi i n  a wa^ '- which makes i t  
im p o ss ib le  to  d ea l  w i th  i t  e x h a u s t iv e ly  i n  one s in g le  t h e s i s .
H t i l l ,  we th in k  t h a t  we have been a b le  to  f in d  a pathway 
th rough  th e  id  do f i e l d  of p h i l o sophi cml deba te  which opens up once 
x\ro s t a r t  a s îd n g  th e  whole q u e s t io n  o f  p M lo s o p h ic a l  method. V/e 
have reached  c o n c lu s io n s  wliieh a r e  n o t  e x h a u s t iv e , b u t  which a r e ,  
we th in k ,  s u f f i c i e n t l y  c l e a r  and c o n c re te  to  h e lp  and determixxe 
f u t u r e  %)hilogophlca 1 approach  to  the  problem*
Because we have found t h a t  i t  i s  th e  fundam enta ls  of th e  
method of the  l i n g u i s t i c  sc h o o ls  t h a t  we have to  q u e s t io n ,  we have 
îiad to  r e f e r  to  a wide v a r i e t y  of o th e r  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  sc h o o ls  to  
i l l u s t r a t e  o th e r  methods* This has  made i t  n e c e ss a ry  to  paea 
from th e  one to  th e  o th e r  i n  a way w hich  m igh t g iv e  an im p re ss io n  
o f  dxB contiim ityo  This d iB C oatin u i t y  i s  more emphasised by th e  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  s ty ;l£  between th e  v a r io u s  sc h o o ls  to d a y . 
T h is  i s ,  however, how th e  case  i s  today , and i t  canno t be avo ided  i f  
one f e e l s  t h a t  a  c o n f r o n ta t io n  h as  to  be atteraptedo (Though we 
hope to  have shovm t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  some e x te n t  to  d i s c u s s
Vth e  v a r io u s  views by means of a  more t r a f l i t i o n a l  form of 
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  lan g u ag e )*
We hope t h a t  i n  th e  ami our e x c u rs io n e  in to  th o s e  v a r io u s  
f i e l d a  of p h ilo so p h y  can  h e  j u s t i f i e d  hy th e  r e le v a n c e  which we 
have been a b le  to  show w i th in  them, th e  re le v a n c e  to  th e  prohlem 
w hich forms t îm  h a n ic  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  t h e s i a ,  i . e o  th e  
p O B s lh i l i ty  of t l i e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s ,
I t  i s  ohvioiiB t h a t  th e  b road  f r o n t  on which we have been 
fo rc e d  to  imrBxxa th e  i n q u i iy  has  n o t  a llow ed  us to  d is c u s s  a l l  
th e  themes t h a t  have p re s e n te d  t ie m se lv e s  as  more o r  l e s s  r e l e v a n t  
to  our problem .
F i r s t  o f  a l l  we have had to  le a v e  o u t any d i s c u s s io n  of th e  
r e l a t i o n  between a  view l i k e  l la re^ s  w i th  i t s  s é p a ra tioxx of f a c t  and 
v a lu e ,  and o th e r  e a r l i e r  t h e o r i e s  of e th ic so  Here th e  r e l a t i o n  to  
th e  fe m a iiS B i of E an t*s e t h i c a l  th e o ry  would have dese rv ed  an 
e x te n s iv e  t r e a tm e n t ,  Haro h im s e lf  e x p l i c i t l y  r e c o g n is e s  the
co m iec tio n s  between h is  th e o ry  and t h a t  o f  E a n t ,  The lo g ic a l  r u l e  
of th e  s e p a r a t io n  of f a c t  and v a lu e  i s ,  a c c o rd in g  to  H are , t h a t  which 
i(an t*s polemic a g a in s t  th e  "heteronomy of th e  w i l l "  r e s t s  upon,
Xt i s  a l s o  the  basiB  of îlumc^s o b s e rv a t io n  of th e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
deducing  an  " o u g h t" - .p ro p o s i t io n  from a s e r i e s  of " iB **-p roposit ions , 
And i t  can even be t r a c e d  b ack  to  A r i s t o t l e  as  th e  source  of h i s  
e t h i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  from P l a t o ,  Hare c la im s .
VI
Becaxise a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  treatM Cnt of a l  I th e s e  r e l e v a n t  
e t h i c a l  t h e o r i e s  would cause  th e  p r e s e n t  work to  gro%f ou t of a l l  
p ro p o r t io n s ,  we th in k  we a r e  j i i e t i f ie c l  in  r e s t r i c t i n g  o u rse lv e s  
to  a d is c u s s io n  of th e  contem porary form of th e  problem .
I t  w i l l  n e v e rU ie le s s  be c l e a r ,  we hope, t h a t  our approach 
to  th e  prohleiri a lso  has  a b e a r in g  on th e  d is c u s s io n  o f  e . g .  th e  
K an tian  th e o ry ,  and of th e  views of th o se  who s t i l l  r e p r e s e n t  a 
Mox-e o r  l e s s  s im i la r  th e o ry  o f  e th ice *
# 10ng the  themes which we have no t been pursvxing to  any 
e x te n t  we can m ention  the  q u e s t j  on whotlier m o r a l i ty  l e  to  be 
conceived  of i n  terms of r u l e s  of some k in d ,  o r  w hether i t  i s  
e n t i r e l y  " s i t u a t i o n a l " .  This  q u e s t io n ,  which p la y s  an im p o r ta n t  
r o l e  in  p r e s e n t -d a y  e t h i c a l  d e b a te ,  a t  l e a s t  on th e  th e o lo g ic a l  
s i d e ,  would have to  be co n s id e red  i n  a  f u r t h e r  development of 
our views*
Another q u e s t io n  which w^oulcl a l s o  need an answer i s  th e  one 
ab o u t  th e  lu iders tam U ng of th e o lo g ic a l  e th i c s  i t s e l f ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  
abou t i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  a  g e n e ra l  approach to  e t h i c s  * This would 
in c lu d e  #'%,# th e  q u e s t io n  abou t a m o ra l i ty  based on a " n a tu ra l  
law" or some s im i l a r  no tion*
Some te c h n ic a l  m a t te r s  shou ld  be mentioned h e re  i n  th e  
in tr o d u c tio n . They term inology and
V II
sp o i l in g o  V/o have g e n e ra l ly  l e t  t h i s  be determ ined  by th e  
t e x t s  w ith  w^hich we have a c t u a l l y  been d ea lin g *  That i s  to  Bay, 
we have n o t  neceB6ari3.y t r i e d  to  impoae any u n i f i e d  i/ermlnology on 
our m a te r ia lo  This would have c r e a te d  co n fu s io n  r a t h e r  than  
e l a r i f i c a t i o n .
One In s ta n c e  of th e  d iv o î :s i ty  i n  the use of some tcrmis i s  
th e  use  of th e  words "moral" and " e t h i c a l " .  Although th e re  i s  imch 
to  be sa id  f o r  making a d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e se  words and a d h e r in g  
to  a  s t r i c t  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  each of them, we have used them 
in d is c r im ln a te ly o  This i s  b ecause  th e r e  i s  n o t  y e t  e s t a b l i s h e d  
any p a r t i c u l a r  u se  of the te rm s a s  d i s t i n c t  from each o ther*  The 
meaning o f  th e  term s w i l l ,  we th in ic , bo  c l e a r  from th e  c o n te x t  i n  
w h id i they  a r e  u sed , and r e f e r  m ostly  to  th e  use of th e  a u th o r  
whose woiiî we a r e  d i s c u s s in g  i n  each contex t*
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I .  A m LYTICAL HiïLOSOPHY OF lÆÏIÏCS AND TOE PROBLEM OF MOliAL VALLES.
I .
R.M# Ba r e ,
We thiiilE i t  i s  p r o f i t a b l e  f i r s t  o f  a l l  to  u n d e r ta k e  th e  m âinly  
d e s c r i p t i v e  ta s k  o f  s k e tc h in g  K.M* H are’ s co n cep tio n  o f  e th ic s  a s  i t  
i s  exposed in  h i s  two main works on th e  s u b je c t  o f  moral lan g u ag e ,^  
and wo w i l l  a t  t h e  end of t h i s  c h a p te r  on ly  i n d i c a t e  our x joints o f  
crJS’Irtie ism  to  bo doveloj>ed i n  t h e  c o u rse  of t h i s  t h e s i s .
A« The Task of E th ic s .
L ike th e  a n a l y t i c a l  x jh ilosophors i n  g en e ra l  R.M. Hare re g a rd s  i t  
a s  no concern of h ie  to  I s e u e  a moral code o r  to g iv e  a c o n c lu s iv e  
answer to  any s p e c i f i c  moral problem . The moral p h i lo s o p h e r ’ o
i n t e r e s t  l i e s  i n  th e  a n a ly s i s  o f  moral language, i n  an  exposure o f  i t s
2 3l o g i c a l  s t r u e  t w o  . He does n o t  %mnt to  be a " m o ra l i s t"  *
A ccord ing ly , th e  th e o ry  which he e l a b o r a te s  i s  " n e u t r a l  a s  between
d i f f e r e n t  moral ox>inions'*^^.
We must n o t ,  however, t a k e  t h i s  to  mean t h a t  e t h i c s  hag no
b e a r in g  on moral xwoblems. I t s  f u n c t io n  i s  " t h a t  o f  h e lp in g  u s  to  th in k
1 . The Language of M orals , 195^ ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  LM,
and Freedom and Ream on. 1963 ( h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  FE^
2 .  Bee LM, p .v  and Fll, p . v .
3 .  For th e  e x p re s s io n  and a s im i l a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  see  A .J .  A yer’ s 
e d i t o r i a l  foreword to  F .E . Nowoll^Sraith, E t h i c s . 193&*
4 .  FE, p . 89.
1b e t t e r  abou t moral q u e s t io n s "  * That io  to  sa y , th e r e  i s  no doubt
t h a t  th e  ausxfering o f  a  m oral q u e s t io n  should  bo a r a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y ,
o'
even i f  th e  " n a t u r a l i s t "  way o f  making i t  such must be r e p u d ia te d ^ .
On th e  one hand th e  freedom o f  ou r  moral- a c t i v i t y  must be a s s e r t e d .
We a r e  f r e e  " to  form our own o p in io n s  ab o u t moral %)%^ oblems" . I t
c a n n o t ,  f o r  one th in g ,  be s a id  to  be s e l f - e o n t e i d i c t o r y  o r  a  m isuse
of language n o t  to  answer a g iv en  moral q u e s t io n  i n  one p a r t i c u l a r
way^. Un th e  o th e r  îmnd th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  of moral th o u g h t must n o t 
q
be d en ied ' ,
! •  H .  P'V«
2 .  H i, p . 2 ,  " th e r e  can be no l o g i c a l  d ed u c tio n  of moral judgements 
from Gta;temeBts of f a c t .  See* a l s o  1 ^ ,  pp . B 6 ff ,  and c f .  LM, 
pp . 29ff*  This  view can he t r a c e d  back to  Hume (T r e a t i s e  Ï I Ï , l , i ) .
3* H | .  P .2
4 .  See FR. p . l .
Hare rei>roaches Eioot moral p h i lo s o p h e rs  w ith  hav ing  den ied  e i t h e r  
one o r  th é  o th e r  s id e  o f  m oral th o u g h t .  The " d e s c r i p t i v i c t s "  
( in c lu d in g  th e  " n a t u r a l i s t e " )  deny our freedom i n  moral q u e s t io n s ,  
w h ile  th e  " s u b j e c t i v i s t s " , to g e th e r  w itli th e  " e m o t iv i s t s " ,  
d i s r e g a r d  th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  m o ra ls .  See FR, p . 3 ,
Whether t h i s  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of th e  " c m o tiv is ts "  i n  th e  lump i s  
j u s t  can be d is c u s s e d .  For a  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e  e x p o s i t io n  of  th e  
e m o t iv is t  e t h i c a l  t î ieo ry  see  C.L. S tevenson, E th ic s  and Language. 
1 9 4 4 , whore th e  au th o r^  in  h i s  way, s t r e s s e s  the  p la c e  of rea so n  
i n  m o ra ls .
"Although most of ub thinlc t h a t  wo a r e  f r e e  to  form our own 
o p in io n s  ab o u t moral q u e s t io n s ,  we do n o t  f e e l  t h a t  • • •  
th e  answ ering  of moral q u e s t io n s  io  a q u i t e  a r b i t r a r y  
b u s in e s s .  We f e e l ,  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  i t  m a t te r s  very  mueh
what answer wo g iv e ,  and t h a t  th e  f in d in g  o f  an answer io  a 
t a s k  t h a t  Bhould^engage our r a t i o n a l  powers to  th e  l i m i t  of 
t h e i r  c a p a c i ty " . "
The lo g ic a l  s tu d y  of Eioral co n cep ts  has a s  it© Biain pu rpose  th e
2r e s o lv in g  of " th e  antinomy between freedom and r e a s o n " \  This s tudy
en a b le s  us  to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e  c h a r a c te r  of moral re a s o n in g  and to
r e a l i z e  t h a t  i t  p roceeds  a c c o rd in g  to  lo g ic a l  ru le s *  I t  can th u s  be
shown t h a t  e t h i c s  i s  h ig h ly  r e l e v a n t  to  m orals  and t h a t  th e  lo g ic a l
ajqiroach to  e t h i c s  has been wrongly accused  of f a i l i n g  to  p ro v id e  a
3r a t i o n a l  b a s i s  f o r  moral thought*
That H a rc ’ e a s s e r t i o n  on t h i s  p o in t  does n o t  s a t i s f y  a l l  h i s
c r i t i c s  can be seen  from some of the  mmierous com tents on h i s  views in
1* Fit, p p . 2 f .
2 .  Ibidem*
3* See M ,  p . 45: "** * i t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  th e  f i r s t  e f f e c t
o f  modern l o g ic a l  r e s e a r c h e s  was to  siake some phiiosox>hcrs 
d e s p a i r  of m orals a s  a r a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y .  I t  i s  th e  purpose 
of t h i s  book to  show t h a t  t h e i r  d e s p a i r  was p rem a tu re " .
See a ls o  *FR, pp . 3fs B 6ff .
4v a r io u s  e t h i c a l  writings^*^ I t  may he sugges ted  t h a t  most o f  t h i s
c r i t i c i s m  a r i s e s  from p h i lo s o p h ic a l  view s h a s lc a l ly  d if f e r e n t  from 
th o se  of H are, and i t  i s  i n to  t h i s  fundaMontaî disagreem em t t h a t  we
w i l l  have to  go in  the fo llox fing  ch a p ters .
The main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f m oral language , according to  H are , 
i a  t h a t  i t  i s  a s o r t  of |> re a e r ip t iv e  language* This fo llo w s  from 
the f a c t  t h a t  i t s  fu n c t io n  i s  to  gu ide conduct^. But i t  i s  not the  
on ly  k ind  of x^rescriptivo language* P r e s c r i p t i v e  language can , 
ro u g h ly ,  he d iv id e d  in to  Im peratives and value™judgements, each c l a s s  
o f  which a g a in  can he d iv id e d  in to  two s u h -c la s s e s , s in g u la r  and
.u n iv ersa l im p e ra t iv e s  on the one hand and non-moral and moral value™
%
judgements on th e  o th e r  * Because th e  d i f f e r e n t  kinds of  
p r e s c r i p t i v e  language have c e r t a i n  Important f e a t u r e s  in  common, Haro
d evotes c o n s id e ra b le  spa«e to  th e  d is c u s s io n  of non-moral v a lu e -
judgem ents^*
1 .  See, o*g*, A* Gewirth’ s review  o f LM i n  E th ic s ,  1953-54, p .228:^  W  »  ^safttcn* ^  w ' *«r P  X
" I  am n o t  say ing  h e re  t h a t  Hare should have p rov ided  us id th  a 
ready-made d o c t r in e  o f  the c o n te n t  of moral p r i n c i p l e s  o r  norms, 
hut r a t h e r  t h a t  M s d is c u s s io n  of th e  method hy which such 
p r i n c i p l e s  may he O Btahliahed s u ffe r s  p r e c i s e ly  from h i s
m iw il lin g n eo s  or i n a h i l l t y  to  b r id g e  th e  s e p a r a t io n s  (o f
iB aperatives from i n d i c a t i v e s ,  commendation from knowledge a .o .o * )  
on which h i s  th e o ry  r e s t s . "
2 .  See M ,  p * l .
3* Bee M ,  p . 3*
4 .  f M s  i s  what cau ses  M. Warnock to  make th e  somewhat far«»fetched 
remarks t h a t  H are’ s hook has n o t  "any very d i r e c t  connexion w ith  
e t h ic s "  and t h a t  Bare " i n c i d e n t a l l y  l e t s  f a l l  some views about 
m o ra ls " ,  E th ic s  s in c e  1900, I960 , p,129*
5The o rd in a ry  iiB pem tivo  aontenco  i s  th e  a impie 91 form of
preG crix)tlT6 language , and i t  i a  th e r e f o r e  th e  b e s t  i n t r o d u c t io n  to
tho  s tu d y  of e t h ic s  to  make im p o ra t iv e a  th e  B ubject of a  s tu d y .
This in  how Hare s e t s  to  work in  M ,  th u s  re n d e r in g  th e  a n a ly s i s  of
Im p e ra t iv e s  th e  key to  h i s  v/ork a s  a whole*
Ail i a l t e r 08t in g  p o in t  i s  th en  liow Hare re g a rd s  tlie  r e l a t i o n  between
th e  in d io g it iv e  and th e  im p e ra t iv e  se n te n c e s  in  genera l*  I f  one wants
to  u n d e rs ta n d  t h i s  r e l a t i o n  c o r r e c t l y  one must n o t  d i© regard  e i t h e r
th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between th e  two k in d s  of se n te n c e s  o r  ^dmt th e y  have in
coimon* (in th e  one hand i t  must be a s s e r t e d  a g a in s t  a l l  a t te m p ts  to
1"reduce"  im p e ra t iv e s  to  in d ic a t iv e s *  t h a t  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  n o t on ly  
one of grammatical form .
" I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  deny t h a t  th e r e  i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
s ta te m e n ts  and commands; b u t  i t  i s  f a r  h a rd e r  t o  say j u s t  
what tho  d i f f e r e n c e  is*  ## The d i s t i n c t i o n  l i e s  between 
th e  meanings which th e  d i f f e r e n t  g rm m a t ic a l  forms convey •»* . 
An i n d i c a t i v e  semtenc# i s  used f o r  t e l l i n g  t h a t  som ething i s  
th e  c a s e ;  an  im p e ra t iv e  i s  n o t  -  i t ^ i s  used f o r  t o l l i n g  
someone to  mako som ething  th e  case*
1* These atteoq^tB are o f v a r io u s  k in d s ,  t r y i n g ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  to  
r e p r e s e n t  im p e ra t iv e s  aa e x p re s s in g  s ta te m e n ts  ab o u t th e  mind 
of th e  sp eak e r ,  o r  a s  s t a t i n g  t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n  i s  eouduoive 
to  a  c e r t a i n  aim .
The source  o f  th e s e  attcm ipts i s ,  a c co rd in g  to  H are, th e  same a s  
t h a t  of th e  te m p ta t io n  to  a n a ly se  value-wos*dB i n  th e  i^ay c a l l e d  
" n a t u r a l i s t i c " ,  namely a  f e e l i n g  t h a t  th e  inq^erative se n ten c e  i s ,  
i n  some way or o th e r ,  s u s p ic io u s ,  so t h a t  i t  needs to  be re scu ed  
by being  shovm to  be r e a l l y  i n d i c a t i v e .  See LM, x»p*5ff*
8 .  M .  P * 5 .
On tho o th e r  hand i t  i a  a l s o  a  i n i s in to r p r o t a t io n  of im p e ra t iv e  a
to  re g a rd  them aa ex p ress io n o  of a t t i t u d e s  o n ly , o r  aa  a t te m p ts  to
in f lu e n c e  th o  em otions of a  p e rso n ,  o r  to  make him a c t  i n  a  c e r t a i n  
Iimy .
"Commands, however much th ey  d i f f e r  from s ta te m e n ta ,  a r e  l i k e  
them i n  t h i s ,  t h a t  they  c o n s i s t  i n  t e l l i n g  someone som ething , 
n o t  1h se ek in g  1x) in f lu e n c e  him*"^
V/hoB v;o an a ly se  im p e ra t iv e  and in d i c a t i v e  se n te n c e s  wo s h a l l  f in d
t h a t  both  o f  them c o n s i s t  o f  two p a r t s ,  which can be c a l l e d  th e
"p lu^astic"  and th e  " n e u s t ic "  * The p h r a s t i c  i s  th e  c o n te n t  which i s
COÏHMOÎ1 to  bo th  k in d s  o f  s e n te n c e s , t h a t  which th e y  " t o l l  a b o u t" ,  w h ile
th o  n e a s t i c  i s  what i s  d i f f e r e n t  in  them, a c co rd in g  to  th e  p a r t i c u l a r
moods* H are’ s co n c ep tio n  on t h i s  |>oint can b e a t  be mode c l e a r  by
one o f  h i s  own exampless The se n te n c e s  "You a r e  going to  sh u t  th e
door" and "Shut th o  door" can be re«»w ritten oo t h a t  th e y  have in
common th e  p h m s t i c  p a r t  "Your s h u t t i n g  th e  d o o r" , w h ile  th e  nous t i c
I* This  i s  an  " e m o t iv i s t” m is ta k e ,  th e  form er a " n a t u r a l i s t "  one*
2m M ,  p*15# Though Hare undoub ted ly  i s  r i g h t  i n  what he
x m s i t iv e iy  a s s e r t s  h e r e ,  i t  i s  n o t  so e v id e n t  t h a t  he i s  r i g h t  
i n  xdiat he den ies*  I t  may be su g g es ted  t h a t  tho  fo c u s in g  of 
a l l  in te i? e a t  on p r o s c r ip t iv o n e s s  h ard ly  does j u s t i c e  to  tho  
c h a r a c te r  of iB ipera tiveo  *
3* From th e  g reek  words meaning " to  t o l l " ,  and "vdua?
moaning " to  nod"*
7of th e  in d ic a tiv e  adds th e  word "Yee" and the n en stie  of the im perative
tho word "P lease"^ .
I f  th is  i s  so, i t  i s  d ec is iv e  of our whole imderotandisig of the
ch a rac te r o f im peratives# Like in d ic a tiv e s  they have fa c tu a l re fe ren ce ,
i# 0* they r e fe r  to a c tu a l or p o ss ib le  e ta te s  o f  a f f a i r s ,  and they have
th e i r  log ic*"  *«« wo can study th e  log ic  of im poratlvea w ith as much
assurance as th a t  of in d ica tiv es" ^ #  Tta,t commands are  governed hy
xniles, ju s t  ae statem ents a r e , means, fo r  in s ta n c e , th a t  they must n o t
he se lf -c o n tr a d i c t o iy , and th a t  th e re  be en ta i Imeiit««relations
3between them#
FerhapB the most iDiportsDt part of the log ic  of Im peratives i s  th e  
ru le  th a t  mo im perative sen ten ce about what i s  to  be done can be 
d erived  from in d ic a t iv e  sen ten ces s ta t in g  fa c ts  only# There can be
no im perative con clu sion  w ithout an imx^erative in  th e  prem isses#
That i s  to  say, a l l  attem pts to  make Im peratives purely  f a c tu a l ,  a re  
attem pts to  deprive them of what makes them, moral, namely th e i r  func tion  
of .guiding cho ices.
1 . See m ,  pp. 17 f f .
2. m ,  P .8 7 .
3# A Bet o f prem isses con ta in in g  the coumand "Take a l l  the boxes to  the
s ta tio n "  and the fa c tu a l statem ent "This i s  one o f  the boxes"
e n ta i ls  the commnd "Take th i s  to  the s ta tion"#  See ÎJI, pp# 2?f#
4* See pp# 28f.
8E q u a l ly  uiiBUCceBslul i s  th e  attem |*t to  deduce im p e ra t iv e s  from
Bome s e l f  ««evident f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,  a  p ro ced u re  wbich Hare c a l l s
" C a r te s ia n "  # T h is  j>roccKhiro i e  i l l u s o r y  n o t on ly  i n  iB orals, b u t  in
1so ie n o e  aa  w ell*  no g e n e ra l  primei})l e  can bo s e l f - e v i d e n t  which
i s  to  he o f  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  d e c id in g  p a r t i c u l a r  q u e s t io n s  .o.boiit w liid t
p
wo a r c  i n  doubt" .
Haro n o t  only  d e n ie s  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  tho e x i s te n c e  o f  any
r e l a t i o n  of lo g i c a l  o n ta l lm e n t  between i m p e r a t i v e s ,and f a c t u a l
p re m is s e s ,  b u t  even t h a t  t h e r e ,c a n  be any in f e r e n c e  a t  a l l .
"o .o  by ,no  form o f  i n f  orone e , however lo o s e ,  can wo g e t  an 
answer to  th o  q u e s t io n  *V/hat s h a l l  1 do?** o u t of a  s e t  of 
p re m isse s  which do n o t  c o n ta in ,  a t  any r a t e  i m p l i c i t l y ,  an 
im p e ra t iv e .
The e r r o r  i s  h e re  a g a in  f i r s t  of a l l  t h a t  th e  e s s e n t i a l  f a c t o r  o f  
d e c i s io n  i s  l e f t  o u t  of th e  answ ering  of moral q u e s t io n s .  The
d e c i s io n  to  do som ething r e q u i r e s  a s  i t s  p rem isses  n o t  on ly  th e  f a c to  
of th e  c a s e ,  which co rre sp o n d  to  th e  minor p rem iss  of th e  A r i s t o t e l i a n  
î ï r a c t i c a l  sy l lo g is m , b u t  a l s o  a p r i n c i p l e  of co nduc t,  corrGax)onciing to  
th e  m ajor promiss.^^
The q u e s t io n  o f  how we th e n  do a r r i v e  a t  th e  d e c i s io n  of a m oral 
X^rinciple i s  th u s  s t i l l  l e f t  unansw ered. But b e fo re  we look  a t  th e  
way Haro p o s i t i v e l y  t r i o s  to  ctnswer t h i s  crucitü . q u e s t io n  i t  m ight 
p e rh ap s  be u s e f u l  to  c o n s id e r  h i s  c o n c e p tio n  of th e  c h a r a c te r  o f
1 , S e e M ,  p .3 9
a .  m ,  p . 41
3 .  m ,  i>-v>
4 .  See LH . p p .  5 6 f f .
value-w(»rds and v a lu e -» ju d g o ten ts , th e  o th e r  kind of p r e s o r i | ï t i v e  
lanfiuage*
H are ’ s d i s c u s s io n  of value^wordB i s  confined  m ainly  to  a t r e a t i s e
on two such w ords, namely "good" and "ought"* This does n o t  Eioan
t h a t  th e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  between th e se  words ami o th e r  valite«“Words
l i k e  " r i g h t "  and "d u ty " ,  b u t  on ly  t h a t  th e r e  i s  a  c lo s e  l o g i c a l
r e l a t i o n  between theiE which raakes a s tudy  of each of them d i s c lo s e
I
th e  saaie main f e a tu re s o
PThe fu n c t io n  of value™terms i n  language i e  t h a t  o f  coimaending. "
Thus th e  meaning of th e  cosmaendatory word "good"@ f o r  I n s ta n c e ,  i s
c o n s ta n t  and can be u n d ers to o d  ae a p p l ie d  to  an o b je c t  w i th in  any
3c l a s s  of o b je c ts#  I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  moral p h i lo s o p h e rs  
have f e l t  tem pted to  t r y  to d is c o v e r  some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  ^diich they  
BUX>posed to  e n ta i l  a  th in g  b e in g  good* This i s ,  however, a f a l l a c y ,  
no m a t te r  w hethor th e  chaînéet e r i s t i e s  i n  q u e s t io n  a r e  though t to  be 
n a t u r a l i s t i c  o r  m e taxA ysica l.  This  f a l l a c y  i s  s im i l a r  to  the  
f a l l a c y  of t r y in g  to  d e r iv e  im p e ra t iv e s  from s ta te m e n ts  of fa c t*
Vdiat i s  wrong i s  th e  a t te c ip t  to  le a v e  o u t the  commendatory elem ent i n  
va lu e -  ju(f g emeîi t  s «
1* See LM, p p . y i f f  and FE, p$20. 
2m See 2ÈI» P«91»
3* SCO m ,  PmM2m
km See JJ4, p*91«
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"V alue-teriiiB have a Bx>ecial f u n c t io n  in  language, t h a t  
o f  coïîmiendiag; and no th ey  p l a i n l y  canïiot he d e f in e d  i n  
tcrina of o th e r  words if h i ch them selves do n o t  perfo rm  tlii© 
fu n c t io n ;  f o r  i f  t h i s  i s .d o n e ,  we^Seprived of a moans of 
perfo ria ing  th e  f u n c t io n . "
AccordinglyB th e r e  i s  ho  complex o r  s is tp le  "p ro p e r ty "  which i a
named hy th e  word "good" and which i s  reco g n izab le  i n  a l l  c a se s
where t h i s  i a  a p p l ie d  to  an o b je c t#  Nob even i f  we t r y  to  make a
d i s t i n c t i o n  between " in s t r iu n e n ta l ly  good" (good a s  a means) and
" i n t r i n s i c  good" (good in  i t s e l f )  and e v e n tu a l ly  o th e r  u se s  of  th e
word "good" s h a l l  we succeed in  p o in t in g  a t  a common p ro p e r ty  which
2i s  meant by th e  word "good" i n  each of th e  d e s s e s  »
T his must 3iot, however, be tak en  to  mean t h a t  bhere i s  no
r e l a t i o n  between "goad-making" c h a r a c t e r l a t i c s  and "good", bu t only
t h a t  th e re  i s  no r e l a t i o n  of l o g i c a l  e n t a i Iment between thonu
Value™judgeoients ab o u t  som ething a r e  c e r t a i n l y  made f o r  r e a s o n s ,
3because  of th e  p o s s e s s io n  o f  c e r t a i n  p ro p e r t ie s #  These p r o p e r t i e s  
a r e  th e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of th e  va lue-w ord , b u t  they  a r e  
n o t  i t s  meaning# The c r i t e r i a  f o r  a p p ly in g  th e  word "good" v a r i e s
p*91#
2# Bee LM, p#103,
l« p w r >  »
I t  does n o t  make th e  case  b e t t e r  i f  wo say th a t  "good" s ta n d s  f o r  
a n o îi-n a tu ra l  | j r o p e r ty ,  as  Moore s a id .  "The re a so n  v/hy t h i s  
hap%)ened was t h a t  i t  was ta k e n  f o r  g ran te d  l)y everyone , Moore 
in c lu d e d ,  i h a t  th e  only  jo b  an a d j e c t i v e  cou ld  do was to  a t t r i b u t e  
a  i j ro p e r ty  to  a th in g  •#• #*# people  should have been look ing
f o r  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  th e  r o l e s  of th o se  d i f f e r e n t  words (sc# 
a d je c tiv e»  )" “ R'M. Hare, "# o J ! b j e e t j ^ x _ o ^ ] W ^  , f iS S Ï Ï  
F a c to r ,  Mo# 1 , 1964, p p . 3 f f .
•ïîwvfrtawirarwsiu^îaa ^  «R
3 .  Soo M f p.9&, c f .  m ,  p .21 .
I l
f o r  each c l a s s  o f  o b je c ts*  ISven i n  th e  case  o f  in s t ru m e n ta l
goodnesB there i s  ho commoB c r i t e r i o n  f o r  a l l  c l a s s e s . The c r i t e r i a
f o r  commcïHiiîig must th à a  be ta u g h t  f o r  each c l a s s  of o b je c t s  in  
1p a r t i c u l a r #
Tlie « l is t in c t io B  be two eu th e  moauiBg of ami th e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  th e
a p i> l ic a t io u  o f  a value-wortî i s  th e  same a s  botv/cen i t s  " |> re s c r ip t iv e "
2o r  " e v a lu a t iv e "  " and i t s  " d e s c r ip t iv e "  laeaning# A value-w ord  i s ,  a s
i la re  d e f in e s  i t ,  a  word which has both th e s e  k in d s  o f  meaning, and a
value-Judgem ent i s  a c c o rd in g ly  a  judgement i n  which such a term  i s
used# The e v a lu a t iv e  meaning of th e  i y p ic a l  va lue-w ords  l i k e  "good"
i s  p rim ary  to  t h e  d e s c r i i j t i v e  meaning, as  i s  shown f o r  in s t a n c e  from
th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  e v a lu a t iv e  meaning i s  c o n s ta n t  f o r  every  c l a s s  of
o b j e c t s ,  w h ile  th e  d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning i s  d i f f e r e n t  i n  each ease*^^
There a r e ,  however, o th e r  words, l i k e  " t id y "  and " i n d u s t r i o u s " , i n  
which th e  d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning i s  th e  prim ary  and th e  e v a lu a t iv e  th e  
5secondary  one#
What i s  i t  th en  f o r  a  term  to  have d e s c r ip t iv e  meaning? The 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of t h i s  i s  c r u c i a l  f o r  our u n d e rs ta m lin g  o f  th e  
r a t i o n a l i t y  of  m o ra ls ,  a s  Hare conço ives  i t #
1# Bee LM, p#l02
«WültWïf* *  * '
2# In  ^  l îa re  p r e f e r s  th e  ex j ire ss io n  "x ^ rese rip tiv e"  to  " e v a lu a t iv e " ,  
th e  l a t t e r  beixig th e  one he used  in  M ,  th u s  p resu p p o sin g  t h a t  
what g iv e s  th e  te rm s i n  q u e s t io n  t h e i r  e v a lu a t iv e  meaning i s  t h e i r  
ï î r c B c r ip t iv i ty #  Be© FB, pp#26f #
30  Ibidem#
4* See LM, p . l lS #
g# Bee III, p#121.
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A term i s  said  to  be d e sc r ip t iv e  when th e re  i s  a meaning—ru le
a tta c h in g  i t  to  a c e r ta in  kind of o b je c t .
**o«. a person i s  m isusing a d e sc rip tiv e  term i f  . . .  lie 
mays th a t  an o b jec t i s  o f  one k ind , meaning, or in ten d in g  to  
convey th a t  i t  i s  of another kind* A d e sc r ip t iv e  term may 
thus he d efin ed  as one, to  misuse wliich i s  to  do th is*  '
The m eaning-rule in  question  can a lso  be sa id  to  he one concerning
s im ila r i ty ,  s ta t in g  " th a t  we may apply an exp ression  to  o b jec ts  which
2are s im ila r  to  each other in  c e r ta in  r e s p e c t s ," ' A d e sc rip tiv e  
judgement io  then an in d ic a t iv e  sen ten ce w ith  d e sc rip tiv e  terms as i t s
p re d ie a te (s )o
From what ie  sa id  about the  meaning o f d e sc r ip t iv e  terms i t  
fo llo w s  th a t  a d e sc r ip tiv e  judgement i s  u n iv e rsa liz a b le , i . e .  " i t  
commits the speaker to  th e  fu r th e r  p ro p o sitio n  th a t anything exactly  
l ik e  the su b jec t of the  f i r s t  judgement, or l ik e  i t  in  the re lev a n t  
re sp e c ta , p o ssesses  the property a t t r ib u te d  to i t  in  the f i r s t  
judgement
Turning again  to  value-xm rds, and con sid er in g  what was sa id  
above of the c r i t e r i a  fo r  th e i r  a p p lic a t io n , we can now, perhaps,
b e t te r  understand what i t  means th a t  ii value-word has d e sc r ip t iv e  
moaning. I t  i s  a p p lied  to asi o b jec t because of i t s  ( i . e .  the o b je c t’s)
1 . m>  p -8 .
g . n ,  p . 13.
3 . See j # ,  p .18.
4 . m , p .12.
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p o s s e s s io n  o f  c e r t a i n  p r o p e r t ie s *  A ccord ing ly , t m i v e r s a U s a b i l i t y
i s  a  f e a t u r e  of v a lu e - ju d g em e n ts ,  in c lu d in g  moral judgem ents, a s  w e ll
a s  o f  d e s c r i p t i v e  judgem ents, i n  so f a r  a s  va lue-judgem en ts  c a r r y
d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning* The l a s t  r e s e r v a t io n  i s  h ig h ly  s ig n i f i c a n t *
I t  p o in t s  to  t h e  f a c t ,  t h a t  w h ile  th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  meaning e x h a u s ts
th e  meaning o f  a d e s c r i p t i v e  te rm , t h i s  i s  n o t  th e  ca se  w i th  a 
Iv a lu e- te rm *
There i s  a n o th e r ,  a d d i t i o n a l  elmmmt i n  a value*^word, t h a t  makes 
th e  r u le  f o r  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  more than  a mere m ean ing-ru le*  This 
e lem ent i s  i t s  p r e s c r i p t i v e  meaning# A r u l e  t e l l i n g  us to  app ly  th e  
word "good" to  a  c e r t a i n  k in d  of man i s  no d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning—r u l c ,  
b u t  a  s y n th e t i c  moral p r in c ip le #  I t  i s  n o t J u s t  an e x p la n a t io n  of a 
word, b u t  a m oral i n s t r u c t io n *  Tb© p r e s c r i p t i v e  elem ent th u s  g iv e s  
valtie -w ords a l o g i c a l  c h a r a c te r  o f  t h e i r  own, and t h e r e f o r e  we should  
n o t  c a l l  va lue-w ords  and v a lu e- ju d g em en ts  " d e s c r ip t iv e  words" and 
" d e s c r ip t iv e  judgem ents" r e a p e c t i v e ly ,  though th ey  "have d e s c r ip t iv e  
meaning"
The p a r t i c u l a r  lo g ic a l  c h a r a c te r  o f  valuo-w ords moans t h a t  th e s e
term s behave i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  way i n  In fe re n c e s*  An e v a lu a t iv e
se n ten c e  ab o u t  som ething can n o t be i n f e r r e d  from a  d e s c r i p t i v e  se n ten c e
ab o u t th e  th in g  I n  q u es tio n #  As f a r  as  m orals i s  concerned , t h i s
means t h a t  no "ought" can be d e r iv e d  from an " io"#  This io  c r u c i a l
f o r  our im d e rs tan d in g  o f  t h e  c h a r a c te r  of morals#*^ An e v a lu a t iv e
1* Boo FE, pi>* l O f f , esp# p p .10 and 22*
2# Beo FB, pp* 22f and 10,26*
3 .  SCO M t  P*82.
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«onclits io il abou t som ething can on ly  be d e r iv e d  from a d e s c r ip t iv e  
se n ten c e  i n  th e  minor p rem iss  to g e th e r  w ith  an e v a lu a t iv e  p r i n c i p l e  
o r  s ta n d a rd  i n  th e  m ajor premiss® Thus th e  purpose of value-^m rds 
i s  to  be used f o r  te a c h in g  s tan d ard s*
I t  can now be seen  t h a t  th e r e  i s  a  c lo s e  s i m i l a r i t y  between th e  
in f e r e n c e  le a d in g  to  an e v a lu a t iv e  c o n c lu s io n ,  and th e  in f e r e n c e ,  
d is c u s s e d  above, from  f a c t u a l  p rem isses  to g e th e r  w i th  a  p r i n c i p l e  of 
conduct to  an im p e ra t iv e  c o n c lu s io n .  This s i m i l a r i t y  co rresponds  to  
th e  s i m i l a r i t y  i n  purpose between valiie-»judgements and p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  
choosing  between a c t io n s *  I n  f a c t ,  ’' c r i t i c a l  value-»judgements a r e  
a l l  u l t i m a t e ly  r e l a t e d  to  c h o ic e s ” .^
"To te a c h  a p e rso n  o r  to  d ec id e  on f o r  o n e s e l f  -  a 
s ta n d a rd  f o r  judg ing  th e  m e r i t s  of o b je c ts  o f  a  c e r t a i n  c l a s s  
i s  to  te a c h  o r  d ec id e  og p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  choosing  between 
o b je c t s  of t h a t  c la s s " *  "
Thus th e  d e c is io n  of p r i n c i p l e s  has tu rn ed  ou t to  bo th e  e s s e n t i a l  
f e a t u r e  i n  t h e  making of va luo-judgeîjion ta , a s  i t  was i n  th e  i s s u in g  
of u n iv e r s a l  im p e ra t iv e s .
I t  may how, p e rh a p s ,  seem n e c e s s a r y  to  c o n s id e r  th e  r e l a t i o n  
betïfoon moral mid non-moral value™juclgemente, a s  w ell  a s  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between them, i n  th e  l i g h t  of what i s  s a id  above . The im p o r ta n t  
l o g i c a l  f e a t u r e s  of  va lu e - ju d g em en ts  a r e  common to  bo th  c la s s e s *  The
e v a lu a t iv e  meaning i s  th e  same i n  b o th  moral and non-moral c o n te x t s ,
1* m ,  p . 1 2 7 *
2* jLM, p.134® €f* M ,  p*7Û, " to  make a value^Judgem ent i s  to  make a
d e c is io n  of p r i n c i p l e " .
Î5
namely t î i a t  of ooîiffiiending. What i s  d i f f e r e n t  in  th e  two caaes  i s  th e  
d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning*^* We must n o t ,  however, ta k e  t h i s  to  mean t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  no im p o r ta n t  d iffe rence®  In  f a c t ,  th e  o b je c t  o f  onr 
coiBîiemlatioïi m a t te r s  vej:y much, and t h i s  o b je c t  i s ,  i n  th e  ca se  of 
1310r a l  judgements 0 men a.s men#
"Ab we have seen  we canno t g e t  o u t  of b e in g  men ; and 
th e r e f o r e  m oral p r i n c i p l e s ,  which a r e  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  th e  
conduct of men a s  men ™ and n o t  a s  p o iso n e rs  o r  a r c h i t e c t s  
o r  batsmen *=* canno t be ac ce p ted  w ith o u t  hav ing  a  p o t e n t i a l  
b e a r in g  upon th e  way t h a t  we conduct o u r s e lv e s ,  I  can
always choose w hether o r  n o t  t o  tak e  up p o iso n in g  or 
c r i c k e t in g  as  a p ro fe s s io n *  This i s  bound to  make th e  
s p i r i t  i n  vdiich wo c o n s id e r  moral q u e s t io n s  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from 
t h a t  i n  which we c o n s id e r  how we ought to  po ison  Jo n e s ,  o r  b u i ld  
him a  house; b u t  th e  lo g ic  of th e  wopd "ought" i s  n o t  
m arkedly d i f f e r e n t  i n  th e  two ca ses* "  *
"E m otiv ity "  i a  n o t  th e  essen ce  of moral language, b u t  "on ly  a
siiinptom of * * * an e v a lu a t iv e  u se  of w-ords"* What makes m oral language
em otive i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  we so o f te n  " f e e l  deep ly"  abou t th e  s i t u a t i o n s
3i n  which i t  i s  u se d .
C* Moral Koasoning*
As was i n d i c a t e d  i n  our in t r o d u c to r y  remarks abou t the  ta s k  of 
e t h i c s ,  h a re * s  a n a ly s i s  o f  moral language has  shown t h a t  no s u b s t a n t i a l  
moral p r i n c i p l e  can be fo rc e d  upon us a s  a  m a t te r  of lo g i c a l  n e c e s s i ty *
1 . See p . 140. 
2* LM, p . 162*
«W W W  r  A
3* Bee M ,  p .  144*
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\Ûmn \io sufeBcribo to  a moral p r i n c i p l e  wo do iio t 8 t a  to  a f a c t ,  b u t  
make a d é c is io n  of our ovm*^ And i f  we a r e  eiokod to  j u s t i f y  a 
d e c i s io n  of p r i n c i p l e  we have no mean8 by which v/e can compel th e  
i n q u i r e r  to  a c c e p t  our d e c i s io n ,  i f  he s t i l l  goes on a sk in g  f o r  
rea so n s  a f t e r  we have shared  w itii him a l l  th e  c o n s id e r a t io n s  upon 
which our d e c is io n  i s  founded® "We can on ly  ask  him to  make np h i s  
mind which way ho ought to  l i v e " * "
But on th e  o th e r  hand tlio s tudy  of moral language has d is c lo s e d  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e r e  r e a l l y  i s  a  p la c e  f o r  reaso n  in  m orals*
D ec is io n s  o f  p r i n c i p l e  a r e  based  upon c o n s id e r a t io n s  of f a c t s ,  even i f  
they  a r e  n o t  d e r iv e d  from them, and they  a r e  made w it î i in  o lo g ic a l  
îramo^mrkÿ i n  accordance  w ith  c e r t a i n  ru ie s o  T h ere fo re  moral 
ar^punont i s  p o s s i b l e .
I t  i s  e n l ig h te n in g  i n  t h i s  co n n e c tio n  to  c o n s id e r  th e  s i m i l a r i t y  
whicii, ac co rd in g  to  H are , e x i s t s  between th e  p rocedu re  of moral 
r e a s o n in g  and s c i e n t i f i c  in q u iry *  Hore ag ree s  w ith  P ro fe s s o r  Popper 
t h a t  th e r e  i s  no s o - c a l l e d  " in d u c t iv e "  in f e r e n c e  in  s c ie n c e ,  from 
o b s e rv a t io n - d a ta  to  " s c i e n t i f i c  laws"* What th e  s c i e n t i s t  does i s  to  
propound hypotheses  id ilch  he t r i e s  to  t e s t  ej^perimentally© The only  
p o s s ib le  in f e r e n c e s  hero  a r e  d ed u c tio n s  from c e r t a i n  o b s e rv a t io n s  to
1* See p . i 960 
2* See DM, pi)* 6 8 f*
C I V , “  *
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th e  f a l s i t y  o f  a  hypo th e  s i  a .  " S c i e i i t i f i e  in q id r y  i s  r a t h e r  a k ind
o f  e x p lo r a t io n # or lo o k in g  f o r  hypotheaee which w i l l  s ta n d  up to
th e  t e s t  o f  ex p e r im en t" .^
How, th e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  m oral re a s o n in g  i s  t h a t  i t ,  to o ,  i s
a Idnd o f e x p lo ra t io n ,  a  look ing  "for moral judgements and moral
p r i n c i p l e s  W iich, when we have c o n s id e red  th e ir  l o g i c a l  conséquences
2and th e  f a c t s  of th e  c a s e ,  we can s t i l l  a c c e p ts  " The k ind  of
in f e r e n c e  i s  d e d u c t iv e ,  from th e  consequences of the p r i n c i p l e s
Biiggeetcd to  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o r  n o n - p o a s iM l i ty  of accep tin g  them.
What i s  needed b e fo re  we can s t a r t  a  moral argument i s ,  f i r s t ,
%
th e  f a c t s  of th e  caa© . S eeo iii ly , th e  lo g ic a l  r u le s  of moral 
reason ing are req u ired *  The lo g ic a l  a n a ly s i s  o f  moral language has 
shown us t h a t  they  a re , f i r s t  of a l l ,  p r e s c r i p t i v i t y  and 
u n i v e r s a l ! %abi1i  t y  *
"Ifliesi we a r e  t r y i n g ,  i n  a c o n c re te  c a s e ,  to  d ec id e  what 
we ought to  do, what we a r e  lo o k in g  f o r  i s  a n  a c tio n  to  
which we cam commit o u r s e lv e s  ( p r e s c r i p t i v i t y )  b u t  which we 
a r e  a t  t h e  same time prepared to  a c c e p t  as exem plify ing  a 
p r i n c i p l e  of a c t i o n  to  be p r e s c r ib e d  fo r  others i n  l i k e  
circuiHstaBces ( u n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y ) *  I f ,  when we c o n s id e r  
some proposed a c t i o n ,  we f in d  t h a t ,  when u n iv e r s a l i z e d ,  i t  
y i e l d s  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  w hich w© canno t a c c e p t ,  we r e j e c t  t h i s  
a c t i o n  a s  a s o lu t io n  to  our moral problem ™ i f  we cannot . 
u n iv e r s a i i z e  th e  p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  i t  cannot become an "ought"*
1 . FR, p .8 8 .
2 . Ibidem .
3* In  m oral re a s o n in g  th ese  f a c t s  need n o t  be a c t u a l ,  th ey  may be 
anpposed. See M , p .93 . 
k .  m ,  p .90 .
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\ûmt makes t h i s  argusnent work (and what t h i r d l y  i s  r e q u i r e d )  
i s  t h a t  peop le  have i n c l i i i a t i o i î s ,  which make them u n w il l in g  to  
a c c e p t  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  w i th  u n d e s i r a b le  consequences f o r  th e m se lv es .
One more i n g r e d ie n t ,  i , e #  th e  f o u r th ,  m ast bo added to  th e  l i s t  in  
coBKiectioB w ith  th e  fo reg o in g , namely th e  f a c u l t y  of  im agin ation .
The p e rso n  or p ersona  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  argument must be a b le  to  
im agine wîiat i t  i s  l i k e  to  be i n  th e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which another 
p e rso n  i s  p la c e d .*
The t a s k  of e t h i c s  i s ,  a s  has been shoim, to  d i s c lo s e  th e  lo g ic
of moral language , and f a r  from being a u s e le s s  occupation , i t
2
p ro v id e s  un w ith  "a pow erful engine fo r  producing  m oral agreement" \
I f  two perso n s  a r e  w i l l i n g  to  u se  th e  moral words p r o p e r ly ,  wo
shou ld  ex p e c t t h a t  th e  other so u rce s  of d isag reem en t could be 
e l im in a te d .
"P eo p le ’ s i n c l i n a t i o n s  ab o u t  most of th e  im p o r ta n t  m a t te r s  
i n  l i f e  tend to be th e  same (v e ry  few p e o p le ,  fo r  example, l ik e  
b e in g  s ta rv e d  o r  mm over by molîor^^^cara) | «.» The f a c t s  are
o f t e n ,  g iv en  s u f f ic ie n t  p a tie n c e , a sc e r ta in a b le . Im ag in a tio n  
can be c u lt iv a te d ."
T his  method o f m oral argument makes i t  p o ss ib le  to  ac h iev e  g r e a t  
r e s u l t s  even i f  th e  in c l in a t io n s  or I n te r e s ts  o f the p a r t i e s  d i f f e r .
1. A person cam be supposed to  r e fr a in  from saying th a t  ho ought to
■ pu t another person in  p rison  fo r  d ebt, because th a t  involves th a t  
he h im se lf ought to be put in  p riso n  in  a s im ila r  s i tu a t io n .
See |R , pp. 9&ff.
2 .  m ,  p . 9 7 .
3 .  m ,  pp. 97S.
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The ap p e a l to  u n iv e r s a l i z e d  ' s e l f - i n t e r e s t  im p l ie s  an appeal to  equal
c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r e s t s ,  one of th e  u t i l i t a r i a n  
1p r in c ip l e s *  Imagining' m yse lf  having th e i n t e r e s t e  of my co u n te r ­
p a r t  I must "a llow  my ch o ices  to  be c irc u m sc r ib e d  by th e  d e s i r e s  of 
2o th e r  people"*
B are r e p e a te d ly  a s s u re s  ub t h a t  h i s  th e o r ie s  on moral reasoning  
im%)ly no breach of "Ihime’ s Law" ("Ko ’o u g h t’ from an ’ is * " )*  H is 
method i s  on ly  form al, and n eu tra l as between d if f e r e n t  su b s ta n tia l  
moral p r in c ip le s *  We must n o t  rep resen t Hare a s  say ing  t h a t  a 
p e r s o n ’ s in c l in a t io n s  a r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  a moral judgement. What 
he saye i s  t h a t ,  "h ia  i n o l i n a t i o n s  b e in g  what th e y  a r e ,  he canno t 
a s s e n t  s in c e r e ly  to  a c e r t a i n  sin g u la r  p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  and i f  be canno t
do t h i s ,  he cannot a s s e n t  to  a c e r t a i n  u n iversa l p r e s c r i p t i o n  which
3 4e n t a i l s  i t " *  ilnd t h i s  i s  an a n a l y t i c  s ta te m e n t ,  '
As a  p r o i f  t h a t  h i s  th e o r ie s  m o ra lly  neu tra l Bare s t r e s s e s
th e  view t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  f o r  a  p e rso n  to  escape h is  argument by 
h o ld in g  an  id e a l  w ith  com plete d i s r e g a r d  of h is  o%m i n t e r e s t s *  Such 
a  person takes a  f a n a t i c a l  a t t i t u d e ,  b u t  h is  moral, p r in c ip le s  are  
l o g i c a l l y  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e .  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  fo r  a  Nasi to  ho ld  th e  
vim'f t h a t  he h im self shou ld  he sen t  to  a  gas chamber i f  a Jew*
1 . Seo f i ,  pp.
2 .  m ,  p . 195.
3 .  m ,  p . 109.
4 . See M , pp. 111,193.
5 . See pp. I lO f, and passim . Hare admits th a t h ie  d isc u ss io n  
of tiiia  p o in t in  LM was coni'nsed, to  say the l e a s t .
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fie f u r t h e r  a rg u es  a g a i i i s t  th e  view t h a t  th e  on ly  k in d  of cogent 
moral argument i s  one which has a s  a  p rem ias a moral p r in c ip le  
a l r e a d y  a c cep ted  by b o th  p a r t i e s  to  th e  argum ent.
" I  have m a in ta in ed  t h a t  once the l o g i c a l  c h a r a c te r  of 
th e  moral concepts la  u n d e rs to o d ,  th ere can be u s e f u l  and 
com pelling moral argument even between people who have, .
b efore i t  b e g in s ,  no s u b s ta n t iv e  moral p r in c ip le s  in  common",
Elsew here, d isc u ss in g  the p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  everyone i s  e n t it le d  to
equal co n sid era tio n . Hare holds*
" It must be emphasized th a t  i t ,  l ik e  the p r in c ip le  of
u n iv e r s a l im M lity  I t s e l f ,  i s  a p urely  formal p r in c ip le ,  ^
fo llo w in g  from the lo g ic a l  character of the moral words,"
To in d ic a te  b r i e f l y  our c r i t i c i s m  a t  t h e  p resen t s ta g e  of th e
in q u iry *  Hare claim s t h a t  h is  a n a l y s i s  of the lo g ic  of moral
d is c o u r s e  i s  form al and independent of any moral p r e s u p p o s i t io n s .
I t  i s  d o u b tfu l  w hether such a  dichotomy between form ami con ten t
i s  p o s s ib le  in  th e  sphere o f m o ra lb . But even i f  i t  were p o s s i b l e ,
Mare has n o t  l i v e d  up to  h i s  c la im . H is tei'm lnology and ch o ice of
examples a r e  h ig h ly  e v a lu a t iv e .  In c a l l i n g  a  "consequen t ’ id e a l is t*
a t t i t u d e "  " fan atica l"  and u s in g  a  Nazi a t t i t u d e  tow ards Jews as an
example, w hile  d e s lr e a - fo r -o n e s e lf  are ju s t  "ordinary" in c lin a t io n s
which we can  ex p ec t everybody b u t  " e c c e n t r ic s "  to  share* , Hare i s ,
t o  some e x te n t , r e ly in g  on shared moral co n v ic tio n s  to  c a r r y  h i s  p o in t
1 . m ,  p . 187.
2 .  Ü .  p '.l lS .
3 .  Sae m ,  p p .115 , 110,
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A gain , i t  i s  one th in g  to  say t h a t  i m i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y  i s  a  
fuBctaiontal p r i n c i p l e  o f  moral judgement* I t  i s  q u e s t io n a b le  w hether 
even t h i s  p r i a o i p l e  i s  p im ely formal® But i t  i s  a l t o g e t h e r  beyond 
q u e s t io n  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  u n iv e r s a l i z e d  s e l f - i n t e r e s t  and o fA * A ftftafilwrt.'Sij' PWL‘(l>Jlrrr»nffrfe’>»WW'BWiiÆ^gtf!te5»sa>
equal c o n s id e r a t io n  of i n t e r e s t s  i s  n o t  p u re ly  form al* I t  i s  a4- u j M  > I wu 1.ÜI Miiki. k »  iLiOi N 0«ui . w f  ' V
s u b s t a n t i a l  moral p r i n c i p l e .  I t  i s  on ly  i n  a  c a se  where peop le  
a r e  s u b s c r ib in g ,  w hether e x p re s s ly  o r  n o t ,  to  th e s e  p r i n c i p l e s  t h a t  
th e y ,  to  g o th  or  ^fi th  th e  l o g i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  of p r e s c r i p t i v i t y  and 
u n iv e r s a l i z a M  11 t y ,  re n d e r  an  arg^-imont l i k e  H are ’ s com pelling .
This  p o in t s  to  what must become our main p o in t  o f  c r i t i c a l  
ten&*on w ith  Hare* We a r e  le a d  to  q u e s t io n  w hether p r e a c r i p t i v i t y ,  
c o n s id e re d  a s  a  fo rm al p r i n c i p l e ,  r e a l l y  e x p re s se s  th e  lo g ic a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  moral lan g u ag e .
2 .  The s e p a r a t io n  of f a c t  and v a lu e  in  a n a ly t i o a l  p h i1obophy. 
àJÈM IM j.
We have i n  the  fo re g o in g  c h a p te r  fp.ven an o u t l i n e  o f  E.M® H are ’s 
co n c ep tio n  of e t h i c s ,  ta k in g  him as  a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of th e  movement, 
or  t r e n d ,  i n  contem porary p h ilo so p h y  c a l lq d  " a n a l y t i c a l  philosophy"#
We have n o t done so c la im ing  t h a t  th e re  i s  i n  every  r e s p e c t  a 
n n i f  o rm ity  of Hi ought in  t h i s  movement, f a r  from i t #  N e i th e r  a r e  
we s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  th e  w i t i n g s  o f  i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a re
i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  way s im i l a r  i n  t h e i r  e x p o s i t io n  of a l l  th e  r e l e v a n t  
to p ic s#
What we a r e  s u g g e s t in g ,  however, i s  t h a t ,  co u n tin g  f o r  a l l  th e  
d i f f e r e n c e s ,  th e re  i s  a f t e r  a l l  a c e r t a i n  l i n e  o f  th o u g h t t h a t  can  be 
t r a c e d  from th e  e a r l i e s t  remarks of th e  " a n a ly s t s "  on th e  s u b je c t  of 
e t h i c s  (iillgerstrdni, Garnap, Ayer, see  below) to  th e  more e la b o r a te  
e t h i c a l  works of th e  p re s e n t-d a y  " l in i^ i i s t s " #
Our use  of K#M* Hare i s  j u s t i f i e d  by our see in g  i n  h i s  w r i t in g s  
perhaps the  most m ature and b a lan ced  work of th e  a n a ly s t  t r a d i t i o n  i n  
e t h i c a l  th e o ry ,  b u t  s t i l l  a work d e fend ing  th e  feast© p o s i t i o n  of t h i s  
t r a d i t i o n #
A d m itted ly , th e  e a r l i e s t  forms of the  "em otive" th e o ry  of moral 
language were v e ry  c ru d e  in  t h e i r  © h u ra e te r iz a t io B  of v a lu e  judgem ents, 
in c lu d in g  moral judgem ents, a s  em otional exc lam ations  and such l ik e#
I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s in g  t h a t  rem arks, l i k e  the  fo l lo w in g  fey A#J# Ayer,
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Itended  to  a ro u se  th e  f e e l in g s  of th e  opponentB ,
"We b e g in  by a d m it t in g  t h a t  th e  m ental e t h i c a l
concep ts  a r e  w m n a ly sa b lo ,  inasmuch a s  th e re  i a  no c r i t e r i o n  
by which one can t e a t  th e  v a l i d i t y  of th e  judgeiuentfi i n  which 
th e y  occur* *•« th e  re a so n  why th ey  a r e  u n an a ly aa h le  i s  
t h a t  they  a r e  mere paendo-concepta*  * * * Thus i f  I say to  
someone, ’You a c te d  wrongly in  s t e a l i n g  t h a t  money*, I am n o t 
s t a t i n g  an y th in g  more th a n  i f  I  had s a id ,  ’You s t o l e  t h a t  
money*, i n  a p e c u l i a r  tone of h o r r o r ,  o r  w n 'ittcn  w ith  tho  
a d d i t io n  of some s p e c ia l  exc lam ation  marks* The to n e , o r  tho  
e x c la im tlo n  moxks, adds n o th in g  to  th e  l i t e r a l  meaning of th e  
sen tence*  I t  m erely  s e rv e s  to  show t h a t  th e  e x p r e s s io n 'o f  i t  
i s  a t te n d e d  by c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g s  in  th e  sp e a k e r" .
I t  must he no ted  t h a t  th e  fu n c t io n  of e t h i c a l  terms i s  n o t  on ly
to  ex p re s s  f e e l in g s *  The}; a r e  a lso  seek ing  to  "a rouse  f e e l i n g ,  and
3BO to  s t im u la te  a c t io n " *  This i s  how Ayer d o c s  i t ,  a t  any r a t e .
Ayer s t r e s s e s  th o  p o in t  t h a t  e t h i c a l  judgements expr e s s  f e e l in g s ,
th e y  a r e  n o t  a s s e r t i o n s  of fee ling*®  I f  th e  l a t t e r  wore th e  co se ,
194 4  y
1 . Ch.L. S tevenson , lMcS_£.adJLfiiËÎMHE®* P-283, qwoteo M artin  D 'Arcy,
who says I "lînder th e  p re te n c e  of u l t im a te  x^ i adorn i t  ( i . e .  A yer’ s 
hook) g u i l l o t i n e s  r e l i g i o n ,  e t h i c s  and a e s t h e t i c s  * * * and 
e v e ry th in g  x*;orth w h i le " .
2 .  l a nmia.vep T ru th . a nd__Lo(jliip 2*ed*1946, p«loy « T h is  can he s a id  to  
correspond  to  say ings  by R* Carnap, l i k e  th e  fo llo w in g s  "A v a lu e  
s ta te m e n t  i s  n o th in g  e l s e  th a n  a  oomBiand in  a m is lea d in g  gramnsatical 
form ", *935, p »2'j .
This view had i t s  e a r l i e s t  and perhaps  most r a d i c a l  spokesman in  
Axel HHaerstrdm. c f .  h i s  s ta te m e n t  i n  " S o s ia l - f i io B o f i a k a  n p p s a to e r " ,
* ^  I,.I'Mi* , I I  .im u iMifcgtKSrtiPiWfca» »
a c o l l e c t i o n  of e ssay s  puhXiehed i n  1939s " I f  1 say , ’This  a c t i o n  i s  
in fam ous’ , I  am e x p re s s in g  e x a c t ly  th e  same th in g  a s  i f  I had s a id ,  
’F i e l  What an a c t i o n l ’ s That i s  to  say , xAat i s  ex p ressed  by t h i s  i s  
on ly  a  c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g  i n  c o n n e c tio n  x^ith th e  n o t io n  of th e  a c t i o n  a s  
a c tu a l* "  (Quoted from G* K i l l e r d a l ,  Teolr i s k  och f i l o a o f i s k  e t i k , 
I 93M* The t r a n s l a t i o n  i s  by the  a u th o r  of th e  p r e s ont t l ie s isT J*
3o Ayer, op. c i t . * p*10S.
4* Ib idem . p.lG9*
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would in  f a e t  bo confronted w itîi am o rd in a ry  s u b j e c t iv is t  th e o ry  
which h o lds  t h a t  e th ic a l judgements are genuine p ro p o s it io n s*  namely 
about th e  f e e l i n g s  o f the speaker, xfherems Ayer m a in ta in s  t h a t  they  are 
n o t  p ro p o sitio n s  a t  a l l ,  and tlia t t h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  im possib le  r e a l ly  to
d is p u te  ab o u t q u e s t io n s  of v a lu e .^
I t  might be Buggeated* however, t h a t  'the h ea ted  d is c u s s io n  which 
fo llow ed  remarks l i k e  th ose  by A.J® Ayer, p a rtly  was caused by a 
c e r t a i n  tendency tmWirds I'mahing‘m a t te r s  to  extrem es, a t  l e a s t  
t e rm in o lo g ic a l ly .  To g e t  th e  c o r r e c t  p i c tu r e  i t  i s  n cceesa iÿ  to
ta k e  in to  account t h a t  Ayer him self allow s thati an e t h i c a l  judgement 
may o fte n  be llnlced up w ith  q u e s t io n s  ab o u t th e  f a c t s  of the  e a s e .  ' 
Thus th e r e  can be d i s p u t e ' i n  co n n ec tio n  xfith an e t h i c a l  judgement, b u t  
only aa f a r  m  th e s e  fa c te  a re  concerned. That i e  to  say , i f  a man 
has  adop'led a system  of moral p r in c ip le s , he has committed h im se lf  to  
rea ct m o ra lly  to  c e r t a i n  em pirical f a c t s  in  a  c e r ta in  way. T h e re fo re ,  
two p e rso n s  \âm h o l’d the same p r i n c i p l e s ,  can , by d is c u s s in g  th e  f a c t s ,
ob ta in  th e  same a t t i t u d e  toxmrd© them, i . e .  come to  have the same
2e t h i c a l  f e e l in g  toxmrds them.
In  o th e r  words', moral judgement© have xistially got to do w ith  f a c t s ,  
and th e r e  can th e r e f o r e  e x i s t  such a th in g  as  a  system of moral 
p r in c ip le s , i . e .  moral judgements can be l o g ic a l l y  re la te d  to  one 
another. C ontraries i n  moral a t t i t u d e  can thus  be reco n ciled  by th e  
persona  in v o lv ed  gain ing  t r u e  knowledge o f  the f a c t s  and a p p ly in g  lo g ic
1 . Ibidem , p . I IO .
2. Ibidem *, p . I l l
*ii»wè#i 1% irm. mwmiw.KiüÊ " ^
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But adm itting  tk a t  these  q u a lif ic a tlo u B  have to lie made in  
order to give the r ig h t  im press ion  of a view  l ik e  Ayer’ s ,  we might 
s t i l l  he j u s t i f i e d  in  saying th a t  in  i t s  more elab ora te  form, 
e sp e c ia lly  in  the works of C«B* Ptevenson^ , th e  emotive theory took 
OB a more sym pathetic shape, i f  we mean by th a t , th a t  i t  seemed to  
take moral problems q u ite  s e r io u s ly  and n ot only t r e a t  them as a 
kind of pseudo-problem .
F i r s t ,  Stevenson speaks o f e th ic a l  judgements having "emotive 
meaning" w ithout p u ttin g  "meaning" in  in verted  commas, thereby  
showing t h a t , "emotive" i s  not in  any sense used d e ro g a to rily . This 
emotive meaning of e t h ic a l  and va lu e  judgements l i e s  in  th e ir  
fu n c tio n  o f speaking from and to  the  c o n a t iv e -a ffe c t iv o  nature  of 
men, namely expressing the sp eaker’s a t t i tu d e  of approval or  
disapproval towards a c e r ta in  o b je c t , and try in g  to  evoke a s im ila r
p
a t t i tu d e  in  th e h e a r e r ."
Stevenson i s  w illin g  to  ax>ply the p red ica te  " tru e"  to e th ic a l
judgements even in  th e ir  p urely  emotive fu n c tio n , although only in  a
p a r t ic u la r ly  broad sen se  of th e  word "true", in  xdiieh i t  i s  used t©
3s ig n ify  an agreement in  a t t i t u d e .
1 . EapooiaH y
2 .  See Op..oltiL. p p .8 0 ff
3* I M t e »  PP» l6 9 f f
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Like A*J# A yer, S tevenson s t a t e s  t h a t  e t h i c a l  judgements u s u a l ly
a r e  based  on b e l i e f s  abou t f a c t s ,  e#g* abou t th e  a c tu a l  s t a t e  of
1a f f a i r s  and abou t what w i l l  be th e  r e s u l t  of o, c e r t a i n  a c t i o n .
Because of t h i s  e t h i c a l  judgements can be reasoned  a b o u t .
More im p o r ta n t  th a n  a l l  t h i s  i s  Stevenson*© s ta te m e n t ab o u t
e t h i c a l  judgements hav ing  d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning, which g iv e s  them a
t h e o r e t i c a l  f u n c t io n  a s  w e l l .  F i r s t ,  th ey  r e f e r  to th e  s p e a k e r ’s
a t t i t u d e s ,  th u s  g iv in g  a  d e s c r ip t io n  of them t h a t  may be t r u e  o r
f a l s e  i n  th e  o rd in a ry  xmy. Secondly , d e s c r ip t i v e  meaning a t t r i b u t e s
q u a l i t i e s  o r  s e t s  of q u a l i t i e s  from which one cou ld  i n f e r  th e  s p e a k e r ’ s
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  e t h i c a l  terms® E th ic a l  judgements can th u s  be t r u e
and  f a l s e  i n  t h a t  th e ^  g iv e  r e f e r e n c e s  which m ight be t e s t e d  by
2o b se rv in g  th e  s p e a k e r ’ s ua© of th e se  term s on o th e r  occasions*
That i s  to  sa y , even i f  an e t h i c a l  judgement e v e n tu a l ly  i s  
foumlod on th o  c o n a t i v e - a f f a c t i v e  n a tu re  of men and i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  
ca n n o t bo mad© s u b je c t  to  v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  i t  can s t i l l  be t r e a t e d  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  i . e .  be d e s c r ib e d  and sy s te m a tiz e d .
It.M. H are , on h i s  p a r t ,  does n o t  want to  c h a r a c t e r i z e  moral
iangimg© as  "em otive" . I t s  f u n c t io n  i s ,  acco rd in g  to  h i s  viexf,
" p r e s c r i p t i v e " .  The f u n c t io n  of im p e ra t iv e s  i s  to  comiiand, and th e  
f tm c t io n  of Bîoml judgem ents, l i k e  v a lu e  judgements i n  g e n e ra l ,  i s  
to  commend, to  gu ide  c h o ic e s .
1* Ib idem , pp . 26ff*
2 .  Ib idem . p%). 134 and 207.
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T his  concep t o f  " p rc B c r ip t iv o "  meaning c e r t a i n l y  i s  not l ik e ly  
t o  a r 01180 ouch a n t a g o n i s t i c  f e e l i n g s  as  d id  th e  concep t of "em otive" 
meaning. liar© seems t o  use a te rm ino logy  which to  a g r e a t  ex ten t
does j u s t i c e  to  th e  character of moral language.
He has  f u r t h e r  b ro u g h t  o u t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n *  and the r e la t io n *  
between th e  e x c lu s iv e ly  moral meaning of moral judgements and t h e i r  
d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning in  a c le a r  form ula. He makes a  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between the  meaning o f  a v a lu e  term  and th e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  i t s  
a p p l ic a t io n *  say ing  t h a t  th e  meaning which makes a  term  a v a lu e  
term* i . e .  i t s  e v a lu a t iv e  or p r e s c r ip t iv e  meaning i s  prim ary to  th e  
c r i t e r i a  f o r  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n .  These c r i t e r i a  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  
d e s c r ip t iv e , secondaiy  meaning of v a lu e  judgem ents, and t h i s  d e s c r ip ­
t i v e  meaning i s  i n  i t s  t u r n  what makes a lo g ic a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
be W een v a lu e  judgements p o s s ib le ,  and. a l s o  requ ired .
In  so f a r  a s  th e  mailing of r\ v a lu e  judgements can , and should  be 
a r a t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y ,  i t  i s  because  o f  t h e  lo g ic a l  co n sis ten cy  which 
i s  demanded In t h e  making of them. There la* acco rd in g ly *  no
q u e s t io n  of moral judgements be ing  a r b i t r a r y .
The im p o r ta n t  th in g  to  n o tic e  in  t h i s  view i s ,  however, t h a t  
th e  eye torn of e v a lu a t io n s  i s  based  on a  d e c is io n  of p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  
c e r t a i n l y  i s  made f o r  reason s, but which s t i l l  i s  a  f r e e  d e c is io n .  
T hat i s  to  sa y ,  t h e r e  i s  no fa c t*  no a u t h o r i t y  o r  a n y th in g  e l s e  t h a t  
can fo rce  a person  r a t i o n a l l y  to  accep t a  c e r t a i n  v a lu e  system ,^
1 ,  Whether Rare h im s e lf  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  i n  th e  f u r t h e r  developBient of  
h i s  th o u g h ts  on moral re a s o n in g  i e  a q u e s t io n  t h a t  i s  t r e a t e d  
e lsew here  and need n o t  concern  us  h e r e .
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A f te r  hav ing  considered  the  development* and to  some ex ten t th e  
v a r ie ty *  of the i l iough ts  of th e  a n a ly sts  on th e  nature of va lue  
language, we are now a b le  to see  th a t , what i s  s t i l l  the c h ie f
i n t e r e s t ,  i s  th e  m aintain ing of a  n o n -c o g n it iv ls t  or n o n - d e s c r i p t i v i s t
p o s i t io n #
T hat i s  to  sa y ,  even i f  a  moral sentence can be s a id  to  g iv e  tie
knowledge of th e  sp eak er  and of e x i s t i n g  system s of moral v a lu e s , i t
does n ot convey any knowledge i n  i t s  s t r i c t l y  moral f u n c t io n .  To 
nee  ïi#M, H are’ s  te rm in o lo g y , th e  p r e s c r ip t iv e  meaning of a moral 
judgement does not p resen t us w ith  any knowledge of a moral k in d ,  
although in  i t s  secondary meaning a  moral or %mn-moral v a lu e  judgement 
may p r e s e n t  u s  m t h  a  knowledge of t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  th e  a c tu a l  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of a  value term  to  an o b je c t .
The same view cou ld  a l s o  be s t a t e d  i n  th e  fo l lo w in g  ways The 
un ique fiiB c tion  of a v a lu e  judgement i s  n o t  to  d e s c r ib e  an o b je c t  by 
a s c r ib in g  a  c e r t a i n  p r o p e r ty ,  or c e r ta in  p r o p e r t i e s ,  to  i t ,  but to  
p rescr ib e  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  i t ,  i , e ,  to  recommend i t ,
Theref&ir#^ %U i t®  f u n c t io n  a s  a kind of p r e s c r i p t i v e  o r  e v a lu a t iv e  
language a  moral judgement does n ot s t a t e  an y th in g  t h a t  can be s a id  to  
be tru e or f a l s e  in  any o rd in a ry  sense o f th e  words.
P a r t  of th e  n o n -c o g n it iv is t  co n cep tio n  i s  th e  d ism issa l of a l l  
k in d s  of n a tu ra l i s m  in  e t h ic s .  To t r y  to  d e fin e  the meaning of a 
m oral judgement i n  tenas of non-moral c o n c e p ts ,  i e ,  a s  G,E, Moore 
h e ld ,  a f a l l a c y ,  "Good" can n o t be d efin ed  in  term s of " p le a s u r e " .
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"fiapplBeee", o r  "usefulnesm "* And a s  a r e s u l t  of t l i i e  i n s i g h t  we 
see  t h a t  the c o g n i t i v i s t i c  t h e o r i e s  of hedonism* eudaimonism and 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  a r e  im p o ss ib le  to defend  any lon ger .
I t  i s  ©f « p e e ia l  importance to  n o tic e *  th a t*  a c co rd in g  to  the  
n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t  v iew , th e  argument a g a in s t  n a tu ra l i s m  i n  e t h i c s  
a p p l i e s  to  a l l  a t te m p ts  to  d e fin e  moral wmrds in  term s o f  m e tap h y s ica l  
and th e o lo g ic a l  co n cep ts  a s  w e l l .  There i e  no u se  i n  t r y in g  to  
evade th e  argument of th e B o n -c o g n i t iv is tB ,  by m a in ta in in g  th a t e .g*  
"good" means "idm t God commands" o r  "what God w i l l s " .
A lthough Moore’ s e x p re s s io n  " n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a l l a c y "  in  h i s  use  
o f  i t  means an a t te m p t  to  d e f in e  "good", a  broader, b u t  c lo s e ly  
r e l a t e d ,  use of t h e  term has g a in ed  c u r re n c y .  I t  i s  used as a 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  a l l  a t te m p ts  to  d e r iv e  moral s ta te m e n ts  ( o r  
no rm ative  and p r e s c r i p t i v e  statem ents i n  g e n e ra l )  from statem ents  
which a r e  p u re ly  th e o r e t ic a l ( s c i e n t i f i c a l ,  d e s c r i p t i v e ,  f a c t u a l ) .  
Hence th e  comaon ch a r a c te r iz a tio n  of th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  n o n -eo g o it iv ism  
a s  the one of sep aratin g  f a c t s  and v a lu e s .
This s e p a r a t io n  of f a c t s  and v a lu e s  means t h a t ,  according to  
th e  B o n - c o g n i t iv i s t  v iew , we canno t from any f a c t u a l  in form ation  abou t 
man and th e  x # r id  a r r i v e  a t  any c o n c lu s io n  about v a lu e s  o r  moral 
o b l i g a t i o n s ,  I»e,@ th e  a ctu a l w is h e s ,  in t e r e s t s ,  d e s ir e s  of p eo p le  
do not t e l l  ms w hat i s  v a lu a b le ,  nor does any knowledge o f  what w i l l  
make people  h a p p ie r ,  what w i l l  d im in ish  p a in ,  what w i l l  strengthen  
fa m ily  l i f e  and so on.
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E q u a lly  im poGsible i e  th e  d ed u o tio n  of v a lu e  judgeraenta from 
knowledge of m e tap h y sica l  o r  th e o lo g ic a l  f a c t o ,  even oupposiiig 
t h a t  we had any a c c e s s  to  each knowledge, e ,g#  ab o u t th e  " n a tu re  of 
t h e  w o rld " ,  a b o u t  God an th e  cronlxir o f  heaven and e a r th ^ ,  abou t 
God’ s love  of th e  w orld  i n  C h r i s t ,  ab o u t  th e  Kingdom of Heaven bb 
m an 's  u l t i m a t e  g o a l .
Xt m ight be im p o r ta n t  to  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  on th e  view sk e tch ed  
above , e x i s t i n g  m oral codes a r e  them se lves  co n s id e red  a s  " f a c t s " ,  
and  th e  f a c t  t h a t  som ething i s  o rd e re d  by an e s t a b l i s h e d  s e t  o f  m oral 
s ta n d a rd s  does n o t  e n t a i l  t h a t  i t  i s  an o b l ig a t io n #  Not even i f  
th e s e  s ta n d a rd s  a r e  th o u g h t  of as  e s t a b l i s h e d  th rough  a d iv in e  
r e v e la t io n #  T hat i e  t o  sa y , th e  f a c t  t h a t  something i s  commanded 
by God, i s  s t i l l  o n ly  a f o o t ,  \dierecis f o r  me to  say t h a t  Ï  ought to  do 
^  a sa a a  to aay t lia t  i.Javejc lec i(JM  th a t  t h is  i s  my d u ty .
From H a r e 's  p o in t  o f  v iew  a t  l e a s t ,  th e  " in f o r m a l i s t "  a t te m p t  
to  b r id g e  th e  gap between f a c t s  and v a lu e s  must be re p u d ia te d  a s  w ell*  
V/e u se  t h i s  te rm  a s  a  name of th e  t r e n d  i n  e t h i c a l  th e o ry ,  r e p re s e n te d
1* P.M. Newel1 - Smith q u o te s  (o p , c i t . , p . 3?)  th e  fo l lo w in g  passage  
from Bishop M ortim er, C h r i s t i a n  E th ic s  aa an example of t h i s  
k in d  of rea so n in g s  "The f i r s t  fo u n d a t io n  i s  the  d o c t r in e  o f  God 
th e  C re a to r .  God made iia and a l l  th e  w orld . Because of t h a t  
He has an  a b s o lu te  c la im  on our o b ed ien ce . We do n o t  e x i s t  i n  
o u r  own r i g h t  b u t  on ly  as  Mis c r e a t u r e s ,  who ought t h e r e f o r e  to  
do and be w hat Me d e s i r e s . "
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f or  In s ta n c e  by S. Hamehire* J .  Wisdom, S. ToiiiEiia a n d 'PJÎ* H owell-
?■Sm ith '',  They p o in t  o u t  t h a t  th e r e  i e  am a c tu a l  eom neetion between
f a c t s  and v a l u e s , or o b l ig a t i o n s ,  i n ■ordimary, "informal" language.
A statem ent of f a c t  can come to  imply a judgement abou t o b lig a t io n
i n  the normal convent!ons of language. And th in  im p lica tio n  i s
r e a liz e d  by anyone who Imoxvs th e s e  con ven tions, i . e .  ifho knows the
co n tex t in  which th e  sen ten ce i s  u tte r e d , "Contextual im p l ic a t io B " ,
which i e  th e  exp ression  used by Howel1-Smith, i s  broader than
" lo g ic a l  im p lica tio n " , and i t  i s  n o t  a e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  to  q u estion
p'Buch an im p lic a tio n , even i f  i t  i s  " l o g i c a l l y  odd"®"
E#M« Hare would o b je c t  to  a theory l i k e  i h l a ,  becau se, no m a tte r  
hew lo o se  the in fe r e n c e , any, a s s e r t io n  t h a t  such an in flu e n c e  i s
p o s s ib le  only  servos to  deprive a .moral judgement o f  what mal<es i t
%
m oral, i . e .  i t s  c h a r a c te r  of being an autonomous, f r e e  decision®
T his  o b je c tio n  does n o t  mean, however, th a t the  in fo r im i l i s t  
theory rep resen ts  any k ind  of c o g n i t iv is m  as opposed to  th e  t h e o r i e s  
m entioned e a r lie r #  N e w e lS m i th  speaks o f moral judgements as 
g iv in g  knowledge, b u t  t h i s  i s  p r a c t i c a l  knowledge, i . e .  Imowledge of
1. Besides Newel 1-Smith, Op#c i t . , fe5?împs the moat im portant
co n trib u tio n  to  th is  type of e th ic a l theory i s  S. Totilmin, An 
Examiimt!on of th e  .Place of Reason in  E th ics; 1930.
2# See Howell-SDÙth, Q p .c it». pp# 79ff 
3# See M , p#46#
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what to  do, n o t  t h o o r e t i c a l  knowledge, i . e .  knov/ledge t h a t  som ething 
1l a  th e  caae* "C on tex tua l i ia p l ic a t io n "  sim ply means t h a t  the
c r u c i a l  moral p rem iss  i s  t a c i t l y  assumed® The re a s o n -g iv in g
se n ten c e  does n o t  se rv e  a s  a s ta te m e n t  of f a c t  from which a moral
judgement i s  deduced, h u t  i t  i s ,  i n  th e  c o n te x t ,  a p r a c t i c a l
2se n te n c e  from th e  begim iing#
T his  meana t h a t  th e  q u e s t io n  of whence th e  key preM iea, i s  
s t i l l  unanswered, and i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  i t  should  s ta y  so , i f  
what we a r e  a sk in g  f o r  i s  a t h e o r e t i c a l  fo u n d a t io n  f o r  i t *
F i n a l l y ,  a c co rd in g  to  a  v iew  l i k e  th e  one we have t r i e d  to  
sk e tc h  above, th e  " i n t u i t i o i i i a t "  type  of e t h i c a l  th e o ry  must bo 
opposed a s  an a t te m p t  to  m a in ta in  an e t h i c a l  cogn itiv ism *  
I n tu i t i o n i s m  d ese rv es  r e c o g n i t io n  f o r  i t s  r e f u t a t i o n  of a l l  a t te m p ts  
to  d e f in e  moral words i n  te rm s of uon-raoral concepts*  But i t  s t i l l  
con tends  t h a t  th e se  term s s ta n d  f o r  p r o p e r t i e s  of an  in d e f in a b le  o r  
unanalyzabl© , i*o* a  s im p le ,  kind* And by ap p ly in g  th e s e  words to  
c e r t a i n  o b je c ts  m>ral judgem ents convey knowledge and can  th u s  be 
t r u e  and f a l s e .  Tliis knowledge, which r e p r e s e n t s  knowledge o f  
o b je c t i v e  v a lu e s ,  i s  n o t ,  however, a r r i v e d  a t  by way of lo g ic a l  
in f e r e n c o ,  b u t  by immediate ap p reh en s io n  through th e  s p e c ia l  f a c u l ty  
c a l l e d  i n t u i t i o n .
lo  O p.c it® , p . 11.
2 .  We c o n s id e r  t h i s  a f a i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  th e o ry ,  bog Wow^ ell»- 
^ I t h ,  O x>.cit,, pp . 79 ff*
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From a  p o in t  of view th e  i n t u i t i o B i s tB  have
r i g h t l y  no ted  t h a t  th ere  i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e o r e t i c a l  and 
p r a c t ic a l d isecn irse ,  o r  between em pirical and moral d is c o u r s e ,  but 
they m isrepresent the  d i f f e r e n c e  t o t a l l y #  They hold t h a t  th e  
d i f f e r e n c e  l i e s  i n  th e  d iffe r e n c e  between tho  s e t s  o f  o b je c ts  which 
a re d escrib ed  in  each case* so t h a t  moral d is c o u rs e  d e s c r ib e s  a  
s p e c ia l  world of objects®  In stead  th ey  should  have n o ticed  t h a t  
m oral words do an a lto g e th e r  d i f f e r e n t  job from words d escr ib in g  
t h i n g s .
I t  i e  c le a r  th a t*  i f  t h is  view  i e  c o r r e c t , i t  has  no longer an^ r 
meaning to  speak of moral v a lu e s  and o b l ig a t io n s  ub h av in g  o b je c t iv e  
v a l id i ty ®  We h e re  use  "objective"  in  the sense  of b e in g  a "datum ",
i*e«  som ething t h a t  i s  "given", e i t h e r  in  man’ s e x is te n c e  in  th e
w orld , or in  a realm  o f  values®
Both il#M« Hare and F®H® Nowell—Hmith make p e r fe c t ly  c l e a r  what 
th e  consequence of t h e i r  view s i s  i n  t h i s  respect®  Hare sa y s ,
speak ing  of d e c is io n s  o f moral p r i n c i p l e s ,
"If pressed  to  j u s t i f y  a d e c is io n  co m p le te ly ,  t/© have 
to  g iv e  ii com plete s p e c if ic a t io n  of the way o f l i f e  o f  which 
i t  i s  a  p art ®*® I f  the in q u irer  s t i l l  goes on a sk in g  'But why 
ahould  I  l i v e  l i k e  t l m t V ,  then there i s  no fu rth er  answer to
g iv e  him »»« We can on ly a sk  him to  make up h i s  own mind which 
way he ought to  l i v e ;  fo r  in  t h e  end e v e ry th in g  rest®  upon 
Buelx a d e c is io n  of p r in c ip le * " !
1» M » P*f»9.
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"Moral x>hi,l0sophy i s  a  p r a c t i c a l '  s c ie n c e ;  i t s  aim i s  
to  mm\rev q u e s t io n s  in  th e  form *V/hat s h a l l  Ï  do?*® But no 
g en e ra l  answer can  he g iven  to  t h i s  ty p e  of q u es tio n *  The 
most a  moral p h i lo s o p h e r  can do i s  to  p a i n t  a p i c t u r e  of 
v a r io u s  ty p e s  of  l i f e  i n  t h e  mamier of  P la to  and ash  which
tyxio of l i f e  you r e a l l y  w ant to  load* But t h i s  i s  a
dangerous t a s k  to  u n d e r ta k e ,  f o r  th e  typo of l i f e  you most 
want to  load  w i l l  depend on th o  s o r t  o f  man you are*  ® * «
The q u e s t io n s  ’What s h a l l  I do?* and ’What moral p r i n c i p l e s  
shou ld  I  a d o p t? ’ must he answered by each man f o r  h im s e l f ;
t h a t  a t  l e a s t  i s  p a r t  o f  th e  c o n n o ta t io n  of the  word ’m o ra l’ "*!
2I t  i s  th e r e f o r e  n o t  wide o f f  th e  mark when V/.K* Frankeua
re g a rd s  even th e  le«B extreme o f  th e  n o n - d e s c r i p t i v i s t  t h e o r i e s  a s
a d m i t t in g  a k in d  of b a s ic  r e l a t i v i s m  a f t e r  a l l *  "*** th ey  a lm ost
in v a r i a b ly  a l lo w  o r  even i n s i s t  t l i a t  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of tlicee  rea so n s
( s o i l*  f o r  e th ic a l  and v a lu e  judgem ents) i s  u l t i m a t e ly  r e l a t i v e ,
e i t h e r  to  tho  in d iv id u a l  o r  to  h i s  c u l tu re *  and, th e r e f o r e ,
c o n f l i c t i n g  b a s ic  judgements may be bo th  j u s t i f i e d  o r  j u s t i f i a b l e * "
O thers  i n t e r p r e t  th e s e  views i n  a s im i la r  way, e*g*
F*V/. H err in g  who h o ld s  t h a t  they  imply t h a t  "ch o ice s  a r e  »*•
3u l t i m a t e l y  a r b i t r a r y ,  t h a t  i s ,  non«-rational"*
T his consequence of th e  n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t  views i s  th e  rea so n  
why "v a lu e  n ih i l i s m "  has ga ined  cu r re n c y , a t  l e a s t  i n  B eand inav ia , 
a s  th e  name of t h i s  type  o f  e t h i c a l  theory* As have seen , t h i s  
must n o t  fee u n d ers to o d  a s  p r a c t i c a l ,  o r  s u b j e c t i v e ,  v a lu e  n ih i l i s m .
1* O p » c it* . pp* 319f*
a . I M ç â .  1963, p .91.
3 .  "Mt o t J i a a J ^ j m ",  Journal o f P hilosophy, 
L.1953, p.688.
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I t  m ight t h e r e f o r e  he m is le a d in g  to  use  terms l i k e  " r e la t iv i s m "  
and " a r b i t r a r i n e s s "  i n  t h i s  connection* But aa a ch a ra c te r iza tio n  
o f  th e  n o n - e o g n i t i v i a t  th e o ry  of how v a lu e  judgements a r e  r e l a t e d  
to  th e o r e t ic a l  s ta te m e n te  "value n ih ilism "  m ight a f t e r  a l l  ho a  
f a i r l y  adequate term*
What l i e s  a t  th e  ro o t o f a l l  th e  arguments of th e  n o n -o o g n lt iv ie t  
i s  a  c e r t a i n  view  of, th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between words which stand fo r  
v a lu e s  and words which stand fo r  f a c t s ,  o r  between value words and 
d e sc r ip t iv e  words * Or, to  p u t  i t  even more p r e c is e ly ,  i n  th e  term s 
of li.M* H are , t h e r e  i s  an im portant d is t in c t io n  to  ho made between 
" e v a lu a t iv e "  and " d e s c r ip t iv e "  meaning, lA lch  makes i t  n e c e ssa ry  to  
d i s t i n g u i s h  between v a lu e  words and d e sc r ip t iv e  words# Hare speaks 
q u i t e  e x p l i c i t l y  of "two c la s s e s   ^ o f  words" (underlined  by me} » 
C onsequently, ac co rd in g  to  t l i i e  v iew , we can speak of moral a s  w ell as  
non-moral words#
When, by t h e  use o f th e  l a s t  mentioned term s, the d é f in i  a t  theory  
i s  presented  as one t r y in g  to  d efin e  moral words i n  non-moral te ram , 
th ere  does n o t seem to be any o b je c t io n  which can p o ss ib ly  be made 
a g a i n s t  the non-cogni t i  v i  s t  r e fu ta t io n  o f  i t ;  fo r  the argument sim ply 
say s  t h a t  by d e f in in g  a  moral word in  term s of a non-moral one we a r e  
d e p r iv in g  i t  of what makes i t  m oral, i . e .  we are making i i  non-m ora l#
T his seems an a n a l y t i c a l  sen ten ce , and the d en ia l of i t  c l e a r l y  a f a l l a c y .
1 .  IR ,  p . 2 6 .
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The " n atu ra l!8t i c  f a l l a c y  i s  th u s  a  lo g ic a l  f a l la c y .
S im i la r ly ,  i t  seems l i k e  a  p la in , lo g ic a l  t r u t h  t h a t  we cam iot 
d e r iv e  a  lvalue s ta te m e n t  from a  s ta te m e n t  of f a c t s ;  because th e  
te rm  " s ta te m e n t  o f  f a c t "  i s  und ers to o d  to  mean a  " i io a -e v a lu a t iv e  
s ta te m e n t" .  The p rocedu re  i n  q u e s t io n  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  th e  f a l l a c i o u s  
one o f d e r iv in g  an e v a lu a t iv e  c o n c lu s io n  from e x c lu s iv e ly  
n o n -cv a lu a 't iv e  p re m is s e s .
The n o n -c o g n it iv is t  case  a g a in s t  i n tu i t io n ! s in  1ms a somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r ,  a t  l e a s t  on th e  fa c e  of i t .  A lthough 
a c c u s a t io n s  o f  in c o n s is te n c y  p la y s  some p a r t  i n  th e  a rg u m en ta tio n , 
e . g .  o f  P.M. N o w ell-B a ith , i t  might be f a ir ly  obvious t h a t ,  what i s  
r e a l l y  a t  ©take, i s  th e  e p is te m o lo g ic a l  and o n to lo g ic a l  co n cep tio n s  
on which in tu i t ! o n !e ra  i s  b a sed .  T h is  i s  most im p o r ta n t  to  n o te ,  f o r  
i t  i s  h e re  t h a t  th e  iimin c r i t i c i s m  of th e  n o n - c o g n i t i v ie t  t h e o r i e s  
w i l l  have to  s e t  i n .  The i n t u i t i o n ! s t  contends th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
b e l i e f  i n  nom -em pirical c o n c e p ts ,  i n t u i t i o n  a s  a, %my of g a in in g  
t h e o r e t i c a l  knowledge, s y n th e t ic  n e c e ssa ry  p r o p o s i t io n s  and non- 
n a t u r a l  p r o p e r t i e s .  This i s  what i s  in a c c e p ta b le  to  the non- 
c o g n i t i v i s t *
F o r ,  what we en co u n te r  i n  th e  t h e o r i e s  of th e  n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t s ,  
i s ,  we v e n tu re  to  say , a view  which i s  founded on th e  b a s ic  n o t io n s  
o f  l o g i c a l  em p iric ism , w i th  i t s  e p is te m o lo g ic a l  and o n to lo g ic a l  
im p l i c a t io n s .
Xn the ca se  of th e  l o g i c a l  e m p i r i c i s t s  them selves t h i s  vmn 
s a id  opesily, e . g .  by A .J .  A yer.
"There i s  s t i l l  one o b je c t io n  to  be raet b e fo re  we can 
c la im  to  j u s t i f y  our view t h a t  a l l  s y n th e t i c  p ro p o s i t io n s  
a r e  e m p ir ic a l  h y p o th è se s .  T h is  o b je c t io n  i s  b ased  on the  
common s u p p o s i t io n  t h a t  o u r  s p e c u la t iv e  knowledge 1b of two 
d i s t i n c t  k in d s ,  t h a t  which r e l a t e s  to  e m p ir ic a l  f a c t ,  and 
t h a t  which r e l a t e s  to  q u e s t io n s  of v a lu e .  I t  w i l l  be s a id  
t h a t  " s ta te m e n ts  of  v a lu e "  a r e  genuine s y n th e t i c  p r o p o s i t io n s ,  
b u t  t h a t  th e y  connot w ith  any show of j u s t i c e  be r e p re s e n te d  
a s  hyx>otheBes, which a r e  u sed  to  p r e d i c t  th e  co u rse  of our 
se n sa t io n s*  and , a c c o rd in g ly ,  t h a t  th e  e x is te n c e  of e t h i c s  
and ees th o tic s  a s  b ranches  o f  s p e c u la t iv e  knowledge p r e s e n t s  
an  in s u p e ra b le  o b je c t i o n  to  our r a d ic a l  e m p i r i c i s t  t h e s i s .
In  fa c e  of t h i s  o b je c t i o n ,  i t  i s  our b u s in e s s  to  g ive  
an  accoun t of "judgemexits of v a lu e "  which i s  bo th  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
i n  i t s e l f  and c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  our g e n e ra l  e m p i r i c i s t  p r i n c i p l e s .  
We s h a l l  s e t  o u r s e lv e s  to  show t l i a t  i n  so f a r  a s  s ta te m e n ts  of 
v a lu e  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  th ey  e r e  o rd in a ry  " s c i e n t i f i c "  
s ta te m e n ts  I and t h a t  i n  so f a r  ae th e y  a r e  n o t  s c i e n t i f i c ,  
th e y  a r e  n o t  i n  th e  l i t e r a l  se n se  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  b u t  a r e  sim ply 
e x p re s s io n s  of em otion which can be n e i t h e r  t r u e  n o r  f a l s e . "
I t  i s  on t h i s  background Ayer d e a ls  w ith  id ia t he c a l l s  th e  
" a b s o l u t i s t "  o r  " i n t u i t i o f i i e t "  th e o ry  of e th ic s ?
"C on sid er in g  th e  use  which we have made of th o  p r i n c i p l e  
t h a t  a  s y n th e t i c  p r o p o s i t io n  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  on ly  i f  i t  i s  
e m p i r i c a l ly  v e r i f i a b l e ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  th e  ac cep tan ce  of an 
’a b s o l u t i s t  th e o ry  o f  e t h i c s ’ would undermine tho whole of our 
main arguBient." '
A lthough th e r e  i s  among a n a l y t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h e rs  to -d a y  a 
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  speak of d i f f e r e n t  k in d s  of meaning, o r  d i f f e r e n t  u se s  
03b f u n c t io n s  of w ords, tlie co n c ep tio n  of fac ixm l meaning i s  i n  a l l  
main e s s e n t i a l s  th e  same, d e s p i t e  a l l  re fo j?m ulations of th e  p r i n c i p l e
1 .
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o f  v e r i f i a b i l i t y  (o r  f a l s i f l a b i l i t y ) #
A ooordingly, knowledge ( i f  i t  i s  n o t a n a ly t i c }  i s  knowledge of 
e m p ir ic a l  f a c t ,  knowledge gained  th rough  em p irica l  ob servation , or 
a t  l e a s t  t e s t a b l e  by em p ir ica l  ob serva tion .
The im portant t i l in g  h e re  i s  n o t  f i r s t  of a l l  the  l i g h t  th is  
Blight throw on th e  n o n -c o g n it iv is t  r e je c t io n  of i i t t i i i t io n is m ,  b u t  
i t s  s ig n if ic a n c e  fo r  uad era  tan,ding tho s e p a ra t io n  of f a c t  and va lue  
i n  a n a l y t i c a l  philosophy aa a w hole, Wc must observe both what 
i ion -cogn itiv iam  demies and what i t  a s s e r t s .  I t  d en ies knowledge of 
v a lu e , and i s  i n  so fa r  a t  odds with i n t u i t i om ise. But i t  a s s e r t s
knowledge of em pirical f a c t .  The l a t t e r  m ight be th e  most 
im p o r ta n t  from th e  p à i n t  of view of e t h i c a l  theory, and i n  t h i s  
l a t t e r  r e s p e c t  i t  i s  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  opposed to in tu i t io m is m .
For a l th o u g h  in tu it io n ism  a t t r i b u t e s  an o th e r  s ta tu s  to  valu es  
than do the n o B - c o g n i t iv i s t  th e o r ie s  i t  i s  a t  one w ith  no îi-cognit iv i s ia  
in  the r e f u t a t i o n  of any d e f in i s t  th e o ry ,  and we want to  ask whether 
t i l l s  i s  n o t because i t  l a  i t s e l f  moulded on the form of em piricism .
The one a s s e r t s  taow led^e of va lue  a s  d i s t i n c t  from knowledge of 
e m p ir ic a l  f a c t ,  the other a s s e r t s  va lue  judgements as  d is t in c t  from 
knowledge of em pirical f a c t .  That i s  to  say , non—co g n itiv ism  i s
ex c lu s iv e  towards i n t a i t i o n i s m  in  t h a t  i t  den ies knowledge a p a r t  from 
the em p ir ica l, but th e re  m ight be an a f f i n i t y ,  a t  l e a s t ,  between the  
two i n  the  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of em pirical f a c t  i t s e l f .
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The q u e s t io n  i s  n o t  on ly  w hether  th e r e  a r e  " o th e r"  f a c t e  th an  
th o s e  acknowledged on th e  p r i n c i p l e  of om piideal v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  b u t 
f i r s t  o f  a l l  w hether th e re  i s  more to  the  " f a c t s "  th a n  th e  e m p i r i c i s t  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of them w i l l  a l lo w  for®
Thus we a r e  le a d  to  a  q u e s t io n in g ,  n o t  only  of n o n -c o g n it iv ism  
i n  e t h i c s  b u t a l s o  of i n tu i t i o n ! s m  i t s e l f  « For d e s p i te  a l l  i t s  t a l k  
a b o u t  n o n -n a tu ra l  p r o p e r t i e s  th e  s e p a r a t io n  of th e s e  from n a t u r a l  
p r o p e r t i e s  I s  seen a s  a  c l e a r - c u t  m a tte r*  Knowledge of n a to r a l  
p r o p e r t i e s ,  c o n s t i t u t i n g  th e  f a c t u a l ,  i s  one th in g ,  and knowledge o f  
v a lu e s  i s  a n o th e r  th in g ,  som ething a d d i t io n a l*  T h ere fo re  
i n t u i t i o n i s m  can go w e ll  to g e th e r  w i th  th e  o th e r  types  of a n a l y t i c a l  
p h ilo so p h y  i n  i t s  r e j e c t i o n  of any lo g i c a l  co n n ec tio n  between f a c t  and 
v a lu e  *
The im p o r ta n t th in g  i s  th e  em p& ricis t b a s i s  f o r  th e  s e p a r a t io n  of 
f a c t  and v a lu e ,  id m tev e r  s t a t u s  m ight be g iven  £o va lues*  That i s  to  
sa y ,  th e  im portance  l i e s ,  n o t  i n  th e  d e n ia l  of v a lu e s  as  o x i s t e n t s ,  b u t  
i n  th e  e m p i r i c i s t  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  fa c tu a l*
We w i l l  u n d e r ta k e  t h i s  q u e s t io n in g  by c o n c e n tr a t in g  on th e  non« 
e o g î î i t i v i s t  view of E*M* H are, and a l th o u g h  we th in k  t h a t  we s h a l l  
th e re b y  expose th e  b a s ic  e lem ents  i n  any th e o ry  which s e p a r a te s  f a c t  
and v a lu e  t h i s  w i l l  n o t  be argued  any f u r t h e r  iliau  i s  d o n e  i n  t ld o  
ch ap te r*  I* G .,  how f a r  our argument in  the  fo l lo w in g  w i l l  app ly  to
o th o i views th an  th a t  of Il*M, must be dec ided  on th e  background
of what we have s a id  above*
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Because em" s p e c ia l  I n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  to  c o n s id e r  the  
p o s s ib le  r o le  of a  th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c  to -d a y ,  we s h a l l  f i r s t  ask  
what l i g h t  th e  d is c u s s io n  of the  r e l a t i o n  between f a c t  and v a lu e  
m ight throw  o b  th e  q u e s t io n  of how th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  i s  to  be 
understood* ¥e s h a l l  a sk  whether th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  can be
^  KTttfltyregRrs»
u n d ers to o d  in  term s of th e  f a c t  and value sep ara tion , and i f  n o t,
wheiAer a s tu d y  of th e o lo g ic a l  e th ic s  can i t s e l f  su g g es t  a new 
approach  to  th e  g en era l, p h i lo s o p h ic a l ,  th e o ry  of e th ic s  to-day *
In  th e  n e x t  ch ap te rb  we s h a l l  draw a t t e n t i o n  to  some 
e x p l i c i t l y  or i m p l i c i t l y  th e o lo g ic a l  con sid era tion s of the e t h i c a l  
problem . We <io n o t  c la im  t h a t  th e  view s d iscu ssed  a r e  
n e c e s s a r i ly  e idm ustivo , b u t  we have chosen some views which we f in d  
w orthy o f d is c u s s io n  in  th e  p r e s e n t  co n tex t, r e p r e s e n t in g  a s  th ey  do 
markedly d i f f e r e n t  approaches to  th e  problem of th e o lo g ic a l  e th ic s#
1 1 . ÏHî-mOGICAl, KTHÏCS IN B(E LIGHT «F 'OSK FACT-ANB-VALUN PH.OBLKM.
1 .  F a c ts  and th o  e t h i c a l  demand i n  K,K, Ldgetm>*B though t
1In  th e  w r i t i n g s  o f  IC,E« LSgstrup r/c f in d  a view of e t h i c s  
which oeemB to  bo f l a t l y  c o n t r a d ic t i n g  tiite th e o ry  o f  e th ic s  in  
a n a l y t i c a l  philosophy*
L bgatm p  h o ld s  th e  r a d i c a l  v iew  t h a t  th e re  i s  no p a r t i c u l a r  
" C h r is t ia n "  e t h i c  a s  opposed to  an e t h i c  on g e n e r a l ly  human 
p re m is s e s .  The t t h i c a l  deritand which meeto us i n  th e  te a c h in g  o f  
J 08UB i s  th e  demand which be longs  t o  human e x i s te n c e  a s  such , and 
w hatever p a r t i c u l a r  r o l e  tiieolofsy m ight have i n  r e l a t i o n  to  e t h i c s  
i t  cannot be b a s i c a l l y  o th e r  #iaii t h a t  of making p o s s ib le  a  deeper 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of Hie g en e ra l  e t h i c a l  demand, I t  does n o t  p ro v id e  
u s  w i th  any p a r t i c u l a r  s ta n d a rd  f o r  d e c id in g  what to  do, l e t  a lo n e  
any such e x c lu s iv e  s tan d ard *
I t  miglit be added t h a t  LOgstrup i s  n o t  by t h i s  say ing  an y th in g  
e n t i r e l y  now* He i s  r a t h e r  g iv in g  a  very  o r ig in a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
of a  view wliieh i s  q u i t e  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  a  L n them n 
th e o lo g y ,  namely t h a t  th e  knowledge of God's w i l l  b e lo n g s  to  man a s  
such  and i s  n o t  co n f in e d  to  th e  c o n te n t  of th e  C hris t^^ reve la tion*
I* H is main work i n  th e  f i e l d  o f  m orals  i s  Den e t i s k e  F o rd r in g ,  1956, 
German t r a n s l a t i o n  l)ie  e t h i a c he . . Thi s  i s  a  x^olume o f  
e s sa y s  d e a l in g  w ith  Ute b a s i s  o f  m o ra li ty #  In  ICvmst og e t i k # 1961, 
he d e a l s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w ith  problem s in  c o n n e c tio n  w ith  a r t s  and 
ïîiorala, b u t  th e  book has a  poleiaie  appendix i n  which L bgstrup  
e n t e r s  in to  a b r i e f  d i s c u s s io n  w ith  some o f  th e  c r i t i c s  o f  Bon
S*1b!E -£ 2 £ M 2 E *
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Lîigstoips t h e r e f o r e , . s t a r t s  e x p l i c i t l y  w ith  t h e  g e n e ra l  
human s i t u a t i o n ,  c la im in g  t h a t  th e  answer to  th e  e t h i c a l  q u e s t io n  i s  
to  bo found by a  s tudy  o f  th e  phenomena of human e x i s te n c e ,  and 
th e  phenomenon LOgstrup f i r s t  wants to  make th e  o b je c t  o f  h i s  
Btndy i s  " t r u s t " *
Lügotrup c la im s  t h a t  t r u s t  i s  th e  b a s ic  phenomenon of m an 's  
moral e x i s te n c e ,  T ru s t  i s  a  f a c t  which i s  given w ith  our 
e x i s te n c e  to g e th e r  a s  men, T hat i s  to  sa y ,  i t  i s  n o t  an a t t i t u d e  
which mon a r b i t r a r i l y  chooses to  Bhow towards o th e r  p e rso n s ,  b u t  
i t  b e lo n g s ,  r a t h e r ,  to  th e  b a s ic  e lem ents of h i s  l i f e ,
LiSgstrup s t a r t s  w ith  th e  t h e s i s  t h a t ,  " I t  be longs to  ou r  
human l i f e  t h a t  when we m eet, vm norm ally  do so hoving  a n a tu r a l  
t r u s t  i n  each o t h e r " , T h a t  i s ,  our t r u s t  i s  extended n o t  on ly  to  
perso n s  whom, we know we 11, b u t  a l s o  to th e  s t r a n g e r ,  P pec la l 
th in g s  must have happened b e fo re  a  s t r a n g e r  i s  met i d t h  d i s t r u s t ,  e ,g , 
b e t r a y a l  in  war o r  under  d i c t a t o r - r u l e .  Wo norm ally  b e l i e v e  t h a t  
a  p e rso n  idiom we meet i n  th e  r  a i  limy compartment, i s  n o t  ly in g  o r  
s t e a l i n g .  We t r u s t  him u n t i l  h i s  words o r  b ehav iou r r a i s e s  our 
s u s p ic io n ,  o r  our d i s t r u s t  i s  caused  by e a r l i e r  u n fo r tu n a te  
e x p e r ie n c e s  w ith  fo l lo w  t r a v e l l e r s .
1 ,  Den e t i s k e  fo r d r in g ,  h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to a s  E ,F , ,  p*17
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To bo man iïriplitïs b e in g  in  a r e l a t lo i i a h ip  of t r u s t a  D i s t r u s t  
ÎB c o n t r a ry  to  l i f e  i t s e l f .  That l a ,  i f  d i s  t r u s t  voro  a b a s ic  
f e a t u r e  of m en 's e n c o u n te r s ,  l i f e  i t s e l f  would in  f a a l  be i î i ip o ss ib le ,  
because we would e.lv/a^fs i n  advance b e l ie v e  each o th e r  to  s t e a l ,  l i e ,  
p re te n d  and deceive*
T h a t  t r u s t  i s  fu j id m n e n ta l  f o r  o u r  e x i s t e n c e  c a n  a l s o  b e  s e e n ,  
I J Ig a tr i ip  s a y s  g f ro m  t h e  vehem ence o f  o u r  r e a c t i o n  w hen somol^ody 
a b u s e s  o u r  t r u s t ,  i . e ,  coramite a  ‘‘b r e a c h  o f  f a i t h " *  To t r u s t  i n
somebody moans to  g i v e  o n e s h l f  ai-jay,  a n d  a  p e r s o n  who t a k e s  
a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  I  h a v e  i n  h im , h a s  n o t  r e a l l y  a c c e p t e d  
i)jy t r u s t *  He h a s  n o t  r e s p o n d e d  t o  jjjy g i v i n g  m y s e l f  away* T h a t  
i s  why I  r e a c t  so  s t r o n g l y * • . . .
E*goS T ru s t  b e lo n g s , éays L o g s trn p , in  an e lem en ta ry  se n se ,  to  
a l l  d ia lo g u e*  The p e rso n  who a d d re s se s  a n o th e r  p e rso n ,  g iv e s  
h im se lf  away, and th e re b y  a c e r t a i n  demand i s  l a i d  upon t h i s  o th e r  
person* T h is  does not on ly  mean t h a t  he i s  under  an o b l ig a t i o n  to  
g iv e  an answer t o  what th e  f i r s t  one sa id#  N e i th e r  does th e  
g iv iB g-oncB elf-aw ay dépend upon whgt i s  s a id ,  i t s  p r i v a t e  c h a r a c te r  
a#s*Oe I t  means, r a t h e r ,  t h a t  i n  a d d re s s in g  a n o th e r  p e rso n ,  no 
m a t te r  what th e  im portance  of what i s  s a id ,  ti c e r t a i n  tone  i s  
s tru ck *  He who speaks s t e p s  o u ts id e  h im se lf  in  o rd e r  to  e x i s t  on ly
i n  th e  d i a l o g u e - r e l a t i o n  to  th e  o the r*  The demand wiiieh i s  l a i d
upoia th e  o t h e r ,  io  the  demand t o  a c c e p t  Uie sp eak er  h im s e l f ,  by
ta k in g  up h i s  tone* Not to  h e a r ,  o r  to  r e f u s e  to  h e a r  the  tone
which he s t r i k e s ,  i s  sim ply to  ig n o re  th e  s e l f  of th e  sp e a k e r ,
f o r  i t  i s  h i s  o\m s e l f  which th e  sp eak er  exposes when he a d d re s se s
■ %
th e  o th e r  person*
L bgetrup’ s a n a ly s i s  m ight he exposed to  some n a iv e  misunder™ 
s ta n d in g s  which i t  i s  n e c e ss a ry  to  p o in t  o u t ,
Faying t h a t  t r u s t  i s  a  fundam en ta l,  or p rim ary  o r  elemontar^r
f e a t u r e  of man*K l i f e  L hgstrup  does n o t  p re ten d  to  s t a t e  any 
s t a t i s t i c a l  f a c t  ab o u t th e  amount of t r u s t  t h a t  can be found among 
men, t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  th e re  i s  more t r u s t  tim n d i s t r u s t  i n  th e  w o rld .  
N e i th e r  i s  lie sabring t h a t  t r u s t ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  d i s t r u s t ,  i s
th e  p r im ary  phenomenon i n  th e  sense  t h a t  th e  l a t t e r  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y
p
s u c c e s s iv e  to  th e  form er in  time# '
2* One p assag e , in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  i n  E#F#, p ,2 4 ,  m ight have g iven  r i s e  
to  such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n *  He c la im s su p p o r t  f o r  th e  r e s u l t  of 
h i s  as ittly s is  from th e  s c ie n c e s  of psychology and p sy c h ia t iy #
They have shomi how th e  whole of a  c h i l d ' s  f u tu r e  l i f e  can be 
de term ined  by th e  a d u l t ' s  behav iou r towards i t *  The c h i ld  i s  
n o t  capab le  of showing r e s e rv e d  t r u s t ,  because i t  has  n o t  le a rn e d
*  ^  «M kC6»i6gwv*ii«eiûW9s!i»
to  nuiko an^r r e s e r v a t i o n s .  The r e s e r v a t io n s  which the  c h i ld  makes, 
a r e  autommtic p sy ch ic  r e a c t io n s  which fo l lo w  th e  d isap p o in tm en t of  
th e  c h i l d ' s  u n c o n d i t io n a l  t r u s t*  The l e t t i n g  down of a c h i ld ,  m ig h t ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  d e p r iv e  i t  of i t s  courage  f o r  th e  r e s t  o f  i t s  l i f e *
This example, f o r  L O gstm p, i s  an i n d i c a t i o n  of th e  r e l a t i o n
between t r u s t  and d i s t r u s t *
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The BuccessloB in  tim e between t r u s t  and d l s t r u s t  i n  the
l i f e  of zm in d iv id u a l  i s  r a t h e r  a m a n i f e s ta t io n  of what i s  r e a l l y
a  p recedence  i n  rank»^
The q u e s t io n  of w hat i s  " f i r s t "  ami what i s  " l a s t "  i s  a
q u e s t io n  of  what - i s  b a s ic  and id ia t i s  d e r iv a t iv e  * T ru s t  i s  th e
hauxc pheiiopaenoii, and  d i s t r u s t  comes from th e  la c k  of t r u s t ,  and
i s  i t s  nega tion*  T h is  i s  why we do n o t  have to  g iv e  re a s o n s  f o r
o u r t r u s t ,  w h ile  wo have to  j u s t i f y  o u r ■d i s t r u s t *
But i s  t h i s  a  s u f f i c i e n t  re a so n  f o r  m a in ta in in g  t h a t  th e r e
i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  rank  between t r u s t  and d i s t r u s t ?  I s  mot t h i s  to
9smuggle th e  e v a lu a t io n  in to  th e  a n a ly s i s ? "  To say  s o le ly  t h a t  
d i s t r u s t  i s  th e  n e g a t io n  of t r u s t  i s  n o t  to  say t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  
" b e t t e r "  th a n  th e  f i r s t #  I t  m ight even he though t t h a t  LUgstiiip
1# Of* Kun s t  OF. e t ik #  h e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  I®, pp« 190ff
r ill , I f ,  1 '|P f ^  v  A . ,L  ^
This i s  what o*g# Gunimr lU llm x ia l  accu ses  L ogstn ip  of do ing , 
In  T eo lqM sk  och f i l o s o f i o k  e t i k ,  195B#
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îiao j u s t  becB m is lead  by, o r  t h a t  he has e x p lo i te d ,  th e
a m b ig u ity .o f  th e  term s " p o s i t iv e "  and " n e g a t iv e " ,  and t h a t  he
th in k s  he can draw a coiieluBioii abou t v a lu e  from th e  gram m atical
8 ù ru e tu re  of th e  w o rd -p a ir  " t r u s t - d i a t r n e t " *
We have to  b ea r  i n  mind, however, t h a t  U g B trn p  i e  n o t
p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith  a s tu d y  o f  words, b u t  of th e  phenomena
which l i e  behind th e  words* So he i e  n o t  j u s t  a rg u in g  on th e
b a s i s  of term inology*
But i s  he © t i l l  d e r iv in g  h is  s ta te m e n t  about the o rd e r  of
v a lu e  bctwoen t r u s t  and d i s t r u s t  from th e  f a c t  t h a t  d i s t r u s t  i s
th e  n e g a t io n  of t r u s t ?  I f  he i s  a rg u ie g  on a .formal b a s i s  o n ly ,
th e n  th e  c o n c lu s io n  i s  n o t  co n v in c in g , to  say the  l e a s t ,
/mil a d m it te d ly ,  IW g s tru p 's  fo rm u la t io n s  m ight be unguarded
a t  t h i s  p o in t  and th e r e f o r e  seem r e c d i ly  exposed to  c r i t i c i s m .
He q u i t e  sim ply aesumes t h a t  the  q u e s t io n  o f  what i s  b as ic
i s  th e  same ms th e  q u e s t io n  o f  what i s  s u p e r io r  i n  r a n k ,
"Stangeriip  ( i , e «  one of M g s t r u p 's  c r i t i c s )  asks  
abou t what i s  f i r s t  and what i a  l a s t  i n  t im e , w h i le ,  
f o r  me, th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between f i r s t  and l a s t  i s  r a t h e r  
a d i f f e r e n c e  i n  rank# What I  have i n  mind i s  the
q u e s t io n  of wliat i s  b a s ic "  ,
And th e  B u r r e p t i t i o u  seems even more e v id e n t  in  th e  fo l lo w in g  
passages
1. KE, p .190,
esn sB S D »  ■®' *
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"The e x p e r ien ce  of n o v e l i s t s  shows ns  -  i f  we ask  
ab o u t t h e  o rd e r  of rank  -  t h a t  d i s t r u a t  i s  based on 
t r u s t  a s  i t s  nega tion"**
We th in k ,  however, th a t-w o  m iss L ë g s t rn p ts  p o in t i f  we 
sim ply take  th is  as a m isuse of: words or as a leap  in  th e  
argument# - .
The I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of what i s  b a sic  w ith  what i s  o f  v a lu e  
i s ,  i n  t h i s  con n ection , not ct m ethodical presupposition^ hut a 
r e s u lt  of L O g a tru p * s .a n a ly s is  of tr u s t  and d is t r u s t ,  even i f  h# 
never s t a t e s  tM s  e x p l i c i t ly  h im se lf  *
The way lie i s  th in k in g  becomes a  b i t  c le a r e r  when we consider  
what lie sfiya in  a n o th e r  p la c e i
tr u s t  and d i s t r u s t  a r e  two vaya in  which man 
understands h is  l i f e  and h im self#  ««# i t  i s  part of 
th e  se lf-u n d ersta n d in g  o f t r u s t ,  t h a t  i t  i s  something
p o s i t i v e ,  in  th e  same way as  i t  i s  p&rt of the s e l f — 
uîiderBtaiidiîig of d is t r u s t ,  th a t i t  i s  something negative*
I t  i s  no ev a lu a tio n  which comes a fte n m rd s , and to  which 
t r u s t  and d i s t r u s t  a r e  made su b je c t, hut i t  be longs to  
the phenomena them selves* I t  l i e s ,  th e re fo re , a ls o  i n  
the meaning o f  th e  two words* To e v a lu a te  t r u s t  a s  
something n e g a t iv e  i s  a g a in s t  the essen ce of t r u s t ,  anil 
i t  i s  contrary to  thé meaning of th e  word"-^*
I t  i f i l î  be n o ticed  t h a t  " p o s i t iv e "  and "negative" a re  h e re  
c l ë a r l y  u sed  i n  th e  sen se  of "good" and "b ad "» F u r th e r ,  th a t
1. M , p. 191. 
8 . M ,  p .193.
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îillgatriip f in d s  the ev a lu a tio n  of t r u s t  and d is tr u s t  as good and 
bad epee l i v e l y ,  in  the words them selves. But the words have
th is  character because i t  belongs to  the phenomena which they  
c o v e r ,
% the exp ression  " self-u n d erstan d in g" , Lîlgstrup wants to  
say th a t t r u s t  fo r c e s  upon us an understanding o f i t s e l f  as good.
In the proper sense i t  i s ,  th e r e fo re , im p o ssib le , says 
îd îgstrup, to  understand tr u s t  as something n eg a tiv e ,
*■ V  ejTj^ iw ifr-.wffK.'itf.g B^ m w iiKSw ao  * ^
We may, however, s t i l l  ev a lu a te  i t  as something n eg a tiv e , 
lie continues* But t h is  i e  p o s s ib le  only i f  we adopt a p o in t o f  
'yiew which i s  fo r e ig n  to  t r u s t ,  and contrary to  i t s  own 
p resen ta tio n  o f i t s e l f .  This i s  not on ly  a th e o r e t ic a l  
p o s s ib i l i ty #  I t  i s  indeed something th a t happens q u ite  freq u en tly .
We eva lu a te  tr u s t  as something n e g a tiv e , because in  a g iven  
circum stance i t  might be dangerous to show t r u s t .  Because 
people might abuse the t r u s t  of a c h ild , we have to teach  i t  not 
to  t r u s t  people under such and such co n d itio n s . That Iidgain ip 's  
argument here i s  n a iv e ly  exposed to  c r it ic !e m  must be adm itted ,
A p o ss ib ly  more adequate accoim t of the fa c t  o f our complex 
a t t itu d e  towards tr u s t  w i l l  be d iscu ssed  below .
F ir s t ,  the fo llo w in g  must be noted; W gstrup does not want 
to  say th a t t r u s t  i s  a n eu tra l phenomenon which we are a t  l ib e r ty
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to  understand e i th e r  me p o s it iv e  or n eg a tiv e . We can evaluate
<ifl5«î6V,yfcs56flWîM«!Ê»^  ^ •* «wawa*fj>*a»«!Wss,n*ï«R»fcaM
i t  nega tive ly  only in  s p it e  o f  " i t s  under standing o f  i t s e l f " .
Correspondingly# a p o s it iv e  ev a lu a tio n  of d i s t r u s t  i s  poss ib le
1only in  s p it e  o f  i t s  understanding of. i t s e l f  as negative#
I t  might he appropriate to q u estion  lU gstrup ' s way o f  
exp ressin g  h is  view on t h i s  p o in t .  To say th a t  we caimot 
"understand" tr u s t  negatively# but on ly  "evaluate" i t  n egatively#
fey a hind of secondary procedure, as i t  w ere, seems most 
unfortunate  fo r  Ldgstrup 'e own argument. I t  seems to  in d ica te  
j u s t  wlmt he wants to deny, namely, th a t  the value a sp ec t ie
something which cornea "afterw ards", and which i s  added fey our
2eva lua tion ,
There i s ,  however, no m istaking what LUgetrup im nts to
maintains
"Whether something i s  p o s i t iv e  or n eg a tiv e , good
or bad, i s  not determined only when we evaluate  i t  g i t  
i s  not decided only when we take p o ssess io n  of i t .  My 
l i f e  lias taken possession  of mo b efore I have taken  
possession  of ny l i f e ,  l i f e  has given  me to  understand
what i s  good and what i s  bad, before I  eva lu a te  i t  and 
decide on the a t t i t u d e  to adopt towards i t ,  I might then 
«•« make up my mind th a t  i t  i s  r ig h t  in  a given s itu a t io n  
to  fu r th er  what l i f e  i t s e l f  has taught mo i s  something 
n eg a tiv e , e .g ,  when I teach a c h ild  to show d i s t r u s t ,
1 , See &W, pp. 1 9 3 ff .
2, The r e la t io n  between the Danish word-pair "verdi—vurdering"  
i s  the same as th a t  between th e  English words "value" and 
"evalua tion" .
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That i s  to say, our evaluation  might he contrary  to  the 
phenomena*e own determ ination of thornselves as good and 
bad, hut i t  cannot snepond i t ;  i t  cimnot make the 
pïieuomena themselves e th ic a l ly  i n d i f f e r e n t " ! *
However, the way in  which LMgstrup here d is t ln g u i shoe 
between "imdoutstanding" and "evaluation" seems to  in troduce a 
c e r ta in  ambiguity in  h is  theo ry * What i s  r e a l ly  the b as is  fo r  
m orality? Is  i t  the understanding which i s  given with the 
phenomenon i t s e l f ,  or i s  i t  my secondary evaluation of i t ?  The 
a n a ly s t  would c e r ta in ly  understand Lbgetrup 's view in  the second 
sense, and say th a t  a f t e r  a l l  he admits th a t  the bas is  of m orality  
3 8 to  be found nowhere e ls e  than in  niy own decision  of what i s  to 
count as good and bad*
The reason why hOgatrup in troduces the ambiguity which lays
him open to th i s  in te rp re ta t io n ,  i s  ev iden tly  th a t  he wants to  find
a 1/ay of accounting fo r  the complexity of the moral s i tu a t io n ,  e*g#
the  f a c t  th a t  we do not always th ink  i t  r ig h t  to show tru s t*
But Lfigstrup could bave given a more co n s is te n t  account of t h i s  
w ith in  the context of h is  own thooiy# I t  could he aiquied Ceg* th a t  
the re  i s  no s in g ly  phenomenon of human ex istence which forms the 
b a s is  of m orality , but a nmnbor of phenomena which must be taken 
together# One might, fo r  example, but need not n e c e ssa r i ly ,  speak
1. IsK., p.194.
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of c o n f l ic t in g  duties® In any oa#e, i t  i s  p e r fe c t ly  possib le  
to  maintain th a t  i t  i s  th e  phoiiomonon or phenomena theme el vos 
which teach im t h a t  i t  i s  not always r ig h t  to show trust®
As i t  ia  lidgstrup i s  now l e f t  w ithout the p o s s ib i l i ty  of 
saying th a t  a value judgement i s  a statem ent of v a lu e , i.e®  a 
statem ont of the understanding which l i f e  i t s e l f  has g iven  me of 
what io  good and what i s  bad* The ambiguity re ferred  to  above 
seems to  blur the  d i s t in c t io n  between a statem ent of the  
phenomena's own determ ination  of them selves as good and bad, and 
BB exp ression  of my su b jec tiv e  a t t itu d e  towards the phenomena*
We do not say th a t  th e  former statem ent can be ab s tra c ted  from 
an exp ression  of a t t i tu d e ,  we would rather say th a t  a t t i tu d e  i s  
always implied in  such a sta tem ent, but we are saying th a t  i t  i s  
always po ss ib le  to  a b str a c t  one 's  su b jec tiv e  a t t i tu d e  from the 
im derstanding which i s  given by th e  phenomena th em selves. That 
i s  to say , i t  i s  always p o s s ib le  to ignore th i s  understanding and 
no t claim any cognitive  s ta tu e  fo r  oae 'e  " eva lu ation s" . I f  th is  
i s  the d is t in c t io n  Lbgstrup r e a l ly  wants to make when he 
d is t in g u ish e s  between "understanding" and "evaluation" , and of 
which he only makes an improper use , then we have no o b je c tio n  to 
i t*  I t  would seem ra th er  to be a usefu l means o f r e la t in g ,  and 
d is t in g u ish in g  between, the views of LUgstrap and e .g .  ll.M. Haro*
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lloth would then bo saying th a t  i t  i s  q u ite  p o s s ib le  to take 
i;ip any a t t i tu d e  towards, i .e #  make any evaluation  o f , a given 
fact*  But while Hare would say t h a t  th i s  i s  r e a l ly  th e  b as is  of 
m orality# Lllgstriip would say th a t  t h i s  hasia  l i e s  elsewhere, 
namely in  the phenomena' a p re sen ta tio n  of themselves,- and th a t  
the  eva lu a tion  muot always he soon on the  background of the 
understanding which I s  given th e r e .
Log strap  i s  well aware t l ia t  h is  concern brings him in to  
c o n f l ic t  with ce r ta in  contemporary p h ilo so p h ica l views,
" I t  i s  stran ge th a t  n e i th e r  the  an ti-m etap h ysica l - 
philosophy nor e x is te n t ia l is m  w ill  recogn ize the 
mitlerstanding o f what i s  good and bad, which comes from 
our e x is te n c e  i t s e l f #  they only want to know of the « 
determ ination  which l a  a r e s u l t  of iny own evaluation" ,
By the term " anti-m etaphysica l philosophy" Ligstriip i s  
ev idently  r e fe r r in g  to what we have# ra th o r  vagu ely , c a lle d  
" a n a ly tica l philosophy", as i t  p re v a ils  in  the  Anglo-Saxon and, 
to  some e x te n t , th e  Scandinavian co u n tr ies  to -d a y ,
We sh a l l  e lse  where question  th e  legitim acy of id e n t ify in g  
the viei-s of a n a ly t ic a l  philosophy and e x is te n t ia l ism  in  th i s  
r e s p e c t . t l ia t  i s  of i n t e r e s t  here i s  to no tice  th a t  LCIgetrap 
i e  conscious of the fundamental philosophical po in t a t  issue
i .  m , p .194.
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between him and M s c r i t ic s *  He ( r ig h t ly )  id e n t i f i e s  e*g« 
l i i l lo r d a l ' e  view  w ith  th a t o f a n a ly t ic a l p h ilosophy, ■
ï l i l le rd a l#  In one passage# accu ses M gs trap of "moving 
d i r e c t ly  from an an a ly s is  o f a commonly occurring r e la t io n ,  
t h a t  of t r u s t ,  to  a p o s it iv e  évaluation  of th i s  as something  
good". For H ille r d a l i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  "from a purely  
phenomenological ana lye ia  can never follow th a t ,  what i s  exposed, 
i s  r i g h t  and desirab le"*
Ltîgstriip, on the  other hand, holds th a t ,  " i t  i s  true th a t  the 
phenomonologlcal a n a ly s is ,  taken by i t s e l f ,  i s  n e u tra l ,  but not 
the phenomenon which i t  examines* I f  tr u s t  i s  the o b jec t of i t s  
a n a ly s is ,  the  d e s i r a b i l i t y  belongs to  th a t  which we become 
conscious of in  th e  phenomenological analysis"#*
F a r t  of th i s  passage we f in d  q u e stio n a b le , th a t ,  namely, 
where i t  i s  maintained th a t  th e  phenomenaIogioal a n a ly s is ,  token  
by i t s e l f ,  i s  n e u tr a l.
What could t h is  be taken to mean?
In the f i r s t  p la ce  i t  could  mean ju s t  what Ldgstrup has 
been saying rep ea ted ly , i* e ,  t h a t  i t  i s  not the an a ly s is  which 
makes the phenomena good or bad* This would, however, be a 
t r i v i a l  statem ent in  t h i s  connection*
1- &&.. p .195.
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I t  could a lso  mean t l ia t  the an a ly s t  approaches the phenomena
w ithout any preconceived  idea about whether they a re  good or had* 
This might he the d e sc r ip tio n  of a aoimd a n a ly t ic a l  a t t i tu d e #  hut 
i t  i s  hardly what M gstrup  i s  th inking of h ere .
Or i t  could, mean th a t  th ere a re  no p resu p p osition s a t  a l l  
behind the a n a ly s is ,  which ia  a very doubtfu l statem ent# The 
aaaXyais, which Ldgstrup d escr ib es  i s  a t  l e a s t  open to the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of f in d in g  th a t  the phenomena have an in h eren t v a lu e . 
This i s  hardly a "neu tra l"  p o s i t io n  id th  regard to the value 
question* I t  i s  a t  any r a te  the exp ression  of a c e r ta in  
nhiloBOphical position# Neither are any other p o s it io n s  n eu tra l 
in  t h i s  re sp e c t .
But Most l ik e l y  Logatrup wants to m aintain th a t  the arta lysle , 
of which he speaks, i s ,  a t  l e a s t  in  p r in c ip le ,  ■ separab le  from i t s  
o b jec t  and i t s  re su l ts#  This would mean t h a t  the an a ly s is  i a ,  in  
a imy, in d i f f e r e n t  about i t s  oim re su l ts*
This i s  indeed the questionable  a s s e r t io n . I s  i t  r e a l ly  
the case th a t  the  a n a ly s is  can ob ta in  i t s  r e s u l t s  concerning value  
w ithou t a c e r ta in  co n g en ia lity ?  Will no t, th e r e fo r e , a statem ent 
about value always express an element of acceptance? This must 
n o t,  of course, be confused with an eventual expression of the
in te n t io n  to pursue t h is  v a lu e . This in te n t io n  does not follow 
from the recogn ition  of the v a lu e .
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To sum up the dificussloii of s ana ly s is  of t r u s t ;
V/o take him to mean th a t  i ru a t  i s  a fomlamental fe a tu re  of 
human existence* That i s  to say, he i s  not p rim arily  dealing  
with t r u s t  as a of confidence# which men might have in.
each other# but with t r u s t  as men's giving th e i r  l i f e ,  in-each 
o th e r 's  hands* Trust i s  not id e n t i f ia b le  with any p a r t ic u la r  
emotional s t a t e  in  man, but l i e s  on-a more basic  level* I t  i s  . 
r a th e r  an aspect of a l l  .man'& dealings v it l i  o ther men*
Wo th ink  i t  i s  c o r re c t  to in te r p r e t  LbgBtmp as saying th a t ,  
by h is  very ex istence man 1s saying something about what i s  good 
and bad, and tlint i f  wc if an t  to say something about tîic l i f e  of 
man, ieC* analyse the phenomena whicli c o n s t i tu te  i t ,  we cannot 
avoid Belying something about vain  os# wi thout being untrue to  our 
o b je c t .
Bomo might fe e l  inc lined  to judge th a t  Lbgstmp'B view i s  
r e a l ly  only a v a r ia t io n  of the " n a tu r a l i s t i c  fa llacy"*  Can ho 
no t be lUKierstood as j u s t  saying th a t  "good" means Cogo "what i s  
fundamental f o r  man's ex istence"?
I t  could peiiiaps be said  th a t "good" means sometîning l ik e  
th i s  fo r  Ldgstrupe But th i s  could hardly with any ju s t ic e  be 
ca lle d  a n a tu r a l i s t i c  fa llacy*  For Ldgstrup does not hold th a t
hio  statem ents about t r u s t  and about men's dependence upon one
f tn o tiio r  a r e  " iio n -e ira lH m tiv e"  *
The r e s u l t s  of hi© an a ly s is  oaBBot he l i le a t i f ie d  with those
of Hciontifici psychology or Bociology, fo r  instance* LU g strop
tilaima e x p l ic i t ly  th a t  there i s  ouch a thinn: as a ivhi}oaophicol
1lu^ychoiogr# beaide s c i e n t i f i c  psychology *
This philosophical psychology does not ask about "non» 
eva lua tive" f a c t s ,  The in s ig h t  i t  acquires i s ,  th e re fo re ,  
a lso  an in s ig h t  in to  the question  of value, i«e*, lo r  Ldgstm p, 
of rank.
So th a t  i f  Lhgstrup would accept the id e n t i f ic a t io n  of 
"good" id th  e#ge "fundamental" t h i s  would not mean a kind of 
"natm’alisBi" 0 I t  would only mean th a t  the word "fundamental" 
and. the phenomenon wiiich i t  charaokerises has a volue aspect 
a s  well®
This would mean th a t  thorn xb no absolute d i s t in c t io n  betw/een 
“good" ami e#go "fundamental"* At lo aa i  in  some conttnrts i t  i s  
impossible to t a lk  about fundamentality apa rt  from an év a lu a i!01,1* 
For in  h is  deeda ami sayings man I s  necesRurily involved 
in  eva lua tive  a c t i v i t i e s ,  so tha t even an an a ly s is  of language 
cannot be undertaken iBdependcutly of epistcjiiological and
1 . KE, p .1 9 0 .
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onto logical cmimil tments, which are  p a r t ly  a t t i t iK l i i ia l , and 
which cannot# th e re fo re ,  be shewn to he e n t i r e ly  " f a c tu a l" , 
ill the senae of ^iion-evaluative"*
I f  i t  i s  tru( Üiat man's l i f e  i s  in tertw ined  with  th a t  of 
h is  fo llo w  men in  the way th a t  we have ©aid above, so th a t  we 
a re ,  in  Lllgstrup'a word8 "each o th e r 's  world" and "each o th e r 's  
destiny" or, in  L uther'@ words "each o th e r 's  d a ily  bread", what 
doOvS th i s  mean in  terms of R.oral ob liga tion?
For LllgBtrup the ease i s  as follows;
I t  i s  equally  c e r ta in  both th a t  "bo m atter what wo want,
snir l i f e  i s  a c tu a l I j  created  in  such a way th a t  i t  cannot be 
l iv ed  in  any o ther way than hy man giving himself away and .giving
more or I cbb of h is  l i f e  in  the  o th e r 's  hand, showing or asking
Jfo r  t r u s t " ' ,  and th a t  the dmmand to  take care of the l i f e  of the 
o ther belongs to  our ex istence as i t  a c tu a lly  is*
No Matter how mmh or l i t t l e  of his l i f e  a person by h is
t r u s t  gives in  the hands of th e  o ther person in  the concrete 
s i tu a t io n ,  in  every encounter between men there  l i e s  an
"nnexnreesed demand"@ This holds true  regard less  of the
ch arac te r  of the encounter and the  elrciirastances in  which, i t
takes p lace ,
! •  m .  pp . %7f.
58
“However mamifold the character of the commimication 
hetween onraelveo i t  i s  always a venturing forward in  
order to  he met* This i s  the essen ce ( l i t * s  nerve) o f  
coKMmnication# and the basic  phenomenon of moral 
existence* The demand which follows from th i s  does not 
need any r e v e la t io n  in  the theo log ica l sense to he heard, 
any more than i t  comes in to  e x is te n c e  because we have 
agreed upon i t ,  more or l e s s  consciously* fo r  onr mntiml 
benefit*
I f  trtiBt and. i t s  giving o n e se lf  away only were 
something th a t  we could decide on a t  p leasure  •*• , there  
would not in  our l i f e  toge ther  have ex is te d  o ther cla im s  
than th o se* which people might th ink  of laying  upon each 
o th e r ,  whether they arc conventional* sen tim enta l, or 
megalomaniac in  character* This i s  not the case, 
howeverj Trust does no t l i e  w ith as* I t  i s  something
given*"
For Wlgstrap i t  i s  im portant to s t r e s s  th a t  t h is  demand i s  not
the same as the  ac tu a l wishes and d e m a n d th a t  are  voiced by the
other person* I t  i s  in c id en ta l  whether th ese  wishes do or do
not co in c id e  with the  demand which i s  contained in  every r e la t io n
to the o ther person*
This i s  p a r t  of the meaning of Ldgstrup 's statement th a t  the
2demand i s  unexpressed, or anonjmions* "'
"For one th ing  i s  the o ther person’ s own in te r ­
p r e ta tio n  of what the t r u s t ,  which he show© or d e s ire s ,  
aims at* Another th in g  i s  the  damand which i s  given v/ith 
the t r u s t  as a c rea ted  f a c t ,  bo to  speak, and which i t  i s  up 
to me to  in te rp re t*  And these  in te rp re ta t io n s  .miglit very
1 . W . ,  p .87.
8 , M - .  p .28.
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w ell co n tra d ic t  each o th e r .  The r e la t io n  may foe a 
s ing le  ch a llen g e  to me to  go ag a in s t  tho ex p ecta tio n s
and wisliOB of th e  o ther person, beea.use only th i s  w il l  
bo fo r  h is  own b e n e f i t .  That ia  to say , the challenge 
presupposed th a t  I know ho tte r^ th an  the o ther person 
himself what i s  for h is  good,”
Ab Mgs tra p  a lee  puts i t :  The demand i s  unvoiced, i t  i a  s i l e n t ,
^  «MutotariiweftEieiawiya»
He, to whom i t  i s  addressed# must in  each concrete r e la t io n  
determine what the demand i s .
This does no t moan th a t  the ind iv idua l a r b i t r a r i l y  can give 
to  the deBiancl the  con ten t th a t  he wishes. In  th a t  case th ere  would 
foe no demand,
font BOV/ there  ie  a demand, and because i t  i s  given  with th©
«fïCfluasi V  CJ*
f a c t  th a t  the ind iv idua l i s  p a r t  of the world in  which the o ther
person has h is  l i f e ,  and th a t  he, th e fo re , ha© something of the  l i f e
of th i s  o ther person in  h is  hands, i t  i s  a demand to take care of
th i s  l i fe *  But nothing i s  said  about how th i s  i s  to be clone,
" It i s  p a r t  of the demand, th a t the ind iv idua l h im self, by 
using the in s ig h t ,  im agination and understanding which he 
might possess, sh a ll  see to i t  th a t  he foecomm© c le a r  about 
what the damand means#"^
Lfogstrup i s  thus advocating the view th a t  we cannot from the
alialyslB of man's e x is te n c e  d erive  any d e ta i le d  moral ru le s  or 
/
command© which can be applied  to  th e  concrete r e la t io n s  in  which man 
f inds  h im self *
1 . g . ,  p .31 .
2 . ® I ., p .3 8 .
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But i t  i s  even more impoi'tant to  note that# on the o ther hand, 
he i s  not holding th a t  the "miexpressed demand" i s  a formal 
demand only® I t  i s  not w ithout content* On the con tra ry , the 
content i s  q u ite  d e f in i t e .
I t  might perhaps not be m isleading to say th a t  Ldgstrup i s ,  
in  h is  way, maintaining  the d i s t in c t io n  between the fundamental, 
or h ig h es t ,  norirt and d e r iv a tiv e  noma which apply to the 
d iv e rs i ty  of moral r e la t io n s ,  and th a t  the "unexpressed" demand 
cannot be brought to bear upon the  concrete r e la t io n  except from 
w ith in  th is  R elation  io  widch i t  i s  to  be app lied .
The understanding of the  luimau condition  and i t s  demand iddch 
we have attempted to  sketch above i s ,  according to LBijstrup, tho 
same as  th a t  which we encounter in  the  e th ic a l  preaching of Josus 
in  tka Gospels.
One must 3101 from our exposition  get the impression th a t,  the 
preaching of Jesus plays an unimportant p a r t  in  LBgstrup's theory.
The po in t i s ,  however, th a t  J e su s ' preaching i s  not a source of
e so te r ic  e th ic a l  knowle_#;e, nor does i t  i t s e l f  c o n s t i tu te  the 
authority^ of tho e th ic a l  demand, though i t  might be said  to  express 
OX’ reveal th is  a u th o r i ty 0 Kot, however, in  an exclusive sense.
As to the d i s t in c t io n  which Ldgstrup makes between the
unexpressed dcmmnd and the ac tua l in te rp re ta t io n  of i t ,  th i s
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r a is e s  a number of fa r-reacM n g  prohlema with which LUgstrup in  
d ea lin g  a t  some length# but which wo w ill  not discuss h ere , e in ee  
our priiaary concern i a  only the problem of the r e la t io n  between 
fa c ta  and th e  moral demand* I t  i s  with regard to t h i s  th a t  w© 
have been discuaaing M g etru p 's  view* We w ill  only venture to 
suggest two p o s s ib le  p o in ts  o f c r it ic is m  here*
F irs t#  i s  i t  in  any sense adequate to say th a t  th e  demand im 
"unexpressed" or " s i le n t"  when i t  has a d e f in i te  content# as 
y igs trup  lias shown th a t  i t  has?
Secondly# i s  i t  In  the end poss ib le  to m aintain a hard and 
f a s t  d is t in c t io n  between the fundamental moral deimnd which the 
moral p hilosopher can p o in t out# and the a ctu a l a p p lic a tio n s  of 
t h i s  demand wdiich only th e  moral agents can undertake in  the 
a c tu a l moral s i tu a t io n s ?
I t  i s  easy to understand th a t  i t  i s  on Lbgstm p’s statem ents 
about the r e la t io n  between f a c t  and demand th a t  the i n t e r e s t  of 
h is  c r i t i c s  i s  focu sed . He i e  q u i te  fa m ilia r  with the  ob jec tion  
th a t  i s  bound to he imde:
" I s ta te#  th a t  men's l iv e s  ax’e intertwined# and then 
I  im m ediately say th a t  out of th is  thex*© a r is e s  a demand 
t h a t  I sh a l l  take care of the l i f e  of the o ther which ie  
given  to  me* But from a judgement about lA at ^  th ere , 
can never follow any judgement about what ought to be".
1, ms.# p .196.
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Mas Lllgstxiip succeeded in  presea ting  lii© con clu sion  
co n v in c in g ly , and in  defending i t  ag a in s t  the objection©  he
mentions? .
E x p l ic i t ly ,  IJJgstmp d ea ls  with the tr a n s it io n  from f a c t  to 
demand only in  passing , and very b r ie f ly ,  This i s ,  of cou rse, 
ra th e r  u n sa t is fa c to r y . The main passage in  LF in  t h i s  re spec t 
i s  to  be found in  a n o te ,
"What m atters here ia  only to p oin t to  the in tim ate  
connection  between fa c t  and demand, th a t  the demand
follows very d ir e c t ly  from fac ta  For the f a c t  lea v es  
U8 wdth the only a lt e r n a t iv e ,  to take care of the  l i f e  of  
the  o th e r ,  or to d estroy  it® There i s  no th ird  
p o s s ib i l i t y ,  l i f e  bein g  created  as i t  i s .  To accep t the
f a c t  lyithout wanting to hoar the dmund means, th e re fo re ,  
to  take  up an in d if fe r e n t  a t t i tu d e  towards the  question , 
whether l i f e  i s  to he fu rthe red  or to be d estroyed ,
In 121 1% strap  has developed th i s  a b i t  fu r th er , holding th a t
" i t  i s  no problem a t  a l l ,  how a demand can a r i s e  out n f  a f a c t ,
2I t  goes au tom atica lly  and cannot a t  a l l  be avoided,"
This i s  BO, because we cminot be content with describ ing  and 
th e o r iz in g  about th in g s . We cannot e x is t  without tak ing  our stand 
and in terv e n in g . For we are p rim arily  a c t iv e  and emotional beings, 
and th erefo re  our l i f e  i s  ch aracterized  by purpose, ac tio n  and 
deei s lo n .
1, m . ,  p . 29.
2, EE*, p.
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In th e  actim l s itn n t io n  i t  i s  imposBihlo# li lg s tm ip  h o ld s ,  
to  s t a t e  t h a t  th e  l i f e  of th e  o th e r  i s  g iven  in  isjv hands w ithowt ta k in g  
mp an a t t i t u d e  tow ards t h i s  fa ct*  Whether we want i t  o r  n o t ,  we 
m nst e i t h e r  h e a r  o r  ig n o re  th e  demand to  ta k e  care of h i s  l i f e ,  
q n i t a  sim ply because lie a s  w e ll  a s  I  l i v e  a c t iv e ly  and 
em otion a lly , and ## more th a n  s t a t e  f a c t s ,
There are  form ulations in  LKgstrnp's argument on t h i s  po in t 
which, on the fa c e  of i t ,  seem l i t t l e  more than n aive attem pts 
to  bridge log ica l gaps, e ,g ,  when he says th a t  i t  ie  no problem 
a t  a l l  how a demand can a r i s e  out of a f a c t ,  and th a t  i t  goes 
a u to m a tica lly , That i s ,  i f  he i s  try in g  to  j u s t i f y  a t r a n s i t io n  
from a non—ev a lu a tiv e  fa c t  to  an eva lua tive  a ff irm a tio n  of a demand.
At b es t he could  be taken to mean t h a t  fo r  a l l  p ra c t ic a l  
purposes we can say th a t  i t  is^^possible fo r  anybody j u s t  to  observe  
th a t something i s  the c a s e , %4'bhout taking up an emotional a t t i tu d e  
towards i t .  In th is  case LWgstrup's p o s it io n  would not be f a r  
from being an *'infom alist* ' one, me,ming th a t  there  ia  a conventional 
connection  between f a c t  and demand because we happen to  be beings 
who rea ct emotionally to  things*
But from the r e s t  o f what IJIgatmp says i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  the  
r e la t io n  between fa c t  and demand fo r  him i s  no " p ractica l"  q u estio n , 
What h© BiiyB i s  th a t  our e x is te n c e  compels us to  take stan d , l , e .
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to  say "yes" or "no" to the demands which are there  a lready , 
given with the f a c t .  That i s  to Sr^y, there  i s  some kind of 
n ecess i ty  in  the connection between the f a c t  of my ex istence  and 
the demand before which I am fo rced , as an "ac tive  and emotional 
being", to take a stand . Ro th a t  the hearing of the demand by 
the person who l iv e s  a c t iv e ly  and emotionally has some kind of 
cogn itive  s ta tu s ,  being an apprehension of an involvoï^îcnt winch 
is  given with the f a c t .
As we see i t ,  we cannot understand Id g s tru p 's  d e sc r ip tio n  of 
the t r a n s i t io n  from f a c t  to dejiand unless we have understood how 
he conceives of the " f a c t" .
The demand a r i s e s  d i r e c t ly  out of the f a c t ,  because the f a c t  
i s  never "only" f a c tu a l . I t  has already a value asp ec t.
Lfjgstrup knows th a t  i t  i s  in  the understanding of " fac ts"  
th a t  h is  way and tlia t  of h is  c r i t i c s  p a r t .  That Ldgstrup 
understands by " fac ts"  i s  " fa c ts  before they are  reduced by 
s c i e n c e " . He v igorously  repud ia tes  the view th a t  
science should have a monopoly on issu ing  statem ents about rea lity '’, 
fo r  there  are  fa c ts  which can be b e t t e r  s ta ted  by our everyday 
language tiîan by th a t  of the sc iences . There are  even 
phenomena which can only be described by, and d i s t in c t io n s  which
Ocan only be expressed by our n a tu ra l language**.'
lo K.lilo a p *196o
2 o Ko E. ,  p * 1 9 7 o
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The fa c ts  from which the demand a r i s e s  d i r e c t ly  are  the 
■facts of the  "concrete l i f e —s itu a t io n  w ith i t s  p len itu d e of 
p e r s p e c t iv e s "
That ti lls  atteiiïptod j u s t i f i c a t io n ,  on Lllgstropes p a rt, o f  
Ills own theozry of the e th ic a l  demand contains l i t t l e  more than 
su g g estio n s io ob vious, and i t  remains to be seen  whether th ese  
or s im ila r  suggestions could be developed in to  a more system atic  
theoryo
Idigstniphs theory can r e a l ly  only be understood when i t s  
e x is t e n t ia l  and metaphysical elements are b r o n ^ t  out more 
c le a r ly  than Lbgstrmp has done i t  h im se lf . T herefore, ou6 
d isc u ss io n  l a t e r  in  t h is  th es is  w il l  form a necessary background 
fo r  the im deratanding of LBgotrup*s views* At the p resen t otage 
they have served as an example of ona way of p resen tin g  the 
e th ic a l  demand in  i t s  r e la t io n  to  the f a c ts  of human ex is tence , 
and they  have served as an incitem en t to  a fu r th e r  d iscuss ion ,
l o  K o E o .  p . 1 9 6 .
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H, E th ic s  an,d r e v e l a t i o n  in  th.e th o u g h t of Knri ihrrtli, 
iÆiil Brunner and T o rs ten  i5o'klisn
case of h . f * LlîgBtrup we mot with a tiaoory of e th ic s  
which If as from the  o u tse t  e x p l i c i t l y  co n tra d ic tin g  the modern 
a n a ly t ic a l  th eo r ie s  of moral language, claiming as i t  did th a t  
the Hoinand " a r is e s  very d i r e c t ly  out of tlm f a c t " .
The case appears to  he very d i f f e r e n t  when we tu rn  to the 
views of theologians who im in ta in  the exclusive chas'acter of 
theo log ica l e th ic s  in  the  sense th a t  the whole understanding of 
the e th ic a l  question  be based on our understanding of the C h ris t-  
re v e la t io n .
The view le  not in fre q u en tly  expressed th a t  the contenders
of a theological e th ic  ie  th is  souse are  a t  one with the
a n a ly t ic a l  trend in  moral philosophy, a t  l e a s t  in  what they  deny,
1Bo fo r  example E.llo She' @ What u n ite s  them a i l ,  ho says, 
i s  the s trug g le  ag a in s t  the  " n a tu r a l i s t i c  f a l la c y " .  This 
f a l la c y  has cha rac te r ized  much of thoo lag ica l e th ic s ,  too, Bbe 
says, although i t  ought to  have been c le a r  th a t ,  from a 
theo log ica l po in t of view, e th ic s  cannot be j u s t i f i e d  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y .
l o  In h is  '*Fra IlenaessanceT). t i l  Voro Dago" ( "From* the 
Renaissance to Our Times"), 3rd ed. I960, eep. p*346
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There w i l l  always bo a leap from the fa c te ,  th a t can be s ta te d ,
1to  the im pera tive .
Ill Karl Barth'*B c r i t ic i s m  of Catholic e th ic s ,  namely th a t  i t  
der ives  o b lig a tio n  from being, She sees an expression of the 
same p ro te s t  as the  a n a ly t ic a l  ph ilo sophers ' ag a in s t  any attem pt 
to bridge the gap between fac tim l statem ents and e th ic a l  
judgements, Tnit Bart'h*s i s  made on the b as is  of s t r i c t l y
theo1ogical c o n s id é râ t!onso
Bbo holds th a t  i t  i s  the same dic-Uoto«]y betv/een f a c ts  and 
vaines which i s  expressed in  Ko Brunner's statement th a t  "Ihe 
imperativo 'Thou Bhalt* i s  a s tran g e r  ij> th i s  world, i t  has nothing
p
to do Ti l  til th ings as they ac tual ly are" \
1* This i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of f a c t u a l  s ta te m e n ts ,  s ta te m e n ts  about 
what X8f w ith  s c i e n t i f i c  s ta te m e n ts  i s  S d o 'e ,  and i t  
su g g e s ts  a c e r t a i n  im iv i ty  i n  h i s  a l l i a n c e  w ith  th e  
a n a l y s t s ,  i n  t h a t  he seems s u r p r i s i n g l y  unconcerned ab o u t 
th e  consequences of t h i s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  th e o lo g y  in-  
g e n e r a l .
Ho Das abbot und d ie  Ordnuimon* 1932, Eng. t r a n s i o,
The D ivine . t e io r a t i v e ,  p . 48 (n*34 i n  the  o r i g e ) .
Q uo ta tions from th e  wox'ks of hrunnev and B arth  w i l l  
be ta k e n  from th e  c u r r e n t  E n g lish  t r a n s l a t i o n s ,  w ith  th e  
page n w b o r  i n  th e  o r i .g im l  i n  b r a c k e t s .
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i s  i t ,  tlieiip r e a l l y  the case  t îm i  tbeologieoB otJd .es, 
as  Barth ami ibmmier conceive of i t ,  can be UBders'laod in  iajrtaa 
of th e  s e p a r a t io n  of f a c t  and value vdiiclt we have been dlBcus.sing 
i n  i i i ia  t l i c s i s ?
Ib th e  e t l i ie  of r’a r t i i  and Binn'i.ner r e a l l y  p o s s ib le  on the  
i ia s ls  o f  a th e o ry  a  I) o a t  the meaning of e th ic a l  language which 
s e p a ra te s  f a c t  from va lue  i n  th e  way th e  n o n -c o g n it iv x fr ts ,  o r  even 
tlI e 1 a t u i  t i  o a i  s t s , do V
The exclusive ch a iac te r  of ihonlogica.] e th ic s ,  as Barth 
soQB i t  ia  expressed by the place i t  i s  given in  the systern of 
h is  thoughto I t  belongs to  theology in  Uie s t r i c t  sense, to tho 
d o c tr in e  of hod. Uarth, therefore* d iscusses ihcj problem of 
e th ic s  in  h is  Church Dogmatics, under the heading "Cod's command".^' 
I t  i s  an  expression of Barth’ s conception of the 
exclusiveness of iheolo^^/ tha t In;; oven  refuses to allow the general 
concept of "e th ics"  in to  the theo log ica l con tex t, w ithout having 
f i r s t  made the re se rv a t io n  th a t  the concept raight have to get a 
new meaning, or to have i t s  meaning a l te re d  by th i s  p a r t ic u la r  
c o n te x t^ .
1 o K i r c h l i c h e  P o g m a t ik ,  i ï p ,  K n g l i s h  t r a n s l a t i p n ;  
Church D o g m a t ic s ,  ÏD 5 7 . 13, ^ 0 9 ^ 5 6 4 1
2 . Ibidem , |)p .312f (568}.
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But, \ it!I th ese  r e se r v a tio n s , (Virth f in d s  tha+ the " e th ica l 
question" i s  a v a l id  one, which needs to he answered also  hy the 
theologian  and which, in  the  end, only the theologian can answer.
This general cnestion  of e th ic s  i s ,  according to Barth, the 
(m estion of the  p o s s ib i l i ty  and b as is  of c e r ta in  modes of ac tio n  
in  and through the m u l t ip l ic i ty  of liiiman ac tio n s ,  l , e ,  the 
question  of whether, and ‘*ow, there  can be constancy and 
c o n tin u ity  in  human behaviour tiirough laws and ru le s .
I t  i s  fu r th e r  the question  as to the r ig h tn ess  of these 
co ns tan ts , or the p ro p rie ty  of the laws.
That i s  to say, the e th ica l queslio r i s  the question  as to 
what i t  i s  t h a t _gives to any ac tio n  i t s  normative ch a rac te r ,  hy 
which i t  can claim the r ig h t  to he repeated*
"U%at i s  the  tru e  and genuine co n tin u ity  in  the 8o«. 
c a lled  c o n t in u i t ie s  of Inman ac tion?  V/hai.^iB i t  th a t  i s
valid  in  and above a l l  the recognised laws?" What i s  the
good in  and over every so -ca lled  good of lumar ac tion?
This i s  -  roughly the e th ic a l  question .$*"3
1. I t  w i l l  be seen  Miat we d i f f e r  h e re  from th e  authorised
E nglish  tr a n s la t io n , which r e n d e r s  th e  Cierraan "'Was 1 s t  dag 
O lilt ige  in  und iiher a l l  den g e l  tendon G esetzen" w ith  "^hnt 
i s  i t  t h a t  r e a l l y  g iv e s  fo rce  to  a l l  th e se  reco g n ised  laws?" 
This tr a n s la t io n  makes the  q u estion  more a q u estion  ab o u t th e  
"em pirical" character of l)*e laws than  about th e ir  v a l id i ty *
a* m M t . ,  P .5 U  (5 6 9 )o
7 0
The e th ica l  q aea tien  i s ,  th e re fo re ,  mot to  be id e n t i f ie d  
w ith  every qiiestiom about laws and r a le s  and e o n t in u it ie e  in  
human behavl.oar® I t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from the p sy ch o lo g ica l 
q u estio n  as to whether the re  i s  a im ifo m lty  of the Iqman w il l  
(which Barth i d e n t i f i e s  with the  q u estio n  of whether there  ia  a 
"n a tu ra l  law", though i t  i s  hardly adequate as an aceount of the 
various th eo rie s  of a na tu ra l  law to  say th a t  they are  ju s t  
advocating # e  view  t h a t  there  occurs a c e r ta in  p a t te rn  of human 
v o l i t io n  which cam be discovered psychologically . They have 
always t r i e d ,  a t  any r a te , to  e s ta b l is h ,  ph ilo sop h ica lly  or 
th e o lo g ic a l ly ,  a s ta tu s  fo r  such a uniform ity of the w il l  above 
the m erely psycho log ica l.)
Til® e th ic a l  question  i s  a lso  a l to g e th e r  another question  
than the s t a t i s t i c a l  one about p attern s of overt behaviour in  
various cu ltu r a l con texts*
And the co n tin u ity  i t  seeks fo r  i s  not the one th a t  
jiadBprudence could po in t to in  the legal system s of various  
invmn s o c i e t i e s ,  N eith er i s  i t  the one th a t  a philosophy of 
h is to ry  could show to b© %iresent in  human a c tio n  in  the middle of  
the changes of h istory*
The e th ic a l question  transcends the questions asked by a l l  
sciences* I t  asks the supremely c r i t i c a l  question  concerning the
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Imf of the good. That i s  to  say, i t  questions the v a l id i ty  of
the claims which a l l  these o ther laws lay upon ue*^
"Our conten tion  i s ,  hoxfover, th a t  the dogmatics 
of the C h ris tian  Church, and b a s ic a l ly  the C h ris tian  
doc tr ine  of God, i s  e th ic s .  This doctrine  i a ,  
th e re fo re ,  the answer to  the e th ic a l  question , the 
supremely c r i t i c a l  question  concerning the good in  and 
over every so -ca lled  good in  luman octions and modes of
a c t i o n .
How then i s  the  r e la t io n  between the general (ph ilo soph ica l)  
answers to  the  e th ic a l  question  and the theo log ica l answer to  the 
same question  to he conceited  of?
Barth d iscusses  various attem pts from the theo log ica l side
to combine the general and th e  theo log ica l answers in  one
%
harmonious system#
The f i r s t  one is  the  apologetic  approach, which seeks to
j u s t i f y  the theo log ical answer by find ing  a place fo r  i t  w ith in
the framework and on the bas is  of the presuppositions and methods
of non*»theological, genera lly  human th inking  and language. This
ia  the approach of Schleiermacher and W. Herrmann, to  mention the
4most no tab le , and of 0. Wünsch , who seeks to secure a place fo r
in n n «gfBrs3trTT*>i=>g^«j:=m::>i>wMrr{uf.iysasyjfff»«gn ^TggMtj*iw g#«npifli
1 . Ï 0  a l l  th is  see  o p .c i t , , p ji,513ff ( 5 6 9 f f ) .  
a .  Ibidem. . p .515 (5 7 1 ).
3 .  To th e  fo llo w in g , see I b id em . , pp.DBOff ( 5 7 ? f f ) .
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the  "holy" am a transcendent supreme v a lu e , w ith in  the framework 
of a general value theory*
The second attem pt to  combine th e o lo g ic a l and ph ilosophica l 
e th ic s  i s  the m aintain ing of a c e r ta in  two«foldness o f the 
e th ic a l  in qu iry , whereby both p a r ts  can he given  coBiparatlvely  
independent p o s i t io n s , though completing complementary tasks*
This approach i s  o ften  combined w ith  the  a p o lo g e tic  one am a second 
stage* Barth thinl^s* because when the a p o lo g etic  theologian has 
j u s t i f i e d  theo log ica l e th ic s  in  terms of general eth ics*  he f in d s  
h im self confronted with th e  task  of saying why he s t i l l  th inks 
th ere  i s  a need fo r  any " theo log ica l"  e th ic s  as a separate  
d is c ip l in e  a t  a l l#
In t h i s  t r a d i t i o n  one t r i e s ,  th e re fo r e , to show the p a r t ia l  
independence o f th e o lo g ic a l e th ics  in  fou r r e sp e c ts .
F i r s t ,  th eo log ica l e th ic s  has, i t  le  sa id , as i t s  sou rce,
^  ^  •  ' #*WWSMNB«»«*Se5»* '
the C h ris tian , or the r e l ig io n s ,  co n sc io u sn ess . Others would say 
th a t  r e v e la t io n  i s  t h i s  e x c lu s iv e ly  theo log ical source. The 
source of p h ilo so p h ica l e th ic s ,  on the other hand, i s  reason or 
exp er ien ce , or both to g e th e r .
Secondly, th eo lo g ica l e th ic s  has a sub jec t of i t s  own, the  
Church, o r  the regenerate man# Philosophical e th ic s  ia  concerned  
with ra t io n a l  man in  g en er a l#
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Thirdly* theo log ica l e th ic s  has i t s  own presuppositions , 
e*g* the op eration  of the Holy S p i r i t  in  the b e lie v e r .
L astly , theo log ica l e th ic s  has i t s  own co n ten t, which might 
he connected with Jeeus® conception of l i f e  in  g en era l, or with 
the idea of the Kingdom of God, While the cen tra l  id ea  in  
ph ilosophical e th icb  might he, fo r  example, the id ea  of the  
e th ic# I  personali ty  »
B arth ’s ob jec tion  to th ese  two attem pts to b r in g  together 
theo log ica l and philosophical e th ic s ,  the "apologetic" and the 
"complementary", w i l l  be c le a r ly  understood when we l a t e r  turn to 
a d iscussion  of what he p o s i t iv e ly  a s s e r t s .  But hie ob jec tion  
i s  r e a l ly  q u ite  evident a lread y . I t  i s  an ob jection  made from 
a theo log ica l p o in t of view, namely th a t  any attem pt to j u s t i f y  
theo log ica l e th ic s  by general means, or to  f in d  a safe  p lace fo r  i t  
in  some p a r t ic u la r  f i e ld  a p a r t  from the f ie ld  of e th ic 0 In genera l, 
d isregards  the claim of theo log ica l e th ic s  to  be the u ltim ate  
e th ic a l  a u th o r i ty  and to be all-em b racing  in  the sense th a t  i t  
ap p lie s  to  anybody and to any e th ic a l  problem.
I t  i s  in  B arth’ s d iscuss ion  of the th ird  way of combining 
the two kinds of e th ic s ,  i,e® the  Moman Catholic so lu tio n , th a t  
lie expresses h is  view in  a way whlch seems to have more d i r e c t  
bearing  on the problem of our th e s i s ,  and which seems to lend
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i t s e l f  to  an in te rp r e ta t io n  in  terms of the sep ara tion  of f a c t  and
value in  a n a ly t ic a l  philosophy#
The Moiuan Catholic th eory , in  i t s  c la s s ic a l  form, of the
r e la t io n  between th e o lo g ic a l and general e th ic s ,  i s ,  according to
Barth, the one which deserves the  most ser io u s consideration*
Mere we r e a l ly  have a theory which i s  reasonably c o n s is te n t ,
and which n e ith e r  makes e th ic s  sub jec t to  heterogenous p r in c ip le s ,
nor l im i ts  i t s  ta sk  to the covering of a spec ia l f i e ld  o n ly .
For OB t h is  v iew  the natural m ora lity  which i s  advocated by
the sound piiiloaophy i s  r e a l ly  a C h ristian  m ora lity  (anima humana
îm tu ra l i te r  C h r is t ia n a ) .  I t  ie  C h ristia n , even i f  i t  i s  not b u i l t
on a th e o lo g ic a l b a sis*  The fundamentals of the moral l i f e  a re
access ib le  to  the philosophy of m orals, through the l ig h t  of na tu ra l
man®a reason , educated in  h is to ry  and by ex p er ien ce . Moral
philosophy i s  capable of knowing the moral p r in c ip le s ,  e .g .  in  the
form of the p h ilo so p h ic a l v i r tu e s  of prudence, ju s t i c e ,  courage and
temperance, s t i l l  knowing th a t th ese  are  r e la t iv e  to the absolu te
Good, which i s  the D iv in e Being® I t  i s  thus capable of
apprehOBding the moral p r in c ip le s  as  "the im perative which has I t s  ro o t
1in  man’s very being" , and to  prepare himself fo r  the e te rn a l  b l i s s ,  
which i s  communion with God.
1 . O p .c i t . .  p . 588 (5 8 6 ) .
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I t  i s  not th a t  philosophy i s  i n f a l l i b l e  in  th is  r e sp e c t .
I t  needs to be en ligh ten ed  and corrected  by r e v e la t io n , and i t  
i a  thus moral theology which has the anpreme a u th o r i ty ,  operating  
as i t  does from the sources of the spec ia l re v e la t io n ,  i . e .  the 
Bible, the t r a d i t io n  and the decisions of the Pope.
Moral theology i s  the supreme n uthority  in  the sense th a t  
i t  co rrec ts  the In s ig h ts  of moral philosophy, but f i r s t  of a l l  
in  the sense th a t  i t  alone can lead  man to  the goal which i s
WhH(wai!<w*art55srti *‘‘‘
recogn ised  a lso  by philosophy. I t  alone rep resen ts  the 
supernatural m o ra lity , which has as i t s  contre the th ree  
C h ris t ian  v ir tu e s  of f a i t h ,  love and hope. Moral theology 
operates w ith in  the ordinance of grace, and there alone cati man 
be healed and ra ised  again from h is  a in . Therefore, supernatural 
m orality  i s  not a s p e c ia l i t y  b esid e  natu ra l m ora lity . I t  i s  
rath er a renewal of na tu ra l  man*
This conception of the r e la t io n  between p h ilo so p h ica l and 
th e o lo g ic a l e th ic s  as a form of gradation , with theo log ica l 
e th ic s  on the top as all-em bracing  supreme in  a u th o r ity , i s  
a t t r a c t iv e ,  Barth adm its.
But s t i l l  i t  i s ,  according to  him, a conception  which must 
be re je c te d  fundam entally . For i t  i s  based on tlio presupposition  
th a t  in  the concept of "being" there can be es tab lished  i\ harmony
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between nature and BUperimture, between reason and revelatiom , 
between mam and God, That means th a t  man, in  sp i te  of h is  
s t a te  of s in fn in e 88, in  p r in c ip le  i s  capable o f knowing the true  
b ein g , anti of having communion with God, the being and
the  h ighest good,
Barth’s ob jec tion  i a  th a t  a methaphysic of being can never 
be the p la ce  where we can a r r iv e  a t  a true  imderstantLing of the 
r e la t io n  between God ami man, grace and nature, r e v e la t io n  a,ml 
reason . This r e la t io n  i s  no t to be found in  a theory about the 
r e la t io n  between th e  being of the Creator and the being o f h is  
c r e a tio n , but on ly  in  the event in  xàiioh Cod e s tab lish e s  th i s  
r e la t io n ,  i . e .  in  b is  etern a l d e c is io n  In the p re ilea tina tion  
and the a c tu a l iz a t io n  of i t  In time*
The theory about the r e la t io n  between God and man bib a t ,  
th e re fo re ,  be a theory not about b e i n g , b u t  about God’ s a c t s , 
about the r e v e la t io n  of h is  Krace in  C h rist,
I t  i s  only through the re v e la t io n  of God’s grace in  Christ* 
i . e .  through God’ s a c ts ,  th a t  h is  commands can be known. Only 
In t h i s  con tex t, th e re fo re ,  i s  e th ic e  r e a l ly  p o s s ib le .
For no order of o b lig a tio n  can be b u i l t  on an order of 
being* I f  o b lig a tio n  i s  based on being th i s  means th a t  i t  has
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n o t  i t s  re a so n  i n  i t s e l f ,  Imt i s * o n t i c a l l y ,  su b o rd in a ted  
something e l s e ,  and, n o e t i c a l l y ,  even d e r iv a b le  from i t .  I t  
becomes a command only  fey fo rc e  of t h i s  "o th e r"  which i a  above
i t e
But i f  t h a t  which i s  above 'ilie o b l ig a t io n  i s  th e  being  i n  
which both  man and God p a r ta k e ,  how can th e  command fee a  t r u e ,  
u n c o n d it io n a l  command, B arth  a sk a .  I t  cannot be a command 
which sim ply en co u n te rs  man a s  an a b s o lu te  o b l ig a t io n ,  s in c e  i t s  
a u t h o r i t y  i s  d e r iv e d  from feeing, which i s ,  i n  a way, under m an 's 
co n tro l*
Thus, no o rd e r  of feeing can form th e  b a s i s  f o r  th e  e t h i c a l  
command, i f  t h i s  i s  to  fee God's u n c o n d i t io n a l  command.
*  *fcf^ an»i*>!aw»»'r3e!yaj«tvgTriftTi»N|ïa wt^
How, th e n ,  i s  t h i s  th e o lo g ic a l  view of Karl Barth  to  fee 
r e l a t e d  to  th e  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  view of th e  lo g ic a l  s e p a ra te n e s s  of 
f a c t  and v a lu e?
Only a s u p e r f i c i a l  s tudy  of B a r th 's  view can f i n d  i n  i t  a 
th e o lo g ic a l  p a r a l l e l  to  th e  a n a l y t i c  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  co n cep tion  of 
th e  lo g ic a l  s t r u c t u r e  of e th ic o l  languagee B a r th ' s s e p a ra t io n
of feeing and o b l ig a t io n  i s  a l t o g e t h e r  a  d i f f e r e n t  problem from 
th e  s e p a ra t io n  of f a c t  and v a lu e ,  as  we have feecn diBUueeiBg i t .
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Ifliat Barth ré fu té s  i s  the  view th a t  man can know God and 
e s ta b lis h  a r e la t io n  to God because h is  ( i . e .  man’ s) being i s  
analogous w ith  the being of God, and accordingly* tim t man can 
know God’s command through h ia  knowledge of being .
Bat Barth does not thereby deny the u n ity  of f a c t  and 
value in  terme of the problem we have been d iscussing  o r , i f  he 
does# he makes h is  own tlieory of e th ic s  incom prehensible.
In  fact#  B arth ’s view i s  em inently a malmtainlmg of the 
theory  th a t  e th ic a l judgements a re  derivab le  from# or 
id e n tic a l  with# facts,nam ely  God’s a c ts ,  i . e .  God’s "factum" in  
C h ris t .
In a double sense does B arth ’s view co n tra d ic t tho f a c t  
and value sep a ra tio n . F i r s t ,  ho hold th a t  th e  e th ic a l  
o b lig a tio n  ia  id e n tic a l  w ith God’s command. T h is , he says, ia  
what makes i t  an unconditional command#
This is# however# d ir e c t ly  the opposite of what the 
a n a ly tic a l ph ilosophers a re  say ing . On Hare’ s theory , fo r  
In s tan ce , i t  i s  ex ac tly  the f a c t  th a t  a moral judgment in  th e  
end r e s ts  on the dec is io n  of the person who makes i t ,  which makes 
the moral judgement m oral. That i s  to  say# i t  i s  moral ju s t  
because i t  cannot be derived from# i r  id e n t if ie d  with# God’ s
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coinmanfî, or any other fa ct*  Barth, on th« other haad, rnuBi 
d e f in i t e ly  be understood as h o ld in g  t h a t  an e t h i c a l  judgement 
i a  a  command anorehended, ami not a command is s u e d  by the  human
Speaker* and i t  i s  apprehended# not as  autonomous i n  th e  
K an tian  sense# but a s  having i t s  a u t h o r i t y  from the other (God) 
i s s u e s  i t *
"lie do n o t  s e r io u s ly  ask  'vhat we ought to do 
excep t when xfe se e  onr duty as  th e  conten t of a 
d e c i s io n  which con fron ts our own w i l l  ^ even when i t  
i s  supremely f r e e  i n  form *« i n  a b s o lu te  ami in f le x ib le  
sovere ign ty#  so th a t , even when we g ive  i t  our 
w h o leh e a r ted , spontaneous a p p ro v a l ,  i t  i s  never th e  
r e s u lt  o f  our d e c is io n , and th ere fo re  i t  never owes i t s  
a u th o r ity  and power to  our d e c is io n s  b u t  always to  
i t s e l f .  That t h i s  i s  th e  case i s  u nequ ivoca lly  c le a r ,  
and safeguarded a g a in s t  a l l  re la p se s  i n to  eud&emo&istlc 
d is to r t io n s ,  on ly  when we keep p la in ly  in  view  -  a s  
Kantian e th ic s  very  ob v iou sly  f a i l e d  to do th e  
e h r i s i o l 0 | | ica l.I  fo u n d a tio n s  o f  the concept and a c tu a l i t y  
of; o b lig a tio n " " ,
, * *
"An im p e ra t iv e  to w hich I owe a b so lu te  obedience 
must n e c e s s a r ily  come in  th e  most ra d ica l sen se from
w ith o u t^ ,  in  o rd e r  t h a t  i t  may c la im  me most r a d ic a lly  
w ithin* A command which transcends our a c t io n s  canno t 
i l l  th e l a s t  a n a l j s i a  be m erely a  coimmnd which I  have 
given  m yse lf  on the b a s i s  o f what' I  m yself have seen and 
experienced and f e l t  and judged of th e  good and th e  tru e  
and th e  b ea u tifu l*  I t  muet come to me as  something a l i e n ,  
a s  th e  command of a n o th e r  **."3 (underlined  by m e),
wa :^JF»'9^PftwWi»7Wwç!A' '^^**î«™iy)esMEïaft3t«cs»’«:!3K4i«ïi«*«4«^^
1 . p .651 (7 2 5 f ) .
H* The au thorized  tr a n s la t io n  says "within", which i s  obviously 
a m isp r in t,
3 .  p .651 (7 2 5 ).
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B arth  a s s e r t s  th e  u n i ty  of f e c i  anti v a lu e  i n  a seçond se n se ,
namely by holding th a t our o b lig a tio n  i s  d isc lo sed  not only in
the  v e rb a lly  expressed commands of God, but a lso  in  the  very ac ta
of God in  h is to r y . The d iv in e ly  im perative o b lig a tio n  i s
"introduced-in  Jesus C h rist, in  the d iv in e  a c t of the w orld’ s
1re c o n c ilia tio n  \?ith God as the  a c t  of h is  pure goodness" *
"The tru e  and genuine o b lig a t io n , law and duty 
voiced  by another than o u r se lv e s , emerges and p e r s is t s ,  
in  face of our own m i l  w ith i t s  conceptions and aims, 
ln ,.3 M  3A th the f a c t  th a t,  in  fw lfilM cn t of the d iv in e  
w il l ,  Jesus C hrist has died and r ise n  again  f o r  u s,
BO th a t  now th a t  lie i s  our Lord and our Head wo should 
no t belong to  ourselve^bift to  Him, and th erefore  
should not l i v e  to  o u rse lv es but to Him. This i s  what 
makes us o u rse lv es debtors to  God; ancl we experience  
o b lig a tio n  « a s  d i s t in c t  from d e s ir e  -  in  ami w ith the 
f a c t  th a t  we ourselves become debtors to God* This i s  
the sovereign  d e c is io n  which confronts our d e c is io n s , »«• 
The o b lig a t io n  revea led  and grounded In the person and 
work and lo rd sh ip  of Jesus C h ris t f u l f i l s  the  idea in  
a l l  i t s  str ic tn ess" ^  (underlined by me).
This 1,8 as d ire c tly  opposed to  the a n a ly t ic a l moral 
ph ilosopher’s theory as possib le*
The view of the o b lig a tio n  as being grounded in  the f a c t  
runs through the  whole of B arth ’s exposition  of e th ics*  Already
1 . iM âSSJP*538 (5 9 1 ).
2 . JM lS S . P l'.631 f (726)
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i l l  th e  f a c t  o f  God’s é l e c t i o n  th e  o b l ig a t io n  i e  p re se n t*  For# 
when (led e l e c t a  man# th is  l a  'because he w i l l s  som ething w ith  
him* The d iv in e  e le c t io n  i s  the détermina t i  on of man to  the
p a rtn e rsh ip  in  the covenant w ith Goil, to the se rv ic e  of Rod, 
to  being a w itness of God’ s own glory^', and i t  i© e x a c tly  from 
th is  îietermina tio n  tbrcmipi the d iv ine e le c t io n  th a t  mania 
o b lig a tio n  can be derived* This i s  c le a r ly  how Barth th in k s*
"The e le c tio n  i t s e l f  and as such demands th a t  i t  
be understood as God’s command d irec ted  to  man; as 
the s a n c tif ic a tio n  or elai^iing which comes to  e lec ted  
man from the e le c tin g  God In  the fa c t  th a t  when God 
tu rn s to Mm and gives Himself to  him He becomes h is  
Commnder" **
Therefore B arth  can say  t im t  " th e  e v a n g e lic a l in d ic a t iv e  •«
j
becomes i t s e l f  an imperative* , which i s  why the Law can be 
regarded simply as the form o f th e  Gospel^*
Knowledge of Uod i s ,  as a r e s n l l  of t h i s , in separab le  
from an awaremosa of obligation# the only rea l obligation®
"For who can p o ss ib ly  see what i t  i s  meant by
the Imowledga of God, Hie d iv ine  being, Mia d iv ine 
p e rfe c tio n s , the e le c tio n  of His grace, w itliout an 
awareness a t  every p o in t of the demand which i s  put 
to  man by the  fa c t  th a t  th is  God is  h is  God, the 
God of
1 . Of. IMdgm p.310(5f>5),
2 . .Üiidiassj p . 5 1 2 ( 5 6 7 )
3 .  n>Aàsi"
4 .  Xblcteci. p . 5 1 1  ( 5 6 7 )
5 . I b id e m . p . 5 l 2  (5 6 B )
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S t i l l  a n o th e r  way o f say in g  t l i ie  i s  to  may th a t  " th e  
g race  of Clod ^  th e  answ er to  th e  e th ic a l  p roblem "^.
Viewed th a t  way, i , e o  s t a r t i ^  w ith  th e  g race  of God, 
i t  tu rn s  o u t t h a t  th e  e th ic a l  cpiest^on i a ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  a  q u e s tio n  
ab o u t th e  b e in g  o f mmu F or man to  e x i s t  i s  to  s tan d  under 
th e  coiTMand o f God’ s grace®
" I t  [ th e  e t h i c a l  q u e s tio n ]  i s  M b l i f e - q u e a t io n ,  , 
th e  q u e s tio n  by whose answ er he s ta n d s  o r  f a l l s *  ’To b e , 
o r  n o t to  b e , t h a t  i s  th e  q u e s t io n , ’ Why? Because 
w ith  i t s  answ er th e re  i s  p u t  in to  e f f e c t  th e  d e c is io n  
o f th e  power which d is p o s e s  a b s o lu te ly  o f h i s  e x is te n c e  
o r non-C 3(istence, th e  power of God, For i t  i s  th e  
e le c t in g  g rac e  o f  God w hich has p la ced  man under Hi a 
command from  a l l  e t e r n i t y .  The command of God i e  
th e re fo r e  th e  t r u th  from  lA lch  w hether he Imows and 
w ants to  know o r  n o t -  man d e r iv e s ,  and which he w i l l  
n o t evade.
And B arth  makes i t  q u i te  e x p l i c i t  t h a t  on h ia  th e o ry  th e  
q u e s tio n  ab o u t %Aiat we ought to  do i s  a  q u e s tio n  ab o u t knqwledKO«
" I t  a sk s  a f t e r  t r u t h ,  b u t jio t the  t r u t h  t h a t  we 
seek , b u t th e  d iv in e  t r u t h  t h a t  seek s u s ,  th e  t r u t h  of 
th e  d iv in e  command t h a t  d e s i r e s  u s  and demands u s  dml 
M n tls 'u s  and commits u s ,  th e  t r u t h  t h a t  we m ust know 
because i t  i s  th e  r u le  and norm of our co n d u c t, «. @ we 
a sk  concern ing  what we ought to  d o ,"3 :
1» m a S B "  p . 516 (3 7 1 ).
2 . p . 516 (572)
3 .  m a m ,  p . 649 (7 2 2 ),
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Barth’ s theory cas# from a p h ilo so p h ica l po in t of view#
only he described as a co&qii t i v i s t  theory , and as one which
also  goes ag a in s t tlio th e o rie s  of th e  in t n i t io n is t s  and of
Kant, hy i t s  id e n t i f ic a t io n  of the "ought" w ith the tru th  of
hod’s grace and coimimiido
He have not here been concerned w ith a d iscussion  of
the views of Karl’ Barth in  general# or w ith -a  c r it ic is m  of
1h is  view of theo log ica l e th ic s  in  p a r t ic u la r . Our main 
in te n tio n  has been to  show# as wo tliiiik we have done, th a t  even 
a theo lo g ica l e th ic  oa Karl B arth’ s terms denies# im p lic it ly  a t  
leas t#  the v a l id i ty  of th e  fa c t-a n d -v a lu e  separation .O f h is  
theory , ae much as of the  th e o rie s  of theo log ica l e th ic s  which 
see  the e th ic a l demand as somehow derivab le  from the being of 
man, or from th e  fa c ts  of h ia ex istence  in  the w orld, i s  i t  tru e  
th a t  the p o sB ib ility  of speaking about fa c t  and value as a u n ity  
i a  i t s  cond itio  sine  qua non*
I f  we turn to  the w ritin g s  of fkd l Brunner, mainly M s
iBiportant "The Divine ÏM peraiive"^, we id .il fin d  th a t ,
The main p o in t where wo would d i f f e r  from h is  Is  in  Mm 
lin k in g  n e c e s s a r ily  to g e th e r Imotfledge of God’s command 
and the re v e la tio n  in  C hrist*
Cf o above,. p*6..7*
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w ith  regard  to  our problem# .he rep resen ts  the  eame view as 
Karl Barth does# and here he i s  f a i th f u l  to  th e i r  common 
d ia le c t ic a l  theo lo |0 #^ d esp ite  the f a c t  th a t l a t e r  th e i r  ways 
came to  p a r t  %eith regard to the understanding o f man and h i8 
r e la t io n  to Clod*
There i s ,  however, a s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe r en c e  in  the way 
the two w riter s  approach th e  problem of ethics® Barth t f i l l  
base h is  c r i t ic is m  of ph ilo soph ical e th ic s  on e x p l ic i t ly  
th eo lo g ica l prem isses only# E. Brunner, on the other hand, 
t r i e s  to  d iscuss the variou s types o f  p h ilo so p h ic a l e th ic s  on 
th e ir  own p resu p p o sitio n s, aiming a t  a phenomenological 
a n a ly s is  o f th e  immanental e th ic a l  se lf-u n d er  stan d in g . Me
t r i e s  to  show the In so lub le  dilemma they run in to , ae long as 
they know nothing o f a transcendence as the only p o ssib le  source 
of an abeelu te  o b lig a tio n , w hile E© Barth would p o stu la te  th is  
connection between God’a command and the e th ic a l o b lig a tio n  as 
the s ta r t in g  p oin t fo r  M s discussion*
In the h is to ry  of ph ilo soph ical e th ic s  we can, Brunner 
thinles, d is tin g u ish  two main types of e th ic s , the  n a tu ra li© tie  
and the id e a l is t ic *  N aturalism  fin d s  the b as is  of e th ic s  in  
p leasu re  and h app iness, w hile idealism  in  e th ic s  f in d s  i t  in  
duty as such, and th e  peak of th e  deonological e th ic s  of id ea lism  
i a  the  formal e th ic s  of Kant. Brunner h o ld s.
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There a re , however, in stan ces  of attem pts to harmonize
the two types of eth ics*  So, fo r  example, in  the A r is to te l ia n
e t h ic s ,  which i s  W i l t  on the p r in c ip le  of oudaimonism, htii
which re la te s  th i s  to  th e  r e a l iz a t io n  of the himan, wMeh i s
then conceived of as a duty .
But those attem pts r e a l ly  rep resen t a lo g ica l lea p ,
Brunner thinlcs# For "no sense o f o b lig a tio n  can be evolved
from the ac tu a l c o n a tlt# tio n  of human!ty v4 thoiit some lo g ic a l 
sharp p ractice*  I t  i s  im possible to define  what tmn ought to
be from th a t  which he a c tu a lly
The same fa l la c y  l i e s  a t  the ro o t of the so -ca lled
"m aterial va lue ethics"® From the f a c t  th at c e r ta in  th ings have
a capacity  fo r  being regarded as valuable by men there cannot be
derived any "ought" or a duty to pursue these things* This
holds tru e , Brunner sa y s , no m atter whether the va lu es are
considered  as p h y sica l* or as  a p ir i tu a l  " e n tit ie s"  v/hick confer
value OB the empixlcal o b je c t. That they are  "va lues", means
th a t  they are of such a kind th a t  tlioy can be d esired , but i t
2
"does no t e s ta b lish  th e ir  e th ic a l and normative c h a ra c te r” ',
1* JSllR-Jiitw. -p .4 0 (2 6 ). . . ■ '
a .  IMdesn . « ,4 2  (2 8 ) .
86
Mot even Kant managed to avo id  th e  s u rre p tit io u s
procedure of smuggling oudoimonism in to  M s notion  of the
es th eg o riea l im perative# in  order to b ridge the gap hetwo en
the ab so lu te  duty  and the m atters of th is  w orld . This i s  the
p o in t in  Brunner’s d iscu ssio n  where he c linches m atters  w ith  the
much quoted remarks "The im perative ’Then shalt® i s  a s tran g e r
in  th is  world, i t  has nothing to  do w ith  th ings as they a c tu a lly  
1a re  » "
I t  i s  im portant th a t  i t  was ICant who was forced to  make 
t h i s  f a ls e  move# he# who has thought more c le a r ly  tîmn anybody 
e ls e  about the e th ic a l  problem. For t i l ls  shows th a t the  
dilemma of e th ic s  i s  no t # e  dilemma of confused th iid iers  only,
b u t ra th e r  a  s ign  of the basic
nrcblcm on an immanental
The dilemma i s  not the  dilemma of p h ilo so p h ica l e th ic s  
gone astray# but the necessary  cn d -r e su lt  of ph ilo soph ica l 
e th ic a l  re f le c tio n #  as w© can lea rn  from the h is to ry  of th is  
thinking*
A M m . p . 48 <:j4), OS quo ted  above, p .67
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"Through ph iloaophical r e f le c t io n  the s i tu a t io n  
has become, in  the f u l l  sense of the word.# hopelessly  
contradictory"®
I t  i s  evident th a t Brunner's d iscu ss io n  so f a r  hears a 
c lo se r  resemblance to the d isc u ss io n  of f a c t  and value in
a n a ly tic a l philosophy than does B arth 's  d iscu ss io n  of the 
subject*  What llrminer says in  the  n egative  he claim© to be 
saying on the  b a s is  of a philosophical a n a ly s is ,  and although i t  
i s  not the  lo g ica l an a ly s is  of a n a ly tic a l  philosophy# i t  could  
s t i l l  be said  th a t i t  1© *tlie log ic  of e th ic s  which i s  expressed 
in  the  e th ic a l  problem a s Brunner sees it#
But when i t  cornea to  Brunner’ s statem ent of h ie p o s itiv e  
view i t  becomes c le a r  th a t  ho i s  r e a l ly  of the some opinion as 
Karl Barth, and th a t  h is  argument i s  the same.
For i t  i s  on ly  revealed r e l ig io n  which can solve the e th ic a l 
problOEi. That th is  i s  the so lu tio n  i s  not something th a t  
phenomenological a n a ly s is  can s e e , but only f a i t h .
This i s  n o t, however, because f a i th  overlooks the problem. 
F a ith  r e a l ly  sees the dileam a, but i t  see© the way ttoough i t .
1" iM U sa* p . 4% (29)
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*Tbu8 in  f a i th  there l i e s  an of
these a n tith e se s  which a ls o  mms np in  one, w ith an
in te n s ity  viiieh-Imman powers conld never a t ta in , and 
f a i th  possesses a so lu tio n  of th a t  one sing le  contra-» 
d ic t io n , w hich, because i t  i s  seen and f e l t  in  a l l  i t s  
pa in fu l urgency, i s  no longer a m atter of th eory , but a
o f  l i f e  and death; i t  i s  perceived  ^e x is ten tia lly ® , 
th a t  i s ,  i t  la  seen to  he an a c t  o f himsanity as a whole, 
and, as such, i t  can only he removed by an a c t o f  God as 
u w hole, which a f f e c t s  humanity as a w hole.* !
flm s %the answer of F a ith  to the e th ic a l problem i s  the Word
2o f Sin and Grace" « That I s  the answer which
"removes those a n tith e se s  which en tangle 'natural#
m orality  and e th ic s ,  an answer in  which th e  question  of 
m orality  i s  seen in  i t s  p u r i ty  th a t i s ,  fr e e  from 
'sacred* and r i tu a l  i r r a t io n a l i ty  ^ and i s  y e t grounded 
in  som ething which i s  higher than human reason; an 
answer in  which th e  Good i s  both in  the h ig h est sense 
hmimm, and y e t in  the h ig h est sense BivJ-ue; an answer 
in  which the c o n f l ic t  between the empty but pure form of 
the eoimand and i t s  concrete but impure eM iical conten t  
i s  ended •«•"3
Therefore Brunner can p o in t to " ju s t i f ic a t io n  by grace a lone  
as th e  removal o f  th e  co n tra d ic tio n  and the foundation  of the Good".
He w ith  Barth th a t e th ic s  can bo r ig h t ly  represented  on ly  as
p art of dogimtloG#
1- Ifeldga*., p.52 (37)
2. IbMem-t p .58 (37)
3 . JM flS , p .51 (36)
4 .  Ibidem , p . 68
5. I M â a t  P'85
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I t  l e  1b accordance  w ith  t h i s  view t lm i  B runner, a l t e r  
hav ing  exposed phenomeno lo g ic  a l l y  tlie in s o lu b le  problem of 
e t h i c s  ill th e  philosopliical, c o a t  e x t ,  makes an e n t i r e l y  new s t a r t *  ^  
I ci i t  i s  God's command, given in  r e v e l a t i o n  and laiowii in  
f a i t h ,  which i s  the s t a r t ! n g « p o in t  f o r  d h r i s t i a n  e t h i c s ,  the  
o n ly  p o s s ib le  form of e t h i c s .
Thus i t  i s  c le a r  t h a t ,  i n  the e n d ,  B r u n n e r , to o , i s  b o u n d  t o  
h a v e  to r e j e c t  the separatloB  of f a c t  and value*
I t  m ig h t  w e l l  be t h a t  the "Thou eh a lt"  i s  a s t r a n g e r  in  th i s  
w o r l d .  But ttien i t  i s  in  th is  w o r l d ,  the w o r ld  seen from a 
purely  im m nental p o in t of v i e w .
In  t h e  o t h e r  w o r l d ,  th a t  is  t h e  w o r ld  w h ic h  has b r o k e n  i n t o  
th i s  o n e  i n  God's ré v é la tio n , i t  i s  c e r ta in ly  not a s t r a n g e r .
On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h a t  i s  w h e r e  t h e  "Thou slia lt"  comes f r o m . I t  
i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  r e a l i ty  o f  G od , o n  the f a c ts  o f  h is  w o r d s  an d  
a c t i o n s ,  an d  i s ,  in  a  w a y , i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t h e s e .
I t  i s  summed u p  q u ite  c le a r ly  i n  B r u n n e r ' s  own d e f i n i t i o n
of C h r i s t i a n  e th ic s  as " th e  s c i e n c e  o f  hum an c o n d u c t  as i t  i©
9
d e t e r m in e d  by B i v i n e  c o n d u c t ," " '
W ‘#rii«»WBWI*Hi».<MK>WtFWWwWftiR>3<y5tr:ahi<^BAPiVSH' i^t««tetWi6NiiSîKrirai^^
1. I n  t h e  tra n s itio n , from R u c t io n  I t o  Section I I  o f  hi© book,
2 .  Ib id e m .  ^ p . 86 ( 7 3 )
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That A standpo in t l ik e  B arth ' m an d  BrnnBor's dem an d s a
re je c tio n  of the i’a c i and value separa tion  i s  re a lise d  by
Torsten Bohliii, whoso work i s  worth m e n t io n in g  in  the c o n c l u s i o n
1
o f  t h i s  chap ter*
llohlin s t a t e s  h is  m a in  th e s is  i n  a  way which, i n  the 
re lev an t a sp ec ts , sounds v e r y  n e a r  to w h a t  Barth and  Brunner a r e  
sa y in g :
" If  i t  i s  p o ssib le  a t  a l l  to e s ta b lish  a genera lly  
v a lid  "Thou siu ilt ' t h e n  i t  i s  only on  the c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  
a n  e s se n tia l connection between e th ic s  an d  re lig io n  i s  
r e c o g n i z e d *  That m u st  m ean : The b e lie f  in  the
re v e la tio n  forms the b asic  c o n d i t i o n ,  wdtiiont which n e ith e r 
c th ica  n o r  re lig io n  c o u ld  be e s t a b l i s h e d  or l a s t * " S
And he r e a l i z e s  th a t  t h i s  m ea n s to base t h e  general "Thou
S h a l t "  on a  " t r a n s c e n d e n t  r e a l i t y  *,*  i n  w h ic h  t h e r e  i s  b o t h  v a lu e
3and b e i n g , "
The im portant t h i n g  to n o t i c e  h e r e  i s  th a t Ijohlin does n o t
a s s e r t  th is  o n  t h e p l o & i c a l  grounds but o n  Ipg ipal g
"From a  lo g ica l po in t of v i e w  the q u e s t i o n  about the 
v a lid i ty  of t h e  moral ( o b l i g a t i o n )  i s  r e le n t le s s ly  f o r c e d  
back o n  th is  a lte rn a tiv e s  e i th e r  there i s  m anifested in  the
lo I lo lilin 's  two most im portant con trib u tion s to  the d iscu ss io n  
of the r e la t io n  between, p h ilo sop h ica l and th e o lo g ica l e th ic s  
are "Das Urundproblom cler Bthik* liber Ktliik iind tilaube" (The 
b a sic  problem of e t h ic s .  On e th ic s  and f a i t h ) ,  Dppeala 1923# 
h ere a fter  referred  to  as G*d*E,, and "b tik en s u p p g ift  pcji 
huvudfoimpr" (The task  of e th ic s ,  and i t s  main form s1, an essay  
in  the yearbook of Abo Academy, 1923# h erea fter  referred  to as B#ii,
F*7e
3» ÏM ijiB » p*399
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consciousness of the u n c o n d i t i o n a l  moral o b lig a tio n  ««.# 
with more o r  l e s s  c la r i ty ,  an over-w orldly w i l l ,  'which,
h.y v ir tu e  of i t s  own e s se n tia l determ ination , has the 
r ig h t  to b e  regarded as v a lid  fo r e v e r y  man, q t^  e lse  th i s  
r 0 1 i g i 0U8»»met a p h y a i c a l  m i l ,  the e x i s t e n c e  of % Aioh i s  
dem anded  b y  o u r  t h o u g h t ,  i s  nothing b u t  a n  i l l u s i o n ;  b u t  
i n  th a t  case a l l  ta lk  of a moral o b l i g a t i o n  i s  in v a lid  
a nd me an in gl e e 0 « " !
Bohlln m aintains th a t  t h i s  a l io rm tiv e  i s  s o m e t h in g  w h ic h  
ph ilo soph ical e th ic s  must e n v i s a g e ;  i t  i s  an in s ig h t t o  w h ic h  
reason i t s e l f  leads u s .  T h a t  i s  to  s a y ,  r e a s o n ,  w h e n  confronted 
w i t h  th e  problem of the  b as is  o f  moral o b lig a tio n , d em an d s a 
so lu tio n  w h ic h  e n ta i ls  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  w h ic h  f a l l  o u t s i d e  the
Q
sphere of the  rational®
O r, i f  o n e  d e c i d e s  f o r  the l a t t e r  p a r t  of the  a l t e r n a t i v e  an d  
c a l l s  a n y  thought of a tram scm dent w i l l  a n  i l lu s io n ,  then th ere  
i s  n o  moral o b lig a tio n  p o ss ib le , a t  l e a s t  n o t  i n  such a way th a t 
we eeai have a r e a l ly  normative e t h i c s .
T h is  i s  w h a t  comes o u t  of e .g ®  A . Illgeretrhm 's theory ,
Bo 111 in  h o ld # »  lllgerstrljm  sh o w s  v e r y  c l e a r l y  w h a t  the n e c e s s a r y
c o n s e q u e n c e s  a r c  o f  build ing  an e th ic a l  t h e o r y  on a  p u r e l y
3immanentai b a s i s *  E t h i c a l  ju d g e m e n ts  become o n l y  s u b j e c t i v e  
e m o t iv e  e v a l u a t i o n s ,  a n d  e th ic a l  t h e o r y  c a n n o t  be norm ative.
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Time B o h l i n  lias e e e n  th a t th e o lo g ic a l o th io e , as he conceive©  
of i t ,  im p lies  a t h e o r y  of the mnity o f v a l u e  and b e i n g  i n  the  
t r a n s c e n d e n t  r e a l i t y ,  w h ic h  i s  G od .
Bat s t i l l  he liae n o t  got the f u l l  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  the natu re 
of the  c o n f l i c t  between h is  view andthe fo r m  of a n a ly tic  
ph ilosoph ical e th ic a l theory w h ic h  confronts him, i . e .  IldgerstrHm's 
emotivism. Bohlin apparen tly  th in k s , as do B a r th  and B ru n n er  in  
th e i r  w a y , th a t  the problem of t h e  b as is  o f  moral o b lig a tio n  i s  
solved, o n c e  w e stop c o n f i n i n g  o u r s e l v e s  to ,  o r  b u i l d i n g  o n ,  the 
fa c ts  of t h e  Immamence and s t a r t  fr o m  the p o s tu la tio n  of c e r ta in  
f a c t s  a b o u t  a transcendence* i . e .  God.
III f a c t ,  i t  i s  eq u a lly  d i f f i c u l t ,  according to the a n a ly t ic a l  
p h ilo sop h ers, to bridge the gap between fa c t  and. value in  the 
transcendent realm as i t  i s  in  th is  w orld.
I f  we ore to take se rio u s ly  th e  problem created  by the  theory 
of the gap between fa c t  and va lue , we need to ask , as we slia ll 
attem pt' to  do in  the follow ing chapter’s , wliy i t  i s  th a t  we cannot 
separa te  value from being in  our knowledge of God, ami, p o s it iv e ly , 
how value and being are u n ited  in  God. he a lso  have to ask whether 
i t  ie  only possib le  to  con ceive of f a c t  and value as un ited  in  tiie 
transcenden t r e a l i ty ,  and of th eo lo g ica l e th ic s  as the only p o ss ib le  
normative e th ic s , as e .g . Bolilin does*
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3»  I 'S n o tiv isM  a n d  t h e o l o t ï i c a l  e t h i c s  i n  t h e  v i e w  o f  B n a n a r  f l i l l o r c t e l
There a re  n o t  m any exam jp lea  of theologian© w ho have t r ie d  
e x p l ic i t ly  t o  b r i n g  the a n a l y t i c  philosoph ical conception of 
the  meaning o f  e th ic a l language to hear on the understanding of 
theo log ica l e th ic s  w ith i t s  d i s t in c t  presm ppeeitions.
One attem pt, however, la  made by Gnnnar H ille rd a l in  h is  
"Teologisk o c h  filo so flB k  e t ik " f Theological an d  nhilosonhieal 
e th ic s ) ,  1958#
This work i s  a n  account of t h e  re la t io n  between various forms 
of ph ilosophical a n d  th eo log ica l e th ic s  thrmighomt t h e  h is to ry  of 
e th ic s , a n d  H ille rda l#b  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the o lh ica l theory of the 
a n a ly tic  pM loaophical t r a d i t i o n  o c c u p i e s  only a  s m a l l  apace in  
th is  contexts But i t  i s  a l l  the m o re  im portant, and servos to  
bring  out q u ite  c le a r ly  what the consequences are o f  try in g  to  
understand theo log ica l e th ic s  in  te r m s  of th is  t h e o r y .  How f a r  
the consequences a r e  r e a l ly  faced b y  the  author i s  another 
question .
According t o  Hi H e r  dal # e  t h e o r y  of t h e  meaning of e th ic a l 
language genera lly  held in  Swedish and Anglo-Saxon philosophy 
i s  a moéliiiod form of the eo -ea lled  "emotive value t h e o r y " .
One might want to  d ispu te  the adequacy o f  th is  account, even
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considering  th a t  i t  was w r i t t e n  10 y e a r s  age, bu t we do not 
th ink  th a t  H l l l e r d a l ' s  l i m i t a t i o n  of th e  diocuseion to emotivism 
re a l ly  a f fe c ts  i t s  u sefu lness f o r  t h r o w in g  l ig h t  o n  the  general 
" fa c t and value" problem in  i t s  r e la t io n  to th eo lo g ica l eth ics*
P a rt of the conclusion o f  H ll le rd a l 's  study i s  th a t  
theo log ica l e th ic s  should b e  confronted w ith a l l  kinds of 
ph ilosoph ical e th ic s  which make th e i r  i n f l u e n c e  f è l t  a i  the time* 
This does not mean th a t  theology should decide w h ic h  i s  the 
" r ig h t"  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  e th ic .  N e i t h e r  does i t  m ean t h a t  theo log ica l 
e th ic s  should d e c i d e  what kind of ph ilosophical e th ic s  corresponds 
host to theo log ica l e th ic s .
T he con fro n ta tio n  s h o u ld  not a t  a l l  aim a t  passing any. 
ju d g e m e n t  on ph ilosophical e th ic s , b u t  o n l y  a t  b ring ing  a c le a re r  
u n d e r s t a n d in g  of th eo lo /d ca l eMiics i t s e l f .  I t  should do th is  by 
tak ing  the v a r i o u s  types o f  ph ilosoph ical e th ic s  a s  they a re , and 
fin d  out where th e ; '^ ^ if fe r  from t h e o l o g i c a l  e th ic s , and, on the 
o t h e r  liaad, where they could be r e g a r d e d  as corresponding to  o r a s  
being o o m p le m e u ta r y  to  each o th e r .
And i t  would seem th a t  H ille rd a l conceives of the e th ic a l 
an a ly s is  of e m o t iv ia m  as b e i n g  in  a s e n s e  complementary to  the 
in v e s t igatioBS of th eo lo g ica l e t h i c s  i t s e l f .
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Ro th a t  t h e o l o g i c a l  e t h i c s  can h a p p i l y  accept i t  ae a  kind 
of m e t a - c t h i o s ,  hy meame o f  which i t  c a n  get a n  u n d e r s t a n d in g  of
the general c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of i t s  own language,
H iilea'dal imderstsHda the  em otiv ist theory as follow ss 
E v e r y  évaluatio n  i s ,  i n  the l a s t  r e s o r t ,  based on a n  e m o t io n ,
T he o r ig in a l ,  a u t h e n t i c  evalua tion  i s ,  th e re fo re , not v e r if ia b le ,  
as th e o re tic a l s t a t e m e n t s  a r e .  I t  i s  n e ith e r  tru e  nor f a ls e .
But, although v a l u e  p r i n c i p l e s  u ltim a te ly  r e s t  on emotive 
ev a lu a tio n s, they c a n  s t i l l  h e  described  and s y s t e m a t i z e d .
E th ica l judgements can, t h e r e f o r e ,  he said  to  h a v e  a d e s c r i p t i v e  
fu n c tio n , in  the s e n s e  t h a t  they r e f e r  to  a system of values which 
i t s e l f  i s  accepted em otively.
W it h in  th e  framework of t h e  emotive theory  i t  i s  q u ite  p o ss ib le , 
i l i l le rd a l  holds, to  s t r e s s  the  d e s c r i p t i v e  r e f e r e n c e  of value 
ju d g e m e n t0  a l s o  in  a n o t h e r  sense:
Although the e v a l u a t i o n  h a s  a n  a f f e c t i v e  b a s i s ,  i t  has a lso  a
po in t of r e f e r e n c e  in  som e th in g  or some u tte ran ce  of a th e o re tic a l
1
a n d ,  thereby, v e r if ia b le  ch a rac te r •
1 ,  €f® On,c i t . , p . 2 2 5 ,  '
» ttJuAvx^ w A  A  * —
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ï l i i s  view  le  in  e f f e c t  a its ila r  to  K«M» Hare’ s somewhat
c le a r e r  theory about the "primary" ev a lu a tiv e  meaning of value  
judgement8 ami th e ir  "secondary" d e sc r ip tiv e  meaning, the la t t e r  
r e fe r r in g  to some fa c tu a l s ta te  o f a f f a ir s ,  idrieh forms the  
sp eak er's reason fo r  making the value judgement, hut which i s  no 
.log ieal  reason fo r  i t .
As E ille r d a l con ceives of th e o lo g ica l  e th ic s  i t  i s ,  b r ie f ly  
p u t, the continuoiis a c tu a liz a t io n , in  the changing h is to r ic a l  
s i tu a t io n s ,  of the eva lu a tion s of the New Testament.
Therefore the f i r s t  q u estio n  would seam to he a q u estion  about 
the meaning of the value judgements to  he f^nml in  the Mow 
Testament and, s in ce  l l i l le r c la l  mint© to in v e s t ig a te  the e th ic a l  
judgements of the New Testament on the b a sis  o f the general theory  
of e th ic a l language o ffered  by ©motiv isa i, b is  e x p l ic i t  q u estion  i s :  
"What are th e  consequences o f the em otive theory fo r  New Testament 
e th ic s ? " ^
There i s  no reason why one should o b ject to emotivism froai a
th e o lo g ic a l p o in t o f  v iew , l l i l le rd a l  maintains* F i r s t ,  one must
not be m islead by the term "value n ih ilism " , when th is  i s  applied  
Pto  e m o t iv l s m .  " F o r  in  n o  ease ie  t h e r e  a q u e s t i o n  of- a  " p r a c t i c a l
1® Ibidem *.  ^ ,
2 . The te r m  "value n ih ilism "  perhaps m o re  freq u en tly  u s e d  i n  the 
S c a n d in a v ia n  than in  the Angio-Raxon c o n t e x t .
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value n i h i l i s m ,  by w h ic h  J l i l la rd a l  a p p a r e n t l y  means an a t t i tu d e  
which does not p l a c e  v a l u e  o n  a n y t h i n g  in  l i f e *  I t  i s  "only" 
a q u e s t i o n  o f  a  t h e o r y  a b o u t  the r e la t io n  o f  e th ic a l j u d g e m e n t s
to  th e o re tic a l statem ents*
S e c o n d l y ,  and. th a t  i s  the most im portant p o in t, i t  i s  q u ite  
p o ssib le  o n  t h e  em otiv lst fonimla to  a c c o u n t  fo r  a l l  the m a in  
elements of New Testament eth ics*
For i t  i s  c l e a r ,  I lille rc la l ho lds, th a t  the b a s i c  e v a l u a t i o n s  
to  be found i n  t h e  New Testament express a n  a f f e c t i v e  e n g a g e m e n t*  
But i t  i s  a l s o  c l e a r  th a t  i n  some s e n s e  the  e m o t io n  e x p r e s s e d  l a  
the evalmatioBB lias a  b a s i s  which i s  of a th e o re tic a l c h a r a c t e r .
H e r e  the sam e a p p lie s , as ap p lie s  t o  f a i th  in  g e n e r a l . 
Although f a i th  i s  fe e lin g  a n d  t d l l ,  i t  ie  a l s o  b a s e d  on a  k n o w le d g e  
of c e r t a i n  fac ts*  I t  h o l d s  c e r t a i n  e l e m e n t s  of t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
u n d e r s t a n d a b le  p r o c l a m a t i o n  to  be t ru e .
New Testament e t h i c s ,  which ie  b a s e d  o n  f a i th ,  i n  i t s  t u r n  
r e f e r s  t o  t h e s e  fa c ta  a n d  ( t h e o r e t i c a l )  c o n v i c t i o n s .
The fa c ts  i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  p a r t l y  of a  h i s t o r i c a l  c h a r a c t e r ,  
e .g . th a t  J o  BUB d id  som e r e m a r k a b le  th in g s , a n d  th a t  h e  sh o w ed  
h i m s e l f  to n m n y  as r i s e n  again  a f t e r  h is  death* But f i r s t  of a l l  
the  fa c te  r e p r e s e n t  a  t h e o r e t i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of the h i s t o r i c a l  
e v e n t ,  th a t  Jeena w a s the Messiah p r o m is e d  t h r o u g h  the p rophets.
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The proclam ation of the New Testament i s  both t e a c h i n g  an d  
a d m o n i t io n  to  b e l i e v e  what h im  tlms b e e n  t a u g h t  t o  be t r u e .
Ami — here e th ic s  comes in to  the p ic tu re  ^ the  proolaraation 
i s  an ex h o rta tio n  to draw the consequences of these  h is to r ic a l  
f a c t s ,  t h e r e b y  engaging the whole of the p e r s o n .  I n  connection 
w ith th is  e x h o r t a t i o n  the New Testament proclam ation a lso  
p re sen ts  u© w ith a d e sc r ip tio n  of these  c o n s e q u e n c e s ,  i n  th a t  i t  
p io tn re s  a c e r ta in  kind of l i f e  w h ic h  ie  w o r t h y  of the G o s p e l  o f  
C h ris t, i.Co of the  new C h r i s t —r e a l i t y .
To t r y  a n d  siiap lify  t h e  sojiewhnt c o n f u s i n g  p ic tu re  p r e s e n t e d  
by H i l le r d a l 's  a c c o u n t  o f  the e th ic s  o f  the New T e s t a m e n t ;
The v a l u e  judgements in  the  New T e s t a m e n t  are  a f f e c t i v e ,  i .e ,  
they a re  b u i l t  o n  e m o t i o n s ,  and as such they have a r e c o m m e n d in g  
func tion  ( th e  terms are  l l i l l e r d a l 's ) .
But they h a v e  also  a d e s c r i p t i v e  fu n c tio n , and th a t  in  a 
double s e n s e .  F i r s t ,  they r e f e r  to  events an d  In te rp re ta tio n s  
o f  these e v e n t s  in  a th e o re tic a l ly  form ulated p r o c l a m a t i o n  a n d ,  
s e c o n d l y ,  they describe  a c e r t a i n  m ode o f  c o n d u c t  w h ic h  i s  
expressed in  t h e  recom m an d at i o n s , i . e .  they d e s c r i b e  the 
c o n s e q u e n c e s  which t h e  s p e a k e r s  i n  the Hew T e s t a m e n t  (presumably 
includ ing  Jesus liiiBself) t h i n k  should be d raw n  from the fa c ta  
re fe r re d  to .
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t h i s ,  of course, seems to  f i t  extremely w ell the erao tiv iat 
theory , aud, w ith a c e r ta in  adjustm ent of the terminology^ any of 
the a n a ly tic  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  th e o rie s  of eth ics*
But one may doubt Wmther M ille rda l has fu l ly  re a liz e d  what he 
h a 8 thereljy c o m m it te d  him self t o  saying*
Ilia a c c e p t a n c e  o f  the e m o t i v i s t  theory as a possib le  b as is  
fo r an account of the  meaning of th eo log ica l e th ic s  n ec essa rily  
im plies the admission th a t  in  the e n d  t h e r e  i s  no o t h e r  c o n n e c t i o n  
be'Ween the  C hris t e v e n t s , w ith th e i r  th e o re tic a l  im p lica tio n s , 
and the e # i c a l  consequences drawn fr o m  them in  the Now T e s t a m e n t ,  
than the  emotions o f  the speakers i n  q u e s t i o n .
I t  im plies fu r th e r  th a t  th e re  i s ,  b a s i c a l l y ,  n o  o t h e r  c o n n e c t i o n  
between the c o n s e q u e n c e s  d ra w n  b y  t h e  s p e a k e r s  i n  t h e  New T e s t a m e n t ,  
1 .0 *  th e i r  eva lua tive  judgements, and my; e th ic a l ju d g e m e n ts  when I  
accept t h o s e  consequences, t h a n  the pure coincidence o f  id e n t ic a l ,  
o r s im ila r , emotional r e a c t i o n s  to  c e r ta in  facts*
I t  i s  of c o u r s e  dec is iv e  th a t  the  s im ila r ity  o r  id e n t i ty  of 
t h e s e  e m o t io n a l  re ac tio n s  i s ,  s t r i c t l y  s p o o k i n g ,  a c o i n c i d e n c e ,  no 
m atter how f roquent i t s  o c c u r r e n c e  m ig h t  b e .  I f  i t  w e r e  n o t  a # ,
i . e .  i f  i t  could h e  sa id  to  b e  i n  som e s e n s e  n e c e s s a r y ,  t h i s  w o u ld  
have b e e n  the  same a s  s a y i n g  th a t  t h e r e  was a necessary c o n n e c t i o n  
between c e r t a i n  fa c ta  a n d  o u r  e m o t io n a l  reac tio n s  to  them, i . e .
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botweeîi f a c t s  ami v a l u e  ju d g e m e n ts *  which would liavo b e e n  d ire c tly  
c o n t r a r y  to  the e m o t i v i s t  theo ry .
I t  would fu r th e r  have im plied th a t  the v e r y  e m o t io n s  w h ic h  
fo r m  t h e  u l t i m a t e  b a s is  of value ju d g e m e n ts  c o u ld  have a  c o g n i t i v e  
f u n c t i o n ,  t h a t  they w e r e  a  k in d  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  t h r o u g h  which we 
c o u l d  ob ta in  k n o w le d g e .  To hold t h i s  w o u ld  h a v e  meant to  r e je c t  
g e n e r a l l y  the f a c t - a n d - v a l u e  s e p a r a t i o n ,  and to a s s e r t  an a l t o g e t h e r  
d if fe re n t  theory about the r e la t io n  between eva lua tion  ami k n o w le d g e ,  
I t  s h o u l d  b e  made c l e a r  th a t  the  x>oiBt a t  i s s u e  in  the e m o t iv e  
t h e o r y  i s  not so nmch t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  e v a l u a t i o n s  a re  based 
0 Î1 emotions, o r  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  them, o@ the q u e s t i o n  of w h e t h e r  
these  e m o t io n s  a re  lo g ic a lly  separated  fr o m  cogn ition , ©o th a t  there  
i s  n o  n e c e s s a r y  c o n n e c t i o n  b e t w e e n  ihem  and statem entg o f  f a c t s .
We cannot, of c o u r s e , d e n y  l l i l le rd a l  the r ig h t  to  a d v o c a t e  a  
t h e o r y  about t h e o l o g i c a l  e th ic s , w h ic h  r e s t s  conten t w ith  claim ing 
th a t  i t  e x p r e s s e s  cm otiom lly  b a s e d  r e c o m e n d a t i o i s , to g e th er w i t h  
r e f e r e n c e s  to  c e r t a i n  non-éva lua tige  fa c ta  o f  o n e  kind o r  a n o t h e r .  
But we s e r i o u s l y  w a n t  to d i s p u t e  th a t  h is  account d o e s  ju s t ic e  
to  theo log ica l e th ica  in  any of i t s  main h is to r ic a l  forms, including  
the e t h i c s  o f  t h e  New T e s t a m e n t ,
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For one th in g ,  i t  would seem th a t  th e  f a c t s  w h ich  Haw 
Testam ent e t h ic s  r e f e r s  t o ,  a c c o r d in g  to  H i11o r d a l , i . e .  th a t  
Jesti© i s  M essiah , and even th e  e v e n ts  o f  J e s u s '  l i f e  th e m se lv e s  
more th an  any o th e r  " fa c t s " ,  a re  f a c t a  n o t to  he se p a r a ted  from  
t h e i r  v a lu e ,  and n o t to  he s ta t e d  a p a r t  from an e v a lu a t io n  o f  them . 
So th a t  In  th e  e v e n ts  o f th e  Mew T estam ent f a c t  and v a lu e  i e  
in s e p a r a b le ,
l%it even  au p p osiiig  th a t  such a  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  "Boti«*©valwatige" 
s ta te m e n t o f  th e s e  f a c t s  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  i t  i e  r e a l l y  in c o n c e iv a b le  
how th e  e v a lu a t io n s  o f th e  New T estam ent w r it e r s  and t h e i r  
s u c c e s s o r s  a s t h e o lo g ic a l  c t M c i a t s  can be c o n s id e r e d  to  be j u s t  
d e s c r ib in g  c e r t a in  f a c t s  and them to  be d e s c r ib in g  a c e r t a in  mode 
o f  con d u ct w hich th e y  recommend a s  w orthy o f  th e s e  f a c t s *
When th e y  d e s c r ib e  con d u ct w orthy o f  th e  G ospel o f  C h r is t ,  
they c e r t a in ly  in te n d  to  make an e v a lu a t io n  w hich i s  more than  
t h e i r  p e r so n a l recom m endatlon, and w h ich , a lth o u g h  i t  r e q u ir e s  
W ap p reh en sio n  and a c c e p ta n c e , i s  n o t dependent on my em otion a l - 
a c ce p ta n c e  to  become an o b l ig a t io n  f o r  me.
I I I .  yiffl VALIDITY Of m ii  SI,U>Aîi4TïON OP FACT AND VAIÆE -  A CKITICI8M.
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! •  The b a s is  fo r  th e lo g ic a l  separation  of f a c t  and value in  
li*M# H a re 's  th e o ry .
«W«^ï»IU4ï4««riE®W*fS^ïSf^nï
To o u t l i n e  t h e  p o s i t i o n  a t  # e  p r e s e n t  s t a g e  o f  o u r  inqu iry; 
¥ e  have seen t h a t  t h e  fundamental a s p e c t  of lUM* Hare' s account 
o f  moral language i s  the m a i n t a i n i n g  o f  a  n o n -e o g u it iv ls t  t h e o r y  
a b o u t  i t s  n a tu r e #
The n o n - c o g n i t i v i B t  t h e o r y  of e t h i c s  h o ld s  th a t i t  i s  not the 
f u n c t i o n  o f  m ora l  la n g u a g e  to  convey know ledge  of any  k i n d ,  e .g o  
o f  s o -c a lle d  "m ora l  v a l u e s " ,  but t o  perform some o t h e r  f u n c t i o n ,  
i n  H a r e ' s  op in ion , to p rescr ib e  a c t io n s . O nly in  a secondary, 
n ou -eva lu a tive  c a p a c i t y  can moral la n g u a g e  be s a i d  to  be 
i n f o r m a t i v e .
The i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  i s  th a t i t  i s  a  m i s t a k e  t o  think t h a t  
ju d g e m e n ts  about w liat one o u g h t  t o  do s t a n d  In any  r e la t io n  o f 
l o g i c a l  in feren ce  to s t a t e m e n t s  about f a c t s ,  about "what i s " .
T h a t  i s  to  s a y ,  f a c t u a l  statem ents a r e  l o g i c a l l y  s e p a r a t e d  from 
ev a lu a tiv e  judgements•
The t h e o r y  o f  such a l o g i c a l  separateness i a  common t o  a l l  
t h e  e t h i c a l  w r i t e r s  of t h e  movement we have l o o s e l y  c a l l e d  
" a n a ly tica l p h i l o s o p h y " , although i t  need not n e c e s sa r ily  be
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noii-cîogxiitiv iatica  The theory of va lu es ao u nd efiaab le non-
natural p r o p e r t i e s  lea d s to  a  s i m i l a r  th eo iy  w ith  r e g a r d  t o  the  
l o g i c a l  character o f m o ra l  language®
A s tu d y  of various types of th e o lo g ica l e th ic s  1ms d isc lo se d  
th a t i f  the claim  of R#M® Hare and others to have g iven  a true  
Ecooniit of the b a s ic  stru ctu re  of moral language i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  
th is  means th a t i t  w i l l  not be p o s s ib le  any longer to  g ive a 
ser io u s meaning to th e o lo g ic a l ethics®
T h is  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  t h e o l o g i c a l  e t h i c s  m t h  a  theory  
l ik e  K®Mo H a r e ' s  i s  n o t ,  of cou rse , in  i t a e l f  any argument f o r  o r  
a g a in st  t h e  l a t t e r  ( a l t h o u g h  o u r  d isc u ss io n  of t h e o l o g i c a l  e t h i c s  
BO fa r  m ig h t  have in d ica ted  some p o ss ib le  a lte r n a t iv e s  t o  H a r e ' s  
view)® B u t i t  c e r t a i n l y  adds in t e r e s t  to the c l o s e r  study of  
H a r e ' s  t h e o r y  td i lc h  we t h i n k  i s  c a l l e d  for* ¥ l m t  i s  needed i s  in  
t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  an in te rn a l c r i t i c i s m  of h i s  a n a l y s i s *
Dn w h a t  b a s is ,  t h e n ,  does H are  hold  t h a t  t h e  m ain  f e a t u r e  o f  
m o ra l  la n g u a g e  i s  the lo g ic a l  independence o f  v a l u e s  from  f a c t s ?  
T h is  q u estion  means t h a t  t h e  main t a s ic  which l i e s  b efore us i s  to  
take a  c l o s e r  look a t  H a r e ' s  v e r y  conception  o f a " l o g i c  o f m ora l 
language"®  What does i t  mean to s a y  th at t h e r e  i s  a  ce r ta in  
l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  morel language? I s  i t  a  q u e s t i o n  of a
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eo ja tl j ig e s it  mge o f  lan g u a g e*  of how m ora l language happen© t o  he  
mgocl* e i t h e r  aom etim es* m o s t ly  o r  a lw a y s ?  I n  other w o rd s  o f  
t h e  a c t u a l  u s e  o f  w ord s?  Or i s  i t  i n  some sense a  q u e s t i o n  o f  
an a p r io r i lo g ic ,  of a l o g i c a l  stru ctu re  w hich  m o ra l  language 
h a s  by  n o c e s e i i y ?
I f  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  t h e  c a se , w h a t  are th e  grounds f o r  h o ld in g  
t h a t  p io ra l language mm a t  have a c e r t a i n  l o g i c a l  stru ctu re?
No m atter w h a t  the a n sw e r  m i l  be to  th ese q u e stio n s , t h e y  
are i n  f a c t  q uestion s w h ich  w i l l  fee seen  t o  in v o lv e  a  d i s c u s s i o n  
o f  t h e  b a s i c  p r in c ip le s  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  p h i lo s o p h y *  n o t  o n ly  w i t h  
r e g a r d  to  moral p h i lo s o p h y *  b u t  t o  philosophy as a  whole*
I t  i s ,  to  b e g i n  w ith *  q u ite  c le a r , th a t the l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  m o ra l  la n g u a g e  i s  so m e th in g  sd iieh  i s  a c t u a l l y  p r e s e n t  i n  moral 
language as i t  i s . ^
1® As we h av e  s e e n  e a r l i e r  t h e  two m ain  fea tu res  of the l o g i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  m o ra l  language i s  p r e s c r ip t iv ity  a n d  u n iv e r sa l-
i n a b i l i t y ,  F r e e c r i p t i v i t y  means th at moral la n g u a g e  i n  i t s  
purely m o ra l  m ean ing  p r e s c r i b e s ,  and d o es  n o t  g iv e  f a c t u a l  
i n f o  m a  t i  o n ,  h e n c e  t h e  l o g i c a l  i i id e p en d e n ee  o f  valu es f ro m  
f a c t e .  U n i v e r e a l i z a b i l i t y  means t h a t  in  a  m o ra l  ju d g em en t 
there i s  a lw a y s  something w h ich  i s  p r e s c r i b e d *  i . e .  some 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  human c o n d u c t*  a n d  t h i s  "something" i s  
p rescribed  f o r  a l l  c a s e s ,  c e t e r is  paribus.
To b r i n g  the th eses  o f  p r e s c r i p t i v i t y  am! u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i i y  
on one s h o r t  formula: There can b e  no l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n  b e tw een
a s t a t e m e n t  of f a c t  and a ju d g e m e n t  o f  v a lu #  ( p r e s e r i b t i v i t y ) ,  
b u t  t h e r e  can b e  a  l o g i c a l  r e la t io n  be tw een  va lu e ju d g e m e n ts  
( u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y ) .  Bee F .E .  p . 4®
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In  th e  c e n t r a l  p assag e  from  th e  P re fa c e  to  Freedom and
Heaeon, w hich we have quo ted  e a r l i e r .  H are speaks o f h i s  ta s k  a s  
t h a t  o f  "exposing  th e  lo g ic a l  s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  language in  which 
t i l l s  th o u g h t [nam ely a b o u t m oral q u e s t io n s ]  i  
(u n d e r lin e d  by me).
In  o th e r  p a s sa g e s , to o , H are seems to  # la lm  to  he s t a t in g  
Bometiiing e m p ir ic a l abou t # e  u se  o f language by exposing  i t s  
lo g ic a l  s t r u c t u r e .  For in s ta n c e ,  i t  i s  n ec e ssa ry  n o t m erely
to  a c h ie v e  an  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f th e  m oral c o n c e p ts , b u t to  u se  t h i s  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  in  o rd e r  to  g iv e  an acco u n t of m oral rea so n in g  « 
showing t h a t  moral  a rm m en t s  p roceed a s th ey  do because  th e  lo g ic a l  
c h a ra c te r  o f th e  co n c ep ts  i s  what i t  (u n d e r lin e d  by me)-., % ¥  ,
Of c o u rse , n o th in g  i s  y e t  s a id  abou t w hat i t  i s  t h a t  e s ta b l i s h e s  
t h i s  u s e .  Ï8  i t  'j i i s t  p e o p le 's  co n v e n tio n s , o r i s  i t  a lo g ic a l  
n e c e s s i ty  of some k ind?
The r e s u l t  of th e  s tu d y  o f m oral lan g u ag e , Hare hopes, i s  t h a t  
we s h a l l  be a b le  to  th in k  b e t t e r  ab o u t m oral q u e s t io n s ,v iz .  by 
u n d e rs ta n d in g  b e t t e r  w hat we a c tu a l ly  a r e  doing when we make m oral 
judgem enta.
!» EsIUt
2 c FolU , p .4
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VariouB p a s t  t h e o r i e s  a b o u t  m o r a l s  have* apparently, confused 
p e o p l e ' s  moral reasoning, by misrepresenting w h$t i a  actually g o in g  
on  i n  such r e a s o n i n g .  And t h e  way to make o u r  t h o u g h t s  a b o u t  
m o ra l  q u e s t i o n a c l e a r e r  and more e f f i c i e n t ,  i s  t o  t r y  and understand 
c o r r e c t l y  the moral concepts, w h ich  Im ve, up  t i l l  now, been so 
w id e ly  m is u n d e r s to o d .^
I t  W.11 be  c l e a r ,  however, t l m i  a l t h o u g h  H are  i s  speaking o f  
how m o ra l  argument p roceeds, he i s  n o t  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h a t  i t  alxmys 
p r o c e e d s  i n  a c e r t a i n  w ay, i . e .  t h a t  t h e  moral concepts are u s e d  in  
one way o n l y .
Speaking o f meaning in  general he h o ld s  t h a t  the meaning of 
a n  exp ression  i s  or i n v o l v e s  t h e  use o f  i t  in  accordance w i th  ' ' 
c e r ta in  r u l e s . f h i a  m ean s , e v id e n t ly , th a t t h e  meaning of t h e  
m o ra l  terms in v o lv e s , a t  l e a s t ,  t h a t  t h e y  are used in  a c c o rd a n c e  
wi'èli # e  ru le s  o f  p r e s c r ip t !v ity  and i i n i y e r s a l i m M l i t y *
1» The k e y  t o  th e  problem i s  t h e  study o f  t h e  concepts which have, 
through b e in g  m isunderstood, brought us in to  t h is  p e r p le x ity  
( v i z * ' t h e  seeming antinomy b e tw e e n  freedom and  rea so n ).
2* & & . P '7 .
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But Hare does not want to be understood as "making out
be 1language to  more in f le x ib le  than i t  is"»  Although he speaks
of ru le s  deterffiiniig th e  meanings o f  expressions* .he s t i l l  
accep ts the aecount of language which l i e s  behind the .now ao 
fa m ilia r  terms "open tex tu re "  and "fam ily resemblance" a.s.o®
Hare c e r ta in ly  tliinks th a t  the exp ression s of language are  
used veiy to le ran tly *  and th is  in  two ways» F irs t*  the use of 
the expressions can change, and secondly, th e re  can a t  one time 
be many b o rd er-lin e  e a s e s , loO . a c e r ta in  l ib e r ty  in  the way the 
expressions a re  used.
The im portant th in g . Hare says, i s  to re f ra in  from tak ing  
"advantage of the f l e x ib i l i t y  o f language in  order to b lur  
ph ilo soph ical is s u e s " . This must mean th a t  he th inks th e re  i s  a 
c e r ta in  ph ilo soph ical is s u e  a t  s tak e  below the le v e l , so to speak, 
of the actu a l f l e x ib le  use of language. In other words, th a t  th e re  
i s  one c e r ta in  lo g ic a l  stru ctu re  i n  the  use of language, though i t  
i s  in  order th a t  language i s  not always used in  accordance with i t .
This view i s ,  of cou rse , not so strange* I f  we are going to  
speak of a l ib e r ty  in  the use of ex p ress io n s, and not o f anarchy, 
th e re  have to be some r u le s  from which th e  use of exp ression s a re  
sometimes, or in  some co n n ectio n s, " set free" .
!» JisJit. P '7"
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What Hare appears to  be speaking aboiit, i s  some th ing  th a t  we
could adequately c a l l  "standard  c o rre c t usage", although he never
uses th is  expression . For on the one hand i t  turns o u t, or eo i t
aeeiiiB, th a t  the  lo g ic a l ra le s  he i s  th inking  o f ,  can he observed in
the ac tu a l use of language. By "rules" he means "that con a isten cy
of p ra c tis e  in  the use of an expression  which i s  the condition  of
i t s  in te 11ig ib i l i t y ," ^
I . e . ,  i t  i s  th e  use of moral language in  so c ie ty  Hare i s
th ink ing  o f . His in te n tio n  i s  to give an account of the log ic  of
moral language wliich m i l  "do j u s t ic e  to th e  moral language o f  a
2so c ie ty  lik e  our own.**"
On the o ther hand, th is  wish to give an. account of our moral 
language, and i t s  l ik e s ,  does not a r is e  merely from a d e s ire  to 
s t a r t  w ith  the ta sk  n ea rest a t  hand.
I t  comes, ra th e r ,  from a c e r ta in  preference fo r  the  moral 
language of our eociet^r. There seems be something in  our 
so c ie ty  which bmrimgs in ti, so to  speak, the u ltim ate  lo g ica l ch a rac te r 
of moral language. For th e  reason why our account must cover the 
moral language o f  our so c ie ty , i s  tlia t i t  i s  a so c ie ty , " in  which 
some people sometimes th in k  about u ltim a te  moral q u estio n s" .




"U ltim ate" means here probably ju s t  " th a t ,  beyond which we 
caimot reach o" That i s  to say, Haro might ju s t  mean th a t  our 
theory must cover the  most extreme, or fa r-reach in g  eases.
The con text in  which these exp ression s occur, deserves c lo s e r  
a tten tio n *
What Hare ia  d iscu ssin g  here i s  the fe a tu re  of our language 
th a t  i t  has both "prltm rily" and "secondarily" ev a lu a tiv e  words»
This po in t has been mentioned e a r l ie r  i n  our th e s is ,  but we have 
not considered i t s  im p lica tio n s from a c r i t i c a l  p o in t of view.
To the f i r s t  c la ss  of words belong words lik e  "good", to  the 
second " in d u s tr io u s" , honest" , "courageous" a . s .o .
The c h a r a c te r is t ic  of a word of the  l a t t e r  c la s s  i s  th a t  i t  
i s  p rim arily  d e e e r ip tiv e . That i s ,  i t  i s  d escr ib in g  a q u a li ty , 
a way of behaving, and on ly  aecondarily  p lac in g  a p o s it iv e  va lu e  
upon th i s  kind of behaviour. The p o s itiv e  ev a lu a tio n  which i s  
im plied  in  the words, i s  ju s t  a r e s u l t  of the f a c t  th a t  the so c ie ty  
in  question  fo r  a long tim e, or always, has tended to regard  the  
q u a lity  which i t  d esc rib es , as something p o s it iv e .
Let us imagine a so c ie ty  which p o sse sse s  only such secondarily  
eva lua tive  words. Ruoh a so c ie ty  could, or does perhaps, e x i s t .
I t s  standards of eva lua tion  wmuld be irrevocab ly  f ix e d . One could 
mot express disagreem ent with them, as long as one used i t s  moral words,
n o
All. OB© could do ill  each a so c ie ty  (th is ,seem s to fo llow  from 
H are 's  views* although he does mot po in t i t  out 1b th is  commectiom) 
ia  perhaps to  j to j i  ta lk in g  about moral questions a ltogether*  by 
ceasing to use the  moral words of th e  so c ie ty , and in s tead  try  to  
express the d e sc rip tiv e  co n ten t by moans of o ther v..oi\ls which have 
me eva lu a tiv e  meaning a t  a l l*  This i s  an im portant consequence of 
th e  lo g ica l sep a ra tio n  between fa c t s  and valmea, as Hare sees  i t*  
and i t  i s  th is  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f s ta t in g  the d e sc r ip tiv e  con ten t o f a 
value word l ik e  "courageous" in  non-evn lnative term s, which i s  doubtful 
to  u s .
In  t h is  con n ection , however, l e t  i t  s u f f ic e  to  t r y  and analyse 
H are 's  view in  order to find  wiiat i s  fo r  him the b a s is  of h is  
account of the lo g ic  o f moral language « ^  we had had. only
secondarily  o v a ln a tiv e  moral words, l ik e  th ose  of the imagined 
"closed" s o c ie ty , the n a tu r a l is t s ,  as Hare p ic tu res  them, would have 
been rig^xt in  th e  account of moral language.
I t  would then r e a l b e  tru e  once we had e s tab lish ed  the
f a c ts  of th e  c a s e , th e  moral co n clu sio n  would follow  by i t s e l f .
That i s ,  i t  would be ju s t  a m atter of bringing  out the meaning o f  
the words, of g iv in g  a verbal in stru c tio n *  I f ,  fo r  in s tan ce , %?e 
had had only value words of th e  seme type as "nigger", i t  would 
have been im possible fo r  us to p r o te s t  aga in st th e  standards behind
I l l
ra c ia l  d iscr im in a tio n . I t  would have been a misunder©landing of 
lan g u ag e .
I t  i s  of g re a t importance to  be q u ite  c le a r  about H are 's  
reaeonm fo r  re fu tin g  natural!am  in  e th ic 8 . He i s  not saying th a t  
naturallam  ia  wrong heeausa i t  I s  untrue a lto g e th e r , but rath er  
because i t  i s  in s u f f ic ie n t
That ia  to  sa y , natw 'allam  i s  tru e , am f a r  as i t  g o es , hut i t
of1b not general enough to cover a l l  the p ie  tu r e . What i© wrong i s  
t î ia t  i t  p re sen ts  th e  com bination of d e sc r ip t iv e  meaning-and 
eva lua tive  meaning as necessa iy , i®e® th a t  i t  p re tends th a t  i t s  
account of moral language i s  a l l  th a t  has to be said  about i t*
2But HOW, Hare h o ld s , th is  n a tu r a l is t ic  account i s  not .adequate. 
For i t  i s  p o s s ib le ,  w ith our language, to express the op in ion  th a t  
the negro i s  an equal to  the w hite man, and i t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  
p lace  negative value on w ife -b e a tin g  (d e sp ite  the standards of 
so c ie ty  i a  the f i f t e e n th  cen tu ry ).
1 . C f. F .% ., p p .a o f .
2. I t  seema th a t  the  " n a tu r a l is t ic  fa lla c y " , fo r  Hare, i s  a r e s u l t  of  
the inadequacy of the  n a tu r a l i s t ic  p ictu re  of th e  lo g ic a l stru ctu re  of 
moral language,
3 . C f. p.PA.
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I f  we were confined  to  a va lu e language of the **nigger" type* 
we could not have broken f re e  of tl.\e oBtablisbed standards,
"Ihit fo r tu n a te ly  we are not so con fined , our language, aa we have i t  
[underlined  by me ]  ^ ; can be a v e h ic le  fo r  new ideaa."*
I t  i s  a  Blatter of f a c t  th a t  **in t h e  re a l w o r ld  s t a n d a r d s  of 
h u m a n  c x e © 1 1  o n e o  c han g e o ’®"
This I s ,  a t  le a s t  p a r t ly , because we have a language w ith 
p rim arily  ev a lu a tiv e  words, l ik e  "good" in  i t s  ord inary  u se .
These words ©an be used to  reeommend d if f e r e n t ,  end o p p o site , 
q u a litie s*  That i s ,  th ere i s  no n ecessary  lo g ica l connection  
between the eva lua tive  and the d e sc rip tiv e  meaning of th ese  terme* 
(This i s  where the n a tu r a lis t* s p resen ta tio n  of the case goes vTong#) 
I t  i s  the lo g ic a l independence of p re sc r ip tio n  from 
d esc r ip tio n  in  words l ik e  "good" which makes i t  p o ss ib le  to express  
disapproval of o*g. honesty  and courage* I t  i s  q u ite  p o ss ib le  to 
say e#ê’o th a t  "hemesty i s  bad", add there i s  th erefo re  no lo g ica l 
i n f eroBCtï-r^iationship between the p re sc r ip tiv e  and the d e sc rip tiv e  
meaning of secon d arily  ev a lu a tiv e  words eith er*
1* F .au , p .85 .♦ac3BÆ«ÎK» * ^ 1 * .
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In a i t  i s  a ooiiseqmcmc© of the lo g ic  of moral language
th a t  a moral q u estion  i s  not a lo g ica l  q u estio n , Imt a q u estion  of 
aaa& tjg . moral principles.
This lo g ic a l  independeao# of value from f a c t  i s ,  as we have
seen , a fe a tu re  of language "as we have i t " ,  " in  th e  re a l  world"*
"The su b sta n tiv e  p a r t  of the p r e a c r lp t lv lo t  th e s is
i s  th a t  th e re  a re  p r e s c r ip t iv e  uses of th ese  words* * * * 
P rescr ip tiv iem  would be refu ted  i f  i t  could be shown th a t  
we do not ever use moral words in  the way th a t  I  have 
ch a ra cter ised  as p r e sc r ip t iv e " .
I t  i s  necessary to  q u a lify  th is  in  a ce r ta in  way* Hare 
2e x p l i c i t l y  s ta te s  th a t  nothing whatever in  h is  argument hangs upon 
the "actual use of words in  common speech". This s ig h t  sound a b i t  
su rp ris in g ; but should probably be explained  in  the follow ing ways 
Hare i s  d escr ib in g  the  use of language in  a way th a t  would be 
tr%%e, BO m atter what sounds people would use to  express th e ir  
concepts.
Making a comparison, Hare holds th a t  i t  would not make any 
re a l d iffe ren ce  fo r  mathematics i f  a person said  th a t f iv e  p lus s ix  
are  a do^en, granted th a t  th e  person in  q u estion  sim ply used "a 
dog;am" to  mean "eleven". In the  same imy i t  would no t m atter i f
&&L# p,B4*
p ,9 6 .
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people changed th e i r  expressions and s ta r te d  naiag "had" (o r
"green" fo r  th a t m atter) iaa tead  of "good", or any oilier .boiukI 
in a tead  of "ought" (thebo examples are no t Hare*a)e
"There i s ,  however, something which I , a t  any r a te ,  
custom arily  expresa by the aouttd \  whose
ch a rac te r i s  c o rre c tly  descri be#i by saying th a t i t  i s  a 
u n iv e rsa l or im lvors a l i sab le  p resc rip tio n *  I hope th a t  
what I cuatonm arily express by the soinid ®ought* i s  the same 
as what most people c u s to m a r ily  express hy I t ;  but i f  I 
am m istaken in  thxo assum ption, I sh a ll s t i l l  have given a 
c o rre c t account, so f a r  as I  am a b le , of th a t  whleh I 
express by th is  sound, N evertheless, th is  account w ill 
in te r e s t  o ther people mainly in  so fa r  as my hope th a t  
they understand the same th ing  aa I do by 'ought* i s  
f u l f i l l e d ,  and since I  am m oderately sure th a t  th is  i s  
indeed the case w ith many people, I hope th a t  I may be of 
use to them in  e lu c id a tin g  the lo g ica l p ro p e rtie s  of the 
concept which they thus ex p ress"*1
The c ru c ia l  statement here i s  ev iden tly  " there  i s  something", 
th is  something being -tfie moral concept, which Hare, fo r  one, 
expresses by the sound "ought"*
I f  we understand Hare c o r re c t ly  we could say th a t  by "the 
lo g ic a l p ro p e rtie s  of the moral uords he does not mean th a t  the 
ac tu a l sounds have any lo g ic a l p ro p e r t ie s ,  tie means, r a th e r ,
^the lo g ic a l p ro p e rtie s  of the  moral concepts". This i s  imp)led 
in  the passages "K thieal theory, which determines the meanings 
and func lions of the moral words, and tims the "roles* of the
Folio, ppo9^>fttsaawea'at-MaKfflB f  )  A
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xmral provides only a c l a r i f ic a t io n  of the conceptual
framework w ith in  which moral reasoning takes place"
I t  i s  thus probable th a t  Hare would agree with the understanding  
of log ic  which biijb th a t  i t  deals w ith the r e la t io n  between 
concepts*
l l i is  must s t i l l ,  however, be understood as an account of 
language as i t  is*
In  terms of th e  argument ag a in s t the n a tu r a l i s t ,  i t  means 
th a t  i t  i s  the conceptual apparatus, witli which he la  d ea ling , 
wldxh i s  inadequate fo r  an account of moral language*
" I t  i s  ra th er th a t  there i s  th i s  concept *ought* 
which we have a l l  le a rn t  the use of (though perhaps 
le ss-d ev e lo p ed  c u ltu r es  have n o t) , and, having i t ,  we 
a re  ab le  to d is tin g u ish  i t  from o ther concepts (a s , 
a lso , we can d is tin g u ish  the concept of adding from th a t  
of B ub trac tion ), and thus to  t e l l  when we are having a 
d isp u te  about what one ought to  do, and when we are  
having some o ther kind of dispute* We are th e re fo re  
ab le  to  p o in t out to  the n a tu r a l i s t  th a t ,  though he i s  
e n t i t le d  to  use h is  concepts, th e  mere e x is te n c e  of ours 
opens up a f i e l d  of d isp u te  more general than they can 
express, and one w ith which the moral ph ilosopher i s  
c a lle d  upon to d ea l, bu t which I s  o u tsid e  the scope of 
a n a tu r a l i s t  moral philosophy"**"
1* P .8 9 .
2* F*R.o . pp*201f*
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îlare claim s to  g e t the b e t te r  of the n a tu r a l i s t  because 
h ie  (i*e* Hare*s) language ia  general enough to deal w ith what 
the n a tu r a l i s t  wants to eay, and a lso  w ith o ther c r u c ia l moral 
problems w ith  which the n a tu r a l i s t  cannot deal*
"Per our language admits of d e sc rip tiv e  terms 
(a s  requ ired  by the n a tu r a l is t ) ;  hut i t  in c lu d es  a lso  
ev a lu a tiv e  term s, in  our sense ( i . e .  u n iv e r sa lly
p re sc r ip t iv e  term s), which he cannot adm it, bu t which, 
are required  in  order to  exp ress th ings th a t we say"*"
This u n d erlin es fu r th er  the  understanding th a t  M are's
d e sc r ip tio n  of language i s  simply a d e sc r ip tio n  of " th ings th a t
we Bay".
But could  we go fu rth er  and ask why i t  i s  th a t  we say the 
th ings th a t we say?
We sh a ll  see  th a t  th i s  aeeme to  be a p e r fe c t ly  p o s s ib le , and 
v a l id ,  question  according to  H are 's  view , and the co n sid era tio n  
of h is  theory from th is  po in t of view shows \m a l in e  of thought 
of M a, which i s  very in te re s t in g  idien taken togeth er  w ith what 
he Bays about the a c tu a l character of moral language.
Hare i s  ( t h is  Is  made c le a r  a t  le a s t  from the beginning of 
Freedom and Reason) ab le  to  say why moral language has the lo g ic a l 
ch a rac te r he has shown i t  to have.
1 . I s l î .»  p .8%  .
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Though i t  h a s  seem ed , from M a r e 's  accoimt, t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  
l o g i c a l  indepen dene ie  o f  v a l u e s  f ro m  f a c t s  which leaves th e  
possibility open for a  f r e e  choice o f  moral p r i n c i p l e s ,  i t  i s  
a c t u a l l y  rather t h e  o t h e r  way round. I t  is m a n 's  freedom 
w h ic h  g i v e s  moral la n g u a g e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  i t  h a s .
Indeed, the s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  of Freedom and Reason i s  a d e s ­
c r i p t i o n  of a  m o ra l  a g e n t ' s  i n t r o s p e c t i o n .  When a  person i s  
faced w i t h  a  s e r i o u s  m o ra l  problem. H are  says, he  "knows t h a t  
i t  i s  I l l s  mm problem, and t h a t  nobody can answer i t  for 
Me himself has to a n sw e r  i t .
" I f  any o n e  w e re  t o  suggest that t h e  a n s w e r  must be  
su c h  a n d  s u c h ,  because e v e ry b o d y  say a  so  -  or t h a t ,  even, 
he  would b e  a b u s in g  t h e  English la n g u a g e  i f  ho gave any  
o t h e r  a n sw e r  -  he M i l ,  i f  be understands what m o ra l 
q u e s t i o n s  are, feel t h a t  to a c c e p t  these suggestions 
w ould  b e  to accept a diminution of h i s  o^m f r e e d o m . For 
one o f  th e  m o s t  important constituents of our freedom, as 
m o ra l  a g e n t s ,  i s  the freedom t o  fo im  our otm opinions 
about moral questions, even i f  t h a t  involves changing our 
la n g u ag e " .^
I t  i s  n o t  8 0  easy t o  s a y  d e f i n i t e l y  w h a t  i t  means i n  t h i s  
c o n n e c t i o n  that we a r e  free t o  change o u r  language. Docs it 
mean that we are f r e e  t o  change some s e c o n d a ry  f e a t u r e s ,  a s  i t  
wore, of e.g. contemporary English according to a  certain
Ilîâs,» P*l*
8 .  , . pp.I f .
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underly ing  stru ctu re  of t h is  same language, or does i t  mean th a t  
we are fr e e  to  crea te  a m ilv e r sa lly  p r e sc r ip t iv e  language, even 
i f  BXX€ih a language did not e x i s t  up t i l l  nmr2
I t  i s  moat l ik e ly  th a t  i t  i s  something l ik e  the f i r s t  
su g g estio n  Hare has in  mind. Another q u estion  i a ,  m  we s h a ll  
s e e , whether f la re 's  view  does not in  the end p o in t more towards 
the a lte r n a t iv e  su g g estio n .
For a person who re co g n ise s  h im self as a fr e e  moral agen t, 
in  H are's sen se , has n ot ju s t  d iscovered  some fea tu re  o f languqKO. 
He has d iscovered  some fundamental fea tu re  of h is  own s itu a t io n ,  
as man, which i s  p r io r  to  language a s  a to o l fo r  exp ressin g  th is  
freedom.
Hare makes t h is  q u ite  p la in s
"*,* I sh a ll  ask what i t  i s  about our human s itu a t io n  
which g iv e s  r i s e  to  the need fo r  a language in  which 
p r e s c r ip t iv e  judgements ( among them moral judgements) 
can be exp ressed ." !
This means ask ing about the "reasons , in  our s itu a t io n  as men,
9
fo r  having a s e t  o f terms w ith  t h is  fea tu re" .
The answer i s  in d ica ted  b r ie f ly  in  the fo llo w in g  p assagesi
2. FoRé, . p .51
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i t  l a  because we a r e  f r e e  a g e n ts  t l i a t  we need to  
ask  p r e s c r ip t iv e  questions" !#
"**# only these who a r e  f r e e  to think and act need a
p r e a c r ip t lv e  lan g u ag e"^ •
T hai i s  to say, th e  l o g i c  i a  a  consequence of th e  f a c t s
aim  i s  «## ( t h a t  of) showihg how the fa c t  of 
moral freedom i s  idiat g iv e s  moral language one o f i t s  
ch aracteristic  lo g ica l properties; i t  i s  because we 
have to make decisions t h a t  we have u se  for th is  sort 
of language"3, (underlined by me )
Language would probably have had other lo g ic a l  f e a tu r e s  i f  
it had not been the language of men*
Compare e#g* the situation of men M t h  t h a t  of a to n es  
( t h i s  example is E ar© 'a o%m) # Granted that a to n es  had th e  
faculty to talk, th ey  would be content w ith  hav in g  a language in 
which th ey  could describe their environment* They would not 
require any prescriptive language* M iereas we a re  in a v e ry  
different position, b e in g  acti^ bodies* We require a  prescriptive
1» Zîiîfc»
2 .  l a y . ,  . p .5 .
3« FolU-, . i>.6l.
120
language because we "have to  make c lio ices  and d e c is io n s  about 
what to  do*"^
This i s  where lia r e 's  di setts s i  on of the fr e e  w i l l  problem  
comes 1b B th a t which g e ts  i t s  answer in  the slogan "'ought* 
im p lie s  'earn*"«
" It la  because I can a c t  in  th is  way or th a t , th a t  
I ask , 'S h a ll I a c t  in  t h is  imy or that*"^#
That i s  to  say , i f  the human s itu a t io n  were not o f a 
c e r ta in  k ind, ought" «= q u estio n s would never have arisen*
The sense in  which "ought" im p lie s  "can", Mare sa y s , i s  
not th a t  o f a lo g ic a l  entai Iment, but o f a weaker k ind , l ik e  t lia t  
between the statem ent "The King of France i s  wise" and the  
statem ent "There i s  a King o f  France"* Unless there were a
! •  JisÂW P*51#
Hare makes a q u a l i f ic a t io n , hmmver, of th e  statem ent th a t  
ta lk in g  sto n es would not need a p r e sc r ip t iv e  language.
They would not need i t ,  "except in  so far  as wven ta lk in g  
i s  an a c t iv i t y  which can be done r ig h t  or wrong, w e ll or 
i l l" *  This ré co g n it io n  of the fa c t  th a t there can be a 
q u estio n  of how one ought to  t a lk , io  im portant. I s  
th ere a lso  Bomething p r e s c r ip t iv e  in  the way we ta lk  about 
language, i . e .  a ls o  in  the way Hare an a lyses moral language?
2 , Ibidem, «
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King o f F rance th e  q u e s t io n  ab o u t h i s  wisdom would never a r i s e
I f ,  th e r e fo r e , uai’ve determ inism  had been t r u e  we would n o t
have Raked " o u g h t" -q u e s t!o n s , ae Mare u n d e rs ta n d s  them . By
"iiafve d e tem in isffi"  Mare means a k in d  o f  determ in ism  which says
"111 i s  p red ic ta b le ;  th e r e fo r e  moral judgem ents a re  o u t o f 
2
p la c e " * '
That m oral judgements are out of p lace  m ust mean t h a t  i t  
does n ot m a tte r  w hat we decide to  do. This i s  c le a r ly  wrong.
Hare apparently  th in k s ,  fo r  even i f  ife could p r e d ic t  a  m an 's 
ch o ice  of b eh a v io u r, M s  ch o ice  would s t i l l  be part«»dete rm in a n t 
o f h i s  consequen t behav iour*
C onsider a n  example:
I f  I  am driven  by a  g a le  towards the co a st o f F rance i t  
r e a l l y  does n o t m a tte r  w h eth er I  ask  th e  q u estion  "Ought I  to  
land in  France?" My answer to  th e  q u e s tio n  would not have 
an y th in g  a t  a l l  to  do w ith  th e  landing in  Franco, i . e .  i t  would 
not in flu e n c e  th e  f a c t  t h a t  I  am go ing  to  land i n  France*
But i f  I am a  c a s h ie r  co n tem p la tin g  ta k in g  money from th e  
t i l l ,  my ta k in g  or not ta k in g  Mie money clop ends on my answer 
to  th e  q u e s t io n  "S h e ll I  ta k e  the money?"* T hat my ch o ice  could
2. . p .63.
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have been p red ic ted , e*g . by an  encéphalographie exam ination o f
th e  b ra in , doea n o t  a l t e r  th e  p i c t u r e .  The s itu a t io n  where I ask  
th e  q u estion  "S h a ll 19" was a  rea l s i t u a t i o n  o f c h o ic e , i n  th e  
sense t h a t  th e  answ er to  th e  q uest!on  determ ined  th e  su ccessio n  
o f ev en ts 9^
We a re  not here d isc u es in g  H a re 's  treatm ent of the fr e e  w il l  
p roblem  a s  such , but on ly  t r y in g  to  d e s c r ib e  h i s  account of th e  
r e l a t i o n  between a c e r t a in  f e a tu r e  of the  Inman s i t u a t i o n  and 
m an 's  moral language w ith  i t s  lo g ic a l  p r o p e r t i e s .
I t  i s  Important to  guard o n ese lf  a g a in st two p o ss ib le  
m is re p re s e n ta t io n s  of M are 's  view on t h i s  p o in t .
On th e  one hand, H are i a  not sa y in g  t h a t  statem ents about 
th e  human s i t u a t i o n  can  be d erived  from s ta te m e n ts  about lan g u ag e ,
o.go about man's a c tu a l  u se of "ought"—se n ten c e s . That i s  to  say . 
B are i s  n o t say in g  th a t  i t  can bo s ta te d  on verbal grounds t h a t  man 
i a  il f r e e  a g en t. (A ll th a t cou ld  be sa id  on verbal grounds 
o r  ao Hare i-muld p ro b ab ly  sa y , th a t man i s  n o t bound by h is  
language to  a c t  in  a  c e r t a in  w ay .)
1 . P .M ., p p . 6 l f .
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On the o th e r  hand* Mare i a  n o t c la im in g  t h a t  hi& s ta te m e n ts
about ïM>3\ai langiiap;© can be derived  from statem ents abou t the 
iaiman a itn a t io a . I t  i e  neceesaxy  to  be c le a r  on t h i s  p o in t .
Hare do eg not h o ld  t h a t  the character o f the htman e itn a t ld n  i s  
h ie  reason fo r , sayiiM  th a t  m oral language has the lo g ic a l  
ch aracter which he says i t  liase The hwmn s i t u a t i o n  i e  the reason  
fo r  moral language b e in g  a s  i t  iSo T hat i s  to  eay , H are i s  
g iv in g  an e x p la n a tio n  why i t  i s  a s  i t  is#
Hare c l e a r ly  cla im s t h a t  i t  i s  by a  d ir e c t  study of language 
t h a t  we can fin d  th e  lo g ic a l  d is t in c t io n  between f a c t  and v a lu e ,
The in tro d u ctio n  o f th e  human s i t u a t i o n  i s  n o t made Æo say why we 
r oqoKnl &e th e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  and H are would p ro b ab ly  m aintain , i f  
p ressed , t h a t  he i s  prepared to  g iv e  up h is  t a lk  about th e  human 
s i t u a t i o n  In  order to  show t h a t  t h i s  would n o t a f f e c t  M s th e o ry  
o f th e  lo g ic a l  gtr u e  t a r e  of moral language.
So much fo r  H a re 's  own u n d e rs ta n d in g  of what M s t a l k  about 
th e  Inman s i t u a t i o n  m eans.
But th e  q u e s tio n  a r i s e s  whether i t  i s  r e a l l y  p o ss ib le  fo r  Hare 
to  escape th e  a ccu sa tio n  of having, in  some sen se , b ased  M s theory  
o f language on a co n c ep tio n  of th e  human s i t u a t i o n ,  i . e .  on an 
a s s e r t i o n  o f e x tm ^ ^ lin g u ie tie  t r u t h s .
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There are passage# in  H are's work where he ©an be in terp reted
as even adm itting th is *
"0*0  the very  e x i s t  mice of th e  problem -  the f a c t  th a t  
ord in a iy  people f e e l  fim derlined  by me] /  , th a t  
'ought* im p lies  'can* and th a t th is  crea tes  p h ilo so p h ica l  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  -  i e  prima f a c ie  evidence a g a in st  d escr ip tiv ia m  
*60  i f  moral judgements were n ot p r e s c r ip t iv e , there would 
be no problem about moral weakness; but there i s  a problem; 
th erefore they are p rescr ip tiv e"  (apparently  meaning 
"therefore ij^$©MS£E bimt they are p r o s c r ip t iv e " )! .
Here i s  a d ir e c t  re feren ce  to in tr o sp e c t io n  as a support fo r  
H aro's case a g a in st  d escr ip tiv ia m  as a theory about moral language#
I t  seems th a t something can be sa id  about the tr u th , or adequacy, 
of H are's account of moral language from the way people o rd in a r ily  
f e e l  about th e ir  moral s itu a tio u o
What we now im nt to  m aintain , and t i i is  w i l l  turn out to be the  
main p o in t of our t h e s i s ,  as fa r  as Hare i s  concerned, i s  th a t b is  
aceom it o f the lo g ic  of moral language i s  in  fa c t  b u i l t  upon a view  
of the world#
We might even say th a t i t  i s  not about language, but about 
the world#
This th e s is  i s  not based upon Iso la te d  passages such as the  
l a s t  one quoted* This passage i s  on ly  a p o in ter  to the fa c t  th a t  
H are's a n a ly s is  of moral language i s  b u i l t  on what we think i s  an 
i l lu s o r y  assum ption, namely th a t  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  ju s t  to  an alyse language*
!® £aS*» P«60#
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¥im t th is  r e a l ly  amcumts to i s ,  of cou rse, a c r it ic is m  of 
the whole o f the lln g u iG tic  approach to ph ilosophy, saying th a t  
i t  ia  b a s ic a l ly  mistaken*
The reason  why B arela approach i s  m istaken i s  not ju s t  th a t
he i s ' bu ild ing  h is  th eo iy  of language on some con tingen t tru th s  
about human ex is ten ce , e*go what people u su a lly  fe e l  in  the  s itim tlo B s 
we c a l l  moral#
The reason i s  rath er th a t  language ia  analysed in  terms of 
cone©pto which already  have a c e r ta in  content*
That i s  to  say , in  h is  an a ly s is  of language Hare, and the  
l in g u is ts  in  g en er a l, are using concepts in  which a view  of 
r e a l i t y ,  and of how we can M m x f  i t ,  i s  a lready  incorporated*
We are  not saying th a t  Haro i s  wrong i n  doing what he i s  
doing.
But ho i s  wrong in  not knowing what he i s  doing and adm itting  
i t*  That is., in  preseâti.ng h im self as doing something d if f e re n t  
from what he i s  doing.
For, fa r  from being "formal" ( i f  such a th in g  as a "formal" 
concept e x is ts  a t  a l l ,  or make© sense as m i  ex p re ss io n ), the very  
concept8 by which Hare an a ly s is  the  language of morale arc a lready  
prestîppOBing the r e s u l t  of h is  a n a ly s is .
1 2 6
The concepts " fac t"  and "va lue", to take th e  two on wSiich 
most of h is  arg%iment hangs, a re  c le a r ly  saying something about the  
world®
And they are  not exp ressin g  some contingent tru th s  about the 
w o r ld i■'
They are rath er a kind of n on-con tingent, a p r io r i ,  eath egorios
in  which man and h is  world a re  in terp reted *
The very d is t in c t io n  between something c a lle d  " fa c t"  and 
som ething c a lle d  "value" i s  not made by people who are th ink ing  
about moral question# i.e® who are d e lib e r a tin g  or arguing about
wliat to  do* I t  1© M^ought in  from w ithout by the th e o r izer  about 
moral language, r e f le c t in g  h i#  own^world-view* That i s ,  the 
a n a ly st  t r i e s  to  understand moral language in  terms of h is  own 
understanding of the wo arid*
That M s an a ly a ls  rep resen ts common sense in  the understanding  
o f  moral language i© ©imply an assumption (u n less  "common sense" ' 
ia  defined  in  suck a way th a t  i t  beg© th e  q u e s tio n ) . We tliiidc th a t  
common sense g iv e s  much more prima fa c ie  evidence ag a in s t lla rc 'e  
a n a ly s is .
We say on ly  "prima f a c ie  evidence", because we do not th ink  
th a t  our problem can be s e t t le d  on the  b as is  of"common sense" or a
study of the uso of lauguage. ¥« th erefo re  rep eat th a t h a r e 's
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procedure i s  n ot in  i t s e l f  in v a lid *  Let h i m  only say what he ia  
doing &o there can bo d iso n selon  about the re a l issu es  a t  stake*
What we m aintain i s  th a t  Oog, the  ooncept of " fa c t"  i t s e l f  
already in co rp o ra tea an epistem ology* This w ill bo a main p o in t 
in  onr d iscu ss io n  i n  the fo llo w in g  chapters*
C lea r ly , Mare i s  not him self going to admit th a t  th is  i s  so , 
bu t we th ink th a t  he cannot avoid these consequences being drawn*
ill!  th is  has, of course , g re a t coneeqnenees fo r  the way we look  
a t  the case between. Hare and hi a ad v e rsa rie s  in  th e i r  account of 
moral language*
1Whom Mare tM idie he can "get the  b e tte r " ' o f h is  opponents, 
whether they be d e s c r lp tiv is tb  who ignore p r o s c r lp t lv ity ,  or the 
oncB on the other liMd who do not account fo r  the n n lv e r a a llty , i t  
ia  because Hare i s  p resen tin g  the case of h is  opponents in  terms of 
h is  own concept#.
Let i t  be p o in ted  out th a t  we are  hot in  th is  connection  
in te r e s te d  in  defending any one in  p a r t ic u la r  of the p o s itio n s  Rare 
i s  a ttack ing*  Our pnxpose ie  to  give a c r i t i c a l  an a ly s is  of H are 's  
own p o s it io n , thereby seeing i f  i t  i s  not p o s s ib le , or indeed
1* cf*  P .M ., p .202«fJÉTWï-îteset P  A
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n e c e s s a ry , to  look  a t  th e  prohlep! o f m oral v a lu e s  in  a d i f f e r e n t  
way ifrom th e  way he does®
In  o rd e r  to  see  th e  n a tu re  of H a re 's  ai'gument l e t  us 
c o n s id e r  some of the  fundam ental a s p e c ts  of h i s  case  a g a in s t  th e  
" n a t u r a l i s t s " ,  (The fo llo w in g  a p p l ie s  a ls o  to  o th e r  of th e  
c r i t i c s  of n a tu ra lism )*
H are p re s e n ts  a a tn ra l ls m  a s  a  th e o ry  say in g  t h a t  a m oral 
co n c lu s io n  can he drawn from a s e t  of o n ly  f a c tu a l  p re m isse s , and 
" fac  t u a l " means "non-m oral"* ^
S im ila r ly  Hare takes i t  f o r  g ra n te d  t im t  there i s  an e x c lu s iv e  
r e la t io n  between " ia "  and "o u g h t" , so t h a t  when th e  n a tu r a lis t s  
v io l a t e  th e  rule "no ought from  an  i s "  they a re  r e a l l y  sin n in g  
a g a i# s t  a r u le  wliivd> -mya "no ought from a n o n -o u g h t" ,
Hut i s  i t  re a so n a b le  to  presume t h a t  th e  n a t u r a l i s t s  d id  
coom it such a  'b la ta n t  f a l la c y ?
Would th e  n a t u r a l i s t s  r e a l l y  re co g n iz e  t h i s  a& an adequate  
p r é s e n ta i>ion of t h e i r  case? That i a ,  t h a t  th e  c o n c lu s io n  can  
c o n ta in  som ething t h a t  i s  n o t  co n ta in ed  in  th e  p rem isses?
1 , T his i s  c l e a r ly  im p lied  i n  w hat Haro sa y s , e,g® in  L,M*,p « 9 le  
Bee above, p* ia .
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"Very w e ll" , Mare might answer,  " I  im  not saying th a t  i n  
Ids in ferences th e  n a tu r a l i s t  i s  a c tu a lly  deriv ing  an "ought" from 
a n  " i s " ,  I am o n l y  s a y i n g  th a t  h e  gives a n  inadequate account of 
what i s  going on  i n  lile  in fe re n c e s ,"
Let us c o n s i d e r  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  Hare o f t h e  
n a tu ra li  a t ' a procedure,
An example o f  n  i n f e r e n c e ,  which the n a tu r a l i s t  f in d s  in  
ac tu a l moral argument:
X b rings B leasure 
T h e r e f o r e  X i s  g o o d .
This can o n l y  m ean  two th ings according to H are 's  v i e w ,  
h ith e r  "good" i s  used i n  t h e ,  u n l i k e l y ,  hut q u ite  p o s s i b l e ,  aenee 
o f  "what b r i n g s  p lea su re" , i . e .  i n  a p u r e l y  d e sc rip tiv e  s e n o e ,  
saying what brings a b o u t  a c e r ta in  fa c tu a l s ta te  of a f f a i r s .
Ill which ease t h e  i n f e r e n c e  w o u ld  ju s t  say th a t  "X brings 
p le a su re , because i t  ie  p l e a s u r e - b r i n g i n g " , o r  s o m e t h in g  l ik e  th a t .  
This would n o t ,  Mara s a y s ,  be a n y  imoral judgement a t  a ll*
Or, onfhe o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  which H a r e  probably w o u ld  
hold to  cover most o f  th e  cases w h e r e  such i n f e r e n c e s  a r e  made#
The i n f e r e n c e  c o n t a i n s  i n  f a c t  a hidden prem iss, ami should t h e r e f o r e  
be presented  l ik e  t h i s :
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(That w h ic h  b r i n g s  p leasu re  i s  good)
T  b r i# :a  p leasure
Therefore X i s  good*
In  th i s  case the  f i r s t  prem iss i s  a s u b s t a n t i a l  d e c i s i o n  of 
p r i n c i p l e ,  i* e . a  r e a l  m o r a l j u d g e m e n t .
And in  c o n s e q u e n c e  we can p ro te s t  a g a in s t t h e  ju d g e m e n t  th a t  
X i s  g o o d ,  b e c a u s e  we do not agree M th  th e  judgement e x p r e s s e d  
i n  t h e  prom iseeso That i s  to say , we have shown th a t  the 
p r e m i s s e s  c o n s i s t  o f  two d if f e r e n t  s t e p s ,  a n  eva lua tion  a n d  a 
f a c t u a l  s t a t e m e n t .  And a c c e p t a n c e  of what i s  contained i n  the 
fa c tu a l p r e m i s s e s ,  d o e s  n o t  c o m p e l us to a c c e p t  the conclusion 
which Im plies t h e  o t h e r  prem iss as w e l l .
In  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  w h a t  R a r e  c l a i m s  to have d e m o n s t r a t e d , i s  t h a t  
words l ik e  " p l e a s u r e " , w h e n  used in  c a s e s  lik e  t h o s e  " e x p l o i t e d "  by 
the n a t u r a l i s t s ,  are d o i n g  tw o j o b s ,  w h ic h  c a n  b e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
and s e p a r a t e d ,  th a t  of d e s c r i b i n g  a s ta te  of a f f a i r s ,  a n d  o f  
e v a l u a t i n g  it®
In  H are 's  own w o r d s ,  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  the n a t u r a l i s t s  a r e  
good f a t  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o n c e p t s " ^ ,  a n d  n o b o d y  needs to accept t h e i rtii';
Ï*
a u b s t a n c e j  i » e ,  t h « i r  p r e s ç i p t i o n  o f  e . g .  a  c e r t a i n  k in d  o f  a c t i o n ,
1 . F .H ., P .200.
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One example of a concept which Incapsiila tes determ inate
moral p r in c ip le s , and one xdiich Hare makes much o f , i s  the
Iconcept "courageous"* This concept " incapsu la tea  a c e r ta in
f)
view about what one to  do in  s i tu a tio n s  of danger*"^
I f  a person did not want to com m onthose who preserved the 
sa fe ty  of o thers  by d isrega rd ing  th e i r  own, he could ju e t  say 
th a t  he did not any longer wish to use the word "courageous", 
because i t  inca'psulatcd the a t t i tu d e  to which he did not subscribe, 
lie could say,
"I p re fe r  the longer, m orally n eu tra l expression , 
'd is re g a rd in g  o n e 's  own safe ty  in  oroer to p reserve th a t  
of others® ' This, though i t  ia  not equ ivalen t to
' courageous' ,  even d e s c r ip tiv e ly , i s  in  f a c t  a l l  th a t  we
can be lo g ic a lly  compelled to admit of a person, once he 
has done the 'courageous* a c t re fe rre d  to * To go on to 
c a l l  the a c t  courageous i s ,  s t r i c t l y  speaking, an 
ad d itio n a l step  which I am not disposed to tak e , because 
I do no t share the eva lua tions of those %Ao take i t*
I t  i s  true th a t  tii§re i s  no sin g le  oval n a tiv e ly  n eu tra l 
word, l ik e  ' n e g r o which in  the proBcnt case con be used 
to describe  such a c tio n s  w ithout coMEiitting the tieseriber 
to  mw  ev a lu a tio n ; but we iroulcl have such a *^;ord* What I 
sh a ll  a c tu a lly  do, in  d e fa u lt of an im a n ted  word, i s  to 
use the same word 'cou rageou s', but to  imke i t  c le a r  hy
!# Za&L, P o l87 ffo
2o Folloj . p*200o
3© R eferring  to the case of a person who does not desp ise negroes,
and th e re fo re  re fu se s  to use th e  word "nigger" and decides to
use only the n eu tra l word "negro"*
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my tone of v o ic e  or by p u ttin g  quo tation  marks round i t ,  
th a t  I mi using i t  in  a purely  d e sc rip tiv e  sen se , implying 
thereby no commendation w hatever" .!
P a r t ic u la r ly  in te re s t in g  in  th i s  passage i s  the adm ission 
th a t  "disregardlng one 's own sa fe ty  in  order to  preserve th a t  of 
o thers" i s  not eq u iv a len t, even d e s c r ip t iv e ly , to "courageous". 
Hare apparen tly  thinks tiiiit i t  would be p o ss ib le  to f in d  a 
le n g th ie r  exp ression  which would be eq u iva len t to the 
d e sc r ip tiv e  meaning of "courageous" w ithout having i t s  ev a lu a tiv e  
meaning iiieapsiila ted .
What Hare i s  a c tu a lly  doing here i s  only to p o stu la te  the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of is o la t in g  the purely  d e sc r ip tiv e  ( in  h is  sense) 
meaning of ^courageous*, I . e .  th a t we could d escr ib e  the  ac tio n  
re fe rre d  to by "courageous" non -eva lna tive ly , and th a t  we could 
d escr ib e  th is  a c tio n  by an inventod word, or by expressing the  
word "courageous" in  a c e r ta in  ton e of voice or by w ritin g  i t  
in s id e  quo ta tion  marks.
We want to m aintain tlia t no tome of v o ice  am! no quo tation  
marks can ever su ffic e  to e s ta b lis h  what i s  r e a l ly  a theory about 
ova' knowledge of th e  w orld, and which ffare should have been 
ar^miuR about, namely th a t  there  ia  something c a lle d  " fa c ts" ,
!» fUik,* P »!8g .
133
which always be apprcliendec! a p a r t  from any e v a lu a t io n .
A ll  t h i s  means t h a t  îla re  i a  n o t  de s c r ib in g  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  
he W een h i s  th e o ry  of  moral language and o th e r  t t i e o r ie s  on a 
" n e u t r a l"  b a s i s ,  so tlvat he can ex p ec t everybody to  a c c e p t  i t  
j u s t  by lo o k in g  a g a in  a t  langiiage, i . e .  on a  p u re ly  l i n g u i s t i c  
b a s is»  lie i s  r e a l l y  d e s c r ib in g  th e  c o n t ro v e r s ie s  i n  term s of 
h i s  own u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  w orld  and of the  human s i t u a t i o n ,  
lie w i l l  answ er, t h a t  what he aslca o f  h i s  opponents i s  only  
t h a t  they  s h a l l  tak e  in to  accoun t w hat Im a t  l e a s t  i s  d o ing ,
For by id s  m oral r e a s o n in g  he shows t i i a t i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to 
s e p a r a te  th e  p r e s c r i p t i v e  meaning o f  moral words from t h e i r  
d e s c r i p t i v e  meaning, and th e r e fo r e  f a c t s  and v a lu e s  a r e  n o t 
l o g i c a l l y  bound to g e th e r .
But however modest a  c la im  th i s  sounds, what i t  r e a l l y  
amnioimtB to  i s  a  c la im  t h a t  we must accoun t f o r  h i s  use  of moral 
language on Id a  own ep ia teE io log iea l p re m is se s .  But th e se  
p rom isses  a r e  e x a c t ly  th e  cfuc^atiomHiieh i s  a t  i s s u e .  So t h a t  
when Hare ch a rg es  h i s  opponents w ith  ip v in g  an i n s u f f i c i e n t  
p i c t u r e  of  moral language, t h i s  in s u f f i c i e n c y  i s  r e a l l y  determ ined 
by H a re 's  own c o n c e p ts .
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Hare ad o p ts  th e  p r i n c i p l e  "no ought from an i e "  c la im in g  
to  d e r iv e  t h i s  from h i s  a n a ly s i s  of language® But th e  
co n c ep tu a l  equipment vh ieh  he u ses  to  c a r r y  ou t t h i s  a n a ly s i s  
a l re a d y  presuppose#  h i s  c o n c lu s io n s .  The u n d e rs ta n d in g  of 
" i s "  ami "m ight" which he b r in g s  to  the  a n a ly s i s  a l r e a d y  
p resupposes  an  e x c lu s iv e  r e l a t i o n  between them,
ITiis i s  the  p e t i t i o  p r i n o i p i i  of H a re 's  a n a ly s i s  o f  moral
lanipMigOj, a s  long a s  he docs n o t  f in d  i t  n ec essa ry  to  t r y  and
j u s t i f y  h i s  co n c e p ts .  But t h i s  he i s  n o t  p rep a red  to  do, 
because i t  would in v o lv e  him i n  Bomethiïig th an  l i n g u i s t i c
a n a l y s i s .
I f  we a re  r i g h t  i n  our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of H a r e 's  p ro ced u re , 
th e n  th e  lo g ic  which he c la im s t h a t  moral language h a s ,  i s  
r e a l l y  a lo g ic  which e x i s t s  p r i o r  to  what any s tudy  of moral 
laïqpiage m ight d i s c l o s e ,  i . e ,  a lo g ic  im plied  i n  th e  co n cep tu a l 
a p p a ra tu s  w ith  which Hare tm deràakes th e  a n a ly s i s  of language .
Only on t h i s  background can we unders tand  how i t  i s  p o s s ib l
to  s in g le  ou t one use of a  c e r t a i n  moral term and say t h a t  i t  I s
" c e n t r a l " ,  o r  " ty p ic a l "  a , 8 , 0 ,
For Hare does t h i s  r e p e a te d ly .
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p re sc rip tiv ism  »®® m aintains th a t i t  is  one of 
the c h a ra e te r ia t ie s  of moral terms » th a t  judgements 
contain ing  t||em are as ty p ic a lly  need, intended aa 
guldea to  conduct"!
", * * moral judgem ents, in  th e ir  cen tra l u se , have i t
as  th e i r  fu n ctio n  to guide conduct**.^
S im ila r ly , liar© i s  ab le  to s ta te  th a t a man who s a y s , "I 
ought but 1 can*t" i s  n ot " intending h is  moral judgement ser io u sly "
and w ith i t s  " lu l l  force"#
"This kind of q u asi-u n iv e rsa l p re sc r ip tio n  i s  ©@* 
v e iy  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of our ac tu a l moral language# I  
have argued th a t  moral judgements, when intended se rio u sly  
and w ith  th e ir  f u l l  fo rc e , must be taken ms committing th e  
Speaker to  some u n iv ersa l judgement applying to anyone in  
re  levant ly  s im ila r  s itim tio u "5  (underlined  by me)* . .
"5Tior© are a groat many kinds o f •o ff-o o lo u r*  moral 
judgements which do n o t, l ik e  the p er fec t  specimen,
' imply "can"* « Tims the  man who says *I ought but I c a n 't '
i s  not n e c e s s a r ily  say in g  anything absurd, a l l  th a t  he i s  
doing i s  to  use 'ought* in  one of the Biaay o ff-c o lo u r  ways
th a t  are  po s s i h ia"© 4
P*67#
2# , p .70# And to % uide conduct" means fo r  Hare, as we
know, to  make évaluat iy o  d e c is io n s  of p r in c ip le , as d is t in c t
from d escr ib in g  something which i e  th e  case#
3 . l ë u  ■ p . 53.
4o p , p . 6 S #
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That i s  to say, among the many poBolblo, and ac tu a l use© of 
a moral term Hare i s  ab le  to po in t out thè use which Is  not in  
accordance w ith the p e r fe c t  specimen and which i s  th erefo re  
"off-colour"©
Vie v/ant to  quote a t  leng th  mm passage which b rings out meet 
c le a r ly  the opposed trends of H are 's  tlieory of moral language, 
tho d e s i r e  to  take language as i t  i s ,  and the do s i  re to in te r p r e t  
i t  ill terms of an id ea l language, 1.6* to arrange a l l  the ac tu a l 
uses of language around one of those u ses , which i s  iltcn honoured 
ao tho id ea l use®
"So d i f f i c u l t  is  i t ,  In fa c t  -  so great i s  the s tr a in  
between p r o s c r ip t iv ity  and un iv e rsa iin a b i l i ty  i n  c e r ta in  
s itu a t io n s  -  th a t  something has to  give; and t h i s  i s  the 
explanation  of the phenomenon of moral wealmess® Kot only 
do we g iv e , because we are m orally weak; we have found fo r  
o u rse lv es a langtiage which shares our weakness, and gives 
Ju s t where we do. For moral language i s  a human in s titu tio n *
I t  i s  the b u sin ess  of the moral philosopher to  sa y , not what 
the lo g ica l behaviour of moral terms would be l ik e ,  i f  they  
were d ev ised  by and fo r th e  use of a n g e ls , but what i t  
a c tu a lly  i s  l ik e .  * .® a 'holy* moral language would be a 
v eiy  simple one; i t  would c o n s is t of u n ivers& lizab le  
p re sc r ip tiv e  judgements w ithout any way of escaping from 
e ith e r  th e i r  p re a o r ip t iv i ty  or th e i r  u n iv e r s a l ity ,
««« human moral language, un like  a holy  or an g e lic  moral 
language, h a s , b u i l t  in to  i t s  lo g ic ,  a l l  manner of ways of 
evading the rigour of pure u n iv e r s a l i ty .  . . .  But 
n ev er th e le ss  i t  would be a slander upon human moral language 
and on i t s  u sers to  claim  th a t  they do not even a sp ire  to 
have u n iv ersa l p r e s c r ip t iv e  p r in c ip le s*
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•  « e  we are  not a n g e ls; and therefore* although the 
o im pleat lo g ie  fo r a taoroJ. language would be th a t  of 
the u n iv e rs a ll ia b le  p re sc rip tiv e#  wo ahy a t  th is  
rigorous and au ste re  aim plieity#  and# in  our vain  
s tru g g les  to  fin d  a more com fortable way of speaking# 
have in troduced co m p lex itie s  in to  the  lo g ic  of our 
moral language -» va in  struggles#  because the id e a l of 
pure un iversa l p r e s c r ip t iv e  moral p r in c ip le s  
o b s tin a te ly  remains w ith u e, and we are not in  the end 
s a t i s f ie d  ivith anything which f a l l s  abort of i t . " l
I t  i s  made q u ite  plain# then# There jjs an id ea l of moral 
language operating# as i t  w ere# in s id e  our ac tu a l use of moral 
language# I t  i s  not of dec is iv e  importance how the dev ia tions 
from th is  id ea l a re  characterised#  As we saw in  the  l a s t  passage 
they a re  given# somehow, a s ta tu s  w ith in  the lo g ic a l framework of 
moral language# belonging as they  do to the *®complexities’* of th is  
logic#
On o th er occasions they a re  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  lee s  f a v o u r a b l y .
F o r  i n s t a n c e #  %àwn i t  c o m e s  to  Hare’ s attem pt to give a p r a c t i c a l
example of the usefu lness of h is  theory  for  moral reasoning# the 
persons who are re fu s in g  to play h is  game of ’’pure u n iv e rs a li ty ” 
are  given th is  la b e l:
H« * « they a re  not ask ing whether they can u n iv e r sa liz e  th e ir
p re sc rip tio n s  I though tliey may make play m th  the moral
1. &&., pp. 73ff.
1:^ 8
wordo which they have heard o th er people u se , they are  
n o t, in  th e ir  own th in k in g , iieing these words according 
to the lo g ic a l r u le s  which are  im p lic i t  in  th e ir  
meaning*'a
This am biguity does n o t, however, a f f e c t  d e c is iv e ly  what ie  
our major concern: To bring  out th a t  the log ic  of moral language,
a s  Mare describee i t ,  i s  the lo g ic  of an id ea l language, and th a t  
th is  descriTrtipn of mmral language depends upon a concept of the 
xmrld which must he p o s tu la te d , and indeed by a p o s tu la tio n  ofiSfc(SiB»js»iîs»at*w»i5asî^^ *  V A
which the ev a lu a tiv e  aspec t i s  an in separab le  part*
That i s  to say , the understanding? of moral language, whereby 
our apprehension of the f a c t s  o f the world can be separated  from 
our eva lua tions of them, r e s t s  upon concepts by means of which 
something about world and our apprehcmslon of i t  i s  p o stu la ted  
a© an ultim ate*
The in te rp re ta t io n  of H are’s tt\eory as a theory about the  a 
p r io r i  log ic  of an id ea l of moral language might seem untenable  
on the background of some o f Hare’ s e x p l ic i t  sta tem en ts, e .g .  the 
one quoted e a r l ie r  saying th a t  ‘’Preacriptivi.sm'^^^^^-^be re fu ted  i f  
i t  could be shown th a t  we do not ever use moral words in  the way
ZÆ&# p*2^%*
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I  have character!zed  as p re s c r ip t iv e ”^»
But th is  passage only appears to l?e a coimter«»proof ag a in s t 
our accoimt of Mare’s theory*
For the  th in g  i s  th a t ,  granted Hare’s prem isses, i* o .  Ma 
worlti®*view, i t  could never he shoim th a t  we do not (o r th a t  
he a t  le a s t  does no t) ever use moral words in  the way th a t  he 
c a i1B p re sc r ip tiv e  «
1 . E s ik . p . 8%.
See above, pol l3«
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2o R elig ion  and i n  lia ro ’ s # ought in  r e la t io n  to
h ie  theory of values*
B nrprieing ly  onough#, i t  i s  H*M* Hare who po in te  to  the  reason 
why M e own abso lu te  d is t in c t io n  between fa c ts  and values ev en tu a lly  
seems to  break clawii, even from a lo g ic a l p o in t of view*
When lie s t a r t s  asking what knowledge o f f a c t s  r e a l ly  moans and 
how i t  i s  a rr iv e d  a t  he appears to  he m aintain ing views which a re  
a t  variance id th  the as sumptions we found underlying M s a n a ly s is  
of moral language and which could therefore provide a d if fe r e n t  
co n tex t fo r  the  understanding of moral language,
These th o u g h ts  a r e  n o t  to  be found i n  any of th e  é t h i e a l  
w r i t in g s  of Ii,M* Hare* but th e y  occur i n  th e s h o r t e r  co n tr ib u tio n s  
which he Ims made to  th e  d isc u ss io n  of r e l ig io u s  language* namely in  
h i s  rcimrks i n  the "Theology and F a l s i f i c a t i o n ” ^  d i s c u s s io n  in  
U n iv ers ity  and i n  h is  a r t i c l e  on "R eligion  and M orals" in
F a i t h and L o g ie* ed , B* M i t c h e l l*1997 ( t h i s  i s  an a r t i c l e  based  on 
a le c tu r e  g iven  in  1954)*
A-B w i l l  be seen , these  co n trib u tio n s  do no t represen t any 
" la te r "  view  of ïi,M, Hare* They date from the time between the
1* Reprinted i n  New Essays i n  P h ilo ao p M ca l Theology# ed . A* Flew  
and A, M acIn tyre , 1995, J ie y e a f te r  referred  to  a s  N,F*, pp* 9 9 f f
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p u b lica tio n  of b is  two main works on o th ie e . They are a l l  the 
more in te r e s t in g ,  however, as  Here him self openly confesses th a t  
he i s  not a t  a l l  sure what he wants to say about th e su b jec t he 
i s  d iscussing  here# and th a t  mich of what he says i s  undigested 
and only t e n ta t iv e ly  put forward*.
His co n trib u tio n  in  the Hniverslty«-diBcussion i s  one of the 
answers to  A,Flew*@ p arab le  {or use of the parab le) of the two 
ex p lo rers who fin d  a c le a r in g  in  the ju n g le . One of the 
ex p lo rers a s s e r ts  th a t  th is  i s  th e  work of a gardener, but he i s  
in  the end incapable of saying anything whatsoever about what 
would have to be the case i f  he should have to say th a t  the  
e x is te n c e  of the gardener ( s o i l ,  God) was disproved, The 
a s se r tio n  is* th e re fo r e , com patible w ith anything happening or no t 
happening, and i t  i s  thus no rea l a s s e r t io n , i t  has no fa c tu a l  
meaning.
With th is  Hare agrees e n t ir e ly .  But he holds th a t  r e lig io u s  
langm ge a c tu a lly  does another jo b , lie goes on to r e la te  another 
parable ("p a rab le” ia  Hare * s mm to m ) .  This parable concerns a 
lu n a t ic  who i s  convinced th a t a l l  do as want to  muider him* A ll  
h is  experiences of done seem, fo r a l l  normal persona, to  show the 
opposite* The dons are a l l  t re a tin g  him in  the  manner of utmost
1 ,  F aith  and  l o g i c * p * l? 6 *
co rd ia lity *  But no th ing  of t l i ie  im allowed to  oeumt ag a in s t th e  
lu n a t ic ’s eoiwictioBo The rlous a re  only h iding th e i r  d ia b o lic a l 
p lans behind a f r ie n d ly  appearance*
inco  no'tiling w ill count ag a in s t the  lu n a t ic ’s theory  i t  
a s s e r t s  nothing* In t l i is  Flew i s  r ig h t .  But s t i l l  the lu n a tic  
th in k s q u ite  d if f e r e n t ly  about dons from what o ther persons do, 
even i f  lie says nothing about th e i r  outward behaviour* The 
lu n a tic  has a d if fe r e n t  " b lik ” about dons*
This b i lk  i s  of the  g re a te s t  importance* Because i t  
do te iiiines the persons a t t i tu d e  towards o ther persons# in  th is  
case dons, and not only h i s  Inward a t t i tu d e  towards them# b u t 
a l l  hia dealings with them in  h is  l i f e *
In  a more everyday s i tu a t io n , to o ,  the b ilk  ap p lie s  to many 
things* For in s tan ce , the d r iv e r  of a ear u su a lly  has a  c e r ta in  
b ilk  about b is  car* Mo t r u s t s  th a t  i t  w il l  obey h is s te e r in g , 
and there fo re  be confiden tly  p laces himself and o ther people, 
whom he loves, In  h is  ear*
This b lik  about the ca r i s  not the  sarke th ing  as knowledge,
e«g* th a t the car i s  in  p e r fe c t  techn ica l order* I t  i s  not
d i f f i c u l t  to  imagine a person who imuld never dare to  go in to  a
ca r ,  oven i f  he knew th a t  everyth ing had been te s ted  in  d e ta il*
But such a person would c e r ta in ly  have a very d i f f e r e n t  a t t i tu d e  
tow ards the contemporary \m j  of l iv in g  from most of ua*
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I t  is^  in  fact#  th e  thoughts of Hume, R*M# Haro claim s to  be
vo icing  in  h is  ta lk in g  of b ilk #  Himm h im self pointed  to  the
f a c t  th a t  our "whole commerce w ith  the world depemlB upon our
I ■b lik  about the world."# I t  i s  im possib le  to reach agreement in  
b lik««attitudc by observing what happens in  the world, but the b l ik  
we have determ ines how we are going to t r e a t  our ob servation  of 
what happens.  The b l ik  i© no s c ie n t i f ic  ex p la n a tio n , but even 
a s c ie n t i f ic  exp lanation  w ill need a. b l ik .  .
Without a b l ik  about how the happenings of the world are  
r e la te d  to  each o th er , no exp lan ation  of what liappcms would be 
p o ssib le#  I t  would not be incom patib le w ith any p o s s ib le  obaezt. 
v&tion s-ir^!^that everyth ing happened by pure chance, fo r  
In s ta n c e #
Now i t  seems th a t Hare wants to hold th a t th e  b l ik  which a 
person, pr group of p erson s , or indeed, a l l  mankind, h as, does no t 
p lay  any p a r t  in  the  q u estio n  of what ia  happening or not happening, 
and th a t  ob servation s of what i s  the case can be made independent
of any bilk#
But i s  th is  80?
1. &&.. P'lOl.
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Let Ufô ©xasïiiïie again  more c lo se ly  the parable of the person 
w ith  the insane b l ik  about Oxford dona# The fr ie n d s  of the 
lu n a tic  want to  make him change h is  opinion about dona, and 
th e re fo re  they  in troduce him to  the  m ildest and most re sp ec tab le  
dons they can find# A fterwards they say to him, "You see, he 
d oesn ’t  r e a l ly  want to murder you, he apèke to you in  a most 
co rd ia l manner ; «#*** And the  lu n a t ic ’s rep ly  i s ,  "Yes, bu t th a t
was only h is  d ia b o lic  cunning; he’s r e a l ly  p lo t t in g  a g a in s t me 
the  whole time ••#"
What Hare apparently  wants to  i l l u s t r a t e  here i s  th a t  the  
lu n a t ic ’s b l ik  i s  com patible w ith  any fa c ts  about the behaviour 
of dons# The sen tence, "he spoke to  you in  a most c o rd ia l 
maimer" ie  thus thought to be a statem ent of f a c t ,  in  H are’s sense 
of the word " fa c t" ,  as d i s t in c t  from e#g#"value"#
Hut su re ly , " c o rd ia l" , i f  any, i s  an eva lua tive  word# And 
i t  i s  very u n lik e ly  th a t  the lu n a tic  should fin d  a statem ent about 
th e  c o rd ia li ty  of the don com patible id th  h is  blik# Would i t  not 
be more probable th a t  he should deny the c o rd ia l i ty  in  the don's  
words to him, being aware a l l  the tim e, as he th in k s , of the don’ s 
d ia b o lic  ia ta n t io n s #
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In t i l ts  ca se  th e  lu n a t ic  and h is  fr ie n d s  would c e r ta in ly  
d isag ree  about f a c t s ,  namely how th e  don ©poke to the poor mmi on 
a c e r ta in  occasion# But i t  would be im possible to speak about 
the behaviour of the don w ithout making an eva lua tion  a t  the 
same time# We are  n o t, of course , arguing from th is  im aginative  
course of the conversation# I t  serves only as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  
of what could be said  about a term lik e"co rd ia l"#
I f  "co rd ia l"  i s  a faet-w ord , i t  should be p o ss ib le  to  render 
i t s  meaning in  unquestionab ly  fa c tu a l term s. Let ub t iy  to 
imagine how the f r ie n d s  could express what they want to  say by the 
sentence "he spoke to you in  a most co rd ia l maimer” , in  a way th a t  
would be imrai. s takab ly  non-^ovaluative#
They could say something about the don’ s vo ice , i t s  volume, 
i t s  so n o r ity , measured in  a co u stic  u n its ,  they could describe w ith 
accuracy h is  vocalm laiy , they could describe the movements of the 
corners of h is  mouth and of h is  eyebrows w hile  ho spoke, and so  
on in d e f in i t e ly .
Bat describ ing  these c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of the don’ s way of 
speaking, the fr ie n d s  would a l l  the time be moving fu r th er  and 
fu r th er  away from what they  o r ig in a l ly  wanted to say , i . e .  "he 
spoke to  you In a most c o rd ia l manner” . In f a c t ,  th e  sentence 
would lo s e  i t s  in tended meaning a lto g e th e r .
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And i t  w ill  not do to admit th a t  ttie sentence was oval n a tiv e  
from the beglmilng and the l i s t e d  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  wore th e ir  
c r i t e r ia  fo r  applying the term "cordial" to the way the don spoke.
This would mean th a t they by u sin g  the word " c o rd ia l” sim ply  
wanted to  commend i t  fo r  having these ch a rac te ris tic s®
Thel r  o rig in a l sentence was c le a r ly  intended to be fa u te s  tasting, 
to  say th a t  something was the case® And i t  i s  ju s t  th is  "something” , 
ioCo th a t which i s  meant by the word "cord ia l" , which seems to  
d isappear when the  attem pt i s  made to  s ta te  ' i t  n o n -ev a lu a tlv e ly »
What t i l ls  example o f  th e  use of words lik e  "cordial"  shews, 
i s  th a t ,  in  some himan s i tu a t io n s ,  a t  l e a s t ,  the d is t in c t io n  
lietweeii fac in s ta tin g  words and value words m ight be im possible to  
m aintain , and th is  a ig h t  not only be the sign  of a p ra c t ic a l  
d i f f i c u l t y ,  Cog* th a t  a strong emotional a t t i tu d e  veiy  o ften  seems 
to  d i s to r t  the f a c ts  fo r  the p e r c ip ie n t  ("Love makes Mind")®
I t  ia  the sign  of an e s s e n t ia l  fe a tu re  of our "commerce with 
the w orld"® There a re  th in g s , i* e ,  th ings th at m atter much fo r  
us as men, the ex istence  o f which we cannot a ffirm  or deny w ithout 
g iv ing  them a va lu e s ta tu s  (p o s it iv e  or negative)® There are  
s itu a t io n s  in  which we want to  say th a t something i s  'the case , and 
a re  unable to  s ta te  t h is  in  non^evaluailve term s.And, a t  th is
p o in t the question  should be r a is e d , a t  l e a s t ,  whether our language
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i s  here r e f le c t in g  funcli'mental epistem elogical eonclitioiiso This 
could mean,g e*g* in  the ca se  of the lunatic, th a t  th e  q u e s tio n  of
whether you see what the re  really ia  to he eeen in  the situation 
depends on whether yon have got the r ig h t  h l ik  by which yon could 
be aware of the value aspect of the situation* To say th i s  would 
a lso  mean to molte some onto logical assertions*
To he true, i t  wight o ften  seem possib le  to regard facts and 
values as separable, bu t i s  t h i s  because we d e l ib e ra te ly  block the 
access to one aspect of re&llty and c rea te  an a r t i f i c i a l  language 
to  cover th i s  distorted experience of i t ?  In which ease i t  i s  
not only an "amputated" experience, because the experience i s
E i s m ) '
The r e la t io n  between fa c tu a l  assertions and evaluations ie  
perhaps most evident in re l ig io u s  language. This becomes 
especially c le a r  from what ÎUM. Hare himself says in  M s article 
in  Faith and Logic. We w ill  have to examine t h i s  a r t i c l e  ra th e r  
closely* ,
F irs t^ lla re  deals w ith the lo g ica l p o s i t i v i s t s ’ theory of 
empiridal v e r i f i a b i l i t y  as the c r i t e r io n  of the meaningfulness of 
a statement, and the Impact of th i s  theory on the conception of 
religious and moral language.
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As might he expected, Hare holds t h a t  th is  cr iter io n  swept
language too clean*, redueiiig moral ami theological language to
psOiido-»|>ropositioB8a What th e  thcoi'y d id .  Hare says, was to  
■ iso la te  one k in d  of u se  we make of language , and g ive  an enorBionsly 
u s e fu l  cr iter io n  of mmaningfu 1n es s  f o r  statements made in  t h i s  
fie ld *  ' ’ '
The in terestin g  point i s ,  however, th a t 'w h e n  Hare him self mmos 
t h i s  f i e l d  of s ta te m e n ts  a s  d is t in c t  f ro #  relig iou s statements, he 
does n o t sim ply ta lk  of " f a c tu a l  s ta te m e n ts ” . b u t  of "what we 
ordinarily  ca lled  a t a t e p e e t s  of 0 # p i r l c a l  fact" (underlined by me)^. 
Hare th e reb y  in d icates h is  amrenoBB of the complex!ty of the  
r e l a t i o n  between s o - c a l l e d  s ta tm ie n ta  of fa c t and, i n  t h i s  case, 
moral and relig iou s utterances, and that i t  i s  not bo easy to  
operate with a c l e a r l y  circumscribed meaning of th e  term "fact" i t s e l f *
1 * One fe e ls  compelled to ask: "Too c l c a n * ^ in  re la tio n  to what?
Perhaps"im re la tion  to actual (c-Mpirical) uses of language"*
But th i s  ia  an extremely d i f f i c u l t  p o s it io n  to  hold# For how i s  
one to decide which, i f  any, of the  usee of language should be 
swept mit i f  the court of appeal i s  only these em pirical uses 
themselves? Or does lanpiage become too clean in  r e la t io n  to an 
id ea l of language? Or ie  i t  judged too clean on th e  b as is  of 
some o ther  considerations, perhaps of . epistem ological conditions? 
We th ink  th a t  the  l a t t e r  i s  the case, and th a t  th is  i s  implied in  
Mare’ s argument as i t  ie  sketched in  the following*
iî& iJiL M âiagJÆ ,» p .1 7 7 .
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The f i r s t  th in g  to  he sa id  about re l ig io n  and m orale, according  
to Mare, i e  th a t  re l ig io n  u su a lly  lias a moral aspect* This does 
not only mean th a t the  supporters of a p a r t ic u la r  r e l ig io n  tend to  
behave according to a p a r t ic u la r  moral pattern* I t  a lso  means th a t  
the preaching of a p a r t i c u la r  r e l ig io n  seems to be in tim a te ly  
linked  with the p r e sc r ip t io n  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  s e t  of moral p r in c ip le s .  
In f a c t ,  the most obvious d iffe ren ce  between p a r tic u la r  
re l ig io n s  i s  v e iy  o ften  the d iffe r e n c e  in  the behaviour of th e ir  
believers#  Tims the very obvious tiling th a t  happened to ^t* Paul 
when he became a C h ris t ian , was be did not any longer regard i t
as h is  duty to persecu te  C h r is t ia n s , He suddenly came to th ink  th a t  
he ought to  in crea se  th e i r  number in s tea d .
I t  i s  not Hare’s in te n t io n ,  however, to say th a t  re l ig io u s  
b e l ie f  means commitment to  a p a r t i c u la r  way of behaving (as o thers  
have done i n  an attem pt to s t a t e  the fu n ction  o f re l ig io u s  lan guage). 
I t  i s  not th e  moral judgements which c o n s t itu te  a r e lig io u s  b e l i e f .  
They ar i s e  out of th is  b e l i e f ,  as ia  c le a r  from ^t* Pau l’ s c a se .
The reason why he stopped, p ersecu tin g  C h ristian s was th a t  he 
had changed h is  b e l ie f  about a p a r ticu la r  noiwiioral m atter, namely 
who JesuB of Naz&reth r e a l ly  was* He had come to b e lie v e  th a t  he 
was C h ris t ,  the Bo b  o f God,
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This resembles, however, veiy much a fac tu a l statement, and 
i t  seems th a t  i t  was not a c tu a l ly  Iris moral p r in c ip le  th a t  had 
changed a t  all* For Paul had always regard eel. i t  as h ie  moral 
o b lig a tio n  to follow the C hris t  when he appeared* !^o i t  might 
be most correct to  say th a t  P au l’s ac tions  were changed, not by 
a change i n  moral p r in c ip le s ,  Imt by a change in h is  factual belief, 
Hare is not, however, content with th is  way of p u tt in g  i t  
either# For, can we say th a t  a person by the sentence "Jesxis 
is C h r is t” is s t a t i n g  a fact at all (and Haro adds significantly, 
"in the  ordinary sense")?
Bt« Ihiul’B new b e l i e f  was not caused by any in crea se  in  
Imowledge of the f a c t s  about Jesiis® lie miglii very w e ll have 
known b efore t h a t  Jesus e a s t  out d e v i ls ,  fo r  in s ta n c e , Bui he 
might have sa id  t h a t  i t  was Beelzebub who stood  behind him, Or, 
i f  he had been a 80th century c r i t i c ,  he might have sa id  th a t  he 
cured mental d ise a s e s  by suggestion^ And, th is  would not in  any case 
iuive a l te r e d  the f a c t s  in  question , in  one sense of the  word "fact". 
But th ere  not other kinds o f f a c t s ,  and i s  not the  most 
important po in t in  connection  with S t, Pau l’s conversion  Ju s t  such 
a f a c t  of "another kind"? The appearance, namely, of the v o ic e  of
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C h r ie t  w h ile  Pau l was on th e  road  to  Damas ou a? This coii |d  then
he ca lled  a "supernatural" fa c t .
Someone m ight e a s i l y  o b je c t ,  however, t h a t  th e  a c tu a l  f a c t  
was t h a t  < t .  Paul had a  pow erful em otional expe rien ce  accompanied 
by an i l l u s i o n  o f  someone t a lk in g  to  him* fh iB  would be 
p e r f e c t l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  w hat could  be observed in  Uie c a s e .
I t  seems, t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  we cannot p o in t  to any d i f f e r e n c e  
between f a c t s  and I l l u s i o n s  whom we a r e  d e a l in g  w ith  " s u p e rm itu ra l '  
f a c t a . *
But another m x y  of looking a t  At, Paul’ s conversion Is to  say 
that what he d id  was t o  adopt a new, a s  i t  w ere , worahiMdug 
a t t i t u d e  to  th e  fa c ts , So t h a t  to say "Thou a r t  th e  Christ”, i s  
n o t  to  s t a t e  a  f a c t ,  but to  do something, namely, worship.
But even t h i s  e% planatlon  does n o t  .make th e  problem c l e a r c u t .  
f o r  to  w orsh ip  something seems to  mean, p a r t l y  a t  l e a s t ,  c e r t a i n  
a s s e r t i o n s .  For in s t a n c e  t h a t  th e  o b je c t  worshipped i s  a p e rso n ,
lo  We are here on ly  r e fe rr in g  to Mare’ s use of the a d je c t iv e
"supernatural", namely to ch a ra c ter ize  th a t  which i s  supposed
to belong to an order of being above th a t  of the o b je c ts  and 
order of even ts in  the na tu ra l  world. And Mare’ s p o in t seems
to be the f  ami l i a r  one th a t  wo cannot apeak of any such kind  
of f a c ts  because statem ents about them could never be v e r i f ie d  
or fa ls if ie d ,  em pirically*
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and t h a t  t h i s  can be seen  from what th e  o b ject of xm rahip does. 
U su a lly  t h i s  i s  th o u fh t  of a s  a c e r t a i n  co u rse  of ev en ts  which 
i s  expected  to  fo l lo w  an, a c t  of w orship .
I t  might he t r u e .  B are h o ld s , t h a t  th e  l e s s  p r im itiv e  th e  
r e l lg io a  i s ,  the lesw w i l l i n g  a r e  i t s  adherents to expose i t s  
statem ents to  aueh em pirical f a l s i f i c a t i o n ,  but even advanced 
r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  imply some e m p ir ic a l  e x p e c ta t io n s .
On th e  o th e r  hand, oven th e  most p r im i t iv e  r e l i g i o u s  b e l ie f s  
are n o t  j u s t  statem ents of em p ir ica l  f a c t .  For th e  mooning of 
the word "god” i e  "a proper o b je c t  of worsMp'% and "proper" i s  
h e re  c le a r ly  a valiie-w ord , w i th  a p r e s c r ip t iv e  mean!ng.
So Haro seems to  have brought o u t, in  co n n ec tio n  w ith  r e lig io n s  
language, a c a se  very s im ila r  to  t h a t  of moral judgem ents.
The word "god” , fo r  in sta n ce , has bo th  e v a lu a t iv e  and 
d e sc r ip t iv e  meaning. For, "According to  t h is  view , in  c a l l in g  
something a god, we a r c  Baying, not merely t h a t  worshipping i t  m i l  
have c e r t a i n  r e s u lt s ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  i s  pro pgr to  worship I t ;  th a t I s  
to  say , we are a t  l e a s t  i n  p a r t  p rescr ib in g  th e  ta k in g  up of a 
c e r ta in  a t t itu d e  towards ilJ'*.
1. F aith  and lo g ic , p .187.
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lias Mare now managed to  g iv e  an adequate  d esc r ip tio n  of
r e l i g i o n s  d ls e o n rs e ,  which l i t e ,  say* Bt® P a u l's  b e l i e f s  a f te r  
h i s  conversion?
As we saw, i t  i s  im p ossib le  to  say th a t i t  was some s in g l e  
th in g  about Bto Paul which had changed when lie s t a r t e d  sa y in g ,
"dosuB i s  C h r ist”* In f a c t ,  everyth ing in  h is  l i f e  changed, 
h i s  fa c tu a l b e l i e f s ,  h is  a t t itu d e  and moral p r in c ip le s*
A cco rd in g ly , r e l i g i o n s  d is c o u rs e  coB sld te  of many k in d s  of 
u t t e r a n c e s ,  which a r e  in te rw o v en , i*e* " a l l  th e se  k in d s  of
Iu t t e r a n c e s  a r e ,  so to speak , i n  e l i c u i t  w i th  a l l  tlie r e s t ” *
Hare sums up h i s  a t te m p t  t o  c l a s s i f y  r e l i g i o u s  language i n
the  fo l lo w in g  xmy*
" I  s t a r t e d ,  i t  w i l l  be rem m b ered , by c o n s id e r in g  th e  
s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  moral jucigemeats a r e  th e  d i s t i n c t i v e  
c o n s t i t u e n t s  o f  r e l i g i o u s  d isc o u rse *  This view I r e j e c t e d ,  
and th e n  c o n s id e re d  i n  tu r n  th e  c la im  of s ta te m e n ts  of r e l i g i o n s  
b e l i e f s  to  be c a l l e d  s ta te m e n ts  of f a c t s  i n  the  o rd in a ry  
se n se ;  end t h i s ,  to o ,  appeared  u n s a t i s f a c to r y *  I f  we ta k e  
r e l i g i o n s  la iigaage a s  a whole, i t  i s  too  f a c t u a l  to  be c a l l e d  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  m o ra l , andyo t too  c lo s e ly  bound up w ith  our 
conduct to  bo c a l l e d  i n  the o rd in a ry  sense  f a c t u a l "
1* Ibidem , p o l8 8 . ,
2 ® I  bi d em, p * 189 *
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Mare them t r i e d  to sk e tc h  a  sym thesis  which would In c lu d e  
bo th  th e  Adoption of i f a c t u a l  b e l i e f  and th e  s u b s c r ip t io n  to  
c e r t a i n  p r in c i p l e s  of a c t io n  i n  th e  ta k in g  up of an a t t i t u d e  
o f  v^orsliip to  an o b je c t*
"As A f i r s t  ske tch  o f  a s y n th e s i s ,  i t  i s  p la u s ib le
to  say t h a t  In  so f a r  as r e l i g i o n s  dioeam rse seem© to  
r e f e r  to  s u p e rn a tu ra l  f a c t a ,  t h i s  i s  the r e s u l t  of the
giijperimpositioB of th e  a t t i im.de of w orship upon f a c t u a l .  
b e l i e f s  which a re  them selves n o t o th e r  than e m p ir ic a l” *
This would, says H are , p o in t  to  a  m is tak e  l ik e  th e  one abou t
"non«^natural q u a l i t i e s ” im e t h i c s ,  i i e *  th e  view which ta k es  the
a p p l i c a t i o n  of the a d j e c t i v e  "good” to  an o b je c t  to  moan th e
a t t r i b u t i o n  of a  q u a l i t y , i n s t e a d  of see in g  t lm t  i t  means to
commend th e  o b je c t  f o r  hav ing  o th e r ,  e m p ir ic a l ,  q u a l i t i e s *
"*6« i t  w igh t he t h a t  th e  f a c t s  t h a t  r e l i g i o u s  d is c o u rs e  
d e a ls  w i th  a r e  p e r f e c t l y  o rd in a ry  em p ii lo a l  f a c t s  l i k e  
what happene when you p ra y ;  Im t we a re  tempted to  c a l l  
them s u p e rn a tu ra l  f a c t s  because  our whole way of l i v i n g  
i s  o rg an ized  romui them, they  have f o r  ub v a lu e , re le v a n c e ,  
im p o rtan ce , which they  would n o t  have i f  we were a t h e i s t s .
I f  t h i s  view were c o r r e c t ,  th e n  th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  th e re  a r e  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e l i g i o u s ,  s u p e rn a tu ra l  f a c t s  cou ld  be ©aid to  
be th e  . r e s u l t  of f a i l i n g  to  d i s t in g u i s h  in  lo g ic  what 
canno t be d i s t in g u is h e d  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  namely, f a c t s ,  and our 
a t t i t u d e s  to
Ibidem,
8 * Ibidem, p *1§0,
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I f  Tiro cou ld  be s a t i s f i e d  w ith  i b i s  way of p u t t in g  i t ,  
e v e ry th in g  xmild f i t  very  n ea tly  i n to  t h e  p a t t e r n  used to  d escrib e  
moral language, t h a t  of e v a lu a t iv e  and d e s c r ip t iv e  meaning as 
l o g i c a l l y  Independent of each other®
But Hare th in k s t h a t  even t h i s  w i l l  not do f o r  r e lig io n #  
language*
What he th e n  goes on to  q u e s t io n ,  i s  j u s t  t h i s  simple lo g ic a l
d i s t i n c t i o n  between f a c t s  and a t t i t u d e s *
"oeo though i t  i s  most im p o r ta n t  to  s t a r t  by making 
t h i s  (listiiiO'fcioM, i t  i s  Important to  end, n o t by 
b lu rr in g  i t ,  a s  i s  o f te n  done* but by a r t i c u l a t i n g  th e  
r e l a t i o n s  between th e se  two k in d s  of th in g s"#
What Hare wants to  r e fu te  i s  th e  id e a  th a t  f a c t s  are given
us i r r e s p e c t i v e l y  o f  our d i s p o s i t io n s *  I* e * , he opposes, what
he , ad o p tin g  a  phrase o f  P rofessor  P opper’s ,  c a l l s  "the bucket
p
th e o ry  of th e  mind", t h a t  "knowledge" i s  th e  r e s u l t  of f a c t s  
dripping, so to  speak , in to  an empty bucket#
Mantg as Mare p o in t s  o u t, long ago r e a l i z e d  t h a t  th is  i s  not 
80# Any statem ents of f a c t  which c la im  o b je c t lv i ty ,  con ta in  a
r e f e r e n c e  to  c a u sa l  n e c e s s i ty  « and i s  thus p a rtly  modal#
1# Ib idem  ' * ,
2# Ibidem, p .19^#
igô
Snolî a  modal e ta te in o n t i s  in  f a c t  n r e s c r in t iv e .  and n o t o n ly
{ laaerip tive*
This VfOEld mean t h a t  a  s ta te m e n t which i s ,  e x p l i c i t l y ,  a
statem ent of f a c t ,  c o n ta in s  aa_ each a  p r e s c r ip t iv e  e lem en t, ifh ich ,
a s  Mare adm its ,  p r é s e n té  c e r t a i n  a n a lo g ie s  w ith  th e  p r e s c i p t i v e
elem ent in  moral judgem ents, and in the end Hare m aintains t h a t ,
"From t h i s  i t  fo llo w s  t h a t  thout p r in c ip le s  of some so r t  wo do
g e t any IllptB j * there i s  no d is t in c t io n  between f a c t  ami I l lu s io n  f o r
A p erso n  who .does not tÂhe iw  a c e r ta in  a t t i t u d e  to the w orld"
1-(underlined  by me) \
For t h i s  view , H are , su r p r is in g ly  enough, draws su p p o r t  from
th e  works of modern nenro-physio 1 , in  p a r t i c u l a r  from -
2P ro fe s s o r  1#%* Young’s Meith L ec tu res ' '*
I t  m ight seem su rp r is in g  t h a t  a  man of P ro fe s s o r  Young’ s 
p ro fess io n  should  he a b le  to g ive  any su p p o r t  to  Kant’8 d o c t r in e s#
But s in ce  there ob v iously  a re  c e r t a i n  form al a n a lo g ie s  between th e  
fe a tu r e s  of language and th e  p ro c e s s e s  i n  the b ra in , the agreement 
between hunt and P ro fessor  Young sim ply  shows ( f o r  llare^ t h a t  i e )  
t h a t  lian t him self was in  the end a " l in g u is t ic ” philosopher#
1* Ibidem , p+lgO#
8* Doubt and C e r ta in ty  i n  Faience#
B r i t i s h  B r o a d c a s t i n g  C o r p o r a t i o n  D,eitb L e c t u r e s  1958> P u b l i s h e d  
O xfo rd  1 9 3 1 •
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j - ro fee so r  Young holds (ay quoted hy H are) t h a t ,
"We canno t speak  a s  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  world around an of 
which our se n se s  g ive  no t r u e  in f o r im t i  on# In  t r y in g  to 
speak abou t what th e  world i s  l i k e  we innst remember e l l
th e  time t h a t  what wo see  and what we say depends on what 
wo have learned; we o u rse lv es come in to  the p ro cess , * * ®
The brain  o f  each one of us does l i t e r a l l y  c r e a te  h is  
or her own world* To exp la in  t h is  wo must answer the  
q uestion : Moxv does each brain  s e t  up i t s  own c h a r a c te r is t ic
r u le s ?  How do those regu lar p a ttern s of a c t iv i t y  in  the 
c e l l s  of th e  brain  «, ,  develop? I l i i s  i s  the process t h a t  I 
c a l l  the  e s ta b l i s h m e n t  of c e r t a i n t y ,  and i t  i e  a p rocess  
t h a t  we may con sid er as beginning in  each human being a t  the  
moment,when, as a newly horn baby, h is  eyes open on to the  
Tforld” *
That i s  to  sa y ,  Young want© -c in v e s t i .^;abe how the h ra ir i s e t s  
up th e  r u l e s  f o r  d i s t in g u i s h in g  f a c t s ,  o r  fo r  tm d e rs lan d in g  th e
c oneep t ”fac  t " ,
Hare contends t h a t ,  " th e  le s s o n  t h a t  i s  to ho l e a r n t  from
P ro f e s s o r  Young, a s  from K ant, i s  t h a t  (a s  Kant m l t  pu t i t )
n o th in g  can become an o b je c t  ( o r  a f a c t )  f o r  us u n le s s  in  our
tl i in k im i we r allow  c e r t a i n  r u l e s  o r  p r in c ln l e s  -  thcrt th e  mi ml
p la y s  an a c t iv e  p a r t  in  c o g n i t io n ,  and t h a t  th e r e f o r e  th e  m rin e ip laa
p
which iiuvern i t s  a c t i o n  a re  nart* .dete rm in an ts  of what we ex p e rien ce"*  
(u n d e r l in e d  liy me)®
lA i th  ttnd L og ic . 
8 . Ibidem, p,192«
*J:S™jta.-*sac»3W5rtrSK8M» "•
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I f  th is  i s  80, we ouijiit to bo re lu c ta n t to speak too e a s ily  
about fa c ts  as something ab so lu te ly  d is tin g u ish ab le  from our 
a tti tu d e s*  We ca to o i speak of anything as r e a l ly  e x is tin g , l*o . 
of fa c ta , o b jec ts  or e n t i t i e s ,  u n t i l  we have accepted ru le s  fo r  
di B c ri. mi na t i  ng be two en f  ac t  a a nd i  1 lu  a ions ". ^
I t  i s  here th a t  re l ig io u s  b e l ie f  cornea in to  the p ic tu r e ,  
according to l ia re* We b e lie v e  th a t  God created  the world out of 
chaos*
"Is  i t  possib le  th a t t h i s i s  our way of exp ressin g  
the t ru th  tlm t w ithout b e l ie f  in  a d iv in e  order -  a 
b e l ie f  expressed  in  o ther terms by means of w orshipping  
assen t to p r in c ip le s  fo r  d iscr im in a tin g  between f a c t  and
i l l i ie io n  «=> there  could he no b e l i e f  in  m atters of f a c t  
or re a l  ob jects?  C erta in ly  i t  is  sa lu ta ry  to recognize 
th a t even our b e l ie f  in  so -ca lled  hard fa c ts  r e s t s  in  the
JuteiïTœi'aKïïaïTi
end on a f a i t h , a commitment, vhloh ia  not in  or to f a c t s ,  
but in  th a t w ithout which there  would not be any f a c t s ”8*
Wlmt comes out of th is  i s ,  i t  seems, th a t  the  b as is  of the 
very notion of " f a c t s ” ia  a p re s c r ip t iv e  a t t i t u d e ,  and we remember
th a t  a main p o in t in  Hare’ s theory of e th ic s  was the r e la t io n  beW een




%  m ight t h e r e f o r e  be J u s t i f i e d  in  say ing  t h a t  to  speak of 
something a s  a  " f a c t "  laetme, a c c o rd in g  to  h a rg ,  to  ta k e  up th e  
e v a lu a t iv e  a t t i t u d e  t lm t  i t  i s  to  be reg a rd ed  a s  a " f a c t "  o r  a 
" r e a l  o b je c t"#  Or, i n  o th e r  words, to  make th e  va lu e Judgement 
t h a t  i t  i a  to  he regarded as a such one* That I s  to  say , not 
the f a c t  i t s e l f  but th e  re c o g n it io n  of i t s  " fa c tu a lity "  i s
l E S â S S M *
Hare i s  not h o ld in g , and n e i t h e r  do.w© want to  h o ld , a 
p e c u l i a r  kind o f  Berksleyan id e a lism , a k ind  of "osso e a t
a e s t i m a r i " * That would mean t h a t  th e  being of an o b je c t  W  i t s  
being evaluated*
Hare c l e a r l y  does not want to  deny th e  r e a l i t y  of the  ex tern a l 
world* He want to  say som ething c lo s e  to what Kant said# Put 
b r ie f ly  th e  view i s  t h a t  th e  phenomena, o r  th e  th in g s a s  they  
ap p ear  to  u s ,  a r e  determ ined, p a r tly  a t  l e a s t ,  by our own
W$%%%ori@8 of apprehension. Or, we could sa y , by the way we
Iapprehend the th in g s *
Hare wants to develop  t h is  even fu r th er  i n  in c lu d in g  e v a lu a t iv e  
and in d eed , r e l i g i o u s  a t t i t u d e s  among th e  p o ss ib le  d e te rm in a n ts  of  
our ca th egories*
lo How f a r  th e r e  i s  a  r e a l  agreem ent between Kant and Hare i n  th e s e  
m a s te rs  camiofc bo d is c u s s e d  h e re  * We a r e  l i m i t i n g  Uxe ta s k  to  
a  p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  H a r e 's  own view#
Ihu
fhi© means t h a t  " f a c t s " ,  a s  th e y  come to  u s ,  a r e  determ ined 
hy ou r  d e c is io n  of what i s  to  count a s  a fact® T h is  d é c is io n  i s  
r e p e a te d  each tim e a new human in d iv id u a l lea rsn  how to  
d i s t i n g u i s h  between f a c t s  and i l l u s i o n s *
This d e c i s io n  i s  not an  in d iv id u a l  d e c is io n , 1#©* i n  the  
meaning t h a t  i t  v a r i e s  from in d iv id u a l to  in d iv id u a l*  I t  i e  
r a t h e r  a common human d e c i s io n ,  a t  l e a s t  fo r  a l l  who have dec ided  
to  use  the  word " f a c t ” or i t s  e q u iv a le n t s ,  a s e t t i n g  up of r u l e s  or 
p r in c ip le ©  f o r  d i s c r im in a t in g  between f a c t s  and i l l u s i o n s *
There i s  no i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  Hare h im se lf  f in d s  hi© view t h a t  
b e l i e f  i n  fact©  i s  based, on a t t itu d e s  in co m p a tib le  w i th  th e  main 
t h e s i s  i n  h i s  e t h i c a l  w r i t i n g s ,  i#e* t h a t  of th e  dichotomy between 
fact©  and v a lu e s  #
lie m ight want to  ©ay t h a t  th e  p r e s c r i p t i o n  o r  e v a lu a t io n  which 
i s  th e  b a s i s  f o r  our m otion of " f a c t s "  i s  a ge n e ra l  pr e s c r i p t i o n  o f  
th e  human mind, s t a t i n g  what 1 b to  coun t a s  a f a c t ,  w h ile  th e  
p r e sc r ip t io n  of the  v a lu e  judgement proper i s  an exp ression  o f  th e  
I M iv M m l'8. «MicG mu.om the., f a c t s  a lread y e s ta b lish e d  by the  
i n i t i a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between f a c t s  and il lu s io n © *
But we do n o t think t h a t  t h e  th e o ry  of the dichotomy between 
f a c t  and v a lu e  can r e a l ly  be up h e ld  on th e  b a s i s  of t h i s  or a s im i la r  
argument*
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For what Mare lia© clone h j  s i r e s  s in g  th e  im portance of b l ik ^  
and r e l i g i o u s  b e l ie f  (a s  he unders tands  i t )  i s  to  q u e s t io n  th e  
whole n otion  of " f a c ta "  as som ething  objeetivelj?^ g iv en  i n  th e  
©enee t h a t  i t  can be considered  in d e p en d en t ly  of i t s  r e la t io n  to  
th e  apprehending su b je c t, the r e l a t i o n  which i s  expressed in  th e  
s u b j e c t ’ s evaluation# The doubts as to  th e  co n sis ten cy  of th e  
fact»and*"Value sep ara tion  would be th e  same whether t h i s  
" e v a lu a t io n "  i e  th o u g h t of as a purely  s u b je c t iv e  p r e s c r i p t i o n  or 
as having some c o g n i t iv e  s ta tu s ,  c#g# r e f e r r i n g  to  some o n to lo g ic a l  
s tr u c tu r e .
By in troducing such elem ents i n to  our d isco u rse  as the  ones 
above we have a l re a d y  in d ica ted  t h a t  a d isc u ss io n  o f another 
im portant trend i n  contem porary p h ilo so p h y , s o - c a l l e d  " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m " ,  
m ight have a  bearing on th e  understanding of our problem#
1# I t  shou ld  be noted th a t  Hare u ses th e  term " b l ik "  on ly  i n  th e  
f i r s t  of th e  two a r t i c l e s  we have been d iscu ss in g  above# So 
th a t we a lo n e  a r e  resp o n sib le  f o r  the use of th e  term  in  
co n n ec tio n  w ith  th e  a t t i t x i d i n a l  b a s is  of th e  b e l i e f  in  " f a c t s ” .
IV . ÏO‘i*lKÏ>S A MiiSDiOr OP ïü lî  UNI'H ÜP PAC! AM.» VALHE.
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1» Values and e x is te n t ia l is m .
The ta s k  a f  comparing the  e t h i c a l  conception  of a n a l y t i c a l
p h ilo so p h y  m t h  t h a t  o f  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  ph ilo sophy  seems prima
f a c i e  a co n fus ing  one*
On the one hand th e re  a r e  u ttera n ces hy th e  a n a ly s t s  ifhich
seem to  d ism iss  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  as  a  f a l l a c y  a l to g e th e r*  The
a n a ly s t s  p r e s e n t  i t  as r e s t i n g  on th e  assumption t h a t  ex is te n c e
i s  an a t tr ib u te , and t h a t  i t ,  th e re fo re , has meaning to  r a i s e
q u e s t io n s  abou t Being* The m is tak e  whicii l i e s  belli ml such
q u estion s i s  t h a t  of th in k in g  t h a t ,  s in c e  senten ces l i k e  **X e x i s t s ”
and "X works" have th e  same gramim k lca l  form, th e y  a r e  a lso  of the
1same lo g i c a l  ty p e , i*e*  they  a r e  a s c r ib in g  a t t r i b u t e s #
This le a d  us to  tliink, t h a t  our q u e s t io n  about .# c  r e l a t i o n
between a n a ly tlo a à  and e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  ph ilosophy  with re g a rd  to  the  
q u estio n  of e t h i c s  i s  e a s i ly  answ ered , the answer be in g  t h a t  there  
i s  no r e l a t i o n  a t  a l l ,  b u t  r a t h e r  a t o t a l  d isc repancy#
A co n c lu s io n  l i k e  t h i s  i s ,  however, c e r t a i n l y  premature# As 
f a r  a s  our q u e s t io n  i s  concerned , th e re  are r e p e a te d  a s s e r t i o n s  from
îo Of* e*g# A#J# Ayer, © p*cit# , p . 42#
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d i f f e r e n t  q u a r t e r s  t h a t  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  i s  a c tu a lly  th e  roost 
f a i t h f u l  a l l y  of a n a l y t i c a l  p h ilo so p h y  in  m a in ta in in g  a consequent 
non^eognitiv ism , h o ld in g  that va lue  judgements a r e  n e i t h e r  t r u e  
n o r  f a k e ,  th a t th ey  em inot be i n f e r r e d  from any statem ents of 
f a c t s ,  t h a t  we can g e t  no im perative from an in d ic a t iv e ,  no "ought*^ 
from an “i s ” and so on* Veiy o f te n  e x is te n t ia lis m  i s  p ictured  a s  
adm itting a. m oral a r b itr a r in e s s  which by f a r  exceeds t h a t  vdiich 
any moral p h i lo s o p h e r  i n  th e  a n a l y t i c  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  c o n te x t  would 
admit*
The Norwegian p h i lo s o p h e r  !I*K# Tranoy, fo r  in s ta n c e , sees  in  
v a lu e  n ih ilism  and e x is te n t ia l is m  a  common tendency, i n  t h a t  the 
v i t a l  c e n t r e  of  m o r a l i ty  i s  sought, not in  th e  r a t i o n a l  and 
in t e l le c t u a l  s id e  o f man, but in  h is  emotdons and f e e l in g s .  This 
im p lie s , then, t h a t  v a lu e  n ih ilism  and e x is te n t ia l is m , though 
coiBj.u0nl,y reg a rd ed  a s  p l a i n  c o n t r a r i e s ,  a r e , in  a sen se , v a r i a t i o n s  
on A common th©m^«
“The problem  of m o t iv a t io n ,  t>f the  r e la t io n  between  
r e a s o n  and f e e l i n g s ,  knowledge and c h o ice ,  i s  «•* a c e n t r a l  
problem in  th e em otive and v a lu e  n i h i l i s t i c  theories*  
IS x is te n t ia l i sm , a l s o ,  i s  much oeciiped by th e  same, or a 
c lo s e ly  r e la te d , problem . I t  t e l l s  us t h a t  Jjoth-'l-îî® and 
death a r e  m m m lngless, . . .  t h a t  everyth ing i s  a b s u rd .  . . .  
For w hat do th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  mean when they  a r e  spooking 
of l i f e  a s  m eaningless and  absurd? They can . . .  mean to  
say t h a t  we can n o t by \my o f  reason ing come to  know t h a t  
l i f e  1ms any ad eq u a te  v a lu e  in  i t s e l f ,  any ultim m te  g o a l,
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amy purpose* *•* I f  wo choose to  l iv e ,  wo bave to choose
w ithout being ab le to ae.y th a t  reason .has chosen f o r  uo«
Does not th i s  resemble what the value n i h i l i s t s  are  saying? .««
| t  may thus in  a way be the same in s ig h t they are 
conveying, the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ,  when they th a t  l i f e  i s  
absurd , and the v a lu e  n i h i l i s t s ,  when they say th a t standards
and ev a lu a tio n s  are  n e ith e r  tru e  nor f a l s e . “I
The way in  which th is  apparent r e la t io n s h ip  i s  s ta te d , v a r ie s ,
even thon^i the  meaning i s  f a i r ly  constant* A* M ontefiore,
speaking e sp e c ia lly  of R.M. hare@ holds th a t “th is  freedom of
eva lu a tio n  ».o Ima obvious a f f i n i t i e s  w ith th a t  proclaimed by th e
2lo g ic a l  autonoBiists** C ontinental e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  cousins
Vieil* Frankena compares the e x i s te n t ia l i s t s  to  th e  most extreme 
of the noiv»cognitivistas “Many e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  likew ise regard 
basic e th ic a l  and value judgements, p a r t ic u la r  or gen era l, as 
a rb i t r a ry  commitments or dec isions fo r  which no ju s t i f ic a t io n  con
be g iven
I 0 F o rn u f t  o i l e r  f o l d s o *  D n iv e rB i te te t  i  Bergen* P m a e k rif te r  
19619  pp. 28,33* ( T r a n s la te d  by me -  A .B#).
2® “Fact# v a lu e  ami ideo logy^ i n  B r i t i s h  i 
ed . A* M ontefio re  a,B* W illia m s , p*19B*
3* P '8 8 .
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E, Baiîibrougli exp resses th e  r e l a t i o n  Im a sim ple form ula,
a s s e r t in g  th a t "both  ï la re  and Sartre i n s i s t  th a t we fa sh io n  our
v a lu e s  and do n o t  f in d  thom"#^
This p ic tu re  of th e  e t h i c a l  co n cep tio n s  of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  and 
a n a ly t ic a l philosophy as in  c e r ta in  resp ec ts  id e n t ic a l  m ight, of 
cou rse , be tr u e , d e s p i t e  th e  a n a ly s t s  ^ lig^ t^ h earted  d is m is s a l  o f  
e x is te n t ia l is m . I t  m ight be t h a t  th e  a n a ly sts  have sim ply 
m isunders tood  e x is te n t ia l i s m , and t h a t  they are r e a l l y  "cousins" , 
u n ited  i n  a common a B t i-e s s e B t la lis p i . A nti^essentialiG m  i s ,  indeed , 
a common fa c to r  in  bo th  v iew s, and i t  cannot be denied t h a t  t h i s  
cau ses  a s t r i k i n g  s im ila r ity  between u t t e r a n c e s  from bo th  a id e s ,  
n o t  on ly  a s  f a r  as e t h i c s  i s  concerned*
What we ivant to  q u e s t io n  i s  th e  leg itim acy  of ta k in g  t h i s  
s im ila r ity  on i t s  fa ce  value* C onsidering t h a t  th e  a n ti^ e a a e n t la lia t  
co n c ep tio n  of th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t e  has  a d if fe r e n t  o r i g i n  and purpose 
from t h a t  of th e  a n a ly s ts ,  we m ight be e n t it le d  to  a s k  w hether th e  
p i c t u r e  of t h e i r  e t h i c a l  c o n c e p t io n s ,  r e f e r r e d  to  above, i s  t ru e*
Or, r a t h e r ,  w hether th is  i s  th e  whole of the  p ic tu re *  I t  might be 
t h a t  c r u c i a l  e lem ents of th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  co n cep tio n  i s  l e f t  out*
lo "Moral S cm itic ism  and Moral Knowledge'! i n  Gommmn F a c to r .
1 / m h ,  w s t .
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In  o rd e r  to  be a b le  to  see the  bea rin g  of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m
upon e t h ic s  we have to  e o n e id e r  a s  a whole the  b a s i c  l i n e  of though t
1of th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  , ami s in c e  th e re  a r e  g ro a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
between thoiu, some of Iho most im p o r ta n t  o f  th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  
even r e f u s in g  to  be c a l l e d  “e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ” , ive f in d  i t  most 
adequate  to  s tudy  some of th e  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  s e p a ra te ly *
A* AnalvBiB and îîlvaln a t io n  i n  M artin  ÎÎJilïDFlïGKR*
2M* H e id e g g e r 's  i n t e n t i o n  i s  from th e  very  beg inn ing  to  ask  
the  " n e g le c te d "  q u e s t io n  what Being ( " S a in " )  r e a l l y  is*  H is aim 
i s  th u s  to  e la b o r a te  an o n to lo g y ,  a "fundam ental ontology"*
I .  None of them has w r i t t e n  ajjçjfelfeMxîg on e th ic s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,
i f  we by t h a t  a r e  th in k in g  of an y th in g  l i k e  a tex tb o o k  of th e  
t r a d i t i o s m l  kind* The fo llo iidng  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  in te n d e d  to  
t r a c e  th e  e t h ic a l  im p l i c a t io n s ,  i f  any, of t h e i r  th in k in g  i n  
gexieral *
2* See H e id e g g e r 's  s ta te m e n t  on p*l of Bein ximl T .e it ,  1927,
n e r e a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  a s  8*%* Q u o ta tions  a r c  t r a n s l a t e d  by th e  
p r e s e n t  w r i t e r , f r o m  th e  6 th  e d i t i o n ,  1949* This i s  b ec au se , i n  
w r i t in g  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  I  have been working from th e  o r i g i n a l ,  
where so much depends o h  H e id e g g e r 's  o r ig in a l  u se  of language*
But i t  does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n d i c a t e  any s u b s t a n t i a l  d isag reem en t 
w ith  John M aequarrie and Ikhmrd Bobinson i n  th e ir  t r a n s l a t i o n  
of th e  work ( “Being and Time"» Loudon, H.C.M* 1 9 6 2 ) .  I t  shou ld  
be no ted  t h a t  th e  v a r io u s  Herman e d i t io n s  of B*Z* d i f f e r  s l i g h t l y
«#TSA*iertweasii ^  ^
w ith  re g a rd  to  p a g in a tio n *
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The method which H eidegger w ants to  employ i s  c a l l e d ,  hy
1Meidogger h im s e l f ,  "phenomenology" This does n o t ,  i n  H e id eg g er’ s 
t e m in o lo g y ,  mean t n a t  he d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between th e  "phenomena" 
and an ev e n tu a l  "noumenal" w orld  behind them, a s  Kant does . I t  i s  
r a t h e r  a q u e s t io n  o f a " d i s c lo s u re  of essence"  ("V/esensschau” ) ,  
whereby we can apprehend th e  e s s e n t i a l  Being of b e in g  ( “S e in  des 
Beienden")**, o r  th e  meaning of Being ("S inn  des R e in s" ) '  *
In  o rd e r  to  reach  t h i s  goal H eidegger want to  i n v e s t i g a t e  th e  
be in g  which we o u rs e lv e s  a r e ,  man’ s "B eing -tlia re"  ("DA #ein"), I t  i s  
im p o r ta n t  to  n o t ic e  t h a t  i t  i s  no a n th ro p o lo g ic a l ,  b io lo g i c a l  or 
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  s tu d y  H eidegger w ants to  make. What he i s  concerned  
w ith  i s  the  fundam ental s t r u c t u r e  of man’ s Being, n o t i t s  a c tu a l  
appearance  under d i f f e r e n t  c ircum stances*  - ' . .
1 « Of® ^4*2 ^» PP* 27ffo
2 , I t  w i l l  be seen  t h a t  we t r a n s l a t e  the  s u b s ta n t iv e  “Sclendes" 
by th e  noun " b e in g " ,  met i f i t h  " e n t i t y "  (M aequarrie-.Robin0o n ) ,
because i t  p re s e rv e s  th e  co n n e c tio n  w ith  th e  p a r t i c i p l e  “b e in g ” 
and a l s o  w ith  "Being" a s  s  t r a n s l a t i o n  of the  s u b s t a n t iv e  "Sein"*
3® H eidegger’ s backgîroiiBd i s  1® H u s s e r l ' s  "phenomenology", i«o* th e  
method, by means of which h e , th rough  a b s t r a c t i o n  from th e  a c t u a l , 
c o n c re te  r e a l i l y  of th e  phenomena, th o u g h t i t  p o s s ib le  to  g rasp  
t l i e i r  essence  o r  i d e a .  But, u n l ik e  H u s s e r l ,  H eidegger, who w ants 
to  in q u i r e  in to  Being i t s e l f ,  cannot le a v e  th e  c |ueetio ii of 
e x i s te n c e  o u ts id e  h ia  phenom enological c o n s id e r a t io n .
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ï l d s  Kmans t h a t  th e  s tu d y  i s  “o n to lo g i c a l ’% n o t “o n t i c ” .^ * T h is  
co rresp o n d s  a g a in  to  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  “e x i s t e n t l a l i a ”
( “K x ls te ï iK ia l ie n " ) , i.C o th e  s t r u c t u r a l  c h a r H c te r i s t i o s  of  human 
B eing, and th e  e x i s t e n t i a l  ( “e x i s t e n t i e l l e " ) , iao* th e  a c t u a l ,  
c o n t in g e n t ,  r e a l i s a t i o n  of th e  fnndamento.1 s t r u c t u r e  i n  men’s 
l iv e s o ^
Tîiis ch o ice  o f  man’ s B e in g - th e re  as  s u b je c t  f o r  tlîe a n a ly s i s  
w i th  a. view to  g ra sp in g  Being i s  n o t  a c c id e n ta l*  I'o approach 
Being wo have to  a d d re s s  our q u e s t io n  alm ut the  Being of being  to  
a s p e c i f i c  being* In  t h i s  r e s p e c t  a  b e in g  which .asks th e  q u e s t io n  
of  Being has a pro-cmdnonce*
That i s  to  say . B e in g - th e re ,  which can be a s c r ib e d  to  men o n ly , 
i s  d i s t in g u is h e d  o n t i c a l l y ,  no t on ly  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  unique 
to  human b e in g s ,  bu t a l s o  by th e  f a c t  t h a t ,  in  i t s  Being, i t  1b 
concerned w i th  Boinp; i t s e l f .  This Being, \/i.th  wbJ.eh IkdnM -there i s  
concerned i n  i t s  Being, i s  c o l l e d  " e x i s te n c e ” * "The ’essence® of 
Being'-the re  l i e s  i n  ,i t s  e x i s t e n c e " .  Thus i t  fo l lo w s  t h a t  " e x is te n c e "  
i s  th e  name of th e  s p e c i f i c  mode of Being of B e in g - th o re .  E x is te n c e  
i s  a “p o B B lb i l i ty  . * * (sc* f o r  Bel .ng-the r e )  of be ing  i t s e l f  or n o t  i t s e l f " .
1 . C i. ^^4^* p p .4 5 r io
2 .  C i .  Cog«î) â=e2jî.s P®
3 .  Cf. SF4#, p p .4 1 f f .
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In him attempt to understand what Being^there i s  Heidegger 
tr ê e s  to  d isp ose  e n t ir e ly  of the tr a d it io n a l "Cartesian" notion 
of tlie world as oqmppsed p a r tly  of apprehemling siihjects  ( res  
eog i tan s )  and p a r t l y  of the objects  to he apprehended ( res  
ex ten a a ). We must not regard giihject and o b jec t as two formm of 
Being, ex is t in g  s p a t i a l l y  beside each other and in  p r in c ip le  
independent of each other* fh i s  "dualism" mast not ,  however, he 
d isp osed  of by man being m&de a p iece  of natere® N either by the 
sp i r i t  being regarded as the only re a l  Being.
Being-"there not a "oneness", bat a “d u a l i ty ” , an o r ig in a l ,  
ind issolt ib le  com bination o f subjec t  and objec t ,  an o r ig in a l  
"Being—in-the-»worId"o The notion of an a%)prehending su b jec t, an
"I"  isolated, from the surrounding w orld, i s  a. mi s i  n terp r e ta  t i  on of 
the essen ce  o f a l l  r e a l existence* I t  leads to a " d ep erson a liza tion " , 
because the person i s  p r im ari ly  "agent"* Man’s "substance" i s  h is  
"existence"  as "Being-in-the-world"* His essen ce i s  a c t iv i t y ,  as  
e x is t in g  i s  Being;-there not w ith in  the con fin es ("Oehlluse") of 
consciousness" 5 but "out there" "with" the th in gs encountered in  the 
world. We do not apprehend the th ings  in  a disengaged  
s c ie n t i f i c a l ly ^ ,  but  in  an a c t in g  in terco u rse  with them as a t en s i la
PP® 4 ? f f
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The r e la t io n  to  th e  B e in g - th e re  o f  other men is- a l s o  something 
which i s  o r i g i n a l l y  p a r t  of g ;  B e in g - th e re  ( "d a s  jem ein ig e  D asein"), 
i t  i s  not a  th in g  t h a t  I  can a f f i r m  o r  deny as  i t  s u it s  me.*
I t  i s  im portant to  r e a l iz e  t h a t  th e  Being of man i s  temporal*
I t  i s  im -aeeu red , thrown to w r d a  th e  fu tu r e . I t  i s  thrown i n t o  
th e  " there of B e in g - th e re "  n o t  in  o rd e r  to  he i n  s e c u r ity , hu t 
lîim voidahly  to  hecome. Man’ s b a s ic  a t t i t u d e  tow ards l i f e  i s ,  
th e re fo re , th e  "no t-heing-a 'W iom e" ("d as  Un-ziihanse, d ie  
Unheim lichkei t “) ,^
This means t h a t  th e  " n ot-yet" , a  "continuing in co n c ln siv en ess" , 
b e longs to  th e  fundam ental stru ctu re  of B ein g -th ere , and t h i s  i s  
connected  w i th  th e  f a c t  t h a t  B e in g - th e re  as  "thrown Being"
("gcworfemes Seim") e x i s t s  "toimrds i t s  end", t h a t  we are thrmm  
tow ards d ea th  as th e  "end of B e in g - th e re " .  For d ea th  i e  not on ly  
th e  s ig n  of th e  end of an u n certa in  fu tu re; th e  lu m v o ic la b il i ty  of
1 . "The B e in g - in  i s  Being-W.th  th e  o t h e r . "
"Being-with  determ ines e x ls te n tj .n lly  ( ^ e x i s t e n t i a l * )  Being-  
th ere , a ls o  when an other i s  n o t  p resen t and apprehended.
The B eing-alone of B ein g-there i s  a ls o  B eing-w ith  i n  the  
w o r ld .  • • .B eing -a lo iio  i s  a  d e f i c i e n t  made of Being—w ith ,  
i t s  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  a p ro o f  of the la t te r " , S.%o@ pp*118,120,
2» « «  § Æ l> p .189.
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d e a th  means rather t h a t  a l l  o n r  Being i s  a “Being towards i t s
1end" . "B e in g - th e re  d ie s  i n  f a c t  a s  long  a s  i t  e x i s t s " , '
The "throw neas i n to  death" d i s c lo s e s  I t s e l f  f o r  Being—th e re  
in  "dread" ("A ngst"), This i s  n o t  th e  same a s  fe a r , i , e ,  f e a r  
fo r  t h is  or th a t .  I t  i s  a "fondamental s t a t e  of mind of
B e in g -th ere , the d isc lo su r e  o f th e  f a c t  th a t  B ein g-th ere as
S'thrown Being e x i s t s  towards i t s  end",
Mow we must n o t ic e , however, t h a t  we by n a tu re  a r e  apt to t r y
to  escape from th is  fundamental co n d itio n  of oiir e x is te n c e  in to
a n  " in a n th e n t ic  e x is te n c e " , Ve wish to lo s e  o u rse lv es  in  th e
many th in g s  of everyday l i f e ,  to  d isp o se  of the problems of l i f e
hy " ta lk " , never ta k in g  a n y th in g  r e a l l y  s e r io n a ly ,  This means
to  lo so  o n e s e lf  in  the "One" ("M an"), doing o r  not doing a th in g
%hecanse  t h i s  i s  what "One" does, o r  does n o t,'
1 . S .Z .s  p p ,2 5 ? f f ,
H. K.%. , 0 , 2 5 1 .
t J J i f 1 HIM . '
3 ,  "The 'O n e '"  i s  h e re  used as  a  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f th e  Homan
" d a s  Man", and  i t  r e f e r s  to  t h e  u s e  i n  E n g l i s h  of "one" 
a s  a n  i n d e f i n i t e  p ro n o u n ,  e » g ,  i n  e x p re s s io n s  l i k e  
"one  d o e s " ,  "one  s a y s " *
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Even d ea th  i s  thus tak en  l ig l i t ly o  I t s  real s e r io n e n e s s  i s
pushed a s id e  by rem arks about " a l l  hav ing  to d ie  one day" o r  by
onrioms or mixions i n t e r e s t  i n  what w i l l  t u r n  o u i  to  be th e
ocmee o f  oiw dea th  •
This  i s  man’s " f a l l e m ie s e " ,  h i s  runn ing  away I n  f r o n t  o f
d e a th .  The"One"does n o t  a l lo w  th e  "courage to  e x p e r ien ce  d read
1
f o r  d ea th"  to  a r i s e . ’
A r e tu r n  to  man’ s own t r u e  s e l f  i s  made p o s s ib le  th rough  th e  
c a l l  of ooaaeience® C onscience i s  th e  v o ice  of Being—t h e r e , and 
u nder  i t s  c a l l  the "One" comes to g e th e r  i n  i t s e l f ,  rem inding me 
a s  co n sc ien ce  does t h a t  my Being i s  a  "Being tow ards d e a th " ,
When I  d ie  i t  i s  n o t  "One" who d i e s ,  b u t  my v e ry  s e l f .  I  must 
take  over m y - s e l f * That i s  to  say , I must d e c id e ,  choose to  be 
m y se lf .  The c a l l  i s  a  c a l l  to  th e  “a u th e n t i c  power—to-he-w lio lo  
of B e in g - th e re " ,  to  be o n e s e l f  " in  the  p a s s io n a te ,  f a c t u a l  
I jP eeâS ja^Ç Jïa ïl l^A ^ îà*  eojîseiows o f  i t s e l f  i n  flreaft, s e t  f ro o  from 
th e  illna ioH B  of th e  'O n e '" .
1 .  C£, p .2 5 ii .
2 . & & ., pp. m ,  2 6 6 ,
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C o n s c i e n c e  doe© n o t  s a y  a n y t h i n g  c o n c r e t e ,  " C o n s c i e n c e
BpeW te o n l y  and always i n  t h e  mode o f  a l i e n e e , " *  But j u s t
th e re b y  Ï  am c a l l e d  b a c k  i n to  " th e  © ilen eed -o ess  of th e  e x i s t e n t  
2p o w e r- to -b e " ,
Thus we a r e  mmaaked a s  g u i l t y ,  independen t of and p reced ing
every  a c tu a l  s i n g l e  g n l l t .  This i s  because we a r e  a l w a y s  b o u n d  
b y  o u r  t b r o m m e s B  and t h e r e b y  b y  th e  e m p t i n e s s  or n o th in g n ess  
w h l c h  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  our B e in g - th e re ,  a s  Being t o w a r d s  d e a t h ,
" B e in g - th e re  i s  g u i l t y  a s  s u c h , M o w  the p o in t  i s  to  see  t h i s
and in  f r e e  dec ision  tak e  over t h i s  "groundlessness" ("B o f io n lo s ig k e i t" ) .  
Tills is. au th en tic  e x i s t e n c e .
Trying to  see what b e a r in g  t h i s  has upon our p rev io u s  
d is c u s s io n  of th e  r e l a t i o n  between f a c t e  and value#  an.d of w hether 
value*-judgement a convey knowledge, we have to bear  in  mind t h a t  
Heidegger liaa n o t, e i t h e r  in  Sein tmd. %eit or elsew here, w r i t t e n  a
1 .  SÆi> P .8 7 3 .
a . S..Z.. . p .877.
3 .  S . Z .  , p . 2 8 9 .
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moral philoeophy*. He i s  not dealing  id.th the  snbjeivfc in  q u estion  
fo r  u s 9 a t  l e a s t  n ot e x p l ic i ty .  Time tbe scope of M s in v e s t ig a t io n  
i s  not a co n crete , moral exposition  of human existence ( i* e ,  
" m o ra lisch -ex iG ten z ie ll" ), but -an ana ly s is  of i t b  fundamental 
stru ctu re  {"e x ia te n z ia le  Analytik
This means th a t  e*g* the  d iffe ren ce  between a u th e n t ic i ty  and
p
i  Banth mt t i  e i  ty  i  a p r im ari  ly  an o b to  1 ogi ca l  lii. f  f  e o n e  e , "* ihit i  t  
docs n o t  exclude th e  n o t io n  of a u t h e n t i c i t y  a s  a l s o  an o n t ic  
p o s s i b i l i t y *  And so i t  happens t h a t  Rein mid K elt  ve ry  o f te n  ia  
i n t e r p r e t e d ,  and we should say , r i g h t i y  so , aa " e x i s t e n t i e l l e  
Verkdml 1gung"*
Itvem i f  Heidegger wants to  m aintain th a t  the terra "a u th e n tic ity "  
does no t s ig n ify  any moral value or o b lig a tio n , but simply one 
p oss ib le  way of Being in  the world, we venture to ob jec t to  th i s  
re se rv a t io n . I t  raiglit be d i f f i c u l t  to deny th a t  the use of the 
name "au then tic"  of a way of Being, im plies th a t  i t  i s  the r ig h t  
way of Beings The c a l l  from conscience W authentic  ex istence i s ,  
on the ùntxe le v e l ,  a c a l l  to  lead the r i ^ i t  l i f e .
1, Of* th e  q u e s t io n  from i ie id e g g e r ’ s young f r i e n d  j u s t  a f t e r  th e  
appearance of S ein  nnâ Z e i t ,  “Wlion w i l l  you w r i t e  an L-thics?”
We mmght suppose th a t  t h e r e  was a foa l ing  t h a t  H aideggar’ e thoupjits 
had got very  much to do wdth th e  l i f e  of men, -  b u t  "what wm 
t h e i r  e th ica l  consequences?"
See Ubcr den Humaaismue, 1946, @,3 8 ,
2 ,  C f ,  I b i d e ^  p , 2 l #  ' , • o
'  ■= - i  ^&
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Of cow?fse, eonscifsncc doos n o t  p rov ide  « b i d t h  a  s e t  o f  m oral
v a lu e s ,  old or bow; n e i t h e r  doe© i t  n e ô o s s a r i ly  d e s t ro y  
t r a d i t i o n a l  " v a lu e s ” , a l th o u g h  i t  m ight do s o  M l h  th e  way men 
lo o k  a t  th e se  va lues*  The v a lu e ,  to  th e  reoognir^xon of whieti we 
a r e  c a l l e d  by co n sc ie n c e ,  i s  a u th e n t i c  e x is te n c e  i t s e l f ,  th e  
courageous e x i s te n c e  fa c e  to  f a c e  v d th  dea th  and f in i tn d e *
The e lem ent of e v a lu a t io n  i s  p r e s e n t  even on th e  o n to lo g ic a l  
l e v e l ,  though n o t ,  of c o u rs e ,  as  a "moral" v a lu e  ( t h a t  b e longs  to  
th e  o n t ic  l e v e l ) .  F o r ,  a s  we saw, " a i i th e n t ie i ty "  i s  p r im a r i ly  th e  
name of an o n to lo g ic a l  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  r e v e a le d  by " d ie  B x i s te n z l -  
al&naly&e"*
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  term, " a u th e n t ic "  a s  e v a lu a t iv e  i s  
ren d e red  p l a u s ib l e  by H e id e g g e r 's  own s ta te m e n t ;
"But does th e re  n o t  a t  th e  ro o t  of the accom pli shod
o n to lo g ic a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e  e x is te n c e  of b e in g - th e r e ,  
l i e  a  c e r t a i n  o n t i c  n o t io n  of a u th e n t i c  e x i s te n c e ,  an 
a c tu a l  id e a l  of Being—th e re ?  I t  i s  i n  f a c t  so .  T h is  
f a c t  must n o t  on ly  n o t  be d en ied  ami ad m itte d  on com pulsion, 
bu t i t  m ust be u n d ers to o d  i n  i t s  p o s i t i v e  n e c e s s i ty  which 
a r i s e s  ou t of th e  th e m a t ic a l  o b je c t  of the in v e s t ig a t io n ®  
P h ilosophy  w i l l  never  r u l e  o u t i t s ’S p re a i ip p a e i t io n s* , 
n e i t h e r  docs i t  adm it them, onl^r. I t  u n d e rs ta n d s  the 
p r e s u p p o s i t io n s ,  and u n i t e s  w ith  them t h a t  f o r  which they  
a r e  p re  suppo s i  t i  o n s , to  a p e n e t r a t in g  d isp la y "* ^
l e  h o L * ,  P e P l O e
tîairtatswA'a^ïtiiii f  ^
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iloideggei* l a  q u i t e  w i l l i n g  to adm it t h a t  th e  fundam en ta l-  
o n to lo g ic a l problem which i a  hero developed, moves in  a "circle" *
Thia must i n  f a c t  be s o ,  beemiBC a l l  i n v e s t i g a t io n  i s  i t s e l f  a  
mode of Being o f  BoIt o - t here*  And, i n  i t s  Being, B e in g - th e re  has  
a l r e a d y  understood  i t s e l f  i n  c e r t a i n  " e x i s t e n t i e l l e  M ë g lich k e ite n ” * 
E x is te n ce  i s  t l ie reb y  in  one way o r  o th e r ,  a d e q u a te ly  o r  n o t ,  
" m i tv e rs ta n d e n " . l* e * ,  "every  o n to lo g ic a l ly  e x p l i c i t  q u e s t io n
ab o u t th e  Being o f B e in g - th e re  i s  a l re a d y  p rep ared  by th e  mode of 
Being of Being-there*'**
Tims, s in c e  we do not want to  deny a " c i r c l e ” (if el dogger f in d s  
the term  inadequate) ,  th e  case could i n  a way be d e s c r ib e d  l ik e  t h i s  : 
"The id e a  of e x is te n c e  and Doing i s  as a whole ^presupposed* and 
'a fte n m r d s ' Being—there i s  in terp reted*  In  o rd e r  to  g a in  th e  id e a  
of Being;*
1?€> m ust, however, be ca re fu l to  n o t ic e  t h a t  t h i s  does n o t  mean 
t h a t  th e  "presupposition" serves a s  a kind of p rem iss from which 
other senten ces about the Being of B eing-there are deduced by means 
of th e  ru les of the lo g ic  of conséquence* This would mean th a t ,  t o  
118 0 the term s of th e  a n a ly s ts , a d e lib e r a te  attem pt was mtde to  prove 
th e  truth  of a sy n th e tic  p r o p o s i t io n  by making i t  t r u e  by d e f in i t io n *
1 . & & . ,  p p .315 ,312 .
' p*3i4*
177.
Hîit i t  iB eq u a lly  im portant to  n o tic e  th a t e x i s t e n t ia l  a n a ly s is
cannot e ith e r  “avoid" a " c irc le"  in  the p roo f, because i t  does not
a t  a l l  proceed according to the r u le s  o f any " lo g ic  of consoqaence"*
An in tro d u ctio n  of t h is  way of speaking i s  t o t a l ly  a l ie n  to t h is
ki Fid o f  anal y s i
The p resu p p osition  of the e x i s t e n t ia l  a n a ly s is  in  q u estion
i s  rather a preceding understanding which makes the "object" to be
in te r p r e te d , i . e *  B ein g-tliere i t s e l f  g e t  a h earing , so th a t i t  can
i t s e l f  decide whether th is  i s  the s tr u c t  m e of deing which i t  
2d isc lo se s*
To try  to deny the c i r c l e ,  or to avoid i t ,  in  order to carry  
til rough a s t r i c t l y  s c i e n t i f i c  in v e s t ig a t io n , i s  to  block the a cc ess  
to the Being of Being—there* I t  i s  i t s e l f  a mode of Being of 
B ein g-th ere , a confinem ent, aamely, to the prudence of the "One”
( “V erstd n d igk eit" )* The pm dence of the "One" wants to con fin e  
i t s e l f  to the experience of th e  " factual"  being ("Seionde"), not 
r e a liz in g  th a t toeing ("B eiaades”) can only then toe " factu a lly"  
experienced, when Being ("Sein") i s  already understood,
I* Of* S%o, p p * 3 l4 f .
2» ",*»docB t h i s  p ro -su p p o s in g  have the character of an understanding
p r o je c tio n , i n  such a  manner indeed t h a t  the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  toy which 
such an under#tanding g e ts  developed, w i l l  l e t  th a t  vhich i s  to  be
i n t e r p r e t e d  p u t i t s e l f  in to  words fo r  th e  very f i r s t  t im e ,  so t h a t
i t  may decide of i t s  own acco rd  whoUier, as th e  ciititM  which i t  i e ,  
i t  has th e  s t a t e  o f  Being f o r  which i t  has been d i s c lo s e d  i n  th e  
p r o je c t i o n  w it h  r e g a rd  to  i t s  fo rm al a s p e c t s ? "* B*E**,. " r>*314*
178,
"The e f f o r t  must r a th e r  aim a t ,  o r ig in a l ly  and 
t o t a l l y ,  leaping into t h i s  " c i r c l e ” , in  o rd e r  to 
enanre, alreaaly from illo 'beginning, t h e . f a l l  view of 
the c i r c l e - l i k e  Being of Being-there*"^
I t  I s  a l s o  a  m isco n cep tio n  of the ta sk  of an o n to lo g ic a l
a n a ly s i s  of B e in g - th e re  to  re g a rd  i t  a s  con fined  to a “t h e o r e t i c a l
s u b j e c t " ,  which a f te rw a rd s  has to  be completed from th e  " p r a c t i c a l "
2p o in t  of view by an added “E th ic s ” *"
We may thug be j u s t i f i e d  i n  h o ld in g  t h a t ,  a c co rd in g  to  H eidegger , 
th e  c a l l  to  a u th e n t i c  e x i s te n c e  a r i s e s  o u t of B e in g - th e re  i n  ii way 
which l a  d i s c lo s e d  hy the  o n to lo g ic a l  a n a ly s is *  An a n a ly t i c  -  
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  c r i t i c  w i l l  s u re ly  f i n d  s u f f i c i e n t  rea so n  to o b je c t  
t h a t  th e r e  must h e re  somewhere l i e  a s u r r e p t io n ,  a g l id in g  from am 
in d i c a t i v e  to th e  iaipera 11 y e .  In  o th e r  words, a " n a t u r a l i s t i c
f a l la c y " *
ibit, judged as  a c r i t i c i s m  of H e id eg g er’ s i n t e n t i o n ,  t h i s  
o b je c t io n  h i t s  o f f  th e  im rk . As i t  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  hy u a , and i n  
our te rm s , i le id e g g d r ’s a n a l y s i s  does n o t i n f e r  v a lu e  judgements 
from d e s c r ip t iv e  s ta tem en ts#  Tlie a n a ly s i s  i s  e v a lu a t iv e  from the 
very  beg inn ing  * This does n o t ,  however, mean t h a t  i t  i s  n o t 
d e s c r i p t i v e ,
P»314o 
2 ,  €fo p p .3 1 4 f ,
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T his  i s  JiiBt th e  p o in t  a t  is su e *  Wo a r e  h e re  on a le v e l
where the s e p a r a t io n  of desc r ip t io n  and ovalnation i s  im posaib le*
1We do no t d e s c r ib e  th e  “ f a c t s ” i f  we le av e  ou t th e  e v a lu a t iv e  
f a c t o r ,  we r a t h e r  shu t o u rs e lv e s  ont from them*
I t  might jxerhaps deserve fu r th e r  underlin ing ,  t h a t  th is  doea 
not imply th a t  Heidegger “fashions hie values" (or “h is  value” )» 
lie c e r t a in ly  " f inds I t"*  But th is  f ind ing  i s  poss ib le  only for 
him who i s  already eva lna t ive ly  engaged. I t  i s  only fo r  him 
Bei ng«there d i scloses i t s e l f »
I t  m ight n o t  be in a p p ro p r ia t e  to c h a r a c te r i z e  t h i s  view as 
“co gn i t iv e“a from an e th ic a l  p o in t  of view* I t e  va lue  judgement 
conveys knowledge which claims to be t r u e .
I t  i s ,  however, more ilubitable wlietlier we can app ly  terms l ik e  
“t h e o r e t i c a l ” and “o b jec t iv e” to th i s  apprehension  of values*  These 
terms belong to a mode of d is c o u rs e  which i s  ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  from 
H e id e g g e r 's  a n a l y s i s ,  and unab le  to p e n e t r a te  to Being-lliere and 
Being i t s e l f *  But t h i s  does n o t  b r in g  the view any nearer to t h a t  
of e th ica l  n o n -c o g n it iv i$ m , I t  r a th e r ,  i f  we u n d ers tan d  i t  
r i g h t l y ,  widens th e  gap between them.
lioidegger uses the term " fac t"  e,g* in  connection vdth con scien ce, 
But "the demand fo r  an 'in d u c tiv e , em pirical proof' of the 
' f a c t u a l i t y '  o f the conBcMBCc and the leg itim a cy  of i t s  'voiee* 
r e s t s  on an onto logical  in v ersio n  of the phenomenon", SoKo, b «269,
180.
B* Freedom and Values in  J.P* Hartre .
Te have seen th a t the e x i s t e n t i a l  a n a ly s is  o f M. Iloidegger 
provides a new context lo r  an understanding o l the r e la t io n  between 
fa c t  and -value, in  which they  csb be seen to be uni te d , and not 
separated*
'vUat i s  the p ic tu r e  i f  we turn to the other main exponent o f  
e x i s t e n t ia l i s t  ph ilosoph y , J .P . Rartre? Can h is  work, to o , g iv e  
a contributàon  to  our understanding o f the r e la t io n  between fa c t  
and value ae a u nity?
To many i t  would seem obvious th a t  th is  could not he the ca se .
1 or i t  i s  f i r s t  of a l l  some s tr ik in g  passages in  the worki of ^artre  
which have given r i s e  to  the opinion  i lm t-there  i s  a g rea t  s im ila r ity  
between the e th ica l  thought oJ* the a n a ly sts  and some fea tu res  of the 
thoughts of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ,
f  peaking of the eth ica l  im p lica tio n s of h is  philosophy in
1I 'E tre e t  l e  î^ letw t he puts his  view  in  a way wdiich immeuiatoly leaps
to  t h e  eye as eq u a lly  r e p r ese n ta tiv e  oX th e  e t h i c s  of the su ccesso rs  
of Hume: "Ontology i t s e l f  can not form ulate e t i ù c a l  p recep ts . I t
i a  concerned s o le ly  v ith  whaI i a ,  and we earaiot p o ss ib ly  derive
le  L'Etre e t  l e  Néant, 1943* h e re a fter  referred  to  as  E.N. The 
quotations a r e  from th e  Kngliali tr a n s la t io n , 1957, Being and 
N othingness, More ppo625f*
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im p o ra t iv e s  from o n to lo g y ’ s i n d i c a t i v e s ” * t 'e  a r e  “co^idemued to  
be f r e e " , and have to  c r e a te  our ov;n v a lu es  *
t l î i s  seems to  come very  n e a r  to  what R.M* Hare i s  saying*
For him, to o ,  "freedom" i s  a very  Im p o rtan t co n cep t,  though he i s  
d e a l in g  w ith  i t  only  in  bo f a r  as  i t  i s  a f e a t u r e  of our use of 
moral language* The "gap" between f a c tu a l  st^item ents and 
judgements of v a lu e ,  between i n d i c a t i v e s  and im p e ra t iv e s ;  i s  the  
freedom of which h a re  i s  speak ing  as  a l i n a n i s t i c  n h ilo so p h e r*
"Freedom" i s  thus  a l i n g u i s t i c  lo g ic a l  c o n c e p t ,  w hatever e l s e  
i t  m ight a l s o  be* I t  says t h a t  n e i t h e r  language nor lo g ic  can 
p ro v id e  any n e c e e sa iy  l i n k  betw^een a s e t  of fa c  h ia l p rem isses  and 
a c e r t a i n  m oral c o n c lu s io n ,  and t h a t  we canno t t h e r e f o r e  be fo rced  
by our moral concep ts  to  ftiake a p a r t i c u l a r  v a lu e  judgement 121 a  
g iv en  case*
To form a irioral c o n c lu s io n  means, f o r  language r e a s o n s ,  to  
make a f r e e  d e c is io n  o f  how one w ants to  use th e  moral te rm  in  
q u es tio n *  The on ly  l i m i t  to  t i u s  freedom i s  the  demand fo r  
1 ogi c n l  COnsi s ten cy  *
I b i t ,  th en , the  same, o r  a iu ïla ted  use of the term "freedom" 
which occurs  in  th e  th o u g h ts  of JW h H a rtre ?  To see w hether t h i s  
i s  i n  f a c t  so , we have, to  some e x t e n t ,  to s tudy th e  u se  of the 
concep t in  S a r t r e ’ s th o u g h t as  a whole*
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S a r t r e ' s  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  i n  F.N* i s  .an a n a ly s i s  of th e
phenomenon. Not o f language, as i t  was fo r  Hare, fo r  in s ta n c e .
The f i r s t  s te p  i n  t h i s  a n a ly s i s  i s  th e  r e d u c t io n  of the .
phenomenon to  th e  s e r i e s  of appearances threwgh which i t  m a n ife s ts
i t s e l f^ *  That means an a b o lit io n  of the Kantian concept of the
phenomenon a s  •ÎErsckeimmg" w ith  a “Ding an s i c h ” behind * The
2phenomenon i s  what am an vs* I t  e x i s t s  qua appearance '®  ,
This i s  n o t  to  say t h a t  th e  be in g  of th e  a%)pearance i s  i t s  
appearing*  T h is  would on ly  mean B e rk e ley ’ s “Esse e s t  p e r c i p i ’%
%mt i n  a new way® And E a r t r e ’ s intm m tion i s  n o t to  m a in ta in  a 
Berk e l  cyan i  cl ca l  i  sm *
ün the  c o n t r a ry ,  r a t h e r ,  R a r t re  h o ld s  t h a t  th e  appearances  of 
th e  phenoBicnfm from an o n to lo g ic a l  p o in t  of view demandb a be ing
which i s  mot i t s e l f  an appearance , b u t something transphenom enal *
We a r r i v e  a t  t h i s  transphenomeiml being  by going backwards from 
th e  p e rc e p t io n  to  th e  p e rc e iv in g  subject®  The " p e rc i p i ” r e f e r s  to  a 
p e r e i p i e n s * This s u b je c t  i s  no t i t s e l f  p e rce iv ed  or ex p e r ien ce d , 
i t  s im ply The being  o f  th e  p e r c ip ie n t  i a  " c o n sc io u sn e ss" .  This
i s  what ^A rtre  a l s o  c a l l s  "be ing  f o r —i t s e l f ” , or sim ply th e  ”. f o r - i t e e l f ”
1# Cf * # p .x lv ,
2* Cf O Ko.M, q Polo
3* C f. KoNop P o lv i io
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( “l e  I n  oonse iousneas  R a r t re  sees  a b e ing  which i s
s o t  i t s e l f  s u b je c t  to  knowledge, b u t  wldeb founds i t *
Now S a r t r e  h o l d #  ( fo l lo w in g  H u s s e r l )  t h a t  consciousness i s
always co n sc io u sn ess  of som etiling, Tlrle doe? nor mean t h a t
co n sc io u sn ess  i s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  of t h e  b e in g  o f  i t s  o b j e c t s ,  b u t  t h a t
co n sc io u sn ess  i n  i t s  n a tu re  i s  a  r e l a t i o n  to  a t r a n s c e n d e n t  being*
("Trandoondcn t” do es here mean "transcending th e  empirical
w o rld " , bu t “t ro n see n d in g  c o n sc io u sn e ss"* )  That i s ,  from t h i s
s ta tem e n t abou t co n sc io u sn e ss  we can Infer t h a t  th e re  i s  a n o th e r  form
of being® "C onsciousness im p l ie s  in i t s  being a non-consc io u s and
transphenomennl being"*#
"To say t h a t  co n sc io u sn e ss  i s  co n sc io u sn ess  of som ething 
i s  to  say t h a t  i t  must produce itself as  a  r e v e a le d —r e v e l a t i o n
of a be ing  w h i c h  i s  n o t  i t  and w h i c h  g iv e s  i t s e l f  a s  a l r e a d y  
e x i s t i n g  w h e n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  r e v e a l s  i t " . <2
Sartre h o ld s  t h a t  H e id e g g e r 's  d e f i n i t i o n  of ha pel n could be 
a p p l ie d  to  co n sc io u sn e ss  a s  w e l l ,  b u t  i t  would have to  be com pleted; 
"C onsciousness f h a s e i n ,  r e s p . J  i s  a being such t h a t  i n  i t s  b e in g ,  
i t s  being is i n  q u e s t io n  [ t h i s  i s  where Heidegger s to p s}  in  so far
as  t h i s  being imj^lies a being  o th e r  than  i t s e l f "  ,
1 * 'K • N ® , p . 1
2 . Ibidem .
3 .  Ibidem .
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I t  must be s t r e s s e d  z lm t  t l i i s  be ing  i a  th e  t r a i l sphenomenai 
being  of th e  phenomena® I t  i s  no noiimenaJ be ing  which i s  h idden 
behind the  phenomena. I t  sim ply weans t h a t  tiie “b e ing  of t h a t  which 
?ears does n o t e x i s t  on ly  i n  so f a r  as i t  a p p e a r s , The
transphenoïxienal being of what e x i s t e  .for con sciousness i s  i t s e l f  
1i n  11 B e l f ” 0 ' H en e e th e name “ h e i ng i  n - i  t  s e 1 f  ” , o r  llx e " i  n -  e el f  “ '
( “ l e  e n -so i" ) a s  the name of the b e ing  of a l l  t im t  i s  not 
oonsciôUBHese*
Â e r u c i a l  p o in t  in  the thoughts of b a r t r e  i a  th e  a s s e r t io n  t h a t
2non-being has o b je c t iv e  e x i s t e n c e The e x is te n c e  of non-being
can be shown in  the f o l lo w in g  way: Questiowing a being about i t s  
way of being or about i t s  being we w i l l  g et a rep ly  which i s  a "yes" 
or a "no”, (Even i f  the q u e s t i o n  on llie face  of i t  doe a not perm it 
a n egative  r e p ly , a n e g a t iv e  rep ly  i n  one form or anoldier i s  s t i l l  
always p o s s ib le ,)  Indeed, what d is t in g u ish e s  the q uestion  from 
a ffirm a tio n  or ixogation i s  j u s t  the ex is te n c e  of these two 
con trad ictory  and e q u a l ly  o b je c t iv e  p o s s ib i l i t ie s *
Thus,w hile i n  p u rsu it of being ,  we suddenly f i n d  t h a t  the very  
q u e s t io n  abou t  be ing  shows th a t we are "encompassed w ith  noth ingness" ,
1 , Ibidem,
8 »  C f o  E . N . ,  p . ' j .
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“The porjoaiient pos r i  toi l i t , y of non-be ing , o u ts id e  and 
yfithxUÿ c o n d i t io n s  mil q u e s t io n  ab o u t b e in g ,  V’lirtherxnoro 
i t  i s  non-being  w h ich  i s  going  to  l i m i t  the  r e p ly ,  ' t a t  
being  w d .ll be m u s t  o f  n e c e s s i t y  a r i s e  on the b a s is  of what 
i t  i a  note Whatever being  i s ,  i t  w,dll allow/ t h i s  fo rm u la tio n ; 
" Being i s  t h a t  and ou t Bid e of t h a t ,  n o th in g ,  “ 1
The BIO a n  a by w i i i c h  c o n s e i o u a n e s R , o r  being f o r - i t s e l f ,  
c o n s t i t u t e s  i t s e l f ,  i s  a  n i h l l a t i o n  ( n é a n t i s a t i o n )  o f  t l i c  i n - i t s e l f *  
and w/hat i s  i n  i t s e l f  n o t  o n l y  e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t s ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  
f  o r - i  t  s e l f *  s own pa. s  t  «
“F o r  t h e  f o r —i t s e l f ,  t o  be  i s  t o  n i h i l a t e  t h e  i n - i t s o l f  
wdiich i t  i s®  Bndor  t h o s e  c o n d i t i o n s  f r e e d o m  c a n  be  n o t h i n g  
o t h e r  t h a n  t h i s  n i h i l a t i o n *  I t  i s  t l irovigh tl.d.s t h a t  t h e  
f o r M t s e l f  e s c a p e s  i t s  b e i n g  a s  i t s  e s s e n c e |  i t  i s  t h r o u g h  
t i l l s  t h a t  tlui  f o r - i t s e l f  i s  alwmjrs s o m e t h i n g  o t l i e r  t h a n  w h a t  
c a n  b e  s a i d  o f  i t *  For i n  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  t h e  f o r - i t e o l f
ifr-jwwjsrromrfl'jf»
i s  t h e  one which  e s c a p e s  t h i s  v e r y  d e n o m i n a t i o n ,  t l ie  one wliich 
i s  a l r e a d y  beyond  t h e  name vr]\ioh i s  giA'^en t o  i t ,  beyond t h e  
p r o p e r t y  w h ic h  i s  r e c o g n i z e d  i n  i t .  To sa y  t ] i a t  t h e  
f o r - i t s e l f  h a s  to  be w h a t  i t  i s ,  t o  s a y  t h a t  i t  i s  w h a t  i t  i s  
n o t  w/liile n o t  b e in g  w/hat i t  i s ,  t o  s a y  t h a t  i n  i t  e x i s t e n c e  
p r e c e d e s  and c o n d i t i o n s  e s s e n c e  ® * « a l l  t h i s  i s  to  s a y  one and. 
t h e  same t h i n g s  t o  be  aivarc t h a t  man i s  f r e e *  I n d e e d ,  by  
t h e  s o l e  f a c t  t h a t  I  am c o n s c i o u s  o f  t h e  c a u s e s  v/hich i n s p i r e  
my a c t i o n ,  Uiese  c a u s e s  a r e  a l r e a d y  t r n n B c e n d e n t  o b j e c t s  f o r  
my c o n s c i o u s n e s s ;  t i i ey  a r e  o u t s i d e *  I n  v a i n  s h a l l  I  s e e k  
to  c a t c h  h o l d  o.C them; X e s c a p e  them b y  my v e r y  e x i s t e n c e *
I  am condGffliied t o  e x i s t  i 'ox'ever  b e y o n d  ray e s s e n c e ,  b e y o n d  t h e  
c a u s e s  and m o t i v e s  o f  my a c t .  I  am condtmoied to be  f r e e *
T h i s  means  t h a t  no  l i m i t s  t o  my f r e e d o m  c a n  b e  f o u u d  e x c e p t  
f r e e d o m  i t s e l f ,  o r ,  i f  y o u  p r e f e r ,  t h a t  w/e a r e  n o t  f r e e  t o  
c e a s e  b e i n g  f r e e *  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  f o r - l t s e l f  w;ishc*s 
t o  h i d e  i t s  owsi n o t h i n g n e s s  fro m  i t s e l f  and t o  i - u c o r p a i ’a t e  t h e  
i n - i t s e l f  a s  i t s  t r u e  mode o f  b e i n g ,  i t  i s  t r y i n g  a l s o  t o  h i d e  
i t s  f r e e d o m  fr o m  i t s e l f ” *^
Ü5Ü*,»
8 * E*No , p*440o
W *< W l# F W » * r ite ïw i*  »
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This raeans iha t  the th ings have no s t a b i l i t y  or i d e n t i ty .
They can be ' 'anything^', Their appearanee of s«“. a b i l i t y  and id e n t i ty  
i s  something we liave a t t r i b u t e d  to lliem, Neither i.p iliere any 
constant human nature which forma the basis  oi‘ the in b iv id u a ls ,
There i s  only an absolu te  f ree  consciousness. I t  i s  t h i s  f ree  
consciousness which u t t r ib u te g  moaaing to the contingent ex is tence ,  
because axis tone o i s  there without any reason^, without our 
p o s s i b i l i t y  oi saying i t  i s .  This means th a t  anything can 
happen, there i s  no p a t t e rn ,  no ru le  or se t  of r u l e s .
There a re , then ,no  ru le s  fo r  our conduct, no moral noms or 
standards* and no values ,  in  the p u rsu i t  of which we could decide 
on how ought to a c t .  We have to  c rea te  our owm values and decide 
on our omi ru le s ,  with no a s s i s ta n c e  from anything outside or ins ide  
o u r s e lv e s ,
1The bar trean  exis tentia l is j! i  i s  d e f in i t e ly  a t h e i s t i c  and th i s  
i s  s ig n i f i c a n t  fo r  S a r t r e c o n c e p t i o n  of va lues .  I f  God did
^ w#wi*a«i6r*
e x i s t ,  there  would s t i l l  be a p o s s ib i l i t y  of f ind ing  values which 
were v a l id  a p r i o r i ,  God being the i n f i n i t e  and p e r fec t  
consciousness th a t  eould tliink, i/iicee values .
1, Bee I d h x i s t e n l i a l i s m e  e s t  un humanirsmc, 1946,
K nglish  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  E x i s t e n t i a l i s m  and Bimanism, 1948, p p ,3 3 f»
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But a s  i t  i s ,  th e re  a r e  only  men upon the  p lan e  where wo 
a r e  now,
The s i t u a t i o n  p ic tu r e d  Ijy D osto ieyaky, say in g  t h a t ,  *'ii' God 
d id  no t e x i s t ,  ev e ry th in g  would bo p e rm it te d ^ ,  i s  indeed  our 
s i t u a t i o n .  This i s  th e  a l 1- d e te r m in iy ^ s t a r t i n g  p o in t  f o r  B o r t r e •& 
t h in k i n g 6 No d iv in e  w i l l  can , acco rd ing  to  - -a r t r e ,  p rov ide  tis w ith  
any v a lu e s  or eoîmiia,.îïd& ak ich  could l e g i t im is e  our b e h a v io u r ,
No d e t e r m in i s t i c  th e o ry  can h e  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  w h i c h  could 
e x p la in  our a c t i o n  b y  r e f e r r i n g  to  a human n a tu re  i n  g e n e ra l ,  o r  to  
any s p e c i a l  p h y s i c a l  o r  p sy c h ic a l  n a tu r e ,  to  i n f l u e n c e  from the
surround!iig, s o c i e ty ,  o r  to  a n y th in g  e l s e ,
i s
Bar i r e  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n  a lm ost mocking a t  th e  B r a n c h  s e c u la r  
m o ra l i ty  of t h e  l a s t  d e c o d e s  of th e  l y t h  c e n tu ry ,  which was b u i l t  on 
th e  a s  sump t i  on t h a t  n o t h i n g  would b e  changed i f  God d id  n o t  e x i s t .
For c e r t a i n  moral v a lu e s  had s t i l l  t h e i r  a p r i o r i  e x is te n c e  in  an 
i  n t e l  1 i  g i  h 1 e he ave n «
The m e a n in g  of t h e  p h ra se s  "Man ..ie f r e e d o m " ,  a n d  "Man l a
9
c o n d em n ed  to  b e  f r e e "  \  i s  t h a t  man i s  thrown i n t o  t h e  w orld , he d i d  
n o t  c r e a te  h im s e l f .  And a t  th e  same t i m e  h e  i s  t o t a l l y  r e s p o n s ib le
f o r  a l l  he i s  d o in g . He i s  f o r c e d  t o  a c t  and t h e r e b y  to  c r e a t e
n i l es which c la im  to  have u n i v e r s a l  v a l i d i t y .  In  so f a r  as m o ra l i ty
le  See P*33«
B.oHo a, p . 3 %*
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l e  a matter of c rea t io n  and invention i t  can be compared to the
work of ar to  The a r t i e t  does nofc work according to any pre*
OBtabliohed ao&thetic vaines* l ia  c rea tes  h is  p ic tu re ,  and the
1valvios appear vhen the work in doneo
iiut,' ciB wo ill hid moral acti -j.ty man in not only ac t ing
fo r  himself and crea t ing  h is  own r u l e s .  he is  in  f a c t  say 1 in. th a t  
the law he invents  i s  niuding fo r  a l l  i-ianliind, and man Is  f a r th e r  
responsib le  fo r  a i l  the e f f e c t s  of h is  clioiees and actiom-So
There i s  in  a l l  t h i s  no poss ib le  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  what man I d 
doing. No explanation* no excuse can he given fo r  iuan’s ciw»ice 
of values ,  fo r  hie actions* Passion i s  no explanation for  man^s 
ac t ions  e i t h e r .  For man i s  responsib le  fo r  h is  own passion.
This means th a t  a l l  questions of morality ami values belong to 
the ontic  leve l  exc lus ive ly* i . e .  they deal only with tha t  wddch i s  
crea ted  by man alone.  On the onto log ical  plane there  i s  nothing to
be said of values ,  U'e could* thereforo* cha rac te r ize  k a r t r o ’s view 
by saying th a t ,  according to him, there  i s  no ontological bas is  
whatever fo r  oiir values and ac t io n s .
Bee E.N., p . 49*
Cfo the s i iu u l io n  of S a r t r e ’s pupil who, during the war, sought 
P a r t r e ’ s advice, wliethor he should stay in  France and. help h i s  
.mother, or go to ' ngland and jo in  the Free French fo rces .  The 
stitdent could not get  any other  answer than the one, t h a t  he had 
to invent his  own law. No es tab l ished  m l  es could possibly 
he lp  him. Ci'. K.N. p y .3 5 f f .
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dan e x p e r ie n c e s  thlB u B lim ited  freedom of h i s  i n  a n r n l s h .
Anguish i s  mtin’ B sense of complote and profound re sp o n s ib i l i ty ^ ,
■tvhen he r e a l iz e s  t l r r l  he has to ac t  as a l e g i s l a t o r  fo r  tV<e whole
of mankind, \ i  tliont Vtavinii th e l e a s t  proof id - n t  b.e has the i lg h t
to do 80, and withoiit any reason f o r  the choice of values which 
2he iii.akeso "
Han i s  always frrc*  lie has no means by which ho can escape 
freedomo dnt man has, n ever the less ,  a des ire  to  t ry  and run  away 
from the angiiisli which he experiences when he r e a l i z e s  h is  freedom* 
lie t r i e s ,  th e re fo re ,  to conceal h is  freedom, and a c tu a l ly  the 
contiagency of a l l  existence*
lie may t ry  to r a t i o n a l i z e  contiiippjncy and p.ive un i ty  to tlie 
manifold by means of laws of science* But the werld of science 
i s  i t s e l f  * i rb i t ra ry , constructed  in  order to make i t  poss ib le  f o r  
man to escape from a t o t a l l y  a r l i i t r a ry  process *
Man manages by means of m agic , i . e .  m erely  by pronouncing 
c e r ta in  words, to decide ihat there are  oonslant o b jec ts ,  absolu te  
and uncluingea]>T e norm s. And he may t ry  and lay a wore so l id  
faundrm.ion for h is  magic by building a motai'diysic* That i s ,  he
gives l i f e  to a higher wBrld by means of concepts which a re ,  in  
f a c t ,  empty. Man does a l l  th i s  in  order to hide the nothingness 
of a l l  there i s .
1 .  Cf« K.llej p,
2 .  C f. E .H ., p .3 1 .
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As fa r  as man’s ac t ions  concerned, a l l  attempts to 
explain tlvoio in  terms of a causal re la t io n sh ip  between motives 
and actions are “bad f a i t h " , or solfwdeception ( ’bnanvaise f o i " ) .
?)otermiîiisra i s  an irariance of t h i s  bod ‘'a i t iu  I t  d<oiies 
the break caused by the mi hi I a t i n  g acf'/jvity of consci one mes s.
T hat i t  wants to  estai)! isb  in  o u rse lv e s  i s  a c o n t i rm i ty  v.'ftdunit 
break of existence*^in™itself *
This takes place ,  psychologically ,  vdien one t r i e s  to regard 
reasons and motives as things* when one taJiers them as cons ten ts  *
One would l ik e  to convince oneself  th a t  the motive of one’s ac t ion  
i s  vdint i t  was® because the motive could then pass from one’s
«ï-sf&ïw *.
p as t  coiiBcioiisnoss to one’ s p resen t ,  re ta in in g  i t s  f u l l  fo rce .
In tliis  ease i t  would i nhabit  consciousneaB. but th i s  i s  
équivalent to giving essence to being f o r - i t s e l f *
Man i s ,  however, f ree  j u s t  because hat la  not “i t s e l f " . A 
being, which i s  uhat i t  i s ,  would not be f re e .  Freedom i s  j u s t  the
nothingiïoaa vdiich i s  created in  raaii, and wh.ieh compeis him to
I
crea te  himself,  in s tead  of being;. As wo saw', fo r  man to be i s  to
choose oneself* because nothing comes to m t m  from without,  nor
from w ith in .
1 o F f . E. H. ,  x> 0 44 0
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0 are iJvns, By ihe ni hi la  ei acm ivit j  of uhc j 'or- i  t s e l i  , 
B«i>arate<i irom vhat i s  in  i t s e l f . '"herei'ore we arc i r e e ,  and 
th i s  freedom remains u n t i l  death reaches us and le iui end to 
a l l  the posr i 'b i l i  l i e s  vl.icU l i e  in  th<r n ih i ia t in g  a c t i v i t y  of 
tlKi f o r - i t s e i f . Only when we t i e  can we become sarethij\g which 
i s  in  i t s e l f ,  for  then cons ci ans ne as cannot an-ç/ long ci' .rcvcnt our 
hecorjing; id en t ic a l  with, ours cl von* and others may luaho pure ob jects  
of ViBo
The coneeq) ti  on of dea th. in  a r t r c  ® s 1 how h ts 3 b i n t e r  e s t i  ng 
in  i t s  î.iias’ked. d iffe rence  i'roin d eg,gar ’ s conceptioi^ o.f i t .  Thieir 
views may be put h r ie f  ly  l ik e  t h i s  ; I or heiilegger the c e n t r e  of 
i n t e r e s t  l i e s  in  death ; i s  the source of dread and to e x i s t
in  a nth en l i  ci ty  moans, t  her of ore, to cùtoose to face deoth, in  the 
meaning of choosing to “ e 1 j o w # e  dread ..lor death to a r i s e " . 
h h i ie  for ' t i r t r e  i t  i s  choice i t s e l f  (or seli-txenincend.ence) wiiicli 
i s  tin; primary neccBsityo >n;ncc i t  i s  the necesHÎ ly of deciding:
 ^ *■ *-’ «-TaiAt IT >~i. l>Aaji6 *’
whie.U causes anguialu ■'o Ilia I * fo r  ' a r l r c ,  au thentic  existence 
means to choose .S’acc to face th. aeatl% (not* as fo r  ' 'e ideaaer,  
to choose to face death)*
A main cdiaracteribt i c  of being; f o r - i t s e l f  i s ,  as a r t r c  goes 
i t ,  a des ire  to t iy  and put an end to the uotliingaiess th a t  i t  i s .
I t  wishes to slop u ih i l a t i n g  the i n ^ i t s e i f ,  hut a t  the same time 
i t  doea not  want to cease being consciousness.
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Thus the fundamental  I n c e n t iv e  in  t h e  Bolf-»t3d,uiBce?vUmce of 
til© fo r—i t s e l f  i s  an in c e n t iv e  to u n i t e  t h a t  vhicli  i s  .for i t s e l f  
w i th  wliat i s  i n  i t s e l f .  %it t h i s  i n c e n t i v e  w i l l  never  lead  to  
ilio g o e l ,  because  i t  i s  s e l f - c o n t ra d ic to ry .
In t i l ls  incen t ive ,  however* l i e s  the basis  of va ines .  The 
h ig h e s t  v a lu e  i s  ju s t  t h i s  impossible union of the  f o r - i t s e l f  
a nd th  e i  n«i t  s e l f  &
The idea of a con sciou s i n ^ i t s e l f ,  i . e .  the idea of the
p e r fec t ;  i s  the idea of God*
"The fundamental value which p resid es over t h is  
p ro jec t (so i l*  of the f o r ^ i t s e l f )  i s  exactly  the i n ^ i t s e l f -  
fo r—i t s e l f ,  that i s ,  the idea l  of a con sciousness which would, 
be the foundation  of i t s  own h o i n n - i t s e l f  by the pure 
con sciousness which i t  would have of i t s e l f *  I t  i s  th is  
idea l  which can be ca l led  God * Thus the b e s t  ivay to con ceive  
of the fundamental p ro jec t  of human r e a l i t y  i s  to say th a t  man 
i s  the being whose p ro jec t  i s  to be God, ,.,G o d , value and 
supreme end. of transcendence, represen ts  the permanent l im i t  
in  terms of which man makes known to  himself what be is "
i-liït to say t h a t  God e x i s t s , ia  to express a s e lf -c o n tr a d ic to r y  
sentence« Man’s e f f o r t  to become God i s ,  th ere fo re , i n  vain ,  
because th e  e f f o r t  of th e  for—i t s e l f  i s  a vain e f f o r t  to 
r e a l iz e  i t s e l f  as conscious being i n - i t s e l f , i t  can attempt to  do 
t h i s  in  a co u n tle ss  number of ways.* Man i s ,  th e re fo re ,  the source 
of IiI b own s e t  of v a lu es , of h is  own moral law* There i s  no 
"human n atu re" which forces  us to a c t  in  a c e r ta in  way* What
1 » .&&.» p»366.
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we dOj i s  done in  com plete freedom .
Man i s  tlms respons ib le  in  an absolute  sense* "e ere a lso  
responsib le  fo r  onr own s i t u a t i o n .  Man c rea tes  bis  own h i s t o r i c a l  
s i t u a t io n  through h is  clioice of u goal fo r  h istory*
I t  soeniB obvious, t h a t  a view which n.-akes values subject  to 
a personal choice, and thereby dec lares  one value as ;^ond as any 
o ther ,  opens fo r  a n ih i l i sm .
Already in  B.N. however* - 'artre  makes some re se rv a t io ns  ag a in s t  
t h i s  consequence, even i f  i t  i s  only in te r ro g a to r i ly *
"but ontology and e x i s t e n t i a l  psychoanalysis .* * must 
reveal to the  moral agent th a t  he is  the boiuji by whom values 
exist* I t  i s  then t l ia t  h is  freedom w il l  become conscious of 
i t s e l f  and w i l l  reveal i t s e l f  in  ougiiisb as the unique source 
of value and the  nothingness by which the world exis ts*  As 
soon as freedoi/i discovers the quest  for being and the 
appro]>riation of the i iv - i t s e l f  as i t s  own posBibles, i t  wdll 
apprehend by and in  axiguisli th a t  they are  poss ib les  only on 
the ground of the p o s s i b i l i t y  of other p o ss ib le s .  But 
h i th e r to  although poss ib les  could be chosen and re je c ted  
cui l ibilAm, the theme which made the un i tv  of a i l  choices of 
poss ib les  was the value ox’ i.he ideal presence of the- eus causa a u i . 
V/hat w i l l  become of freedom i f  i t  turns  i t s  back upon th ie  
value? . . .  Will freedoui by the very f a c t  Uuit i t  apprehends 
i t s e l f  as a freedom in  r e la t i o n  to i t s e l f ,  be able  to put an 
end to  rho re ign  of t'his value*?
In ] )a r t icu la r  i s  i t  poss ib le  fo r  freedom to take i t s e l t  
fo r  a value as the  source of a l l  value* or must i t  necessa r i ly  
be defined in  r e l a t i o n  to a transcendent value whicli haunts i t ?
In  p a r t i c u l a r  v / i l l  freedom by ta il ing  i t s e l f  f o r  an 
e scan & a l 1 s i  t u a t i  on? . . .
Or w i l l  i t  s i t u a t e  i t s e l f  so much th e  more p r e c i s e l y  and 
th e  more i n d iv i d u a l l y  as i t  p r o j e c t s  i t s e l f  f u r t i i e r  i n  an g u ish  
a s  co n d i t io n e d  froedosa and a c c e p ts  more f u l l y  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
a s  an  e x i s t e n t  by v/hoai th e  w orld  comes in to  b e i n g
1. EÆl, pp. 6272.
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These a r e  q u e s t io n s  which belong to  the  a r e a  of e t h i c a l  
p roblem s, says S a r tre , and can on ly  g e t  t h e i r  answer Lhere,
^ 'a r tre  prom ises to  u n d e r ta k e  the ta s k  of t r e a t i n g  them i n  a  
s e p a ra te  work which has not y e t  ap p e a red «
V i r t u a l l y ,  however, '••artre may he sa id  to  have answered h is  
q u e s t io n s .  His l i n e  of  Uioiight becomes q u i t e  c lea r*  f o r  in s ta n c e  
and above a l l  i n  K,H* While e a r l ie r ,  as we have seen , th e  e f f o r t  
of  co n sc io u sn ess  to  r each  a c e r t a i n  p e r f e c t i o n  was the  supreme 
v a lu e ,  freedom is- now d e f i n i t e l y  t h i s  value*
} reedoM i s  n o t  (any more) o n ly  a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
c o n sc io u sn e ss ,  w ith o u t  v a lu e  im p l ic a t io n s*  I t  i s  i t s e l f  a v a lu e  
to  be r e a l i z e d  by man,
n a r t r e  u ses great e f f o r t  to  re fu te  the a ccu sa tion  of 
su b je c tiv ism *  The fr e e  cho ice  what to do i s  no s u b je c t iv e  cap rice*  
I t  i s  no t  t r u e  t h a t  i t  does n o t m a t te r  what I do , 'v en  i f  th e r e  
a r e  no a p r i o r i  v a lu e s  which I choose, i t  m a t te r s  very  much what 
I do * For my cho ice  " in v o lv e s  mankind in  i t s  e n t i r e t y " ^ .  The 
one o b l i g a t i o n  I am im d a r , i s ,  th e r e f o r e ,  to choose*
"F o r , when I confront a r e a l  s i t u a t i o n  * « * I am ob lig ed  to
choose t&y a t t i t u d e  to  i t " ^ *
1 *0 * 9  to say t h a t  Î must make a f r e e  ch o ice ,  i s  no t  j u s t  to  




F u r th e r ,  i t  i s  n o t  t r u e , “N ir t re  s a y s , t h a t  he oanuot judge
o t h e r s  i n  t h e i r  choice*
C erta in ly , he cannot judge a man’ a ch o ice  on the b a s is  of a
v a l i d i t y  of  c e r t a i n  pu rposes  r a t h e r  than o th e r s ,  h u t  lie can judge 
Inxs since:
F i r s t ,  t h i s  h a s  a l o g i c a l  s id e :  I f  a  man t r i e s  to  d ece iv e
h i m s e l f  by h id in g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  one of " f r e e  
ch o ice  w ith o u t  e x c u s e  and w i t h o u t  h e l p " , ta k in g  " r e f u g e  behind the  
e x c u s e  of h i s  p a s s i o n s , o r  by i n v e n t i n g  som e d e te r m in i s t i c  doctrine*} 
£ m ight judge h i s  p r o c e d u r e  a s  erroneous*
The same a , . p l i e s  i f  a  man says t h a t  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s  e r e  
incumbent u p o n  him* This i s  simply c o n t r a d ic to r y  to say in g  t h a t  
he w i l l s  th e se  va lues*
Hut th e  judgement of o th e r s  has  a moral s id e  as  w e l l #
" I  can pronounce a  moral j u d g e m e n t ,  ’ or I d e c l a r e  
t h a t  freedom , i n  r e s p e c t  of c o n c re te  c irc u m s ta n c es ,  can 
have no o th e r  end and aim h u t  i t a s l f ;  and when ouoe a 
man has  seen  t h a t  v a lu e s  depend u p o n  h im s e l f , in  t h a t  
s t a t e  o f  lo rsakennoes  h e  c a n  w i l l  o n l y  o n e  t h i n g ,  a n d  
th i i t  i s  freedom a s  the  fo u n d a tio n  of a l l  v a lu e s ,  That 
d o e s  n o t  mean thao  h e  w i l l s  i t  i n  t h e  a b s t r a c t :  i t
sim ply means t h a t  the  a c t io n s  of men o f  good f a i t h  have , 
as  t h e i r  u l v im a t e  s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  th e  q u e s t  o f  f r e e d o m  
i t s e l f  a s  such* *•* We w i l l  f r e e d o m  f o r  freedom ’ s s a k e , 
a n d  i n  a n d  through p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c i u o s t a n c e s *  And i n  
th u s  w i l l i n g  f r e e d o m  we d i s c o v e r  t h a t  i t  depends e n t i r e l y
1# See iW L ,  pp .  5 0 f*tp.fsssivariesiWittîa?» »  4* —'
vipoii tlio freedom of o th e r s  and t h a t  th e  freedom of o th e r s  
depends upon our  own"^.
And i t  i s  iBqn r t a n t  t o  n o t i c e  the  in f e r e n c e  which ' - a r t ro
makes i n  th e  fo l lo w in g  passag e :
v;h.c ih e r  he ought to .stay w i th  h i s  mother or j o i n  the  Free - r  
"Consequently ,  when I  r e co g n ize ,  as  e n t i r e l y  a u t h e n t i c ,  
t h a t  aian i s  ii iioing wliose e x i s t e n c e  precedes h i s  es sence ,  
and t h a t  he i s  a f r e e  b e in g  who canno t ,  i n  any c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  
b u t  wdJ.1 l i i s  fx'eedomp a t  the  same time I r e a l i s e  i-hat wi 11 
to  freedom which i s  im pl ied  i n  freedom i t s e I f , I  can form 
judgements upon those  who seek to h ide  from fd)emselve8 the
wholly v o lu n ta ry  n a t u r e  of t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e  and i t s  complete! P j reedom".
Boj, a l though  man can nowhere f i n d  any s p e c i f i c  r u l e s  or  va lues  
imposed upon him, t h i s  1b n o t ,  a cco rd in g  to  ^ a r t r e ,  a l l  the re  i s  to  
say abou t  i t .
"Thus, al .though the  c o n te n t  of m e ra l i ty  i s  v a r i a b l e ,  
n <;ertain  form of Uu. s moral i t y  i s  u n iv e r s a l
In  t i l l s  cormtïctxon 'à n ' t r e  ag a in  mentions the s tu d e n t  wlio asked 
v;h.e ih e r  he ought to .stay w i th  h i s  mother or j o i n  the  Free  ■ rench
.1 o r c e s .  aï luive no means of judg ing  dui co n ten t  of Iris choic(‘o
The co n ten t  i s  always c o n c re te ,  and t h e r e f o r e  unpref«ic t a b l e  ; i t
has al\.ays to be in v e n te d .  “')'he one tiling,, t b a t  c oun ts ,  i s  to  know
who Iher  th e  j  n y e n l io n i s  eiadw . in the  name of freedma".« ( th c
Bontonee a n d o r i iu e d  by mo ) .
1» &&&, p .5 a .  3.  Xfeidern.
2 .  4 . E M . ,p .  5 3
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In o th e r  c o n te x t s  Rortre i s  evon in c l in e d  to  "ednco c e r t a i n  
p o l i t i c a l  consequences of th e  n o t io n  of freedom as th e  supreme 
v a lu e  « T h is  r e la t io n , or any r e l a t i o n  a t  a l l ,  between freedom 
and p a r t i c u l a r  r e a l i z a t i o n s  of th is  value need n o t  concern  u s  
h e r e ,  ‘ h a t  i s  of  importance from our p o in t  o f  view i s  t h a t  
^ •artre  q u i t e  c l e a r l y  seems to  th in k  t h a t  he can say what he says 
a b o u t  freedom a s  v a lu e ,  on th e  b a s i s  of h i s  o n to lo g ic a l  a n a ly s is *
T hat i s  to  say , even i f  th e  v a lu e  of freedom i s  n o t based  upon 
th e  "essence"  of man, o r  upon a u n iv ersa l human " n a tu r e " , i t  i s  
s t i l l  based upon a "hmuan u n iv e r s a lity  of co n d itio n "^*  I t  i s  based  
Upon the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of coi^scioiisnes,«, th a t, namely of being  
f r 66 c o n s u lo u sn e s s .
I f  t i l l s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of what ^urtre sa y s , e x p l i c i t ly  or 
im p l ic i t ly ,  i s  c o r r e c t , we might say t h a t  from one p oin t of view  
freedom i s  o n e c e ssa ry  human c o n d i t io n ,  hut from another p o in t  of  
view t h i s  n ec essa ry  human co n d itio n  i s  i t s e l f  a  demand, namely, th a t  
we s h a l l  assume i t .
And above ' we saw nhat ' - 'a rtre  in  th e  end seems to  fierivo h is  
r i g h t  to judge those who r e f u s e  to  assume th e ir  freedom, from th e  
f a c t  t h a t  man i s  a  being  whose e x is te n c e  precedes h is  e ssen ce .
1© JijoIIott p ,4 h .
2 ,  C f ,  the q u ota tion  from p , 3 2 *  a b o v e  p p .  1 9 5 f
Î 9 8
I t  ffliiÿît be  imey, of c o u rse ,  to  say t h a t  R a r t re  makes a 
s u r r e p t i t i o u s  in f e r e n c e ,  t h a t  i t  i s  sim ply ( d e l i b e r a t e l y  or  
unooBBciously) by a  t w i s t  of th e  hand t h a t  he manage a to  tmrn 
th e  d e s c r ip t iv e  tex^m "freedom" i n t o  an e v a lu a t iv e  one.
But 1b t h i s  a f a i r  d e s c r ip t io n  of S a r t r e ' s  ca se?  I e  i t  n o t 
much more th e  c a se  t h a t  th e s e  two a s p e c ts  a r e  p r e s e n t ,  more o r  
l e s s ,  a l l  th e  tim e? I s  th e r e  n o t  a l r e a d y  an elemexit o f  e v a lu a t io n  
i n  th e  s ta te m e n t  t h a t  freedom i s  reco g n ized  i n  angu ish?  Fliy n o t  
r a t h e r  in  t o t a l  i n d i f f e r e n c e ,  f o r  in s ta n c e ?
I t  seems t h a t  i n  a way an a n t i - o s s e n t i a l iB m  l i k e  t h a t  of 
B a r t re  ends w i th  a c e r t a i n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  of i t s  own s t a r t i n g  p o i n t .
The o ld  " id e a s"  and "esBencea" a r e  abandoned. But in  th e  end wo 
meet w i th  a  now id e a ,  o r  s e t  of id e a s ,  and new e sse n c e s  (even  i f  
th e s e  a r e  te rm s t h a t  S a r t r e  and o th e r s  h o ld in g  th e  same views would 
n o t  a c c e p t ) .
This does n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  mean t h a t  S a r t r e  has l e f t  h is  o r i g i n a l  
way o f  th in k in g .  I t  m ight be t h a t  a l l  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  th in k in g  
m ust n e c e s s a r i l y  s ta n d  in  a  p a ra d o x ic a l  r e l a t i o n  to i t s  own 
s t a r t i n g  p o in t  ( a s  K ie rk eg aard  was a l s o  aware o f : " I  th in k ,
t h e r e f o r e  I  am n o t " ) .  I . e . ,  th in lc ing  i s  h a rd ly  p o s s i b le  i f  we should  
p r a c t i c e  a  consequen t a n t l^ e s B e n t ia l i s m .
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And must we not understand th i s  " in  i t s  p o s it iv e  n ecess ity "
( to  borrow Heidegger’ s expreamion used in  a p a r tly  d if fe re n t  
co n n ec tio n ). Tliiia we # ig h t  be ab le  to  understand how the n otion  
of freedom as v i r t u a l l y  an a p r io r i  value can occur in  a kind of 
th in k in g  l ik e  that of J . ",p. B artre.
T h is  m ean s9 to return  t o  the comparison b e tw een  Bartre and 
E.M. H a re , fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  th a t  there i s  c e r t a i n l y  a n  a g re e m e n t in  
CO f a r  a s  b o th  h o ld  t h a t  man i s  t h e  a u th o r  of h i s  own s e t  o f  moral 
v a l u e s .  T hese  v a lu e s  h a v e  no v a lid ity ? - o f  t h e i r  0^01 * T h is  i s  
ffian’e freedom as a moral a g en t.
The c r u c ia l p o in t i s ,  however, t h a t  fo r E.M, Hare t h is  i s  a 
fea tu re  of our language, and th at the f a i lu r e  to  n o tice  th is  
freedom i s  a mistake ( th a t  i s  a t  l e a s t  a l l  he can say as a 
ph ilosopher). For Burtre on the other hand freedom i s  a fea tu re  of 
the  human cond ition , and i t s e l f  a demand, so th a t  the re fu sa l to 
accept th i s  freedom in  the  utm ost s in c e r i ty  makes man sub jec t to  
a moral judgement*
Freedom i s  mot on ly  the form al side of m orality , even i f  Bartro 
h im self seems to want to t h i s  of h is  v iew . Vlliat Sartre judges 
i n  a person who d isg u ise s  h is  freedom, i s  the lack o f  s in c e r i ty ,  
and even i f  s in c e r it y  caanot j u s t i f y  a c e r ta in  cho ice , i s  i t  not a 
su b s ta n t ia l  p a r t  of any ch o ice which i s  made In i t s  name?
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TÎuib we th in k  i t  can be s a id  t h a t  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  a s  a whole 
opens up a  new way of lo o k in g  a t  th e  problem of f a c t  and value*
I t  su g g e s ts  a new c o n te x t  I n  which m oral language can be 
a n a ly se d  and i n  which f a c t  and v a lu e  can be understood  as  a u n i t y .
For i t  would seem t h a t  th e  p o s s ib le  u n i ty  of f a c t  and v a lu e  r e s id e s  
somehow i n  'man's e x i s t e n t i a l  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  world*
T h ere fo re  i t  i s  n o t  t r u e  t h a t  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  i s  i n  u l t i iu a to  
agreem ent w i th  a n a l y t i c a l  p h ilo so p h y  i n  th e  l a t i e r ’ s s e p a r a t io n  
o f f a c t  and v a lu e .  I t  i s  more t r u e  to  say t h a t  th e r e  i s  some 
a f f lB i ' ly  between e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  and t h a t  f e a t u r e  of E.M. H are ’ s 
thought which was in d ic a t e d  by h i s  concep t of "bX ik",
To say  t h a t  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  su g g e s ts  a  p o s s ib le  new vmy of 
lo o k in g  a t  th e  r e l a t i o n  between f a c t  and value does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y  
mean, however, t h a t  we a c c e p t  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  a s  a whole i n  any of i t s  
fo rm s, l o t  a lo n e  t h a t  i t  should  be co n s id e red  ao ex c lu d in g  a l l  
o th e r  f o m a  of t h i  ïd d n g .
What we m a in ta in  i s  t h a t  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  p o in t s  to  an  clem ent 
which we must ta k e  accoun t of i n  our th in k in g  and which m ight have 
a b e a r in g  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of our problem .
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ïh e  e x i s t e n t ia l  and onto lo g ic a l  dimension o f th e o lo g ic a l lanKoage,
John M aeouarrio .
Obo w r i t e r  who had developed  élém ents of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t
thoTijiJît more G y a tem atiea lly  weithin th e  w ider c o n te x t  o f
reaso n ed  d is c o u rs e  i s  John Macqisarrie* His work i s  w orth  d e a l in g
w ith  i n  some d e t a i l ,  because of th e  q u i t e  d i r e c t  way i n  which i t
r e l a t e s  to  our problem .^
Indflueneed, in  though t and te rm in o lo g y , by contem porary
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  p h ilo so p h y  he a rg u es  t h a t  a l l  d is c o u rs e  ex p re sse s
9.e x is te n c e  o r  "l>eing-in-tlie«-world" N That e x i s te n c e  i s  "ljeing-in*=- 
th e -w o rld "  means t h a t  i t  i s  always " s e l f  and world t o g e th e r " .  
M acquarrio adm its  t h a t
i t  i s  always p o s s i b l e  to  dim down w hatever be longs to  
th e  s id e  of th e  s e l f ,  o r  to  p e rso n a l  b e in g , such a s  f e e l i n g ,  
v o l i t i o n ,  value*^judgement, concern  and b o  on, s o  t h a t  the  
s e l f  rem ains ae a  mere p o i n t ,  a  c o g n i t iv e  s u b je c t  which 
s ta n d s  over a g a in s t  i t s  o b j e c t ,  The s p e c ta to r  docs
n o t  oxxïress ’ t o t a l  e x i s t e n c e ’ . VHmt f i n d s  e x p re s s io n  i n
h i s  u t t e r a n c e  i s  sim ply  a  r e p o r t  of the ’ o b je c t iv e  f a c t s ’ #. 
Those, 1b t e r n ,  a r e  obvi. on s ly  never  more th a n  an 
a b s t r a c t i o n  from ’ t o t a l  e x i s t e n c e ’ , t h a t  i s  to  say , from
1. This  i s  th e  ca se  f i r s t  of a l l  id t,h  h i s  book G o d - ta lk ,  196?, 
and i t  i s  w ith  t l i a t  book we s h a l l  be d e a l in g  i n  t h i s  c h a p te r .
2 .  C f. Ib idem . p . ? l .
3» C f. p .? 0 .
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1th e  f u l l  range  of b e ix ig - in - t l ie -w o rld "  «
B a t,  h o ld in g  t h a t  e x i s te n c e  i s  always s e l f  and w orld  to g e th e r ,
M acqtiarrie s t r e s s e s  t h a t  "even in  d is c o u rs e  lA e re  th e  mode of
e x p re s s io n  a b s t r a c t s  most from th e  s e l f ,  some elem ent of concern
2and e v a l im tio n  canno t be e n t i r e l y  a b s e n t" * .  In  su p p o r t  of t h i s
view  he r e f e r s  to  th e  argum ent of Michael ï^o lanyi, who i n s i s t s
" t h a t  th e r e  i s  a p e r s o n a l  f a c t o r  i n  a l l  knowing, and t h a t  even
s c i e n t i f i c  u n d e rs ta n d in g  in v o lv e s  p e rso n a l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  w ith o u t
%
th e re b y  becoming m ere ly  s u b je c t iv e "  .
And H eidegger , comparing two o th e r  k inds  of d i s c o u r s e ,  i s  
quo ted  a s  say in g  t h a t  "m athem atics i s  n o t more r ig o ro u s  th a n  
h i s t o r i o l o g y ,  b u t  on ly  n a rro w er,  because  th e  e x i s t e n t i a l  fo u n d a tio n s  
r e l e v a n t  f o r  i t  l i e  w i th in  a narrow er rm ige"#^
I t  i s  M acquarr ie ’ s v iew , a s  i t  i s  o u r s , t h a t  th e  f a t a l  th in g  
o ccu rs  on ly  when th e se  more a b s t r a c t  k in d s  of d is c o u rs e  ( " a b s t r a c t " )  
because  th e y  a b s t r a c t  from th e  f u l l  range o f  e x i s te n c e )  a r e  
a b s o lu t i z e d ,  and when i t  i s  p resupposed  t h a t  th e y  show us a l l  t h a t  
t h e r e  " r e a l l y  i s " ,  T h is  i s  what happens e ,g*  when language which
le  Ibidem.»} p . 69®
2 ,  Ibidem , p*?0 ,»'K.'e-anr*8irFeeraeco »  JL
3 ,  IbldeBi,
I M M a .  P '7 i«
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c la im s to  exp ress  t o t a l  e x is te n c e  i s  co n s id e red  to  have on ly
em otive o r  s u b je c t i v e  meaning, and no c o g n i t iv e  s ig n i f ic a n c e *
ïn so  f a r  a s  language i s  concerned w ith  u n d e rs ta n d in g  i t  i s
a l im y s , M acquarrio t h in k s ,  r e p r e s e n t in g  something* That i s  to
sa y ,  i t  s ta n d s  f o r  some p e rso n  or th in g  or s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  t h a t
i s  p o in te d  a t  o r  r e f e r r e d  t o .  Now, th e r e  might be d i f f e r e n t
modes of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  k h a t  wo a re  doing i n  " a b s t r a c t "  d is c o u rs e
i s  t o  r e s t r i c t  th e  x*e%)r e s on ta  t i  on to  u n iv e r s a l  and o b je c t iv e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  such a s  s i s e ,  mass, shape and th e  l i k e .
b u t  th e r e  a r e  o th e r  modes of r e p r e s e n ta t i o n ,  " in  which we
seek  to  r e p r e s e n t  what we a r e  t a lk in g  abou t i n  th e  most c o n c re te
way, in c lu d in g  such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e  aa  may be a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y
1dependent on ou r  own r e l a t i o n  to  what we a re  t a lk in g  a b o u t" .
These modes miglit speak  of e . g .  b eau ty , M acquarrie s a y s ,  and th e y  
m ight prosuBiably speak of moral v a lu e s  a s  w e l l .
How, th e n ,  do wo become aim re of th e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  
we seek  to  r e p r e s e n t  i n  v a lu e  language , f o r  in s ta n c e ?  ("Value 
language" being; our e x p r e s s io n ,  n o t  M acquarrie® b).
M acquarrio th in l is  t h a t  we canno t abandon th e  concep t of 
i n t u i t i o n  i n  t h i s  c o n te x t .  He h o ld s  t h a t  i n t u i t i o n  i s
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in d is p e n s a b le  i n  a l l  d i s c o u r s e ,  o r  r a t h e r  as a  r e l a t i o n  
u n d e r ly in g  a l l  d isc o u rse*  D iscou rse  I s  coaTomnication, and f o r  
i t  to  be p o s s ib le  th e r e  must be "iîiore d i r e c t  and fundam ental 
r e l a t i o n s  th a n  th e  ifîediate one of language between th e  speaker  
and th e  two o th e r  term s oi; the  d is c o u rs e  s i t u a t i o n "  ( i . e .  th e
j
p e rso n  to  whom i s  spoken, and. t im t  of which i t  i s  spoken) .
f l i i s  i n t u i t i o n  i s  th e  same a s  man’ s openness i n  h i s  b e i n g - i a -  
th o -w o rld .
M acquarrie c la im s t h a t  t h i s  i n t u i t i o n  canno t be r e s t r i c t e d
*  Vto  th e  p e rc e p t io n  of o b je c t s  tlj^ugh sense  ex p e r ie n c e .  There io
a n o th e r  k ind  of i n t u i t i o n .  What he has i n  mind i s  what th e
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s  have c a l l e d  " a f f e c t i v e  s t a t e s " ,  such a s  a n x ie ty .
"These a f f e c t i v e  s t a t e s  too a r e  I n t u i t i o n s ,  d i s c lo s in g  
e x i s te n c e  i n  th e  w o rld ,  and making a c c e s s ib le  s t r u c t u r e s  
t h a t  can be b ro u g h t to  e x p re s s io n  i n  language* These s t r u c t u r e s  
a r e  n o t  l i k e  th e  o b je c te  in txiitoû  through Üie s e n s e s ,  b u t  we 
m ight c la im  t h a t  they  a r e  o f  an even more fundaiaental k in d ,  
s in c e  they  have to  do %;ith what wo have c a l l e d  ’ t o t a l  
e x i s te n c e " ,  and embrace bo th  s u b je c t  and o b j e c t .  But f o r  
t h i s  re a s o n ,  • they  can never  be o b j e c t i f i e d ,  and we a re  
aware of them o n ly  th rough  p a r t i c i p a t i o n " . ^
I t  i s  our o p in io n  t im t  n o th in g  i n  t h i s  argi.iiwftàt hangs on th e
a c t u a l  terms " a n x ie ty "  and "be l tlie-wo r l  d ' ’ and o tit ex' p a r t s
o f  th e  te rm in o lo g ic a l  a p p a ra tu s  w hich M acquarrie has g o t  from th e
ex i  s t e n t i a l i s t s  «
1 . Ibidem , p .? 6 .
2 • IbidoMt , ■ .1
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V/hat he has l a i d  ho ld  on i s  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e re  a r e  s t r u c t u r e s  
of r e a l i t y  which we can become aim re of  through i n t u i t i o n ,  b u t 
which a r e  n o t dem onstrab le  l i k e  th e  o b se rv ab le  o b je c t s  of sense  
p e r c e p t io n ,  because th ey  belong  to  th e  r e l a t i o n  between s u b je c t  
and o b jec t*
That i s  to  say , th e r e  a r e  luodew of aw areness which a r e  n e i t h e r
p u re ly  s u b je c t iv e  nor p u re ly  o b jec tiv e j ,  because th ey  d i s c lo s e
s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which we o u rs e lv e s  a r e  in v o lv e d , and which th e r e fo r e
have a  "com prehensive" c h a r a c te r  ( th e  term i s  K arl J a s p e r ' s ) . ^
I t  i s  w i th in  t h i s  framework Ü iat we raust seek  an
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of t h e o lo g ic a l  language*
T h e re fo re ,  e*g* th e  em ùtive th e o ry  of the  meaning of
th e o lo g ic a l  language w i l l  n o t  do, a c co rd in g  to  M acquarrico T h is
th e o ry  i s  r e a l l y  a prejudgem ent of th e  c a se ,  and a g a in s t  such
p re  jud gem ents,
"♦*• i t  must be m a in ta in ed  t h a t  * * * th e  a f f e c t i v e  
s t a t e s  o r  moods t h a t  we have ta lk e d  a b o u t ,  ••* a f f o r d  
d i s c lo s u r e s  of e x i s te n c e  w hich, j u s t  a s  much a s  what i s  
d i s c lo s e d  i n  sensuous i n t u i t i o n ,  have some c o g n i t iv e  
s ig n i f i c a n c e  t h a t  c a n  be b rough t to  e x p re s s io n ;  though 
a d m it te d ly  th e  mode of e x p re s s io n  w i l l  be more complex 
th a n  what i e  in v o lv e d  in  po in ting  to  th e  o b se rv ab le  b u t  
n o t  v e ry  e x c i t i n g  f a c t  t h a t  *tho e a t  s i t s  on th e  m at*, • • •  
T h eo lo g ica l  language does n o t  convey s u b je c t iv e  
im p ress io n s  from one mind to  a n o th e r ,  s t i l l  l e s s  does i t  
convey s c ra p s  o f  m etaphj^sical in fo rm ation*  B a th e r ,  
tîirough e x p re s s io n  and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i t  i n t e r p r e t s  and
1 , Cf* Ib idem , p*Bl
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1l ig h tB  up a  sha red  e x i s te n c e  a t  th e  d e e p e s t  l e v e l s "  «
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  i n  eiich n th e o ry  of th e o lo g ic a l  language
a kind of r e a l ism  as  opposed to  nominalism i s  presupposed*
Ik icq u arr ic  e x p l i c i t l y  p r o t e s t s  a g a in s t  what iso c a l l s  "A
thoroughgoing nom inalism "; w ith o u t  be ing  w i l l i n g  to  i d e n t i f y  h i s
view i d t h  t h a t  o f  of th e  schoo la  t h a t  have been opposed to
nominalism* I t  mi gist Isave been more adequate  M  him to  come o u t
open ly  on th e  s id e  of r e a l i s m  i n  th e s e  m a tte rs ,-
Bo t h a t  as  i t  may, th e  c o n te n ts  of h i s  view i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t
i s  t h a t  names, and t h a t  iueans a l l  names, h av e , o r  o r i g i n a l l y  had*
2'* ex i B t  e n t i  a 1 c onjio t a  t i  ons " *
Words i n  discourse* c a r r y  w i th  them a e s o c i s t i o n s  vdiieh a r e
n o t to  be regarded  m erely  as  em otional o b s c u ra t io n s  of the
" t ru e "  or " p r e c is e "  s i g n i f i c a t i o n s  of th e  words* The erroneous
view t h a t  naBies a r e  mere l a b e l s  i s  the r e s u l t  of an a b s t r a c t io n *
The t r u t h  i s  t h a t  because of t h e i r  c o n n o ta t io n s  i.'ords have a
c e r t a i n  i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  power, which i s  " j u s t  a s  b a s ic  and e s s e n t i a l
a f u n c t io n  of nmies a s  t l i e i r  c a p a c i ty  to r e f e r  to  o b je c ts " *  This
3i n t e r p r e t a t i v e  power means a jmw-er to  l i g h t  up moaning ,
1 , Ib idem *. ,p p * 8 2 f*
JÜ?M®Si. P - 9 0 .
3 .  C f .  U l M S i ,  p . 9 3 .
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Mow, th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  d e n o ta t io n s  of a word and
i t s  c o n n o ta t io n s  i s  r e l a t e d  to  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between d i f f e r e n t
modes of d i s c o u r s e ,  wiiicli we have d isc u sse d  e a r l ie r®
"e®« i t  would appear  t h a t  i n  some modes of d is c o u rs e  the  
denotaW.on of names i s  of p rim ary  im portance , whereas in  
o th e r  modes t h e i r  c o n n o ta t io n  p la y s  a m ajor part®
(ifCjierally sp eak in g , s c i e n t i f i c  language i s  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  
d o n o ta t io n ;  each name must r e f e r  a s  p r e c i s e l y  a s  p o s s ib le  
to  some r e f e r e n d  i n  th e  o b se rv a b le  world* In  o th e r  modes 
of d is c o u rs e  -  n o t  on ly  th e o lo g y , b u t  a l s o  h i s t o r y ,  p o e t iy ,  
and many o th e r  s u b je c t s  and everyday ways of t a lk in g  -  th e  
e x i s t e n t i a l  o r  i n t u i t i v e  c o n n o ta t io n s  o f  words a r e  of g r e a t  
im porta rne  f o r  th e  m udcrs tand ing  of the discourse®  •«« i n  
th e  f i r s t ,  words r e f e r  to  o b je c t s ;  in  the  second, ® * * th e y  
ex|>resB s i t u a t i o n s  which belong  to  M iat have c a l l e d  
" t o t a l  e x is te n c e "*  * * * id .th  a  wrord l i k e  " w a te r " , 
som ething approach ing  an a b s t r a c t ,  im p erso n a l,  d e n o ta t iv e  
u se  i s  p o s s ib le  «*** But does i t  s ta n d  wdth such a 
name a s  ’ love®Y Can i t  have any s ig n i f i c a n c e  f o r  a  
p e rso n  wdno has n o t p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  th e  ex p e r ien ce  of lè v in g  
o r  of b e in g  loved?
\dm t i s  r e a l l y  in te n d e d  i n  words l i k e  " th o u g h t" ,  "memory" and 
" love"  i s  something t h a t  can n o t be seen  o r  d e s c r ib e d  by a n e u t r a l  
o b s e rv e r ,  i*e® i t  i s  known only  t h j ’ough p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a c t s  of 
th in k in g ,  remembering, lovinig and so on . What th e s e  words want to  
e x p re s s  i s ,  i n  o th e r  w ords , unobservab le  experiences^®
I s  i t ,  llien , the  ca se  t h a t  th e o lo g ic a l  language has  no p o in t  
o f  r e f e r e n c e  beyond th e  e x p e r ie n c e  i t s e l f ?  Gould th e  expe rien ce
1* IMdomi.-» P '9 4 .
2 .  Cf * Ib id e m , pjp* 9 3 f«
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which i s  r e f e r r e d  t o ,  a f t e r  o i l  "be d e s c r ib e d  more o r  l e s s
a d e q u a te ly  a s  "on ly  s u b je c t iv e " ?
This i s  c l e a r l y  n o t  M acquttrrie’ s view* The ex p e rien ce  i n
q u e s t io n  i s  n o t only  an  ex p e r ien ce  a sue he b u t  an ex p e rien ce
of ooraethinjie
" I f  we e x p lo re  th e  v a r io u s  item s in  th e  c lis tiinctly  
th e o lo g ic a l  v o c a b u la ry ,  I  th in k  t h a t  somei/hero among t h e i r  
co n n o ta t io n s  we a re  always p o in te d  to  th e  experience of 
Gode This would be t r u e  even o f  uanies t h a t  s tand  f o r  
p h y s ic a l  o b je c t s  used  in  C h r i s t i a n  v/orsMp" (e .g*  the  a l t a r )  *
And to  t h e  word "God" an o n to lo g ic a l  d im ension i s  
in d i s p e n s a b le 'a  Macquarr.ie e x p l i c i t l y  r e j e c t s  th e  v a r io u s  a t te m p ts
to  acco u n t f o r  th e  meaning of th e o lo g ic a l  language w ith o u t  t h e i r
a c c e p t in g  t h a t  i t  has atiy " t r a n s c e n d e n t"  r e f e r e n c e  * We must ta k e
3s e r io u s ly  t h a t  i t  c la im s  to  d e a l  m t l i  th e  "knowledge of God"*
An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  our " a f f e c t i v e  i n t u i t i o n s "  by a  k ind  of 
" e x i s t e n t i a l  plihiiomenology" m ig h t, M acquarrie th in k s ,  acco rd  to 
them a " t r a s i s s u b je c t iv e  v a l i d i t y " * Thai i s ,  we m ight be a b le  to  
reach  th e  o n to lo g ic a l  d im ension where we a r e  s%iealclng of "transhum an 
r e a l i t i e s "
1 . H i i à s î i - »  p*98.
20 Cfo Ib idem , p*100o
3® Cfo Ibidem , p p . l0 9 fe
4 . Cf. Ibidem, pp.237, 839.II III Ml aiiif w m iii i# f 11 w  -a. A  v
th eo lo g y  i s  ooiHBonly u n d ers to o d  to be more th an  a 
psyciiology of r e l i g i o n  and f a i t h  i s  more than  a s t a t e  
of aiind* Theology c la im s aome h in d  of t r a n s s u b je c t iv e  
v a l i d i t y  f o r  th e  e x p e r ie n c e s  which belong to  th e  l i f e  of 
f a i t h .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  God and C h r i s t  a r e  reg a rd ed  n o t  
m erely  a s  e lem ents  i n  human e x p e r ie n c e ,  hu t a s  s ta n d in g  
in d ep em len tly  over a g a i n s t  mam* C e r ta in ly ,  th e o lo g ia n s  
of many d i f f e r e n t  p e rsu a s io n s  have o f te n  d e c la re d  t h a t  
we do n o t  know God a s  he  i s  i n  h im s e l f ,  Imt on ly  o.a he 
r e l a t e s  h i  ms cl f  to  uso Duty th e y  have never in te n d ed  by 
t h i s  to  im p |y  I h a t  God i s  n o # i n g  b u t  a f a c t o r  in  human 
ex p e r ien ce"  *
Speaking of th e o lo g ia n s  who have used a " language of e x is te n c e "
(S ch le ie rm ach e r ,  O tto ,  H erm an n , llultmann) M acqnarrie  ad«iite t h a t
th e  most v u ln e r a b le  p a r t s  of t h e i r  th e o r ie s  a r e  th e  p a r t s  where
th e y  seek  to  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  th e  Chr3.stian ex p e r ien ce  of God i s
founded i n  a  r e a l i t y  which t r a n s c e n d s  th e  human consc iousness*
"F ran k ly , X do n o t  suppose th e re  i s  any way i n  which 
one could  prove t h a t  th e  a s s e r t i o n s  of f a i t h  and of 
t lieo logy  do r e f e r  to  a R e a l i ty  (God) t h a t  i s  independen t 
of and p r i o r  to th e  e x p e r ie n c e s  wMch we c a l l  " e x p e r ie n c es  
of God"» Xn o rd e r  to  prove t h a t  th e re  ig  an  en c o u n te r  
w ith  a r e a l  O ther , one would somehow need to  g e t  behind th e  
e x p e r ie n c e ,  o r  f in d  a  second ro u te  to  t h a t  which we know i n  
th e  e x p e r ie n c e ,  and t h i s  i s  n o t  p o ss ib le *  Yet on th e  
o th e r  îiand th e  c o n v ic t io n  t h a t  th e r e  a  r e a l  O ther i n  t h i s  
expe rien ce  i s  ex trem ely  d e e p - ro o te d " *
1* Ihidevt, po942* 
2® Ibidem , p#244*
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That there  i s  no such second ro u te  to the r e a l i ty  of God 
seems in  f a c t  to  be p a r t  of the very meaning of the word 
Vfl'ien we have given so much space to a d iscussion  of 
M acquarrio’s views i t  i s  not because we want to  take up the 
whole problem of the meaning of theo log ica l language, wliieîi i s  
M acqtiarrle’ s tojîiCe N either i s  i t  because we th ink  th a t  what 
we have quoted or re fe rre d  to  in  M acquarrie’s work i s  adequate or 
s u f f ic ie n t  in  every re sp e c t as an account of the moaning of 
th eo lo g ica l language* Our top ic  i s  the  meaning of value language, 
or moral language in  p a r tic u la ro  And we are  drawing a t te n tio n  to 
M acquarrie’s thoughts because, no m atter how inconclusive in  some 
re sp e c ts , they express some ijiiportant t ru th s  about language in  
general and, by way of a p o in te r , about th eo lo g ica l language in  
p a r t ic u la r ,  which b ring  u b  neare r to an understanding of value 
language and i t s  r e la t io n  to  language in  general and to th eo lo g ica l 
language in  particular®
That there  a re  c lo se  a f f i n i t i e s ,  a t  le a s t ,  betimon value 
language and th eo lo g ica l language, Macquarrie conceives of i t ,
'#,1 - C T J ^ < i Wi 1*11 , thr,VtX# » * 4V&'
Ibidem'.a, Bo246®
Mo#e Macquarri© says th a t  " fa ith "  means th a t  th e re  can be no 
"c e rtitu d e "  in  those mattora® In th is  re sp ec t he i s  wrong® 
"Faith" in  the  C h ris tian  con tex t means ra th e r  " c e r titu d e
w ithout ex terna l p ro o fs" .
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aeem# obvious. Wa b e liev e  i t  to  be tru e  th a t ,  whatever more
should foe said  about i t ,  th eo lo g ica l language in tends to  deal w ith
a r e a l i ty  (God)$ which stands over a g a in s t man, but wMeli cmmot
foe experienced a p a r t from an in i t i i t ip B which im p lies  p a r t ic ip a t io n * .
md which cannot, accord ing ly , foe expressed w ithout a language 
wiiioh iK iplles p a r t ie  ipatioB* That i s  to say , in  th e o lo g ic a l
language we are speaking of transhiman r e a l i t i e s ,  but on ly  "as
Ithey impinge upon us" ,
This i s  where th e  v a lu e  aspec ts  come in to  the p ic tu r e . F art 
of what i s  In tu ite d  in  the experience of 'die r e a l i ty  of Clod is  
th a t  i t  has a value c h a ra c te r , th a t  i s ,  th a t  i t  ex e rts  a claim  
upon me, nd what i s  expressed  in  t lu io iig ic a l language i s  th erefo re  
a reco g n itio n  o f and an acceptance of th is  claim .
This might not foe fa r  from what Macquarrle i s  saying 
e x p l ic i t ly .
"The o n to lo g ica l dim ension of the word 'God' i s  
in d isp en sa b le  to i t  * * * bu t as th e  word i s  i# ed In  r e l ig io n ,
i t  im plies an e x is te n t ia l  ju s t  as much as an on to log ica l 
dim ension. .* .  The Being encountered ie  not an o b jec t 
of which we can ta lk  in a d is in te r e s te d  way, bu t the Being 
in  which we l iv e  and move and have our b e in g , too ,
r e l ig io u s  d iscou rse  i s  alim ys of God in  h is  r e la t io n  to  u s . 
When we ta lk  of God, we ta lk  a t  th e same time o f o u r se lv e s .
The word MIod' does n o t ju s t  s ig n ify  Being, but a lso  im plies 
an ev a lu a tio n  of Being, a commitment to Being as Holy Bcihg, 
Being th a t  i s  graciou s and judging. This [ la  th e ]  
e x is te n t ia l  or eva lu a tin g  dimension of the word *God" .«*
1. Cf. Ibidem». ,  p .239.
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The nome o f 'G od' i s  n o t a d i s in te r e s t e d  la b e l  f o r  Being
or l i c a l i ty  or any rem ote a b s t r a c t i o n ,  h u t c o n n o ta te s  our
e x i s t e n t i a l  concern  w ith  Being# In  T i l l i c h 's  language ,
God i s  bo th  B eing i t s e l f  and u l t im a te  co n ce rn " ,^
Aixd, r e f e r r in g  to  th e  th eo lo g y  of S t. A th a n a s iu s ,
lîa e q u a rr ie  h o ld s  t h a t  " th e  word 'G od' speaks of Being a s  u l t im a te  
co n cern . Being w hicïi i s  a t  the  same tim e Biumjiiim ho mum, u n i t in g  
h ig h e s t  r e a l i t y  and h ig h e s t  v a lu e
T his means, th e n , t h a t  th e o lo g ic a l  language from one p o in t  
o f view  v a lu e  lan g u ag e , Not in  th e  sense t h a t  i t  i s  i d e n t i c a l  
v /ith  v a lu e  laj^j^uage, b u t in  th e  sen se  t h a t  one a s p e c t  o f  i t  i s  
e v a lu a t io n ,  o r  a s s e r t i o n  o f v a lu e  a s  an  a s p e c t  in s e p a ra b le  from  
th e  r e a l i t y  w hich i t  seeks to  express#
And we m ight on th e  b a s i s  o f t h i s  in s ig h t  be a b le  to  in d ic a te  
an answer to  th e  q u e s t io n  ab o u t th e  r e l a t i o n  between Eioral v a lu e  
judgem ents and th e o lo g ic a l  s ta te m e n ts  abou t th e  "W ill  of  God".
As we have seen  e a r l i e r  th e  understand ing ; o f  judgem ents 
c o n ta in in g  v a lu e  term s l ik e  "good" ami "rigl& t" a s  in  ai%r sense  
d e r iv a b le  from  s ta te m e n ts  ab o u t -fcho W ill of God, has been 
d ism isse d  by th e  ad v o c a te s  o f a n o n - c o g n i t iv is t  th e o ry  o f e th ic s  
a s  j u s t  one ty p e  of th e  " n a t u r a l i s t i c  f a l l a c y " .  For in  t h e i r
1 . Ibidem’ . ,  pp . lOOf,
M â s& t  p * i 'i9 .
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u n d e rs ta n d in g  of i t ,  t h i s  means j u s t  t h a t  one th inks one can 
d e r iv e  o n e 's  own m oral judgement of th e  case  from a s ta tem e n t of 
f a c t  ab o u t what God w i l l s o
f«iafW?56»£S>
There a r e , a c c o rd in g  to  t h i s  v iew , only  two a lte r n a t iv e #  to  
th e  f a l la c y ,  i f  we want to  eay th a t  something i a  good because Ood. 
w i l l s  i t *  We could ^eièlièr sa y  t h a t  "God w i l l s  X" means ju s t  
"I p rescr ib e  X ( to  u se iuM* H a r e 's  term inology)" , in  which case  
"God w i l l s  X" does n o t  s t a t e  any f a c t  a t  a l l*  Or we could say  
t h a t  "X i s  good" i s  j u s t  id e n t ic a l w ith  a f a c t u a l  statem ent abou t 
God's W ill, which means t h a t  we adm it hav ing  reduced th e  v a lu e  
judgement to  som ething p u re ly  " f a c tu a l "  and nori-«evaluative«
But now i t  cou ld  be m aintained t h a t  a  s ta te m e n t  ab o u t God's 
W ill  i e  c le a r ly  n e ith e r  i d e n t i c a l  w i th  th e  s p e a k e r 's  p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  
nor does i t  convey a  p ieed  of "factual"  knowledge abou t th e  opinion  
o f  somebody e l s e  ( i a  t h i s  ease God),
And s t i l l  i t  i e  not a  f a l la c io u s  procedure to  d erive  a value  
judgement from a s ta te m e n t  a b o u t  God's W ill . For to  i d e n t i f y  th e  
"good" w ith  th e  W ill  of God, or to  p r e s e n t  th e  mm a s  d eriv a b le  from 
th e  o th e r ,  does not mean to  make a  confuslom of v a lu e  judgements and 
" fa c tu a l" statem ents# But I t  means t h a t  to  speak of th e  r e a l i t y  of
God i s  to  speak of a  r e a l i t y  which embodies isi i t  v a lu e  and 
o b l ig a t io n  a t  th e  same t im e , as something in s e p a ra b le  from i t ,  and 
s ta te m e n ts  about th e  W ill of God a r e  j u s t  e x p l i c i t  r e f e r e n c e s  to  
t h i s  v a lu e  a s p e c t  of th e  O od«-reality .
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f l i i s  i s  t r u e , no m a t te r  how we conceive o f  th e  way, or 
ways, i n  which man may g e t  to  know the W ill of God,
I t  i s  a l s o  the way In w hich e ,g ,  th e  n a r r a t i v e  of the 
g iv in g  o f the  Lav/ to  th e  I s r a e l i  t e e  a t  Mount Ainal could he 
understood in  i t s  b ib l ic a l  c o n te x t . Not even in  th e  recep tio n  
o f  th e  two t a b l e s . o f  th e  Law by Moses did they  r e c e iv e  a p ie c e  
o f " f a c tu a l "  in fo rm a t io n  ab o u t  God's moral o p in io n . But tliey 
had an experience o f the r e a l i t y  of God, i n  which they  were 
grasped by a diM ne demand, I . e ,  they rece ived  a now aw areness 
o f th e ir  ex is te n c e  i n  th e  %mrld as  c o n st itu te d  by a  d iv in e  g i f t  
and a d iv in e  o b lig a t io n . We can only  think o f how th e  I s r a e l i t e s  
reg a rd ed  b o th  God and M s  demand a s  p r e s e n t  in  th e  Ark o f th e  
Covenant, in  which th e  t a b l e s  of the Law were k ep t.
I t  i s  c l e a r  from t h i s  # a t  th e o lo g ic a l  d isco u rse  r e f e r s  to  
an  aw areness of a  r e a l i t y  Miicli we can know only in  i t e  value  
f o r  u s , That i s  to  say , to  s e p a ra te  th e  fa c tu a l from th e  
e v a lu a t iv e  i n  t h i s  kind of d isco u rse  i s  m ean in gless ,
But i t  i s  im p o r ta n t  to  s t r e s s  t h a t  t h i s  u n i ty  of f a c t  and 
v 'lu e  i s  not ex p ressed  only in  t h e o lo g ic a l  language , though i t  
i s  perhaps most m a n ife s t  t h e r e .
And i n  a  way a l l  language i s  t h e r e f o r e  value language, Words 
in  a l l  k in d s  of d is c o u rs e  have va lu e c o n n o ta t io n s  and r e f e r  to  am
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experience of a s t ru c tu re  of r e a l i t y  which i s  not a c c e s s ib le  to 
sensory observation , whetho%" the g^peaker i s  coma cions of th is  or 
not#
But although a l l  language could be described as value  
language i t  i s  s t i l l  t ru e  th a t  i t  i s  more or le s s  e x p l ic i t ly  so .
I t  wight there fo re-be  qu ite  j u s t i f i a b le  to  speak of "value language" 
as a kind of language in  which t h i s  value asp ect ie 'b rough t d i r e c t ly  
to exprcBs i  on#
The po in t i s ,  however, th a t the value in tu i t io n  re fe rred  
to  In value language i s  not e x c lu s iv e ly  bound to the experience of 
God, v/ith which theo log ica l language d ea ls  ex p lic i t ly #  An
aim reness of value and ob lig a tio n  i s  p resent in  the experience of 
men also  where there i s  no referen ce to an experience of God, We 
might of course m aintain th a t the value or o b lig a t io n  i s  n ot then 
recognised in  i t s  f u l l  s ig n if ica n ce #  But th i s  does not 
in v a l id a te  the non^ relig ious value experience as such#
I t  w il l  a t  t h i s  stage  be c le a r  on what p o in ts  th is  theory of 
moral language m i l  come to  d i f f e r  fundamentally from th a t  o f  
natnrnlifBîiî In e th ic s  on the one hand and from th at of in tu it io n ism  
on the other#
E th ical n aturalism , as i t  has normally  been understood, 
id e n t i f i e s  moral values with what i s  conducive to c e r ta in  fa c tu a l
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s ta te s  oX a f fa ir s #  Tliia means, in  terms of the fa c t  and value*  
sep a ra tio n , th a t v a lu es  a re  reduced to  something n on -eva lu a tive  * 
In tu itio n ism , as i t  was held  e.g* hy G.F, Moore, conceived 
o f  values as p ro p e r t ie s  of the th ings , hut  p ro p ertie s  of a sp é c ia l ,  
noii-nalmral kind , which were apprehended hy a sp ec ia l ,  immediate 
kind of apprehension, namely in tu it io n *
On the  theory which we have in d ica ted , there i s  no question  
of a reduction  o f values to fa c ta  and, though there might he 
g re a ter  a f f i n i t i e s  between th i s  view and th a t  of in tu it io n ie m , we 
do not hold th a t values are  p ro p e r t ie s  to he apprehended in  
ad d ition  to  na tu ra l p roperties*
l¥6 might fin d  the concept of " in tu itio n "  imliapeiisablo in  an 
account of va lu e  co g n itio n  and of value language* But th i s  
I n tu i t io n  plays a mach more ce n tra l  p a r t  than i t  would do i f  t h i s  
value co g n itio n  were ju s t  a gathering  of some p e c u lia r  extra*  
in form ation  about some of the ob jec ts  of knowledge*
To sum up our arguaaàà so f a n
What we want to maintain i s  th a t  the  q u estio n  of the meaning 
of rioral language, and of any kind of value language a t  a l l ,  
cannot he settled , ap a r t  from the  question  about the natu re  and 
condition  of human c o g n it io n .
2 1 7
The q u e s t io i r  w hether juclgoinents of va lue  have a " p r e s c r i p t iv e "
Bieaning, which i s  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from th e  meaning of something'
t h a t  we could c a l l  " f a c tu a l "  s ta te m e n ts , and which does n o t ,
a c c o rd in g ly ,  g ive  us any knowledge of th e  w orld , be longs r i g h t l y
to  th e  study  of c o g n i t io n ,  and n o t i n  th e  sense t h a t  i t  i s  a
q u e s t io n  of th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of g r a n t in g  va lue  judgements some
d o u b tfu l  c o g n i t iv e  s t a t u e  on tlie f r in g e  of human knowledge* But
i n  tJie sense  t h a t  we must a sk  w hether  the  v a lu e  q u e s t io n  i s  n o t
fundam ental f o r  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of human c o g n i t io n  as  a whole*
We have e a r l i e r  drawn a t t e n t i o n  to  lUM. H a re 's  O'wn d is c u s s io n
Xof th e  b a s i s  f o r  our t a l k  abou t som ething a s  a " f a c t "  *
IliB view was t h a t  n o th in g  can become a f a c t  f o r  u s  u n le s s  
we ta k e  up a c e r t a i n  a t t i t u d e  Inwards th e  w o rld * ‘
Hare l in k s  t h i s  w ith  K a n t 's  d o c t r in e  of th e  cat-hegorieo of 
apprehension*  Vdmt we e x p e r ien ce  i s ,  so Hare i n t e r p r e t s  K ant, 
p a r t l y  de te rm ined  by our mind, ioo* by th e  p r i n c i p l e s  a r m i e s  
which th e  mind fo l lo w s  in  i t s  cog n itio n *  In  th e se  p r i n c i p l e s ,  
o r  c a th e g o r ie s ,  t h e r e  i s ,  ICare seams to  ho ld , an elem ent of 
a t t i t u d e ,  and oven of worship* He can speak of "w orsh ipping
2a s s e n t  to  p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  d i s c r im in a t in g  between f a c t  and i l l u s i o n " ^
1* Cfe above %)p 1 9 6 f f  .
2* Of * above, p* 19^^
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H a re 's  use  of Kant i n  t i d e  com iec tion  i s ,  we th in k ,  open to  
c r i t i c i s m *  I t  i s  d o u b tfu l  w h e th e r  i t  i a  p o s s ib le  to f i t  th e
co ncep t of " a t t i t u d e "  and "w orship" i n t o  the  e p is to m o lo g ic a l  
d o c t r in e  of Kant*
The p r i n c i p l e s  which govern th e  a c t io n s  of the  ml ml, do n o t  
c a l l  fo3? any a s s e n t  i n  a  "w o rsh ip fu l a t t i t u d e " *  They can by an 
a n a ly s i s  of th e  p ro ce ss  of c o g n i t io n  he found to  be n e c e ssa ry  ami 
f ix e d  s t r u c t u r e s  i n  th e  working of the  mind* And from one p o in t  
o f  view, what happens in  c o g n i t io n  i s  t h a t  th e  co g n is in g  s u b je c t  
r e l a t e s  th e  e x te r n a l  o b je c t s  to  th e se  f ix e d  p r i n c i p l e s  of the  
mind * So f a r  Kant*
To say , however, t h a t  i t  i s  a c c e s s a ry  to  ta k e  up a c e r t a i n  
a t t i t u d e  tow ards th e  w orld  f o r  th e r e  to  be any f a c t s  a t  a l l ,  and 
t h a t  t h i s  a t t i t u d e  i s  of a w o rsh ip fu l  c h a r a c te r ,  must mean something 
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  K an tian  d o c t r in e  of  th e  c a th e g o r ie s*  I t  
must mean, r a t h e r ,  t h a t  th e r e  can be no c o g n i t io n  u n le s s  we a r e  
r e l a t i i M  o u rse lv e s  to  H ia t  which i s  be ing  cognised*
\fhat Mare i s  say in g  i s  perhaps n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  in co m p atiW I 
weith K a n t 's  th o u g h ts  * But i t  be longs  a t  any r a t e  to  a d i f f e r e n t  
l e v e l  of i n t e r e s t  from t h a t  of a  r e f e r e n c e  to  common s t r u c t u r e s  of 
th e  mindo Hare may n o t be e n t i r e l y  c l e a r  h im se lf  ab o u t the  i iq m e t 
of h i s  rem arks =» he adm its  t h a t  th ey  a r e  t e n t a t i v e  b u t  %ve th in k  
t h a t  they  a re  v e ry  i l l u m in a t in g  i f  we a llow  # ie  consequence# to  be
819
f u l l y  drîuvn from them.
The rem ain ing  im portanco of ex p re sB lo n s l ik e  " a t t i t u d e "  ami 
"worship" i n  th e  c o n te x t  i n  wMch Hare u se s  them, i s  t h a t  th e y  
su g g e s t  to  us tJie c e n t r a l i t y  of involvem ent and i n t e r e s t  i n  a l l  
c o g n it io n *
Form ulated i n  a n o th e r  way, r e m in isc e n t  of one of l i a r e 'e  
s e n te n c e s ;
Nothing can hecoHie an  o h ja c t  o f  c o g n i t io n  i f  i t  i s  on ly  an 
" o b je c t " ,  ioO. i f  i t  i s  som ething over a g a in s t  which I  am 
s ta n d i  jig i n  the  p o s i t i o n  of a d i s i n t e r e s t e d  observer*
I f  we draw th e  consequences from H a re 's  remarks i t  x^ill foe 
im p o ss ib le  to  d i s s o c i a t e  " f a c t "  from "value"® For a l re a d y  behind 
th e  co n cep tio n  of som ething a s  a  " f a c t "  th e re  l i e s  a  c e r t a i n  
i n t e r e s t  i n  t h a t  w hich i s  thus named, and even a commitiuent to  a 
c e r t a i n  view of th e  world# Behind a l l  c o g n i t io n  th e re  i s  
involvem ent and i n t e r e s t *
This m ight seesi to  open th e  way f o r  an e n t i r e l y  s u b j e c t i v i s t i c  
th e o ry  abou t c o g n i t io n .  Uhon we hold t h a t  i n t e r e s t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  
i n  a l l  c o g n i t io n ,  do v/e n o t  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  what we c a l l  c o g n i t io n  
i s  î’o a l ly  a  cons t r u e  t i  on of th e  %orld acco rd in g  to  t a s t e ?
This i s ,  however, h o t  our i n t e n t i o n ,  and i t  i s  n o t  a  consequence 
which can be drawxi from what we have ao id  above, o r  from II*M. Hilro’ s 
omi oxpr es s i  o n s•
2 2 0
To have aaid th a t  in  a l l  cognition  we are in  some way 
r e la t in g  cmrselves to th a t  which i s  being cognised® I t  i s  not 
the  case th a t  Ï f i r s t  apprehend the ob jec ts  of apprehension and 
;U\Qn evaluate  them, by a secondary process, as i t  v/ore® I t  i s  
much more the  case th a t  the  process of cognition i t s e l f  i s  
fiindamentally a. recogn i t io n  of an e x is t in g  r e la t io n  between me 
and th a t  which i s  apprehended# To take up a worshipping a t t i tu d e  
towards something (to  use H are 's  expression once more) must moan to 
recognise a r e la t io n  to something which i s  worthy of worship.
That i s  to say, b as ic  fo r  a l l  cognition , or r a th e r ,  ^  a l l  
cognition  i s  a  sense of value or o b lig a t io n , * A value which 
le  not something ap a r t  from mo# Neither i s  i t  something which 
comes from me,, and which i s  id e n t ic a l  with one of Ejy sub jec tive  
l ik e s ,  but a value which i s  a value for me* Therefore i t  belongs 
as  much to r e a l i t y  as  docs anything else#
This i s ,  of coursep a c ru c ia l  point® We might fool j u s t i f i e d  
in  saying th a t  values have a g re a te r  claim on tlie a d jec tiv e  " rea l"  
than has aijything else* because they a s s o r t  something which i s  
c o n s t i tu t iv e  of m y  r e la t io n  to  the  world#
Therefore we might, using  a somewhat dangerous expression, 
say th a t  values are  p ro p e r t ie s ,  not of th ings , but of my r e la t io n  
to  the world# And in  th a t  sense they b e l o n g  to  the nature of the 
world, of which m y  r e la t io n  to i t  i s  an aspfct#
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I f  i t  i s  tru e , as we have sa id , t h a t  ev a lu a tio n  in
fundam ental fo r  a l l  co g n it io n , th e n  the r e c o g n i t io n  of onr v a lu e  
r e l a t i o n  to  the w orld  in  d e c i s iv e  fo r  onr a s s e r t i o n  n o t on ly  of 
som ething i n  a d d i t i o n  t o th e  f a c t n a l i t y  of th e  th in g , b u t  of th e  
f a c t u a l i t y  i t s e l f #  N othing cam become a f a c t  fo r  me n n leas i t  
has v a lu e  fo r  me, l i e #  u n le s s  I  have reco g n ised  t h a t  I  s ta n d  i n  
a  v a lu e  r e la t io n  to  i t .
2 2 2
3» Values and knowlodree in  John E!iaaa*8 tUoufht»
Xn th is  the s i  B wo liave advocated the view th a t  we can 
understand the r e la t i o n  hotweon judgements of value and knowledge 
of f a c t  only on the b as is  of an understanding; of knowledge i t s e l f *
V/itli theo log ica l language, as we .have bce.u d iscussing  i t  in  the 
previous chap te r, i t  i s  seen to  be the case th a t  in  so f a r  as i t  
expresses knowledge of some kim( of r e a l i t y ,  t h i s  r e a l i t y  i s  
in separab le  from an aB|»ect of value which belongs to it® So th a t  
i n  Bome a reas  of knowledge, a t  l e a s t ,  i t  could bo said th a t  value 
i s  p a r t  of what i s  known, and th a t  t i i is  cannot be separated  from 
Ê^omething " fa c tu a l" ,  i.Oo "noiMovaluative"®
But i s  i t  poss ib le  to say any tiling Eiorc d e f in i te  about the 
r e la t io n  between evaluation  and cognition? That i s  to say, xAiat 
i s  tlio place and ro le  of evaluation  in  condition?
An important co n tr ibu tion  to the answering of th i s  question  i s  
given in  John üman's work* He belongs to e number of w r i te r s  who 
up t i l l  now imiy have been undeservedly neglected , because tliey wore 
w rit in g , as i t  were, ag a in s t  the t id e  of th e i r  time®
In turning; to  the work of e.g® John Opian we acknowledge th a t  
the recogn ition  of the e x i s te n t ia l  elaiient in  human discourse i s  not 
confined to contemporary e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  philosophy in  any s t r i c t  
senseo The e x i s te n t i a l  elcmieat i s  p resen t a lso  in  e a r l i e r  
philosophy and in  o ther types of philosophy* I t  can be claimed th a t .
i n  a  se n se ,  th e r e  i s  something p e r e n n ia l  in  the  th e o ry  t r y  to  
m a in ta in .
The r e c o g n i t io n  of th e  i n s e p a r a b i l i t y  of c o g n i t io n  from 
o v a ln a t lo n  i s  exp ressed  f i r s t  of a l l  in  Oman's book "The N a tu ra l  
and th e  S u p e rn a tu ra l" ,  1931o This book i s  p r im a r i ly  a  study of 
r e l ig io n *  Or, s t a t e d  i n  a n o th e r  way, a s tudy  of a l l  environm ent
*  « ' V I /  III <1* 11 mui r t,
from th e  p o in t  of view of i n t e r e s t  f o r  r e l ig io n ^ »  This i s  what 
i s  i n d ic a t e d  by th e  terms th e  "N a tu ra l"  and th e  " S u p e rn a tu ra l" .  
T ogether tliejr in c lu d e  a l l  t i l in g s  i n  heaven and e a r t h .  But when a 
d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  made between them, as  in  (knan'B xvork, t h i s  i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  th e  inquiiiy  i s  l im i te d  by th e  p a r t i c u l a r  I n t e r e s t  of r e l ig io n *
Our i n t e r e s t  i s  n o t  p r im a r i ly  t h a t  of a r r i v i n g  a t  a th e o ry  o f  
r e l i g i o n ,  and, a c c o rd in g ly ,  our c h ie f  aim in  t h i s  co n n ec tio n  i s  n o t  
to  d ism iss  th e  adequacy or s u f f i c i e n c y  of Bman’s acco u n t of r e l ig io n *  
I t  i s  r a t h e r  th e  case  t h a t  th e  answers wo miglit a r r i v e  a t  w ith  
re g a rd  to  p u r  problem w i l l  s t i l l  le a v e  a number of the  most im p o r ta n t  
q u e s t io n s  ab o u t r e l i g i o n  unanswered.
N e i th e r  do we propose to d is c u s s  Omaji's use  of th e  t e m e  
" n a tu r a l"  ami " s u p e rn a tu ra l"  and a l l  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  which a re  
connected  w ith  th e  a m b ig u i t ie s  of th e se  te rm s . V/e ta k e  t h a t
1 .  Cfo Op. c i t a ,  p p .2 f
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th e  c o n te n t  of Oman's th o u g h ts ,  a t  l e a s t  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  our 
problem , can be b ro u g h t o u t  i r r e s p e c t i v e l y  of such a d i s c u s s io n ,
A pro lix idnary  d e f i n i t i o n  of what f to n  wants to  convey?* by th e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  "N a tu ra l"  and the  "S u p e rn a tu ra l"  i s  t h a t  
of Uie d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  senso ry  world and what t ra n sc e n d s  
i t .
" I f  .#« we ta k e  th e  N a tu ra l  to  be what ap p ep ls  to  onr s e n s e s ,  
and th e  S u p e rn a tu ra l  to  be w hat i s  above i t ,  we can say t h a t  
th e  e s s e n t i a l  im rk of r e l i g i o n  i s  concern witï! w hether th e r e  
i s  such an onvironmunt a s  th e  S n p e r im tu ra l ,  and th a t  nvhat a t  
l e a s t  r e l i g i o n  ouglkt to  be depends on what th e  n a tu re  of t h i s  
en v iroBBient i s .  The q u e s t io n  o f  r e l i g i o n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i s  a  
q u e s t io n  n o t  m erely  of r e a l i t y ,  b u t  of u l t im a te  r e a l i t y # " ^
b u t we could  a l s o  say t h a t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  N a tu ra l
and th e  S u p e rn a tu ra l  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  in  v a lu e .
"«*• bo th  th e  N atu ra l and th e  S u p e rn a tu ra l  a r e  d i s t in g u is h e d  
by th e  vay i n  which th ey  make uhemselves kmn-m, whioh i s  by 
th e  meaning, or i n  o th e r  words, the v a lu e  th e y  have f o r  us#
Ao th e  m t u r a l  world, i s  known by s e n s a t io n  and i t s  v a r ie d  
comxïarative v a lu e s ,  so tlie  B uperna tu ra l w orld  i s  known by 
the  sense of th e  h o ly  and i t s  sa c red  or a b s o lu te  v a lu e s ;  
and. f o r  p r a c t i c a l  p u rp o se s ,  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  
N a tu ra l  and thg  S u p e rn a tu ra l  i s  between com parative  v a lu e
and a b s o lu te "
That i e  to  say , th e r e  i s  a  w orld  which hman th in k s  of a s  the 
w orld  of " n a tu ra l"  v a lu e s ,  wh.ere i^e judge th e  v a lu e  o f  th in g s  by 
d e g ree ,  acco rd in g  to  t h e i r  com parative  w orth  from the  p o in t  of view
1# Ibidem:, p .  2 6 .
2* Ibidem , p . 6 9 *
•w w w K M 3 k M r tj* r »  *  ^  ^
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of our physical i n t e r e s t s ,  as i t  were.
Blit there  i s  a lso  another w orld, where we do not judge
according to standards which have a r ise n  out of a comparison of
the physical c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  of th ings in  the world, hut
according to  values which mamife s t  themselves w ith  a kind of
ab so lu ten ess*  This abso lu teness means incomparable worth,
"and incomparable i s  not merely superb-excellent, hut what m a y  not,
1'be broiiglit down and compared wuth o ther goods."
This va lua tion , which i s  not to  foe weighed or bargained w ith ,
speaks to  man of another r e a l i t y  than th a t  iAlch he Iciiowe by h is
2sen ses  and judges h y  h is  a p p e t i te s " .
That i s  the r e a l i t y  of the Supernatural,
"As here used, the <bi%iernaturul means the  world which 
m anifcats more than n a tu ra l  va lues , the world which has 
va lu es which s t i r  t h f  pense of the holy  and demand to be 
esteemed as sacred"."^*
1. lb). Jem, p.C'5o 
2 d Cf. Ibidem, p .67#
3 .  I M â ® ! .  p . 7 1 .
4# C o n c e r n in g  t h e  u s e  o f  the terms "holy" an d  " s a c r e d "  i t  s h o u l d
1>a pointed o u t  t h a t  Oman wants t o  c o i n  th em  fo r  more p r e c i s e  
u s e s  than i s  com m on: "The 'holy* I p r o p o s e  t o  u s e  f o r  the
d i r e c t  s e n s e  o r  fe e l in g  o f  t h e  S u p e r n a t u r a l , a n d  the 'sacred*
fo r  i t s  va lua tion  as of a b s o l u t e  w o r t h " , Ibidem* p # 9 2 #
f  •o.hâiiiterïaKSitàMîSsatei^ V  ^
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That means t h a t  th e  sense  of th e  ho ly  has go t to do, from 
one p o in t  of v iew  w ith  th e  e x i s te n c e  of a kind of environm ent, 
ioOo the  P u p e rn a tu ra l5 and from a n o th e r  p o in t  of view w ith  
v a lu e ,  i . e .  sa c re d  value#
"As mere f e e l i n g  ta k e n  hy i t s e l f , we canno t r i g h t l y  
i n t e r p r e t  th e  sense of the  h o ly ,  hu t must r e l a t e  i t  to  
sac red  v a lu e  and th e  e x i s te n c e  of the S u p e rn a tu ra l , 
because we canno t e x p la in  one f e e l in g  by a n o th e r ,  b u t on ly  
by th e  judgement of va lue  which depends on i t  and th e  k ind  
of em drom aent i n t o  wliich i t  in t ro d u c e s  ub . # ® ® As mere 
f e e l in g  g tlie  sense  o f  th e  ho ly  would be im p o ss ib le  to  
d i s t in g i i i s h  from th e  mere spooky f e e l in g  wdiich i s  m a g ica l,  
a t  one end, and fI'om the  sense  of th e  sublim e which i s  
a r t i s t i c ,  a t  th e  other® b u t ,  when v/e r e l a t e  i t  to  the 
a b s o lu te  v a lu e  of the s a c re d ,  we see a t  once t h a t  i t s  awe 
has a  qua 11%'" d i f f e r e n t  from d read , ami i t s  rev e ren c e  from 
th e  souse of th e  sublime# * . ® I f  i t  i s  a fee linp ; w hich 
i s  w holly  d i r e c t e d  tow ards our own ad v an tag e , i t  i s  n o t 
th e  sense  of th e  holys i f  i t  has to  do w ith  incom parable 
v a lu e ,  to  which d e s i r e s ,  convenience and p r o f i t  must be 
s u b o rd in a te g i n  th e  p re se n ce  of a r e a l i t y  b e fo re  which one 
may n o t seek h i s  oim p le a s u r e  o r  walk a f t e r  the  im a g in a tio n  
o f  h i s  ovai h e a r t ,  i t  i e . "
Besides," th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between " n a tu ra l"  and " sa c re d "  v a lu e s
Qimu a l s o  makes a d i s t i n c t i o n  between " n a tu ra l"  and " id e a l"  v a lu e s
The illegal v a lu es  a r e  th e  v a lu e s  t h a t  can be sumiued up a s  th e  t r u e ,
2th e  b e a u t i f u l  and th e  good*
1 o I,hi c l e m , pp • 6 l  f  *
2 « Cf # I h i d e m , « , p  *140 *
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Tîiose valiioB a r e  r e l a t e d  to  aacrod v a lu e s  and to  th e
A» Ejg*i*jiwwarrw di yniif-iti-o*
Super n a t u r a l , Imt t h a t  does no t mean t î i a t  sacred  v a lu e s  a rc
i d e n t i c a l  w ith  id e a l  va lues#
I t  m ight be more c o r r e c t  to  say  t h a t ,  a s  Oman conce ives  of
i t ,  th e  sa c re d  i a  th e  sphere  where idea), v a lu e s  can a r i s e ,  because
■} 2
i t  i s  where we can becorae f r e e  from th e  m erely  n a tu ra l" '^  "#
Thox-efore, we can say t h a t  id e a l  v a lu e s  a r e  " su p o r im tu ra l  i n  th e
sense  t h a t  l o y a l ty  to  them i s  concerned w ith  a w orth  Ijeyond a l l
m ere ly  na t n r a l  va lue
1. Cfo Ib idem ,» , p*92#
2« v/e may %) or haps say t h a t  " sa c red "  i s  a w ider concep t than  " id e a l"  
i n  t h i s  c o n te x t ,  because i t  may s t i l l  be a ont e th in g  c o n c re te ,  
m a te r ia l  which has th e  c h a r a c te r  of be ing  sacred, of a b s o lu te  i n  
valueo Hut i t s  sacrodnesB o r  a1>solutone8s has  a l r e a d y  taken  us  
away from th e  com jiarativo w orth , and bhus made i t  p o s s ib le  t h a t  
id e a l  v a lu e s  can a r i s e #
3# Ibidem , p . 208#
4* Ive must n o t ,  however, ta k e  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between n a tu ra l  and
id e a l  v a lu e s  to  mean t h a t  they can be t o t a l l y  s e p a ra te d  and t h a t  
th e re  i s  no r e l a t i o n  between them * On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  Oman ho lds  
t h a t  "we canno t have sound n a tu r a l  v a lu e s  q u i t e  a p a r t  from r i g h t  
id e a l  v a l u e ( p . l A l ) ,  and t h a t  **th e re  i s  no b reak  in  p r i n c i p l e  
between n a tu r a l  and id e a l  v a lu e s .  Nor i s  th e re  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  f o r  
th e  h ig iior v a lu e s  of th e  îsbit n r a l  a l r e a d y  m a n ife s t  the  id e a l*
Bo til may d ea l  w i th  th e  same f a c t s ,  and may d i f f e r  w ith  d i f f e r e n t  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  and th e r e  be u n c e r t a in ty  and even m is take  ab o u t 
e i t h e r , ■a lth o u g h  th e r e  i s  an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  way of judg ing  
■\diat we tak e  to  be of sa c re d  o b l ig a t io n  and what we ta k e  to  be 
m erely  of expediency  and co n v en ien ce ."  (p*209)o
This r e l a t i o n  between n a tu ra l  and id e a l  v a lu e s  co rresponds  i n  
a v/ay to  th e  r e l a t i o n  between th e  N a tu ra l  and th e  S u p e rn a tu ra l  i n  
g e n e ra l ,  f o r ,  a s  Oman sees  i t ,  the su p e rn a tu ra l  i s  m a n ife s te d  
th rough  th e  N atu ra l*  ( ib id e m )*
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But mot im the  sense  t h a t  th e  c la im  which tliey la y  npon ub 
i s  d e r iv e d  from tlie P u p e rn a tn ra l  o r  from r e l i g i o n  a s  an e x te rn a l  
a u t h o r i t y .  The v a in e s  should ho sougiit f o r  t h e i r  own sak e . To 
say t h a t  tiioy a r e  sn p erm atn ra l i s  to  ex p ress  something abou t th e  
c h a r a c te r  of t h e i r  c lo in i§not to  t r y  and j n s t i f y  i t  hy a r e f e r e n c e  to  
som ething e l a e #
"Both th e  sense  of th e  h o ly  and th e  jndp;ezimnt of th e  
sacred  a r e  va^'s o f  l i v i n g  in  th e  h ig h e r  environm ent we c a l l  
th e  Super n a tu r a l  5, and a r i g h t  judgement, or i n  o th e r  words 
a %'ight sense  of i t  and a r i g h t  l i v i n g  in  i t ,  a r c  n e c e ssa ry  
f o r  a r i g h t  knowing of it® #»o Yot d i r e c t l y  no q u e s t io n  of 
t r u t h ,  beau ty  o r  goodnossis  to  be determ ined by th e  
Supexmiatural* ».# B e l ig io n  may n o t la y  dows t h e i r  r u l e s ,
b u t  a l s o  i t  may n o t  en fo rc e  them by e x te rn a l  m o tiv e s . * * *
N e v e r th e le s s ,  a l l  a b s o lu te n e s s  . * .  i s  from b e in g  i n  th e  
?:ti|>ernaturalo •« . None th e  l e s s ,  only  i n  one way should  
t h i s  foe determined, by th e  B aperim tvira l, and t h a t  i s  by l i v i n g  
i n  i t  i n  i t s  own o rd e r  which i s  freedom . A ll  i t s  wortli 
depends on b e in g  f r e e l y  chosen , and we can e n te r  i t  on ly  a s  
we a r e  f r e e . "
¥ h a t  has been s a id  abou t th e  r e l a t i o n  between id e a l  v a lu e s  and 
th e  ^Supernatural ho lds  of th e  r e l a t i o n  between moî^ality i?i g e n e ra l  
and re li^pxm  or tlie natural®  I t  i s  from the  sobbo of th e
awesome h o ly , and th e  sense  of soi^iething a b s o lu te  i n  v a lu e ,  t h a t  
a l l  m o ra l i ty  s p r in g s .  H i s t o r i c a l l y ,  to o ,  the  awesome ho ly  Imo 
developed in to  moral r e # o re n c e ,  Oman holds®^"
1 o Ib id  cm, 0 , %)p e 309f .
2o  Cfo Ibidem, p .62#
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This does n o t  mean t h a t  th e  sense  of th e  holy i s  more moral
reverence*  " I t  i s  th e  sense of th e  P u p e rn a tn r a l , and only
becomes moral rev e re n c e  because of th e  moral n a tu re  of t h i s  
I
eiwi romîient " ® '
" I t  i s  n ec essa ry  to  d is t i r ig n is l i  what r e l i g i o n  p ro v id es  
f o r  m o ra l i ty  d i r e c t l y  from what i t  should  p rov ide  on ly  
in d i r e c t l y o  D i r e c t l y ,  i t  p ro v id e s  only th e  sphere  i n  %/hi oh 
p e rso n s  have a b s o lu te  im r th  and dn tdes  have sacred  o b l ig a t io n *  
As, %fith.ont b o th ,  th e r e  i s  no m o r a l i ty ,  no m o ra l i ty  t h a t  16 
t r u l y  moral i s  n o n - r e l ig io n s ;  and a s  lb ore i s  no r e l i g i o n  
widch does n o t  p ro v id e  t h i s  sp h e re ,  th e re  i s  none which i s  
non-m ora l. But i d e a l s  and m otives  r e l i g i o n  sliould p ro v id e  
on ly  in d ire c t ly ®  When, in  th e  name of r e l i g i o n ,  r u l e s  ai/e 
l a i d  dtnm by a u t h o r i t y  and enforced  by hope of b l i s a s  and 
f e a r  of , we have n e i t h e r  r e l i g i o n  nor m orality"^®
R e lig io n  i s  thus n o t  th e  e x te r n a l  a u t h o r i t y  %/hicli imposes
o b l ig a t io n ,  b u t  th e  sphere  i n  %*;hich v a lu es  end o b l ig a t io n s  m a id fe s t
them selves a s  a b s o lu te ,  where th e y  them selves ta k e  ho ld  of iiso
" In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e ,  r e l i g i o n  i s  a l i f e  w i th in ,  a 
t r a n s a c t i o n  of Lhe s o n l ;  and a s  such embraces a l l  the 
I 'lhysical f u n c t io n s .  I t  i s  n o t  only an id e a ,  a d iscern ing ; 
and knovv’in g ,  o r ,  i f  %/e sjxeak c r i t i c a l l y ,  an o p in io n ,  a 
c o n v ic t io n ,  b u t  a l s o  a  co n sc io u sn ess  of %;orth, a f e e l i n g ,  
a sense  of b e in g  taken possesB ion  of and of s e l f - s u r r e n d e r ,  
and f u r t h e r ,  in ^acco rd  thoro%/ith, a w i l l i n g  and 
accom plishing*
1 @ I b i d e m , p #64®
fcav.ti»l^*Éüi.i*rtL**ywe^V4» f  A
2 .  Ibidem, m},38?fo
3 .  Xî>i dem, p • 1 3  «
Tiîo d e c is iv e  a s p e c t  of dman's victor, i n  x 'c la l io n  to  our 
problem  i s  n o t ,  hm^/ever, th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  he makes ho "Ween 
" n a tu r a l " ,  " sac red "  and " id e a l"  v a lu e s ,  nor th e  r e l a t i o n  he f in d s  
betw een tlienu
t h a t  i s  of iiitex*C’Bt to  us i s  f i r s t  of a l l  the  vmy i n  %-ddcb 
he makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t ,  whenever ve  a re  concerned x d th  o b ta in in g  
knowledge of any " o b je c t i v e " ,  w hether %-;o c a l l  i t  "N a tu ra l"  or 
"^’u p ern a tu i’a l " ,  yje cannot hope to  g e t  to  knm-/ i t  %sd.thoiit being  
concerned i . i t h  th e  value i t  has f o r  us®
1This i s  %diat was in t î ic a to d  in  th.e passage quoted above ,
%<;here Oman says t h a t  th e  N a tu ra l  and tl ic  s u p e rn a tu ra l  a re  
d i s t in g u is h e d  by the %%%y i n  %-/hxc1i. got  to  knot'/ them, i o e .  
t h e i r  moa-ning .or y a l u e , and t h a t  th e  n a tu ra l  v'orld i s  k.nm^ n^ by 
i t e  com parative v a lu e s ,  a s  i s  the  s u p e rn a tu ra l  v o r ld  by i t s  sa c red  
or  a b s o lu te  values®
I t  i s  thus in  Oman's b a s ic  theo ry  of knowledge t h a t  wo must 
seek  an, u n d e rs ta n d in g  of h i s  co n cep tio n  of values®
To s e p a r a te  .îoiowledge from v a lu a t io n  means to  impose an 
a b s t r a c t i o n  ifliich viLblates th e  ex p e rien ce  throiipji id iich  an y th in g  
i a  Imoinio
l o  p .  2 2 4 ,
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know a l l  env ironm ent, n o t  as  Im pact o r  p h y s ic a l  
in f im e ,  h u t  a s  meaning; and t h i s  meaning depends on
il )  th e  un ique c h a r a c t e r  of th e  f e e l in g  i t  c r e a t e s ;2 ) th e  miiqno v a lu e  i t  has  f o r  u s ;  (3 )  th e  immediate c o n v ic t io n  of a  s p e c ia l  k in d  of o b je c t iv e  r e a l i t y ,  which 
i s  in s e p a ra b le  from t h i s  v a lu a t io n ;  and ( 4 ) th e  n e c e s s i t y  
of  th in îîing  i t  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  r e s t  o f e x p e r i e n c e  and 
th e  r e s t  of e x p e r ie n c e  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  i t " " * " *
And a s  a co n c ise  e x p o s i t io n  of t h i s  vieif th e  fo l lo w in g  passage
i s  w orth  q u o tin g  i n  f u l l s
" I im l l  e x p e r ie n ce  th e s e  fo u r  a s p e c ts  ai'o i n d i v i s i b l y  
jo in e d  i n  one, and each lo s e s  i t s  s ig n i f i c a n c e  i n  i s o l a t i o n .  
The f e c l i h g  depends on th e  v a lu e ,  ami th e  v a lu e  on th e  
f e e l i n g ;  c o n v ic t io n  of r e a l i t y  i a  n o t an  a d d i t io n a l
in f e r e n c e ,  b u t  th e  v a lu a t io n  depends on th e  c o n v ic t io n  of 
r e a l i t y ,  and th e  c o n v ic t io n  of r e a l i t y  on th e  c o r r e c tn e s s  
of t h e  v a lu a t io n ;  th e  th in k in g  o f  i t  i n  i t o  p la c e  i n  our 
whole ex p e r ien ce  i a  n o t  a f t e r  we have re c e iv e d  i t ,  b u t  i s  
uecessaxy  f o r  r e c e iv in g  i t ,  and e s s e n t i a l  to  th e  c o n v ic t io n  
of i t s  r e a l i t y #  These e lem ents  a r e  th e  same f o r  th e  
ex p e r ien ce  of th in g s  p h y s ic a l  as  f o r  th e  ex p e r ie n ce  of 
th in g s  s p i r i t u a l .  What d is t in ^ ^ i is h e s  r e l i g i o n  from a l l  
e l s e  i a  tlie un ique  q u a l i t y  of th e  f e e l i n g ,  of th e  v a lu a t io n ,  
of th e  n a tu re  of th e  o b j e c t ,  and th e  %my of th in is ing  th in g s  
to g e th e r"#
I* SE î- JS Ü ul P '5 8 .
2* Cf# p#3%# %'/here Oman saye of th e  ex p e r ien ce  of r e a l i t y
t h a t  i t  "comes a s  meaning, n o t  a s  im pact; and meaning i s
v a lu e ;  and v a lu e  i n  th e  end dppeiids upon f e e l in g s  y e t  i t  i s
n o t  upon mere f o o l in g ,  b u t  upon r i g h t  th in k in g  and a c t in g  i n  
r e l a t i o n  to  i t " .
3* IM âS ïl t  P»58.
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Tills irap lies  t h a t  to  apeak of knowledge of something means 
to  r e f e r  to  an ex p e r ien ce  where t h e  aspect#  of meaning, value
and r e a l i t y  a r e  r e a l l y  in sep a ra b le .
In h h o r t ,  Oman can say t h a t  " r i g h t  valu es are r i g h t  
Iknowing # « #" «
I t  i s  im portant to  p o in t out t h a t  Oman holds t h i s  to  app ly  
a l s o  to  the percep tion  of p h y s ic a l  th in g s , of# the s ta te m e n t  t h a t  
" a l l  p e rc e p t io n  concerns meaning, and th e re fo r e  the  r e a l i t y  of
n a t u r a l  v a lu e s 20
This i s  why th e r e  can he no knowledge <^1 th o u t  i n t e r e s t ,  an 
i n t e r e s t  which i s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  a l s o  o f  sense  p e r c e p t io n .
"A ll p e r c e p t io n  of a l l  l i v i n g  c r e a tu r e s  from th e  
b eg in n in g  lias been  developed hy i n t e r e s t ,  and i n t e r e s t  
has embedded i n  i t  v a lue-judgem en t I and t h e i r  p e rc e p t io n  
l i a s  advanced, a s ,  hy s in c e r e  l i v i n g  in  t h e i r  environm ent, 
th e y  have t e s t e d  i t s  values® They do n o t  m erely  p r e f e r  
one th in g  to  a n o th e r  because l i f e  i s  ifhat i t  i s ,  h u t l i f e  
i s  what i t  i s  because  the  v a lu e s  of environment a r e  what 
th e y  a r e .  . . .
A t r u e  v a lue-judgem en t i s  thus  a judgement o f  r e a l i t y ;  
and , what i s  more, no k ind  of judgement ever was foî^mecl 
excep t from knowledge lA ich  d e r iv e d  i t s  meaning from v a lu e ,  
nor would man ta k e  th e  t ro u b le  to  form any o th e r  k in d  o f  
judgement e x c ep t  f o r  v a lu e  a l re a d y  determ ined"^*
1 o Ib idem , .  ^ n . 293®
2 . Ibidem . n« 206.
3 0 I b i  fl mi,  p . 2 0 2 .
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This i n t e r e s t  i s  n o t  p r e s e n t  o n l y  w hen  th e r e  i s  a se a rch  
f o r  id e a l  v a l u e s ,  to  u se  Oman ' @ te rm , b u t  a l s o ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,
i l l  th e  w h o le  range  o f  i n t e r e s t s  w h ic h  determ ine the  s c i e n t i s t ' s  
work®
"A ll l i f e ,  a t  a l l  e v e n t s ,  has d e a l t  w i t h  th e  w o r ld  
o n l y  b y  i n t e r e s t ,  an d  t h e  w o r ld  d o e s  n o t  seem to  h a v e  
r e s p o n d e d  t o  an y th in g  e l s e  a l l  dow n t h e  ageso Am! to  
th e  h ig h e r  I n t e r e s t s  o f  t r u t h  and beauty  a n d  g o o d n e s s  i t  has 
r e s p o n d e d  m o s t .  Even th e  s c i e n t i s t ,  to  quo te  P ro f .  W ii t e h e a d  
a g a in ,  i s  a k in d  o f  a r t i s t ,  s u s t a i n e d  i n  h i s  l a b o u r s  b y  the 
i d e a l  of f i n i s h  and p e r f e c t i o n  i n  h i s  work* And, o n  th e  
lo w es t grounds of u t i l i t y ,  s c i e n c e  w o u ld  h a v e  no  u se s  w e r e  
t h e r e  n o  v a l i d i t y  b e y o n d  t h e  m ere  m e c h a n ic a l  w o r ld  w h ic h  
s c ie n c e  has been s u p p o s e d  t o  p r o v e  t o  b e  a l o n e  r e a l "  .
Tliie i n t e r e s t ,  th e n ,  i s  n o t a c o n s t r u c t io n  o r  shaping of tlio
e n v ir o n m e n t  ac co rd in g  to  p e r s o n a l  l i k e s  o r  d i s l ik e s #  I t  i s
more l i k e  an openness to  th e  meaning of the  env ironm en t, o r  a
w i l l i n g n e s s  to  r e s p o n d  t o  i t  by e v a lu a t in g  i t  r i g h t l y ®
"T hus t h e  t o  r e c e i v e  th e  ivdtuess of a l l  r e a l i t y  
i fo u ld  seem to  be a mind c o n c e r n e d  lo know  t h e  o b j e c t  b y  
v a l u i n g  i t  a r i g h t , an d  t h i s  goes back e v e n  to  s e n s a t i o n ,
making i t  a t r u e  re sp o n se  to  t h e  v/itnoBs o f  r e a l i t y " ^ ®
T h ere fo re ,  Oman ad h e res  to  tlie  view t h a t  th e  mind p la y s  an  
a c t i v e  p a r t  i n  c o g n i t i o n .  A c t i v i t y  i s  n o t in v o lv ed  o n l y  %vliem i t s  
i n t e r e s t  i s  d i r e c t e d  to w a r d s  a l t e r i n g  t h e  w orld  f o r  som e purpose*
1 Ô JÜ2MÊ&  ^* p#6«
2 o Ï bide m , p ®141,
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The a c t i v i t y  of th e  mind i s  a l s o  d i r e c te d  towards knowing
th e  w o r ld , 'by " respond ing  to  im p ress io n s  j u s t l y  and com pletely"^*
That i a  to  aay, no knmfledge i s  re c e iv e d  p a s s iv e ly ,  b u t
n e i t h e r  i s  i t  a c r e a t i o n  of th e  mind * Meaning i s  g iv e n , b u t  we
2m ust a c t i v e l y  i n t e r p r e t  I t  a s  onr o%m f o r  i t  to  become onts®”"
"On th e  one hand, onr knowledge canno t be a p u re ly  
m ental c r e a t i o n ;  and , on th e  o th e r ,  i t  canno t be a mere
e f f e c t  of an oxitvmnl cause o r  a mere r e f l e c t i o n  p a s s iv e ly ,  
a s  i n  a m i r r o r ,  of an ontivard r e a l i t y o N e ith e r  th e  appeal 
to  mind, no r  th e  a f f i r m a t io n  of o b je c t iv e  r e a l i t y  may be 
perm anently  ig n o red  w ith o u t  d i s t o r t i n g  o a r  view of th e  
N a tu ra l  I and th e  s tu d y  of th e  -Aipernatural has been s t i l l  
more d i s a s t r o u s l y  a f f e c t e d  by re g a rd in g  only  one aspect© 
ivnowledge i s  tak en  to  be e x c lu s iv e ly  a  mental c o n s t r u c t io n ,  
any co rrespondence i t  may have M t h  r e a l i t y  hav ing  to  be 
proved by something a p a r t  from our experience  i t s e l f ;  o r  
our knowledge i s  tak en  to  'be imposed w holly  from w l th e u t ,  
and to  be t r u e  i n  p ro p o r t io n  a s  i t  r e q u i r e s  n o - ta s k  of 
m m roness and u n d e rs ta n d in g  o r  any kind of a c t i v e  d e a l in g  
i t  on o u r  own part® In  n e i t h e r  case  can our knowing 
be t r u l y  knowledge*
1 . C f. . p . «04.
8 . C f. p . 4 9 9 .  "Another argument i s  t h a t ,  a s  ws r e c e iv e
kno%/ledge of the N atu ra l  p a s s iv e ly  a t  the bottom of th e  ladder 
of our kno%flng, so may i eccivc knowledge of th e  supernatu ral 
p ass iv e ly  a t  the top® This ®*® i s  m erely  a very  a n c ie n t  e r ro r .  
Our id iole s tudy of per cep tio n  has shown t h a t  even th e  lo ife s t  
percep tion  i a  an a c t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  th e  meaning d o u b t le s s  
given, b u t becoming oiira only as we a c tiv e ly  in te rp r e t  i t  a s  
our own® knowledge i s  j u s t  a c t i v i t y  of the mind, and a p a s s iv e  
kiKmledge i s  a c o n tra d ic tio n  i n  term s".
^35
Nor i s  I t  enough to  bold  the  so two a s p e c ts  to g e th e r  
and n o t  to  n e g le c t  e i t h e r . In  our a c t iv e  l i f e  they a r e  
in t im a te ly  one® The more our minds a re  a c t i v e ,  the 
g r e a t e r  th e  a s su ra n c e  t h a t  our knowledge i s  o b j e c t i v e |  
and the s t r o n g e r  raid more < tirec t tlie im p ress io n  of the  
r e a l i t y  fl the  more our minds a r e  s t i r r e d  to  a c t i v i t y  
concern ing  it® Only in  t h i s  in t im a te  u n i ty  can we ^ver hopo 
to  f in d  any l i ^ h t  on our knowledge of r e a l i t y ,  n a tu r a l  o r  
s u p e r n a tu r a l " ®"
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t ,  on t h i s  view, a "knowledge of f a c t s "  wliieh
2can be contrasted  th "evaluation" ,  i s  inconceivoJile® "
V/lth regard to the response to the world, by which only we can 
kno\’/ i t ,  i t  should be pointed out th a t  i t  i s  not an i so la te d  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  activity® I t  i  s something with %/hich the whole
ir 4V <i' n My. atOir xKrssrtis. fld “
person i s  concerned#
’H/e kno%'/ ouï* environm ent only  as  wa r i .g b t ly  l i v e  
i n  i t ;  and we r i s e  to th e  e ig h t  of I t s  meaning 
a c co rd in g  to the  k in d  of persons  we a re"3 * 4 .
1 o » fl j>p. llOfe
2o Cfo Ibidem,,* v)©l69s "" 'ensa t ions  and nhysica l  im p a c t s , ao
d i s c r e t e  i s o l a t e d  f a c t s ,  a r e  unknown, f o r  a l l  I,h a t  g i v e s  them  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s  j u s t  t h e  p a r t  t h e y  p l a y  i n  t h e  w o r ld  o f  
m e a n in g  and r a t i o n a l  e x p e r i e n c e o  rven i f  s c i e n c e  r e d u c e s  t h e  
p h y s i c a l  f a c t s  t o  v i b r a t i o n s ,  w h a t  i s  m o s t  im p o r ta rr t  a b o u t  tîiem.  
m u et  b e  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  i n  a  c o n t e x t  o f  m e a n i n g , and t h a t  b e  W e e n  
them and s e n s a t i o n  t h e r e  i s  not mere p a s s i v e  s u b j e c t i o n  b u t 
a c t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  them a s  meaning"®
3 e Ibidem,, ,  p ®2 04#
4o Of# Ilddem, ].)«71j r ig h t ly  kno%^? any (nndronmcnit only %-.'hGn we
have a mind to  perceive i t  a r ig h t  and a w ill  to use  i t  iv e l l" .
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That 1b to  say , to  know th e  world i s  a q u e s t io n  of l i v i n g  
i n  i t  i n  ftiich a way t h a t  one ex p e c ts  to  eec what th e r e  r e a l l y  i s  
to  eeoc
UecauBe m easuring  of q u a n t i t y  i s  one way of managing; the
woi'ld, a)id th e r e fo r e  judgements o f  i t  seem ves^y conv inc ing , i t  i s
p o s s ib le  to  In- m is lead  by a view which l im i t s  th e  sneaning, which
Jenvi rormaeat manj. t e s t s ,  to  qna n t i  ty  * 
ho wove?.",
**tho f i r s t  ta .sk , even f o r  managing onr w orld , i s  to  he sur© 
t h a t  we a e tu a l l j^  see th e  world and th e  f u l l n e s s  t h e r e o f <,
For t h i s  th e  f i r s t  q u e s t io n  i s  w hether we a r e  so liv ing ; in  
our n a tu r a l  environm ent t h a t  we can expect to  hcsve the 
normal n a tu ra l '  v a lu e s  by which, we could p e rc e iv e  what i s  
h ig h e s t  and g r e a t e s t  i n  it'*#*
knowledge of th e  environm ent i s  p o s s ib le  on ly  i f  we have th e  
r i g h t  aw aren ess , vdiich i s  th e  power to  a p p re c ia te o  And t h i s  i s  
on ly  a n o th e r  way of say in g  t h a t  th e  ex p e rien ce  of tlie environm ent in  i t s  me; 
o r  v a lu e s  i s  dependent u])on our re sp o n se ,  or our a t t i tu d C e
lo This I s  vhat iiappens Cogo when one thinl^s th a t  science can
prov ide  a worlfh»vicws "Science  se rv es  i t s  purpose p r e c i s e l y  
by i t s  l im i ta t io u o  I t s  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  i t  ex tends a 
p rocess  of a r r e s t i n g  and s te r e o ty p in g  which has a l re a d y  begun 
i n  p e rc e p t io n ;  t l i a t  i t  e n la rg e s  man’ s p r a c t i e a l  management of 
h i s  world by i s o l a t i n g  ip ia n t i ty  from a l l  e l s e ,  bo th  the  mind 
t h a t  knows and th e  v a r ie d  meaning l)y idiioh i t  know's; and t h a t  
i t  goes behind a i l  meaning the  w orld  m a n ife s ts  to  f in d  th e  means 
whereby v/c can make th e  world speak our moaningo Thu?' i t  Ig  an 
e f f e c t i v e  in s t ru m e n t  p r e c i s e ly  because i t  i s  n o t  f i t t e d  to  
p ro v id e  a  cosmology" ï^tdem p , , po2!>7o
2* ib idem , p*204«
« jivratrafceew eitif-lL^e»* ^
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" i t  i s  c e r t a i n  t h a t  n o th in g  does re v e a l  i t s e l f  to  iia 
u n le s s  we ta k e  up th e  r i g h t  a t t i t u d e  to im rds i t ,  and 
t h i s  more concerns r i g h t  f e e l i n g ,  which means s e n s i t i v e  
anti s in c e r e  and o b je c t i v e  f e e l i n g ,  th a n  cvcjt r i g h t  
a c t i n g  o r  r i g h t  thinking® ke can n e i th e r  be a rgued  in to  
i t  o r d r i l l e d  in to  i t ,  and th e je  i s  im narrow er ed u c a tio n  
f o r  i t  th a n  the  wdiole of l i f e " '  @
And a la ck  of a p p r e c ia t io n  o r  re sp o n se  does n o t  mean j u s t
to  le av e  th in g s  "as th ey  are"® I t  i s  r a th e r  th e  la c k  of
a p p r e c ia t io n  (>je cou ld  a l s o  say "évalua.l i o n " ) wliich r e p r e s e n t s  th e
d i s t o r t i o n  of the  facts® For i t  means t h a t  we do n o t  a l low  l i f e
to  im%]ress us a s  i t  i s ,  b u t  " c o r ru p t  expe rien ce  a t  i t s  soiirce by
th e  absence of s im ple , d i r e c t ,  w h o le -h ea rted  re sp o n se  to  i t s  
2w itn e s s "  %
A d e n ia l  of p a r t  of r e a l i t y  may, th e r e f o r e ,  be j u s t  a
r e f l e c t i o n  of a la c k  of i n t e r e s t ,  or ap |. i re c ia t io n ,  as  i s  no
o f te n  the  re a so n  why th e  'Anpernatiiral i s  den ied  o r  ignored®^
1 o t b i d e m , p®211 ®
2o Ib ideau
3« Of 0 Ibidem , p ,7 4 ;  "Of any environment we imy bo unaware, e i t h e r  
because we have n o t  developed th e  i n t e r e s t s  i t  s e rv e s ,  a s  space 
to  a c r e a tu r e  w ith o u t m otion , o r  because i t  so c o n s ta n t ly  se rv o s  
them as  n o t  to  s t i r  any r e f l e c t i o n s ,  as  space to th e  an im als t h a t  
rove abou t in  it® A lso i t  i s  jjosB ible to  deny in  thooiy  what 
i s  b e l ie v e d  i n  p r a c t i c e  ® ® ® For any of th e se  rea so n s  th e
S u p e rn a tu ra l  can  be ignored® be may n o t  he seek ing  a n y th in g  i t
p ro v id e s ;  ve may so l i v e  and move and )mve onr be ing  in  i t  every  
day and a l l  day t h a t  because  i t  has f a i l e d  u s ,  wc have n o t
r e f l e c t e d  on i t ;  th e  b e l i e f  \k'0 p ro fe s s  may be one th in g ,  and th e  
b e l i e f  x/e a c t  on another"®
23 0.
I t  i s  n o t only th e  oriso t h a t  th e  la c k  of i n t e r e s t  nr ev en ts  
TIB from r e c e iv in g  th e  *hd.tnoBB of r e a l i t y " ;  i t  i s  a lso  o f te n  th e  
c a se  t h a t ,  “when we th in k  t h a t  ve. can ig n o re  i n t e r e s t  and
a p p r e c ia t io n ,  we intro<hiee i n t e r e o t s  widch o re  a l i e n ,  and th e r e f o r e
Si 2m is lead in g "*  This i s  t h e  f a t e  of bo many s t u d l e s  o f  r e l i g i o n  *
Fundam ontally , th e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  fnma-enoss of the env iroM exit
i n  i t s  v a in e s  I s  n o t ,  f o r  Oman, a q u e s t io n  of a r a t i o n a l  understanding®
At l e a s t  n o t  purely® I t  i s  r a t h e r ,  a s  we saw, a q u e s t io n  of r i g h t
3f e e l i n g  « F e e l in g ,  n o t  a s  s u b je c t iv e  em otions, b u t os on " u l t im a te
elemexit i n  e x p e r ie n c e " ,  which "canno t be exp la ined  hy an y th in g
"That f e e l in g  i s  the  way mind responds to  i t s  environm ent 
i s  an u l t ih ia te  f a c t  which bos m erely  to  be acce?>ted"5o^o
1 q Cf® Ibidem , ,  po6*
2o Gfo Ibideup , p«8; " In  r e s p e c t  of r e l i g i o n ,  more th an  any o th e r
s u b je c t ,  we can say t h a t ,  w i’thou t th e  r i g h t  i n t e r e s t  and a t t i t u d e
of mind, a i l  a t te m p ts  to  d i s t i a g u i s h  i t s  sphere  by d e f i n i t i o n  o r  
d e s c r ip t i o n  a re  vain"®
3o Cfo Cogo above, poE31, n o te  2®
4 ®  C f o  b p o  c i t e s  p o 2 0 4 o
5® Ibidem,^ n . l 8 8 .
6o I f  g on t h i s  view , we l e t  f e e l in g  p la y  an i.m pnttant p la c e  i n  our
th e 0)73^  of r e l i g i o n  t h i s  does no t moan t h a t  ve make of r e l i g i o n  a
p sy c h o lo g ic a l  m a tte y , or t h a t  we a s s e n t  to  an " e m o tiv is t"  th e o iy  
of r e l i g i o n ,  which d e s c r ib e s  i t s  meaning a s  j u s t  e x p re s s io n s  of 
emotion.so Cf ® op® c i t® , p*27s " I f  we look more c io s o ly  a t  tho 
t h e o r i e s  ef r e l i g i o n  a© e s s e n t i a l l y  of reaso n  o r  f e e l i n g  o r  w i l l  
we s h a l l  see t h a t  t h e r e  i s  one p o in t  on v/jiich they  o,re agreed®
They aro  m etaphysica l and n o t m erely psychological®  They ask  hmj 
environm ent i s  knoTm, and th e  p re s u p p o s i t io n  of them a l l  i s ,  t h a t  i t  i 
known by what i s  the r e a l l y  c r e a t i v e  elem ent in  a l l  knowledge*
To say g e n e ra l ly  t h a t ,  f o r  ;Schfè i e n m c h e r , r e l i g i o n  i s  fee l in g ; i s  to  
m iss h i s  c e n t r a l  conviEstioii, which i s  t im t  r e l i g i o n  has i t s  source  
i n  t h e  p e c u l i a r  f e e l i n g  o r  i n t u i t i o n  which i s  th e  c o n ta c t  w ith  i] 
u n iv e r s e  t h a t  c r e a t e s  a l l  e x p e r ien ce  of r e a l i t y " .
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v/liore he speaks of the two kinds of values, which may 
c a l l  th.e na tu ra l  and the id e a l ,  Oman holds th a t  i t  i s  p la in  th a t  
the  id ea l  values cannot be separated from the "ni  necri ty  of fe  e1i  UK 
hy which anything i s  r ig h t ly  xaalued and. so r ig h t ly  known"®
But :io3: both kinds of values a l ik e  " i t  i s  s in c e r i ty  of fe e lin g  
which a r r iv e s  a t  r ig h t  and o b je c t iv e  valvi.es, th e re  be ing  fo r  anything 
an fippreciation whicii i s  according t<> naùûre and a perversion which 
i s  no t, and a tru e  ob jec tive  sense of the n a tu ra l world i s  as
1dependent on th is  as a t ru e  oh joe live sense of tho supoia'u'itural" « 
That i s  to say, our apprehension or awareness of tho values 
of the enviroiiDient i s  a question  of an immedic.te experience®
I t  i s  here th a t  t r a d i t io n a l  a e s th e t ic  th e o r ie s  f a i l ,  according 
to  dmauo
"None of the t r e a t i s e s  on the suhlivne and bixuutiful 
have in  tj\em much to help ub, because tivey a re , mostly a t  
least*  ïleterKiiîUui by the . r a t io n a l is t  view th a t  everything 
must be j u s t i f i e d  by the understanding* whereas a l l  our 
argujuent has been tiu it i t  must be determined by the true  
nature  of our whole environment, and that means by 
in tu i t io n s  and a n t ic ip a t io n s  vdiich go fa r  beyond what v e  
ca.u s e t  in  the c le a r  hard l i g h t  of the um^erstondingo 
I t  concerns prim arily  what we have suggested a.bout 
perception* th a t  i t  i s  l ik e  personal in te rcou rse  w)ieii speech 
i s  more than a s e t  of Bymbois to be in te rp re le d ,  something 
beyond the more expression of the  speaker and th.e sympathetic 
response of the h ea re r ,  vdien every word Itas in i t  sometlfing 
of the whole mind of the speaker and some d i r e c t  sense of
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ii t  i n  the  h e a re r "  *
In  l i n e  w ith  t h i s  view Oman s t i l l  wants to  make use of the
concep t of co n sc ien ce  in  h i s  th e o ry  of morals® I t  seems t h a t
a d i r e c t  sense  of v a lu e s  can be a s c r ib e d  to  i t *
îkit n o t in  tho sense t h a t  i t  i s  in f a l l ib le ®  I t  i s  i t s e l f
i n  need o f  oduca tlo ïi ,  b u t  by n o th ing  e) so th an  ex p e r t  once i t s e l f *
th rough  which r e a l i t y  i s  ml1owed to  m a n ife s t  i t s  xmlues®
T h ere fo re ,  though th e  v e r d i c t s  o f  consc ience  a r e  n o t  f i n a l ,  they
should  s t i l l  be regarded  as  fuic3*ed and demanding a b s o lu te  loyalty®
For th e  "very  pT irsuit o f  more } ig h t  r e q u i r e s  a b s o lu te  l o y a l ty  to
2th e  l i g h t  we have" \
" i f  i n  l o y a l ty  to  th e  a b s o lu te  req u irem eu t of  the  sa c re d ,  
i n  courageous freedom fo.llowing I t s  guidance and t r u s t i n g  
i t s  power* we s ta n d  on our f e e t  and a llow  exporionce  to  
speak f o r  u s ,  ® ® we can hope to  f in d  what j u s t l y  c la im s 
aï)8 0 l u t e  v a lu e  because i t  i s  our t r u e  environm ent in  
v.diich we f in d  our t r u e  se3 v es"3 .
I t  i s  our c o n v ic t io n  t h a t ,  i f  we a r e  to g ive  a c o n s i s t e n t  
t h e o r e t i c a l  accoun t of tlie meaning of ct'iiica.l language, we have to  
r e t u r n  to  a vay  of th in k in g  which, l i k e  d® Omau*s, f i i i d a i t  
im p o ss ib le  to  speak of lo ca li ty  a ;)a r t  from i t s  values®
lo Ibidem, p®210o
2® Ibidem , p*317o
3 o Xhid0ÎÎI, p#323*
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Isfi eonolusioH*
The lino of argument in  the t l ies is  has been a<f f(>llo3-/s;
A stu<ly of the conception of e%hicM im tho w ri t ings  of 
lUrU Hare, wliom we chose as txn exponent of contemporary so-ca l led  
l i n g u i s t i c  philosophy in  the f i e ld  of icthics, br/mght out the 
fo 11 owl Dg vi mv :
The task of ethics* i*o* the work of the moral phiIoso;;her, 
i s  no t to discuss su bs tan t ia l  moral problems font to d is c lo s e  the 
log ica l  s t ru c tu re  of uioral languagGo }’’or i t  i s  F a re ’s view th a t  
moral lungnage has a form which can he exposed independently of any 
discussion of the c o n te n t  of mor-alityo This forsi^al s t ru c tu re  of 
moral language can he. knmni ti^rougli a study of tlic ac tua l  use of 
t h i s  language®
'i1ic:re are two fomml c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of raoral language, Hare 
Bays, naiaely p r e s c r i p t i v i t y  and un iv e rsa l ix a fo i l i ty ® The f i r s t  of 
the two expresses the formal meaning of moral language as th a t  of 
prescribi.Uk ac tions .  (maidng moral language, vhen i t  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  used, a su'b-elags of value language* which i s  
in  tu rn  one s o r t  of p re sc r ip t iv e  language * What gives \xiluo 
language i t s  evaluative meaning i s ,  according to dare ,  i t s  
p re so r ip t lv i ty o  to th a t  the evaluative meaning of value language
1l e  i d e n t i c a l  i t s  p r e s c r i p t i v e  meaning ) ,  That 3 s to  say ,
when a moral judgement i s  made, t h i s  weans t h a t  th e  speaker  i s  
presc37ibiiig a c e r t a i n  a c t io n *  And t h a t  in  h i s  p re sc r ib in g *  though 
ho way have h i s  rea so n s  f o r  p ro s c r ib in g  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  a c t i o n ,  he 
i s  l o g i c a l l y  f r e e  to  p r e s c r ib e  any action®
1-,very  th in g  t h a t  i s  d i s t i n c t i v e l y  moral i n  tlie meaning of a 
mo3"al jiuigriDaent i s  t o t a l l y  independen t ( l o g i c a l ly  independen t)  o f  
the n a tu re  of th e  a c t im i  which i t  a c t u a l l y  p re sc r ib e s*
The second form al p r in c ip l e  of moral language, u n iv e rs a l  i n a b i l i t y *  
se rv e s  a s  a r a t i o n a l  check on the moral jiui'p.ements of the  sp e a k e r ,  
ioCo i t  en su res  t h a t  he i s  c o n s i s t e n t  and does no t rirescs’iho  
d i f f e r e n t  a c t io n s  in  s i t u a t i o n s  which a re  s im ila .r  in  a l l  r e l e v a n t  
a a p o c ts ,  t h a t  i s  to  say , un i e ss  he has changed h i s  moral opinion®
I t  i s  liic f i r s t  of th e  two p r i n c i p l e s ,  ;>rescr i p t i v i t y ,  which 
i s  the  most importaivt fimm th e  p o in t  of view of ouj  ^ d isc u ss io n *
For i t  i s  presc :ri p ti v i t y  which makes moral language m o ra l , Hare 
holds* 1 *0*5 the  prim ary meaning of a moral jndgcmmit i s  th e  
p r e s c r ib i n g  of a c e r t a i n  a c t io n ,  f o r  which pz'c sc rib ing ; the r e  i s  no 
l o g i c a l  rea so n  in  the  a c tu a l  a c t i o n  i t s e l f  or i n  any of th e  f a c t u a l  
a s p e c t s  of th e  a c t i o n ,  e*g* some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of th e  a c t i o n  i t s e l f
1* Too ppo 2(1
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or some r e s u l t  i t  might have*
So hero we see th a t  Hare’ s main oonterition i s  to s t a t e  the 
lo g ica l  iiKl.e|>entience of moral judgeiaeuts (and value judgements 
in  general) frotji fa c tua l  statements*
And th is  means tluit Hare i s  es tab l ish ing  on formal nr omis ses ,  
(ioOo on the bas is  of a formal study of language) 3 h a t  has 
previously been held on various other premisses* lie holds th a t  there  
i s  no necessfuqy connection betv/eeii f a c t s  and values, or he (ween 
what i s  and what ought to ho, m' how i t  might luive been put*
in  th is  sépara tiou  of f a c t  and value hare i s  a t  oiu^  I'd.th the 
other rep resen ta t ives  of Xiuguielic jjhi * osopliy, and a lso  v-dtli the 
viev/s of the  log ica l  p o s i t i v i s t s  with which l i ru n i is t ic  philosophy 
i s  sometimes linked uuilc-r the common name "an a ly t ica l  philosophy", 
desp i te  a l l  the d iffe rences  in  mood and, terminology and a l s o  
ma 11ers of su.b s tance *
After having considered ILN* h a re ’ s view so f a r  we turned to 
a study of some recent  exponents of u ilicological e t h i c , including 
BV.Qh views as tfiose of *, # Ldgstnip, who elainis on a. theologica l  
bas is  th a t  there i s  no p a r t i c u l a r  i ;h r is t ian  ethic  apa r t  from a 
moral i ty  based on tha^  general human s i tu a t io n ,  and those of K* B arth  
and l'"o nruuncrj wlu> hold tha t  e th ics  i s  only possible on tlie bas is  
of the Christ-revelfit iono In  e i th e r  case we (lave got to do w ith  a
2 #
view of e th ic s  which im p lies another theory about the  moaning o f  
moral language than  th e  one p ro v id ed  by th e  a n a l y s t s .  And an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  on term s which a r e  com patib le  
w ith  the  separation  of f a c t  and va lue  c o n s t i tu t e s '  a  fundam ental 
b reak  w ith  an y th in g  t h a t  has h i t h e r t o  been meant by e th ic s  i n  a 
th e o lo g ic a l  c o n te x t .
This c o n f ro n ta t io n  of tiie e t h ic a l  theory of a n a ly tic a l  
philosophy w ith  various th e o lo g ic a l  views o f the  meaning of e th ic s  
prompted u s  to  a c lo se r  c r i t i c a l  a n a ly s is of II,M, F a r e ’ s accoun t of  
the meaning of moral language*
wixat we c la im  to  have shown in  t h i s  a n a ly s i s  i s  t h a t  the 
u n d e rs tan d in g  of the meaning of moral language, which b are  ho ld s  
th a t  he has arr ived  a t  by a study of th o  actu a l use of language* 
r e p r e s e n t s  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of langunge based on o th e r  p rem isses  
th a n  those o ffered  by language i t s e l f ,  That i s  to  sa y , what Hare 
c a l l s  the  lo g ic a l  s tru c tu re  o f moral language i s  r e a l ly  a stru ctu re  
imposed on t h i s  k ind  of language on e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c  grounds i n  the  
a c tu a l  process of a n a l y s i s .  The "form" of language which H are’ s 
a n a ly s i s  d i s c lo s e s  to  us i s  the  form which emerges when language i s  
s tu d ie d  on th e  b a s is  of a c e r t a i n  view of tho world and our knowledge 
of i t ,  and of th e  fu n c t io n  of language in  t h i s  w o rld , H are’ s 
s u b s t a n t i a l  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  views a r e  exibodied in  th e  very  concep ts  
which he u ses  f o r  a n a ly s in g  moral language, f i r s t  of a l l  th e  concepts
of " f a c t "  anti "v a lu e"  themselves®
That i s  to  s o y , th e  f o cl ia37acter i s t ic  of i-mral language 
which i s  exp ressed  in  the d i s u i d ty  ox f a c t  and va lue  d e r iv e s  from 
tho  co n te it t  i n  which moral language i s  ana lysed  *
]i’or undtnrlying Glare’ s a n a ly s i s  i s  th e  view t h a t  -what ve  can 
have knowledge of a r e  " f a c t s " as  something s e p a ra te  from th e  
f a c t o r ,  o r  f a c t o r s ,  which mntxe m o ra l i ty  moral* And t h a t  the 
in fo rm a t iv e  fu n c t io n  of language l i e s  in  3’eportiu;-; these " o b je c t iv e "  
f a c t s *  'GO t h a t  Bta/lomonts fUîOut them a rc  th e  only p o s s ib le  s ta te m en ts  
ab o u t ivhat th e r e  r e n i l y  " is "*  (w hether s ta tcm ta iis  abou t th e se  
f a c t s  r e q u i r e  a v e r i f i c a t i o n  i n  some lo o s e r  o r  s t r i c t e r  sense does
n o t a f f e c t  t h i s  axquimenta) In  t h a t  case  s c i e n t i f i c  languages i s  th e
p a i^ d ig in a tic  case  of c o g n i t iv e  language *
hut i f  t h i s  i s  th e  c o n te x t  i n  which piox'al lonauage i s  to  be
an a lysed  then I h e r e  i s  n o t  much l e f t  fo r  iuoral language to have b u t
" p r e s c r ip t iv e "  o r  some s im i l a r  kind of meaning, w ith  i t s  lo g ic a l  
independence Ibroitii "facts"®
What i f  one ho lds  t h a t  th e  n o tio n  of " f a c t s "  as des ttr ibed  above 
does n o t  ex p ress  a l l  th e re  " i s " ,  b u t  r a th o r  an a b s t r a c t i o n  fj'oni i t ?  
This a b s tx u c t lo n  laay have some purpose and v a l i d i t y  in  a c e r t a i n  
con tex t*  lîut the  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  tho c o n te x t  i n  x/hxch a l l  k ind  a of 
language a r c  to be understood  to t h i s  co n te x t  a lone  i s  cpiite  a r b i t r a r y ,  
ioGo u n le s s  ve o p e ra te  on the  b a s i s  of a c e r t a i n  view of th e  w orld  and 
o f  language*
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What Hare i s  doing  I s  to p o s tu l a t e  sojuethigg which he c a l l s
" fac ts"  and of which he claijiis tliat h is  pa-eseriblnp, of c e r t a in
ac t ions  i s  lo g ic a l ly  indejfendent (Cf® his  owxi statement th a t  i t
i s  enough th a t  he u se s  moral words p r e s c r i pl i v e l y  f o r  h i s th e o ry
of moral Iruigunge to ho tho c o r rec t  one)®
lint there i s  no reason \/hatsoever why one should accept
lUire’a ( e x p l i c i t  or im p l ic i t )  d e f i n i t i on  of " fac ts"  ami of
"proscripLivity"  as a b a s is  fo r  an a.tiàlysis of moral language and
of the moral jdienomonA which are  expressed in  it®
In o th e r  w r i t in g s  a p a r t  from h is  d i rec t  c o n i r i imt i o u s  to  th e
discussion  of  e thicb hare leuusolf Bcm-ts to be on the po in t  of
r e a l i s in g  th a t  the matter i s  not bo c le a r -c u t  as tiie fact™and“value
Boparation snggestsp and th a t  when we make a factual  statement wo
arc  not j u s t  labollin.?- some "objective fac t"  witlio. name * something
eiore i s  involvcuï, fo r  ve do not c a l l  smnething a " fac t"  unless ve
I"take up a c e r t a i n  a t t i t u d e  to tho world" * This would seem
to  open up a t  l e a s t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of a broader con tort  in  which 
moral language could bo iinderstoodo Mire’s ov^ n contril>utxon does 
not inke us very f a r ,  however* and f o r  two re a s o n s :  F irs t*  h is
thought a on the function of b l ik  and of re l ig io n s  b e l i e f  oj^e unre la ted
lo Fee above p,156o
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to  l i is  e t h i c a l  w r i t i n g s o And secondly* h is  t h o u g h t s  on those  
m a t te r s  a re  in c o n c lu s iv e  * n o t to say aaihiguous* Tîïey iUight foe 
in t e r p r e t e d  a s  im plying  t h a t  what wo c a l l  " f a c t s "  a re  in  th e  
l a s t  r e s o r t  c r e a t io n s  of the s u b je c t  (loOo of the  common Irxmn 
mind) * Hut t h i s  i s  i\a rd ly  h a r e ’ s view* - I t  mipht foe mere f a i r  
to  say th a t  f o r  hii?i th e  a t t i t i ic le  i n  q u e s t io n  cojcrcsponds to  som 
ab o u t Lhe '-oarldj b u t something otlir.i* Umn t.lie " f a c t s "  them se lves , i n  
th e  sense in  -which h are  p r e f e r s  to  use th e  word "fact"®
In any ease* i t  i s  lo foe d ep lo red  t h a t  Hare s t ops  s h o r t  o f  
a sk in g  whot t h i s  means f o r  oui' \fhole u n d e rs ta n d in g  of language and 
of moral language in  p a r l i e u la r *  s in c e  t h a t  i s  what .he has p r im a r i ly  been 
c one orned vith®
But s t i l l  th e se  thoughts by lUM® hare  c r e a te  a c e r t a i n  l i n k  
w ith  o th e r  t r e n d s  i n  r e c c u t  tl^ought, v h ic h  v.'oula seem to  o f f e r  a 
more ado- u a te  u n d ers ran d in g  o f  the  context, i n  which moral language 
fdiould ho axîÆil.; sed Uxin does h is  theoryo Fo Cog® coniemporary 
e x is  l e n t i a l  ana l y s i s  «
I t  v/ouid f30Ciu tJ’u t  hiiifian ex is tence , as Viore  a.nalysed, i s  the 
conlext vijere language has to be Biudiedo In the e x is te n t ia l  
aspec t of language a union, or u n ity ,  between fa c t  and val*.«o becomes 
possibleo Or ra tl ie r ,  necessary* For oltiiougji conventional values 
might be re je c te d  h j  e x i s t e n t i a l i s t  philosopher© there  s t i l l  emerges
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a  plienoBieiion o f  lamma e x i s t e n c e  w h i c h  i s  b o t h  c o n s t i t u t i v e  o f  
e x i s t e n c e  a n d  i t s e l f  a v a l u e  o r  a  c l a i m *  ^io re  o f t e n  t l i a n  n o t  
ÿ’,h i s  phenom enoi i  i s  " f r e e d o m " ®
I t  h a s  been .  l e f t  t o  t h e  e x p o s i t o r s  o f  t h e  g r e a t  l ' c p r e B c n t a t i v e e  
of a x i s  t C i i t i a l i s t  p h i l o s o p h y  t o  t r y  and ,  w o r k  o u t  inm-e © y s t c m ? a t i c a l l y  
w h a t  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n s  o f  î l i o  l a t t e r  m e a n  a n d  w h a t  t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
a r c ®  e f o u n d ,  r e a s o n  t o  d r a w  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  r o r k  o f  
J o h n  M a .c q u a )T x e  i n  t f d s  c u n n e c t i o n ®  h i s  u n J e r s  c a n a i n p ;  o f  t h e o l o g i c a l  
l a u g ^ i a g e  i s  b a s e d  o n  H e i d e g g e r ’ s  p l i D o s o p h y ,  a n d e i ' l i n i n g  i t s  
o n to lo g ic a l  aspects, a n d  a lso  drawing a l i n e  t o  elem ents i n  i d e a l i s t  
p l î i l o s o p h y ,  i n  c a s u  t h e  t ! i o u g h t s  o f  Hi* (Jrban o n  t h e  f u o a n i n g  o f
la, ligua g G o
M a o q u a r r i o  s t r e s s e s ,  w i t j i  t h a t  l a n g u a g e  i s  a n
e x i s t e n t i a l  i ) h e n o m o n o u  a n d  t h a t  i t  c a n n o t  b e  l U H h r s t o o d  a p a r t  from 
i t s  e x i s t e n t i a l  c o n t e x t ,  i oC® iJuim i t s  Immaîi c o n t e x t ,  " t h e  c o n t e x t  
o f  t h e  l i f e  a n d  ex p e rien ce s  o f  t h e  b e i n g s  who u s e  l a n g u a g e " ^ ®
p r i n c i p l e s of C h r i s i i a a  t heo lo g y , 1956, p * 1 3) ®
In c id en ta l ly ,  Maccpuirrie tUinIss t h a t  on t h i s  p o in t  th e re  in  a 
convergence o l' cxis len t la l ism  a,nd ] o,^\ical ana lys is  xdth i t s  
s'lresH on the u^e of language* Hut no convergence i s  r e a l ly  
possible  here* lo r  the ana lys ts  imagine i|i.e p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  an 
ana lys is  of the use of language per ae, by observing i t s  o v e r t  
behaviour, as i t  were, ioC® iriflepeudently of any and or standing 
of th e  c o n te x t  of t h i s  n a e ,  of human e x p e r ie n c e .  These
are exactly quest ions  v.-hich the logical ana lys ts  would blaim 
to  trauscc iid  with t h e i r  study of language®
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The modes of laiigiiago which ex p ress  i t s  e x i s t e n t i a l  elem ents
in t ro d u c e  such p e rso n a l  f a c t o r s  a s  v a lu a t io n ,  f e e l i n g  and i n t e r e s t *
But t h i s  does n o t  malce them non-oogn itivep  a s  M aequarrie sees  i t *
I f  tho dogmas of r e l i g i o n  e x p re s s  "an i n t e n t i o n  to  fo l lo w  a
p o l ic y  of a c t i o n ,  t h i s  i s  in s e p a ra b le  from th e  c o n v ic t io n  t h a t
suck a  p o l i c y  i s  bo th  demanded and supported  by the  s t r u c t u r e  o f
r e a l i t y " .  And "a lthough  e lem ents  of f e e l i n g  u n d e r l i e  them
f i , e ,  th e o lo g ic a l  s ta te m e n ts ]  i n  a way wiiieh i s  n o t  th e  case  w i th
s c i e n t i f i c  a s s e r t i o n s ,  th e se  a f f e c t i v e  e lem ents a ro  in s e p a ra b le
1from what a r e  bcMevecI to  be i n s i g h t s  i n t o  th e  way th in g s  ax'o" ,
Such e x i s t e n t i a l  language l i g h t s  up a s i t u a t i o n ,  i t  " l e t s  u s  be
aware of tho  situation a s  a  whole and p e rm its  us to  n o t ic e  d im ensions
of t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  which a r e  d i s c lo s e d  to  a p a r t i c i p a n t  b u t  may be
o
v e i l e d  from a mere b e h o ld e r " ,^
A f f e c t iv e  s t a t e s  and th e  s e n te n c e s  i n  which th ey  come to  v e rb a l  
e x p re s s io n  do n o t g iv e  toowlodge o f  p a r t i c u l a r  beings* But t h a t  
does n o t  mean th a t  they  r e f e r  on ly  to  th e  s u b je c t  of th e s e  a f f e c t i v e  
s t a t e s • They p o in t  to  some s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  beyond them se lves , to  
an  "unbroken u n i ty  o f  s u b je c t  and o b je c t  w i th in  a s i t u a t i o n  o r
1* M f l m .  p .1 1 5 .
2* Ibidem , p ,8 8 .
«saaNWiàflWTOMiiaefet»^ *
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s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  i s  knoim from An unbroken u n i ty
ex p erien ced  on the  l e v e l  of f e e l i n g ,  t h a t  i s  to  soy , " in  f e e l i n g
3we i n t u i t  th e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  which we f in d  o u rs e lv e s "  '•
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h i s  a n a ly s i s  of th e  e x i s t e n t i a l  c o n te x t  of 
p o s s ib le  modes of language , amongthem th e o lo g ic a l  language , 
p ro v id e s  a c o n te x t  f o r  an u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  moral language , of th e  r e l a t i o n  between f a c t  and v a lu e ,  vexy 
d i f f e r e n t  from th e  c o n te x t  p ro v id ed  by a p h ilo so p h y  which has no 
room f o r  t h i s  human s i t u a t i o n  o r  th e se  dim ensions of th e  human 
s i t u a t i o n  among tho " s t r u c t u r e s  o f  r e a l i t y "  or  " th in g s  a s  th ey  a r e " .  
S ta tem en ts  ab o u t "Bod" i n  th e o lo g ic a l  language do n o t exp ress  
s u b je c t i v e  em otions, nor s u b je c t iv e  u n d e r ta k in g s  to  pu rsue  a c e r t a i n  
p o l i c y ,  nor do th e y  on th e  o th e r  hand g ive  in fo rm a tio n  about some 
f a c t  p e r  s e .  They a l m y s  imply a r e l a t i o n  of v a lu e  or o b l ig a t i o n ,  
i . e *  they  have moral im p l i c a t io n s .
This mi.ght be a  v a l i d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of M acquarr ie ’ s v iew .
Hut t h i s  does n o t  mean t h a t  such a  c o n te x t  f o r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  
m oral .language i s  to  be found on ly  i n  s o - c a l l e d  " e x i s t e n t i a l i s m " .  
Indeed , M acquarrie  h im se lf  lin lcs h i s  viexf m t h  t h a t  o f  W.M. Urban.
I* IM âm »
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And we foimd a r e l a t e d  view i n  John Oman’ s work. He d e a ls  
e x p l i c i t l y  w ith  th e  q u e s t io n  of v a lu es  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  knowledge, 
ooHihining e x i s t e n t i a l  e lem ents s y s t e m a t ic a l ly  w ith  reasoned 
d is c o n ro e .  His v iew  i s  t h a t  expe rien ce  of v a lu e s  through 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and i n t e r e s t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  a l l  knowledge, and 
th e re b y  an  e s s e n t i a l  elem ent a l l  knowledge.
Oman i s  th u s  p ro v id in g  a  c o n te x t  i n  which moral language could  
be und ers to o d  both  a s  c o g n i t iv e  and a s  a l low ing  f o r  a  u n i ty  between 
f a c t  and value® Values a r e  a s p e c t s  o f  r e a l i t y  to  be known, and 
th ey  a r e  always r e l a t e d  to  th e  r e s t  of tJ ia t  i s  known#
I t  should  be p o in te d  o u t t h a t  i n  c o n c e n tra t in g  on th e  above 
m entioned w r i t e r s  we a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  a rg u in g  t h a t  a c c e s s  to  a 
s t r u c t u r e  of r e a l i t y  i n  which th e  u n i ty  of f a c t  and v a lu e  r e s id e s  
can on ly  be conceived  of a s  o b ta in a b le  through experience® In
t h i s  co n n ec tio n  wc w ant to  le a v e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  open f o r  a rg u in g  
t h a t  we can reach  an u n d e rs ta n d in g  of i t  through in n a te  reason®
In  e i t h e r  case  th e  c o n te x t  f o r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  nmral language would 
have the  same s t ru c tu re *
I t  i s  even more im poi'tan t to  p o in t  ou t t h a t  we a r e  n o t 
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  " e x p e r ie n c e ” in  any narrow sense* We 
w i l l  indeed  hold  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  open f o r  a rg u in g  t h a t  th e  expe rien ce
through t/h ich  v;e see  th e  t o t a l  c o n te x t  of human l i f e  and language io  
de term ined  by r e v e l a t i o n  and i t s  accep tan ce  i n  f a i t h ,  i n  any sense
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of th o se  wordo#
I t  w i l l  be c l e a r  t h a t  a th e o ry  y i i c h  seeka to  im d ers tan d  
m oral language i n  i t s  c o n te x t  w i l l  have to  s t a r t  w ith  an a n a ly s i s  
o f  th e  Bo^oalled " f a c tu a l "  words which o ccu r,  o r  .might o c c u r ,  in  
m oral d is c o u rs e  a s  b e a re r s  of moral meaning. These a r e  th e  words 
which Hare adailta  can have a  "secondary"  e v a lu a t iv e  meaning, i # o ,  
th e y  can come to  be connec ted  w ith  a c e r t a i n  moral o p in io n  abou t 
th e  f a c t s  which they  denote* But i n  H are ’ s view th e  im p o r ta n t  
th in g  i s  t h a t  t h e i r  p r im ary , f a c t u a l ,  meaning can alw ays be 
a b s t r a c t e d  from th e  moral o p in io n  and b rough t to  e x p re s s io n  i n  
o th e r  w ords, i f  necessary*
Our c o n te n t io n  has been t h a t  t h i s  i s  th e  qKcBtion»begging 
p r e s u p p o s i t io n  of H a re ’ s th e o ry .  We g e t  a  t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
p i c t u r e  i f  we see  t h a t  th e  l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  and th e  meaning of 
m oral language i s  n o t  to  be found f i r s t  of a l l  by a s tu d y  of vmrds 
l i k e  "good", " r i g h t " ,  "o u g h t" ,  a s  i f  they  bad a meaning i n  i s o l a t i o n  
from every  ti l ing  e is e *  I t  i s  to  be found i n  the  lo g ic  of im rds l ik o  
" lo v e " ,  "co u rag e" , " t r u s t " ,  i n  words ex p re s s in g  b a s ic  Inmian 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  l i k e  " f a t h e r " ,  " b o b " ©**, "n e ig h b o u r" ,  " f r i e n d " ,  and 
i n  words w ith  a t h e o lo g ic a l  c h a r a c te r  l i k e  "God", " c r e a tu r e " ,  " g ra c e " ,  
"comimndment" and so on*
Words l i k e  th o s e  l a s t  m entioned a r e  n o t mere l a b e l s  f o r  o b je c t iv e  
f a c t s ,  b u t  they have co im o ta tio n o  which d e r iv e  from th e  t o t a l  c o n te x t
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l a  which th e s e  f a c t e  a r e  kmmm. That i s  to sa y ,  th e se  c o n n o ta t io n s  
r e fe r  to such a s p e c t s  of th e  c o n te x t  a s  place the  su b jec t in  a 
moral r e la t io n  to the f a c t s ,  s t i l l  c la im in g  t h a t  they thereby r e f e r  
to  a  B t ru e ta re  of r e a l i t y .
What the moral words l ik e  "good", " r ig h t "  and "ought" do i a  
to  re fe r  e x p l i c i t l y  to  t h i s  moral a s p e c t  of our apprehension or 
awareness (o r  wliat word we might want to  u se )  of r e a l i t y ,  ami t h e i r  
moaning cam iot he found anyifhere else®
T hat Haro p o s t u l a t e s  another use  and meaning of th e se  words 
which he wants to  c a l l  th e  "m oral" meaning does n o t  a u to m a tica lly  
make hiBi a  v i c t o r  i n  th e  d i s p u te  about t h e i r  meaning, j u s t  because 
i t  a llow s him a "free#*er" use  of them. We have m aintained t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  su b s ta n tia l p h ilo so p h ica l is s u e s  in v o lv ed  i n  th e  
under@tanding of language, and t h a t  th e s e  i s s u e s ,  of ep lstem o lo g ica l 
and o n to lo g ic a l  c h a r a c t e r ,  have to  be argued a b o u t .
And i t  i s  on th ese  issue.s  t h a t  we d i f f e r  from H are, h o ld in g  
t h a t  he d e n ie s  the  v e ry  c o n te x t  in  which moral experience and moral 
language cou ld  be c o n s i s t e n t l y  a n a ly sed  and understood.
IVo d is t in c t io n s  ha#o to  be made in  t h is  co n n e c tio n s  
F i r s t ,  by hold ing  t h a t  moral words r e f e r  to  a s t r u c t u r e  of 
r e a l i t y ,  but not s o m e '" o b je c t iv e "  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of th in g s ,  we do 
n o t  advocate  a view  s i m i l a r  to  s o - c a l l e d  " in tu i t io n i a m " ,  which
254
holds th a t  moral words describe  non-natural q u a l i t i e s  of things®
For on th a t  view the f a c t  and i t s  value are s t i l l  to ho apprehended 
in  two separate  and d i f f e re n t  a c ts ,  as i t  were. Whereas our main 
ob jec tiv e  has been to show th a t  when we coneidor the f a c t  in  i t s  
con tex t, i*eo w ithout making a b s tra c t io n s  in  our statem ent of 
it® i t s  value i s  always a co n s t i tu e n t  element®
And, secondly, our view must be d is tingu ished  from the 
in fo rm a lis t  theory which a lso  speaks of "contextual im plica tions"  
of fa c tu a l  s ta tem en ts . For on th a t  view "contextual im plica tion" 
means j u s t  th a t  in  a given context a fa c t  and a c e r ta in  evaluation  
of i t  can como to be assoc ia ted  i a  the  conventions of a sm aller or 
la rg e r  so c ie ty , although there  u lt im a te ly  i s  no lo g ica l  reason fo r  
the a s so c ia t io n .
On our view the context in  which the f a c t  and i t s  value are  
seen as inseparab le  i s  the tiltim ate  p o in t of re fe ren ce .
We should a lso  perhaps make i t  e x p l ic i t ly  c le a r  th a t  our theory 
floes not involve us in  any " n a tu r a l i s t ic  fa l la c y " .  The whole jm rport 
of our argument has been to re fu te  the  view which id e n t i f i e s  the 
" fac tu a l"  with th e  ".uoB-evaliiative". I t  i s  on the valicU-ty of th i s  
id e n t i f i c a t io n  th a t  the  charge of f a l la c y  r e s t s .
As w il l  have become c le a r  we have ind ica ted  a b a s is  on which a
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th e o lo g ic a l  e th ic  can  s t i l l  he m ean in g fu lly  maintained® For 
th e o lo g y  p ro v id e s  a  c o n te x t  i n  which th e r e  can be a  u n i ty  of
f a c t  and v a lu e .  This  i s  tx'U© w hether th e  i n s i g h t s  o f  th eo lo g y
a r e  conceived  of a s  a r r i v e d  a t  by way of re a s o n ,  ex p e r ien ce  o r  
^ reve la tion , or by some com bination  of th e s e .
Nothing has been sa id  by t h i s  abou t the q u e s t io n  o f  w hether 
th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s , i s  to  be und ers to o d  a s  e x c lu s iv e  i n  r e l a t i o n
to  o th e r  k in d s  of e t h i c s  o r  n o t .  That i a  f i r s t  of a l l  a
th e o lo g ic a l  problem , n o t  to  be s e t t l e d  on l o g i c a l  grounds * I t  
m igh t w e ll  be arg^ied t h a t  th e  u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  th e  moral demand 
i n  th e  c o n te x t  of th e  C h r i s t - r e v e l a t i o n  does n o t make th e  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  of th e  moral demand in  a g en e ra l  human c o n te x t  
in v a l id *
Im a d d i t i o n  to  t h i s  i t  must be adm itted  t h a t  our d is c u s s io n  
does n o t  seem to  have ta k en  u s  v e ry  f o r  towards answ ering  p a r t i c u l a r  
s u b s t a n t i a l  moral q u e s t io n s . D esp i te  t h i s  we thinly t h a t  something 
n e c essa ry  liaa been sa id  w i th  s  view to  p ro v id in g  a b a s i s  on which 
we can hope to  g e t  an ansvor t o  our moral problems®
9 fi
To vfhut we have been do ing  i n  t h i s  th e s i s s
( a )  We have examined th e  e t h i c a l  th e o iy  of l i n g u i s t i c  a n a l y t i c a l
p h ilo so p h y , m ain ly  i n  ïi.H* Haro as  i t s  perhai^s moat 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  exponemt, f in d in g  t h a t  i t s  main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
i s  th e  s e p a r a t io n  of f a c t  and v a lu e .
(b )  With a  view to  th e  pj^ohlem of th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  we found t h a t  
on t h a t  p o in t  th e r e  a r i s e s  a b a s ic  c o n f l i c t  i n  which th o  whole 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  i s  a t  is su e*
(c )  On a c l o s e r  exam ina tion  i t  tu rn s  o u t  t h a t  what we have go t to
d e a l  w ith  i s  th e  fundam ental m ethod ica l p r e s u p p o s i t io n s  of a  
p id lo so p h y  l i k e  lUM* H aro ’ s .
(d )  This makes i t  n e c e ssa ry  to  pursue  th e  in q u i r y  on a  v e ry  broad 
f r o n t  i n  se a rch  of a  more ad eq u a te  method f o r  d e c id in g  th e  
fundam ental problem s of e t h i c s .
That i s  to  say , th e  p r e s e n t  # t a t e  of th e  r e l a t i o n s  between 
p h i lo s o p h ic a l  and th e o lo g ic a l  e t h i c s  c a l l s  f o r  some broad 
s t r a t e g i c  d e c is io n s  o f  method and approach  b e f o re  s p e c i f i c  
problems can be ta c k le d *  I t  i s  in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  need f o r  
ouch p re l im iim ry  d e c is io n  t h a t  %/e have e lu c id a te d  our q u e s t io n  
and worked to%mrds an  ano%/er %Aich, though n o t  d e f i n i t i v e ,  i s  a  
s u f f i c i e n t  b a s i s  on %;hich to  d e c id e  th e  d i r e c t i o n  i n  which
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f u t u r e  in qu iry  and more d e t a i l e d  s tu d ie s  would b e ' l i k e l y  to  
prove fr u it fu l*  I t  i s  th u s  a  co n tr ib u tio n  to im rde breaking  
th e  present a ta te -a ia te  in  r e la t io n s  be W een the i#/o 
d i s c i p l i n e 8*
